shown by one of the questions left to the jury to have been that acted upon, that the information was given and received as relating to the day on which it was given.

My views may be shortly recapitulated thus: The contract is not one to provide special information, or to make fresh inquiries, on each application. It is to use care, diligence and skill in procuring information which is to be recorded for the use of subscribers, and, on application, communicated to them. In other words, the defendants undertake to make a representation concerning the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade, or dealings of customers of their subscribers, and to embody in that representation information which, to the best of their ability, they have procured. When an action is brought for breach of this agreement, if the charge is that they refused the information and would make no representation, the matter is simple, and it is not this case. If they make the representation, and the charge is that it is misleading, and that, by relying upon it, a loss has been sustained, the first question, and the one without answering which it is impossible to move a step, is, what was the representation? It is right that a company, having it in their power, either from design or carelessness, to do very serious injury, should be held strictly, on every proper occasion, to the proof of their care and good faith in the performance of their selfimposed duties; but for this very reason they should have the benefit of such safeguards as the law provides; and one of these is the provision that they shall not be charged upon a representation which is not evidence of a writing signed by themselves. One contention for the plaintiff is that the complaint is not for making an incorrect representation, but for failing to use due diligence in acquiring information. The actual statement contained in the defendants' books is shown in evidence, and, after hearing the testimony as to the way in which the information was acquired, and seeing the witnesses who were the persons who had been deputed by the defendants to make inquiries about Wilson, the jury found that proper diligence had not been used. But what is the effect of their finding? There is this dilemma: Either the defendants did not act upon the information because it was insufficient, and they are entitled to the damages which resulted from their not having had information on which they could act, which in this case could be nominal damages only; or they act upon it, and by so doing lose their money, in which case the statute interposes by requiring written and signed evidence of the representation on which they acted.

In the case of Lyde v. Barnard, a singularly lucid and able exposition of the purpose and scope of the statute of which ours is a counterpart, was given by Parke, B., but I am not sure that it greatly aids our present discussion. In that case the plaintiff complained that, by an untrue representation of the charges upon a life-interest in some trust funds, he had been induced to advance money on the security of those funds. The court was equally divided on the question whether that representation was within the statute, and Parke, B., combated the application of the statute to the case of advancing money upon securities, and maintained that it applied only where personal credit was to be given. I do not understand it to be intended that there must be a design to induce the person to give credit, or that one may not be liable, although entirely indifferent whether credit is given or not; but merely that the giving of personal credit, as opposed to acting in any other way in dependence on the information given, is what the statute deals with.

The learned Chief Justice in the court below has

referred to authorities which establish very clearly that the measure of damages may, in case of credit being given on the faith of a representation of the circumstances of a customer, be the amount of the credit given; and he has pointed out the principle that the damages to be recovered are such as were in contemplation when the contract was made, or, as he expresses it with reference to this case, "because the amount of credit given was within the amount for which, directly or indirectly, it is said credit may be given." What, in my judgment, has been overlooked in applying this principle is, that it was never contemplated that credit should be given except on the faith, of the representation.

The assertion on which the liability to these damages rests is this: You may give credit within certain limits, because the circumstances of your customer are so and so. And this brings us again face to face with the statute. I regret that there is a difference of opinion between the learned Chief Justice who is now presiding, and the other members of the court; but, after discussing the matter, and also after having had an opportunity of perusing the judgment he has just delivered, I am compelled to adhere to the opinion I have expressed.

I think the appeal should be allowed with costs, and the rule made absolute, at the option of the plaintiffs, either to enter a nonsuit or to reduce the verdict to nominal damages.

BLAKE, V. C.:

A perusal of the evidence makes it clear that the defendants were wanting in ordinary care and diligence in procuring information, as to the standing and credit of Ernest M. Wilson. The failure on the part of the defendants to collect any or sufficient information as to Wilson would not in itself be the direct cause of damage to the plaintiff, unless it be the expense the plaintiff might be put to in seeking from some other source for the statement with which the defendants should have supplied him. This amount, I presume, the plaintiff could recover against the defendants.

The injury in the present case arises from the defendants having given certain unreliable information to the plaintiff as to the credit of another, on which he acted, and whereby he has lost the amount for which credit was given. There was by the defendants "a representation ** made ** concerning *the** credit of a person to the intent or purpose that such other person might obtain goods or credit thereupon."

Disguise it as we please, we can not conceal the fact that it was not until this representation was made, that the cause of complaint, in respect of which the plaintiff seeks relief, arose. It was for the conveying this false information on which he acted, that he complains.

Let the case end with the non-compliance with the undertaking of the defendants to collect the needed information, or with the defendants' collecting or supplying it untruthfully, and no substantial injury has arisen to the plaintiff from such conduct of the defendants. There is yet a link missing, and that is not supplied until the standing of Wilson, as thus ascertained by the defendants, is made known to the plaintiff. But then the making this known to the plaintiff is the very representation concerning credit," to which the act refers, and in respect of which it declares that no liability arises unless it be supplied in the manner designated by the statute, namely, "in writing by the party to be charged therewith." This statute, relied on by the defendants, seems clearly to cover the present case, and I do not think we can get over its effect except by adding to it a clause declaring that it shall not apply to dealings with such a mercantile agency as

66

that represented by the defendants. I think this is an addition to the act which, if made, must be by the legislature and not by this court.

The plaintiff should have liberty to take a verdict for nominal damages, or a nonsuit.

The appeal shouid be allowed with costs.

HAGARTY, C. J. C. P.:

In my judgment this appeal must turn wholly on the defense, raised by the appellants, of the statute. The words are: "No action shall be brought to charge any person upon or by reason of any representation or assurance made or given concerning or relating to the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of any other person, to the intent or purpose that such other person may obtain money, goods or credit thereupon, unless such representation or assurance be in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith."

We have to inquire if this be an action to charge the defendants upon or by reason of such a representation? In one sense it may be said literally to answer that description. In another sense it is to my mind wholly outside the grasp of the statute.

I at once disclaim any intention to rest a decision upon any difference in the form of the action between assumpsit and case, and prefer ascertaining, if possible, the substantial claim sought to be enforced. It is a contract for a valuable consideration to furnish to the best of defendants' ability information of the mercantile standing and credit of certain of plaintiff's customers; and the breach is that defendants did not exercise ordinary care and ability in ascertaining such mercantile standing and credit, setting out a report furnished by defendants as to-one E. W., incorrect and misleading, on which plaintiffs trusted him with goods, and wholly lost the same.

Here there is a hiring and retainer to collect information as to the credit of third persons. The information is furnished, it is wholly incorrect, and the employer, trusting to its correctness, sustains loss. It is certainly in a sense a claim to charge the person hired "upon or by reason of the representation." But does the law so define and limit the nature of the claim? It seems that the claim is rather for the breach of the contract to collect the information with reasonable care and diligence.

I can not believe that the legislature could have meant to extend the words used to cover a transaction of this character, and protect a person in the neglect or careless execution of an employment and business specially undertaken by him for value.

A doubt may well arise, whether even on a signed representation any action, as for a false representation, would lie against these defendants. "It is settled law," says Parke, B., in Thom v. Bigland, 8 Exch. 731, "that independently of duty no action will lie as for a misrepresentation, unless the party making it knows it to be untrue, or makes it with a fraudulent intention to induce another to act on the faith of it, and to alter his position to his damage." See Behn v. Kemble, 7 C. B. (N. S.), 260, and the authorities collected in 2 Smith's L. C. 88, notes to Pasley v. Freeman. In Lyde v. Barnard, 1 M. & W. 114, Parke, B., very fully comments on the origin and effect of this clause: "It was stated at the bar, on both sides, and my learned brethren who have preceded me agree, that the mischief to be remedied was the evasion of the provision of the statute of frauds, that no one could be charged with the debt, default or miscarriage of another, unless there was a note in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith. I concur in that opinion. practice of bringing actions on such parol representations was an evasion of the statute of frauds, and Lord

The

Tenterden, who framed the act, I think meant to put all cases on the same footing, where one, on the personal credit of another, gave personal credit to a third, and to make it necessary that there should be a note in writing where such credit was given on the faith of a representation, as well as where it was given on the faith of a positive promise. I consider, therefore, the mischief to be this, and no more. I am of opinion that the statute applies only to those cases in which the representation is made relating to the trustworthiness of a third person, with the intent that he may obtain personal credit on the faith of such representation. If we assume Lord Tenterden's object to have been merely to prevent evasion of the statute of frauds, as we think it was, and use this as a key for the construction of the clause, it would induce one to prefer the former alteration," (as to suggestions for reading the peculiar words of the clause), "by which the clause is made clearly to apply only to cases where the purpose of the representation is to obtain personal credit for the third person." It may well be argued here that the information furnished by these defendants was in no sense to be regarded as furnished with the intent that Wilson should obtain personal credit on the faith thereof. The information was collected as to him and numberless others-traders-within course of defendants' business as proprietors of a kind of dictionary of reference to to commercial standing. It was neither their interest nor their design to induce plaintiff to trust Wilson or to sell goods to him on credit. If Baron Parke's explanations of the clause be correct, the case would probably fail, if based on the mere careless inaccuracy of the statement, there being no conscious falsehood and no fraudulent intention, etc.

In this view of the alleged misrepresentation by defendants, the plaintiff's only remedy might be for a breach of a contract to furnish reliable informationreliable to the extent of being contracted to be prepared with reasonable care and diligence. If the statute be a bar in such cases as this, the result must be as surprising to ordinary minds as it would be unjust. I do not consider the case relied on by Mr. Robinson, in Haslock v. Fergusson, 7 A. & E. 86, as affecting my views. There was nothing there but the false representation; no hiring, no duty, no breach of contract express or implied. If a man hire another for the express purpose of obtaining information as to the standing and credit of certain named persons, the individual employed would be certainly bound to use reasonable diligence in doing the work. If he report to his employer without having made due inquiry, I think his liability rests wholly on his breach of contract, and his breach of duty is the proximate cause of damage, resulting from his carelessness. He is not sued for making a false representation in the ordinary sense, as men understand false representations, but simply for his omissions to do that for which he was paid, viz., the reasonably diligent and careful collection of information. A merchant in extensive business might have a salaried clerk, solely employed in making inquiries and reporting as to his employer's customers. He is sent to vari ous places for that purpose. On his return he either verbally reports on each case, or perhaps enters in a book, not signed by him, the result of his inquiries as to the standing and credit of each. If he so report without reasonable care, I think there is certainly a remedy against him for his breach of contract, and not by an action for false representation. A merchant might send his clerk or pay an agent to visit a port to ascertain if his vessel had safely arrived. The agent goes part of the way and accepts a hearsay statement that she has arrived, and reports to his master that he has ascertained that to be the fact. The master on this omits to insure, which he otherwise would have

done. I think the agent is liable to the loss caused by his neglect, and that it is a fallacy to urge that the statement he reports must be in writing, being that on which the master acted to his damage. Such a misrepresentation would not be within the statute, but illustrates the point as to the ground-work of action. A man may wish to invest money, and employs an attorney or other paid agent therefor; the latter reports to him that A or B wishes to borrow, and informs his employer that A and B are solvent, responsible parties, of good standing, capital and credit,-perfectly safe, etc. On this the employer makes the loan. A and B turn out worthless, and the money is lost. It appears that the attorney or agent has really made no inquiries whatever, and knew nothing of their standing, etc. I think he would be responsible on a breach of contract to use due care and diligence, and that the fact that his employer acted on the unsigned representation so made as to credit and standing would be no defense whatever. I also think that the measure of damages would be the sum lost by the agent's want of due care, etc.

Either the plaintiff should recover his actual loss or nothing. I can not see how a recovery of nominal damages would be proper, except where some right or principle is thereby determined; the recovery of nominal damages is hardly to be encouraged or extended beyond well defined bounds. I see no medium course in this very peculiar case. The plaintiff ought to recover his substantial loss, or there should be a verdict for defendants. The rule as to the measure of damages is largely discussed in Horne v. Midland Ry. Co., L. R. 7 C. P. 583, and in error, L. R. 8 C. P. 137. this last page: "The damages for a breach of contract must be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things from such breach of contract itself, or such as may be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it."

At

I do not see any difficulty as to the contract not being performable within a year. On the face of the contract there is a specific payment in advance "for one year's services of the mercantile agency." The lapse of that time would, without further payment or agreement, I presume, terminate the bargain. A fresh payment would create a new bargain on the same terms, unless varied by agreement. It is not on its face a fixed contract, extending over a year. It is simply one for a year, renewable, if the parties annually agree and payment be made.

I have not thought it necessary to review the numerous cases cited. It is unfortunate that we can not find any information about the case of Lloyd v. Perry, noticed in the Law Times of August, 1875, cited by Harrison, C. J. It was tried at the Lincoln Summer Assize. I gather from the notice that the statement as to the credit of the plaintiff's debtor was in writing, and probably signed by the defendants; that the action was not for a false or deceitful representation, but for negligence, and that substantial damages were recovered. A file of the Times would probably give a further report.

I think the appeal should be dismissed with costs. BURTON, J. A.:

I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, that there was ample evidence of the want of ordinary care and diligence on the part of the defendants in procuring and furnishing, to the best of their ability, information of the mercantile standing and credit of Wilson (in the community wherein he resided), and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover such

damages as are the primary, natural and immediate result of that breach of the contract; and in this respect only, that is, as to the amount of these damages, do I differ with very great hesitation from his conclusion, after an anxious consideration of the reasons which he advances in support of it. The liability, with which it was at first attempted to charge the defendants, was much larger than the evidence warranted, and the plaintiff's counsel applied at the time to amend; and it is, I think, to be regretted that the amendment had not been actually made, so that we might have discovered from the pleadings, upon what precise grounds he finally rested his case.

This much, however, appears to be clear. That, although the application to the defendants for information was made on the 10th of June, it had reference (to the knowledge of the plaintiff), to the information which the defendants had collected and compiled on the 29th of April previous. It is to be noted, also, that the application requested the defendants to furnish such information, for the purpose of "aiding us to determine the propriety of giving credit to Wilson," the person about whom the inquiries were made. If the informa tion so collected was insufficient to enable the plaintiff to come to any satisfactory conclusion upon the matter which prompted the inquiry, he had a ground of complaint against the defendants, and he would have been entitled, I should say, to recover expenses which he necessarily incurred in obtaining the information, which the defendants under their contract should have furnished. So far, there is no difficulty; but why, if the information was insufficient, and such as the plaintiff felt was not of a character to be acted upon, should he be entitled to recover more damages than those I have referred to. Clearly, he could not but take the other position, that the statement furnished, though erroneous in point of fact, was sufficiently full to warrant the plaintiff, if he believed it, to act upon it. The question would then arise, did the plaintiff, in reliance upon the information so given, give credit to Wilson, or did he not? If he did not, he was not injured by anything the defendant had done or omitted to do; if he did, then it becomes necessary further to inquire what the representation was upon which he acted; and if he can establish in evidence that the information was false, and he parted with his goods upon the faith of it, there is no reason why he should not recover for any loss resulting from his having acted on such representation; but the question then arises, is that representation within the statute, C. 44 Con. Stat. U. C. Sec. 10, so as to be inadmissible in evidence, unless in writing?

The plaintiff, as his declaration was originally framed, alleged that the defendants represented Wilson's position on the 16th of June, 1875, to be such that the plaintiff, believing it to be true and accurate, acted upon it within a few days thereafter. Whereas, it was admitted at the trial and upon the argument, that the information had reference to his position not at that date, but in the previovs month of April, which might be no guide to the plaintiff, without further information, in selling goods to him in July. If erroneous in that particular, may it not be equally so in others, and seem to fall within the mischief intended to be guarded against by the statute? Is it then an action brought "to charge any person upon, or by reason of, any representation or assurance made or given concerning or relating to the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of any other person, to the intent or purpose that such other person may obtain money, goods or credit thereupon, unless such assurance be in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith?"

The learned Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench says,

it is in no sense upon the representation, but for the breach of contract; but that does not appear to me to meet the point. Granting that the action is founded on the defendants' want of care in performing their contract, the plaintiff fails to show any right to recover the damages awarded, unless he proves the representation and that he acted upon it. To do this, he is driven to prove the representation given verbally to his clerk, and if the statute forbids this, his action to that extent fails.

As before remarked, if the plaintiff did not furnish the goods in reliance upon such representation, there is an end of the inquiry. He has sustained the loss from the confidence which he has mistakenly placed in the customer, and not by reason of his having relied on the representation of the defendants; but if he did part with his property, in reliance upon the representation made to him by the defendants, and which, as he says, was made with a view to his acting upon it, can it be plausibly argued that it does not come within the very terms of the statute, and is therefore not receivable in evidence, unless in writing and signed by the defendants?

The defendants deny that any such representation as alleged was made. It is shown that the representation, as originally alleged, was untrue; and then it is proposed to prove that it is at all events true, as a statement of Wilson's position at an antecedent period; but the statute says, no such verbal evidence shall be received. The law is, I think, very clearly established at the present day, as quoted by the learned Chief Justice, from the judgment of Parke, B., in Thom v. Bigland, 8 Exch. 730, that "independently of duty, no action will lie for a misrepresentation, unless the party making it knows it to be untrue, or makes it with a fraudulent intention, to induce another to act on the faith of it, and to alter his position to his damage."

But the statute does not alter the law, or give any right of action which did not previously exist; it merely provides that in all cases in which a party is attempted to be charged by reason of a representation, it must be in writing and signed by the party. It may be quite true, as the learned Chief Justice of the Common Pleas remarks, that it was neither the intent nor the design of the defendants, to induce the plaintiff to trust Wilson, or sell goods to him on credit. But is that material? If the communication is in reply to an inquiry as to the standing of a trader, to aid the applicant in determining as to the propriety of giving credit, and the applicant acts upon it and suffers damages in such a case, he is entitled to maintain an action, I should say, if the representation be fraudulent and false, apart from any contract or duty, and whether it be fraudulent or not, if the party making the representation be under any contract to give the information, and is guilty of negligence in reference to it.

In the case of Swift v. Jewsbury, L. R. 9 Q. B. 301, the Court of Exchequer Chamber, whilst holding that the bank was not liable to an action for a false representation, inasmuch as the letter containing it was signed by an agent, held the agent himself liable, although he had no knowledge whatever of the plaintiff in that case, much less that he was intending to give credit to the debtor. The information there was sought by one bank from another, as a mere matter of courtesy, no intimation being given as to the reasons for the inquiry, but merely seeking in confidence the manager's opinion of the respectability and standing of Sir W. Russell, and whether he considered him responsible for £50,000. It was then neither "the interest nor the design" of the defendant that the plaintiff should give Sir W. Russell credit; but it must have been in his contemplation that it would, or might be communi

cated to the customer of the bank, on whose behalf the information was sought; and that customer having acted upon it to his damage, the court held that he was as much entitled to maintain the action for such damage, as if the representation had been made directly to himself. It is quite true that in that case the action was an action on the case for fraudulent misrepresentation, and that is the way in which the great majority of the cases, which have arisen since the passing of the statute, have presented themselves to the court; but the statute is not confined to fraudulent misrepresentation; although, in the absence of duty or contract, the action whereby the defendant would be sought to be charged, would be sustainable only upon proof of a representation known to be false, or made with a fraudulent intention that another should act on the faith of it.

The learned Chief Justice of the Common Pleas suggests several cases illustrative of the views which he entertains; among others, he takes the case of a merchant, employing a salaried clerk for the express purpose of making inquiries as to the people he could safely entrust with goods. The clerk neglects his duty, and makes reports in a book kept for the purpose, as to the solvency or credit of the persons inquired about, which are untrue in fact, and his employer suffers damage by selling goods to such persons. I agree with him, that the clerk would be liable to his employer, if he could prove such a case; but if the clerk should allege that he made no such representation, his employer might be met by the objection, that the statute requires such representation to be in writing; and even if the clerk's own written reports are relied upon, the statute again interposes, as it not only requires it to be in writing, but to be signed by the party charged. I am unable to see why that representation does not come as clearly within the statute as those made by parties under no obligation or contract to furnish the information. If the clerk, in such a case, had not only falsely, but fraudulently made the report, and he was charged in an action for so doing, he would not be liable, unless the representation was in writing. As it was, however, his duty to collect and furnish the information, it would probably be unnecessary to go the length of showing that it was false to his knowledge, or made with any fraudulent intent; but I do not see how we can say that he could be made liable for the representation, unless we take upon ourselves to disregard the plain language of the statute. In conse quence of the different view entertained by the Chief Justice who has just delivered his judgment, and the two learned judges in the court below, I have come to the decision I have expressed with great hesitation: but after a very careful examination of the reasons advanced by them, I am unable to convince myself, that evidence of the representation on which the plaintiff is represented to have acted is receivable, and am therefore of opinion, that the damages are not the natural and proximate result of the breach of contract proved, and that the verdict for these damages can not be sustained.

I think the appeal should be allowed with costs, and the rule made absolute to reduce the verdict to one shilling, with the option to the plaintiff of taking a nonsuit.

JUDAH P. BENJAMIN, formerly Confederate Minister of War, but now an English Queen's Counsel, enjoying an extensive commercial practice, lately returned all his briefs for the Guildhall sittings, accompanied by cheques for the fees he has received with them, because all his time would be wholly taken up by the causes at Westminster Hall, and he did not think it right to retain payment for business to which he could not attend.-Irish Law Times.

BOOK NOTICES.

BOOKS RECEIVED.- Markby's Elements of Law. Macmillan & Co., New York; Supplement to same. Macmillan

& Co., New York.-Burrill on Assignments, Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York.-Wharton on Evidence, 2 vols., Kay & Bro., Philadelphia.-Wisconsin Reports. Vol. 40. Callaghan & Co., Chicago.-Leading Cases on Mines, Minerals and Mining Water Rights. Sumner, Whitney & Co., San Francisco. Sawyer's Reports. Vol. 3. A. L. Bancroft &

Co., San Francisco.

INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND STATUTE LAW-BY JNO. B. MINOR, L.L. D., Professor of Common Law in the University of Virginia. Richmond, 1876. Volumes I and II.

The second volume has been printed during the present year. The first volume treats of the rights which concern or relate to the person; the second, of rights which relate to things real. Volume III will treat of the rights which relate to things personal, and volume IV of the remedies for wrongs. The two remaining volumes are to be published, as the author tells us, at an early day. The general division of the law, it will be seen, corresponds with that of Blackstone, which, by long use, has become familiar and natural to the profession; but in the treatment of his topics the author is by no means slavish.

With rather unusual and commendable candor Prof. Minor tells us in the preface to the present edition that "the appearance of a second edition of the first two volumes of this work, after so brief an interval, might seem to indicate a degree of favor which the performance has not attained, nor indeed has had an opportunity to achieve; for though not denied to those who sought it, no attempt has been made to invite purchasers, nor has it yet been offered to the general public at all." He adds: "A reprint, however, having been made requisite by circumstances which need not be detailed, advantage has been taken of the occasion to revise the text, to make many corrections and some additions, and especially to put the whole in a more compact form, thereby lessening the bulk, and in a still greater ratio, the price." We greatly fear that there are many writers who, being less explicit, would have abused the situation by permitting the reader to suppose that the first edition had been suddenly snapped up by an eager and keenly appreciative public; also that there are not a few who would have laid greater stress on the additions than on the corrections.

The work is that of the life of a man eminent for learning and labor in the walks of jurisprudence. How difficult it is to write a really good and accurate law book may be inferred from the fact that in revising a work which the author has, in the course of professional teaching, been in the daily habit of reviewing for many years, he finds many errors that need correction. Whether these errors were of any magnitude, or might properly be compared with the rather few and feeble, though sinful, sallies of wit that filled with remorse the spirit of the retrospective and conscientious Quaker of Charles Lamb-a spirit that aggravated and multiplied every past departure from rigid sobriety-is a thing of which we have not had an opportunity to inquire. There is something, however, in the wary and chastised style of the author that shows that he is quite capable of applying the file to his own productions with the unsparing resolution that Horace commends, however grating and harsh the sound produced by such a process may be. It is quite a relief to find, as a result of this course, a law book which is absolutely free from redundancy.

The training in the law department of the University of Virginia has always been marked by its thoroughness, while other law schools have not unfrequently

graduated students who could not, as a matter of life and death, tell the difference between a common of piscary and a free fishery, having only a vague notion of the running contents of a few later works, fortified by a stern resolve to read Walker's American Law and Ram on Facts at an early day. The foundation of Jefferson adheres to the somewhat antiquated rubrics that demand a laborious acquaintance with the fundamental principles which underlie the vast edifice of the law.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the present work will be found useful to students only. It is apprehended that Prof. Minor does not make the common discrimination of books that are good for students and books that are good for lawyers. He evidently regards his students as being of that robust kind from whom there is no need to preserve the approaches to animal food, and who could hardly grow in intellectual stature and strength, if they should be restricted to a diet of milk alone. He rather supposes them to have undergone a literary training and discipline which will make them ready to take hold of something hard and enduring, as the world goes. Hence the present work is not one of well rounded generalities, making the student exclaim that he had no idea that the law was such a light and agreeable study. It might rather be likened to a skillfully arranged armory in which the student will find most of the bright, strong weapons which he will habitually need in his coming warfare, the use and right knowing of which involves the work of a lifetime. The fact that the author descends into the minor details of his subject, with a most pertinacious spirit of inquiry, will, we apprehend, cause the present treatise to be as often referred to by the bench and bar as any that has lately seen the light. The chapters on "Title by Alienation," cover four hundred and fifteen pages of the second volume. If it had been published as a separate treatise, it would probably have commanded an extensive sale. There is nothing anywhere extant on the subject that is half so thorough; and it seems indeed to be everything that is needed. It is to be remembered that all of these pages are pages of law, from which every useless word has been expelled as if by some patent winnowing process; pages in which principles claiming to be scientific are attempted to be presented with scientific precision. In other parts of the work the author is equally painstaking and conscientiously minute.

This is the day of monographs. Science and learning are cut into sections and fragments, and distributed to a hungry multitude according to the appetites and digestion of different applicants. Tired of allopathic doses, the present generation is willing to take its mental fertilizers in homœopathic pellets, and so to be thankful to Heaven and Dr. Hahnemann. The old abridgments are too ponderous for a race of men that never donned a coat of mail nor swung a forty-pound battle-axe. There must be a reason for the change of taste, if taste it be, that has caused men to prefer the separate and smaller treatises on special questions of law. Certainly the smaller works are handier. And yet there is room for books like the present; provided that they show an ability and learning equal to the increased magnitude of the tasks with which they deal. U. M. R.

IN San Francisco recently, a Chinaman, who was indicted for murder, was instructed by his counsel to attempt to prove an alibi, as being the best line of evidence he could adopt under the circumstances. Accordingly, at the trial, a couple of Celestials appeared, and swore that at the time of the murder he was at work in a wash-house; two more swore that he was at home in bed, and several others were prepared to prove that he was in several other places, when the lawyer interfered and stopped further testimony.