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have by law succeeded to his rights upon his death or bankruptcy. Gen. Stat. c. 146, §§ 30–38; Johnson v. Thaxter, 7 Gray, 242. As Dupee, the owner of the goods replevied, was not a party of record to the original action, his assignees in bankruptcy could not maintain a petition for review in his or their name. 2. But Depee, or his assignee, representing him, may have been under obligations to protect the warehousemen, and might, with their assent, have assumed the defense of that action in their name. White v. Dolliver, 113 Mass. 400. The real party in interest may, upon indemnifying the formal party of record against costs, be allowed to sue out a writ of review in his name. Fuller v. Storer, 111 Mass. 281. 3. The statutes authorize amendments by change of parties or of forms of action, or in other matters, either of form or substance, to enable the plaintiff to maintain the suit for the cause for which it was intended to be brought. Gen. Stat. c. 129, §§ 41, 82. 4. These statutes permit the substitution of a new plaintiff, and are applicable to petitions for review. Crafts v. Sikes, 4 Gray, 194; Emery v. Osgood, 1 Allen, 244; Davenport v. Holland, 2 Cush. 1. Opinion by GRAY, C. J.-Winch v. Hosmer.

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A BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, in canvassing the votes cast in an election, have no right to go behind the returns sent up by the judges of election from the respective townships of the county.-Moore v. Jones.

PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO MEANING of Words-EXCEPTION TO INSTRUCTION-CHALLENGE.-What is meant by the word "dollar" in a note case can be shown by parol evidence. A general exception to the whole instruction of the court below must be overruled if any part of it is right. Whether there are one or more plaintiffs or defendants, only four peremptory challenges to the jury on either side are allowable.-Bryan v. Harrison.

ACTION ON BOND PAYABLE IN "CURRENT FUNDS"-PAROL EVIDENCE.—On the trial of an action brought upon a bond dated August 19th, 1864, and payable six months after date, and expressed "to be paid in current funds when called for," it is not competent to prove that there was an agreement at the time the bond was executed that it should be paid in Confederate money.-Davis v. Glenn et al.

ONE WHO MALICIOUSLY PERSUADES ANOTHER TO BREAK A CONTRACT with a third person is liable to such person for damages. Therefore, in an action for damages, where the plaintiff had made a contract with a railroad company of which the defendant was president and superintendent, which contract the defendant maliciously, and in order to injure the plaintiff, refused to complete; held, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.-Jones v. Stanly.

WHEN ORDER OF COURT UNNECESSARY-DEFECTIVE DESCRIPTION IN DEED-JOINDER OF CLAIMS.-It does not require an order of court to authorize the bona fide receipt of money by a clerk and master, upon a bond before its maturity, given for the purchase of land at a sale under decree of court which has been duly confirmed. After the payment of the purchase money for land sold under decree of court, an order of court is not necessary to enable the master to make a valid deed to the purchaser. In case, however, the master and purchaser take upon themselves the risk of determining that the case is one in which such an order would be fit and proper, "That John Brown, the ancestor of the petitioners, died seized and possessed of a tract of land in said County of Guilford on the waters of 'Stinking Quarter,' adjoining the lands of," is not so defective a description that it may not be possible to identify with certainty the land meant. A claim for the recovery of real estate which has been sold under decree of a court of equity can not be joined in the same action with a claim against the clerk and master for the purchase-money. Brown et al. v. Cable et al.

NOTES.

THE new jury law of Florida provides that, when in any case, civil or criminal, a knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic is necessary to enable a juror to understand the evidence to be offered, he may be challenged if he does not possess such qualifications.

CHIEF JUSTICE GRANT, a Scotch judge, was called "the silent man." A couple of barristers once argued before him for two whole days the point whether a certain offense came within the purview of a certain act of Parliament. When the judge was quite sure they had exhausted their arguments, if not themselves, he quietly observed: "The act you refer to has been repealed."

The English Court of Appeal, (25 W. R. 159), have lately affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Seaman v. Netherclift, reported at length in this journal, 3 Cent. L. J. 543, holding that words spoken by a witness as such, and with reference to the subject of inquiry, are not actionable. The defendant, who was an expert in handwriting, was called as a witness before a magistrate on a preliminary investigation of a charge of forgery. In cross-examination he was asked if he had read the comments made by the judge in a previous case upon his evidence; having answered that he had, he voluntarily added a statement affirming that evidence in words defamatory of the plaintiff. It was held, that the words were spoken as a witness, and with reference to the subject of inquiry, and were therefore privileged.

PROFESSIONAL COSTUME Once More.-The London Law Times gives the following rather amusing scene in the Natal Supreme Court. Dr. Smith, a barrister, late of the Norfolk Circuit, England, who, since his arrival in Natal, has acted as editor of a newspaper called the Witness, published at Maulzburg, brought an action against the Times of Natal, the opposition newspaper, for libel. He claimed £500 damages, on the ground that the Times had accused him of scurrility. The learned doctor attended at the supreme court, which was presided over by Connor, C. J., for the purpose of arguing his exceptions to the defendant's pleas, and was attired in the wig and gown of an English barrister. He was proceeding to argue his exceptions to the defendant's pleas, when the chief justice, in interrupting him, said: "You are not in costume." Dr. Smith looked puzzled, and the chief justice repeated the expres sion.

Dr. Smith-I am not aware that there is anything wrong in my attire.

The Chief Justice-Yes, there is. You are dressed as an English barrister and not as an advocate of this court. Dr. Smith said he was very sorry if his robes were any way irregular, and he would be happy on another occasion to make any alteration which his lordship would desire. The Chief Justice-You must do it now. I can not hear you unless you do it.

Dr. Smith (in astonishment)-Do I understand your lordship to direct me to alter my attire in open court? The Chief Justice-Yes, if you wish to be heard. Dr. Smith-Would your lordship kindly indicate to me the nature of the change which I am to make at so short a notice?

The Chief Justice-You wear a wig. You must take it off.

Dr. Smith-A wig is an antiquated article of attire, till lately worn, in some shape, by gentle-people. Any man is entitled to wear artificial hair here or in the street, and doing so, is at most an eccentricity.

The Chief Justice-Not so. It is a covering to the head, like a hat or any other, and you must not appear here cov ered.

Dr. Smith-Now that your lordship has expressed that view, which is quite new to me, I presume your lordship will not put me to the trouble of making the alteration now, but will allow me to correct the mistake another time? It would be more usual and more agreeable.

The Chief Justice (with energy)-No, now. If not, we must adjourn the case. When shall we adjourn it to? Dr. Smith-As far as I understand your lordship, if I take my wig off, I may go on?

The Chief Justice-Yes.

Dr. Smith (putting his wig on the table)-Then there it is, my lord; and I have six objections to the defendant's plea.

The whole of the doctor's objections, except one, were overruled.

The Central Law Journal. jurist who presides over the department of mailing

SAINT LOUIS, MAY 4, 1877.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE act passed by the Missouri Legislature in regard to the printing of the reports of the supreme court of this state provides that the volumes shall be equal to the 40th Iowa in mechanical execution; shall be stereotyped; shall be sold to the profession at not more than three dollars, and at not more than two dollars and fifty cents to the state. The reporter is appointed by the supreme court, and receives from the state a salary of $2,000 per year. The contract for the publication of the reports is let out to the lowest bidder by the Attorney-general, the Auditor and Secretary of State; and the successful bidder gives a bond in the sum of $10,000 for the faithful performance of the work. In regard to the manner of reporting, the law provides that the reporter shall make a brief statement of the facts in each case, in place of that now required to be made in the opinion of the court, when such statement is not contained in such opinion. Such a provision would not be thought necessary, were it not for the fact that a good many cases, as at present reported in the Missouri Reports, are unintelligible, by reason of the failure of the judges in the first place, and secondly of the reporter, to make a statement of facts. A conspicuous instance of this is the case of the South Pacific Railroad Company v. Laclede County, 57 Mo. 147, a decision that involved hundreds of thousands of dollars to the people of this state.

THE popular ridicule against the legal profession is well enough in its way, and particularly if it is not carried too far. A little ridicule benefits any man, or any class of men, where the ridicule is deserved, because it makes us see ourselves as others see us. But people are hardly justified in ridiculing lawyers and courts on account of what is called "legal technicality,” when it is known that persons who are not lawyers, when called upon to act in a judicial capacity, generally "stick in the bark of the statute," instead of interpreting it according to its meaning and intent. We presume that very few lawyers, if acting as judges, would construe a statute so strictly as to hang the surgeon who had opened the vein of a man who had fallen down in the street in a fit, because the statute denounced the penalty of death against shedding blood in the streets; but judges of elections pursue the almost invariable habit of rejecting votes on account of the slightest inaccuracy in spelling the name of a candidate, although not a man in all the county could doubt the candidate for whom the voter intended to cast the ballot. This is a common illustration. A special illustration which has recently come under our observation is a decision of the Vol. 4.-No. 18.

the printed matter in the St. Louis post-office. We had occasion to send to our agents in San Francisco 2000 printed circulars, to be by them distributed to their customers there as they might see fit. We rolled them up in several large packages, put the stamps on them required on ordinary printed matter, and put them in the post-office. This official ruled that we were obliged to pay double the price that we had paid on them, on the ground that they were circulars, and could only be sent at the rates prescribed on circulars. Of course, this would have been the correct ruling, if they had been put in the mails for direct distribution as circulars; but they were not sent as circulars to the persons to whom the information contained in them was intended to be conveyed; but they were sent the same as we might have sent so many sheets of blank paper to be printed as circulars in San Francisco, and to be distributed from that point. The ruling was most ridiculous. But the United States has got our money, and will probably repeat the operation, unless the distinguished lawyer who presides over the post-office department can be induced to make a ruling applicable to such cases, such as any lawyer would make on the bench-construing the statute according to its manifest intent and purpose.

THE Solicitors' Journal, an English legal publication of authority, is moved, in a recent issue, to protest against the language used by the Lord Chief Justice of England in a letter to Judge Dillon, published in this JOURNAL of the 23d of March. While it has no desire to criticise harshly so graceful and admirable an expression of friendly feeling," because "no lawyer would speak without respect of American decisions," it feels called upon in the name, not, as will be seen hereafter, of the bar, but of the bench, to ask: "Is not this going a little too far as to their authority?" What is here referred to is the statement in Lord Cockburn's letter, that "the respect paid by the jurists of the United States to the authorities of this country in regard to the law which both nations have derived from a common source, is most cordially reciprocated." While the Solicitors' Journal admits that in some branches of the law American decisions are quoted and relied on, "who ever heard," it demands, "American decisions cited on a question of real-property law, the law of landlord and tenant, or numerous other branches of the law?" But even on those subjects where it appears American decisions are worth something, the practice of receiving foreign authorities is, we are assured, of very recent date. That this is so, we are referred to the case of Ralli v. Janson, 6 E. & B., 422, decided a little over twenty years ago, where the court refer to the foreign law,only to show that there is nothing in the general lawmerchant to sanction the proposition contended for in that case. There was a time when American authorities were not permitted to be cited before an English judge. The shade of that distin

guished jurist must still hover over the barristers of to-day; for, says the same Journal," the main use of cases from the American reports, even where they are most commonly used, is as a quarry from which counsel hew out arguments, the origin of which they do not always acknowledge. If a careful investigation were made of the admirable arguments which appear in the various law reports on certain branches of law, we have a strong suspicion that a transatlantic parentage would be found for many of them." We can not but accept this as a high compliment to the legal writers and judges of this country. Dr. Johnson, it will be remembered, considered that his duty to his hearers consisted in giving them arguments, and that it was not incumbent upon him to likewise furnish them with the faculties for understanding them. And whatever an English journal may say to the contrary, we are certain that the English reports, during the last fifteen years, will sustain the statement in Lord Cockburn's letter to which it has referred.

THE public right to use a horse-railroad track in the streets of a city for vehicles traveling through the streets, it is held in Camden Horse R. R. v. Citizens' Coach Co., recently decided in the New Jersey Court of Chancery, does not authorize a transportation company to use it in competition with the railroad company. This is a very interesting case, and was decided upon a bill filed for an injunction by the complainant, a horse-railroad company chartered to operate and maintain its road through certain streets of the city of Camden. Subsequently to its charter, the defendants became incorporated for the purpose of carrying passengers, goods and merchandise in coaches in and about the city for compensation. The bill was filed to restrain them from using the complainants' railroad track with their coaches, in the pursuit of their business of carrying passengers for hire in and about the city. The defendants, by their answer, while they denied that they had used the track to the prejudice of the use thereof by the complainants, insisted that they had the right to drive their coaches, in pursuit of their business, upon the rails of the complainants' railroad when they were not occupied by the complainants. "Though," said the court," the railroad track is, by charter, required to be of the breadth of the wagon track established by law, and to be, in all cases, level with the surface or face of the street on which it is laid; and although the general public have a right to use the track for passage thereon with vehicles, when not occupied by the complainants, that right does not extend, and could not reasonably be extended, to the defendants, as carriers of passengers or property, in competition with the complainants. If it were, it would obviously render the complainants' franchise of but little, if any, value." The injunction was granted. A right to use a horse-railroad track for the purpose of competition with the company differs essentially from the incidental right

to use it in traveling through the street. Brooklyn Coach R. R. v. Brooklyn City R. R., 32 Barb. 358; Jersey City & Bergen R. R. v. Jersey City and Hoboken R. R., 5 C. E. Gr. 61; R. & D. B. R. R. v. D. & R.Can. Co. 3 C. E. Gr. 546. That another horserailroad company has the right to use such track by the authority of the legislature, see Metropolitan R. R. Co. v. Quincy R. R. Co., 12 Allen, 262. Common vehicles may be used on a horse-railroad track, when not occupied by the cars; the company's exclusive right only exists while its cars are passing. Heegan v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 380; Wilbrand v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 3 Bosw. 314; Barker v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 4 Daly, 274; Jatho v. G. & C. R. R. Co., 4 Phila. Rep. 24. So, pedestrians may use such track in the same manner as any other part of an ordinary highway. Shea v. Portrero R. R. Co., 44 Cal. 414; Unger v. Forty-second St. R. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 497; and see Shea v. Sixth Ave. R. R. Co., 62 N. Y. 180. As to the liability of a traveler or driver who, going in advance of a car, refuses to turn out of the track when requested, see Commonwealth v. Temple, 7 Gray, 69; Adolph v. Central Park R. R. Co., 1 Jones & Spencer (N. Y.) 186. As to a temporary obstruction while unloading a wagon standing across the track, see State v. Foley, 31 Ia. 527.

WHEN land is dedicated to the public and accepted for the purposes of a street, the public right is complete, and it may be appropriated to any use to which a street acquired in any other mode can lawfully be put. So also the streets of a city may be lawfully used for the construction of sewers, whether the public right was acquired by condemnation or dedication. This is held in the case of Stoudinger v. City of Newark, lately decided in the same court, citing Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn. 362; Boston v. Richardson, 13 Allen, 146; Chapman v. Albany & S. R. R., 10 Barb. 360; Milhan v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 210; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, §544. In Glasby v. Morris, 3 C. E. Gr. 72, it was held that express authority must be conferred by a charter in order to construct sewers. An act of the legislature which expressly authorizes a city to turn a natural stream into a sewer is constitutional. Butler v. Worcester, 112 Mass. 541; and a plaintiff must establish some particular injury to himself arising therefrom, to entitle him to relief. Washburn Co. v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 458; and see Workman v. Worcester, 118 Mass. 168. As to the right of a city to connect a sewer with, or to discharge it into a natural stream, see Munn v. Pittsburgh, 40 Pa. St. 364; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 176; Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510. In Proprietors, etc., v. Lowell, 7 Gray, 223, it was held that a right to enter "streets and private lands," for the construction of sewers, would not authorize a city to discharge its sewage into a canal, or to lay sewers upon lands purchased by the corporation for the use of their canal; and see Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345; N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. M. G. L. Co., 63 N. Y. 326; Columbus v. Hydraulic, etc., Co., 33 Ind. 435. A corporation

formed under a general act has no right to lay gas pipes in a country highway, without the consent of the owner of the fee, or compensation made to him. Bloomfield Gas Light Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 386. In the same case a query was raised, whether the streets of a city could be so appropriated without such consent or compensation. That a land owner, on a street already opened to the public, is entitled to no additional compensation for the construction of a sewer therein, see, also, Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410, 33 How. 39; State v. Laverack, 5 Vr. 201, 206. The owner of the fee can not maintain an action against town authorities for placing in the highway a reservoir for the purpose of retaining water with which to sprinkle the highway. West v. Bancroft, 32 Vt. 367. An action lies by an adjacent land owner against a city for so constructing a culvert that it was insufficient to carry off a natural stream. Rochester Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463. In Boston v, Richardson, supra, Chief Justice Gray says: "Whenever land is taken for public use as a highway, and due compensation made, the public have a right to make any use of the land, directly or incidentally, conducive to the enjoyment of the public easement; and such uses clearly include the making of culverts, drains and sewers under the highway, for the cleansing of the streets and the accommodation of the inhabitants on either side." And Judge Harris, in Chapman v. Albany and Schenectady R. R., 10 Barb. 360, says: street may be used in any way which shall best promote the interest and business of the city. What will so promote those interests and business is to be determined by the municipal authorities, to whom the control of the streets is committed. Sewers and drains may be constructed, and water and gas pipes laid in them. The only restriction upon the power of the municipal authorities is that they can not appropriate them to a purpose incompatible with the ends for which they were established." We take this, and the case in the former paragraph, from the first volume of Stewart's New Jersey Equity Reports just published. A recent act of the legislature of that state, approved Feb. 28, 1877, requires the law and equity reports to be published separately in parts. In the first volume of the equity reports issued in accordance with this act will be found a large number of equity decisions on interesting and practical subjects. Many of the opinions are enriched with able notes by the reporter from which we have taken the liberty to make the foregoing extract.

"A

THE Louisiana election of last fall came incidentally before the United States Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana, sitting at New Orleans, during the past week. During the last campaign the Republican State Committee, with a view to detect fraudulent registration, issued a large number of circulars addressed to every white voter in the parish of Orleans. These circulars were supposed to have been circulated by a mercantile house, and at the time were known as the "Sewing Machine

Circulars." They were distributed through the post-office, and upon their non-delivery were returned to the chairman of the State Central Committee. Immediately upon their return, an affidavit was made before one Southworth, an United States commissioner, charging false and fraudulent registration; and without further inquiry into the fact, the commissioner issued his warrant of arrest for the accused. In the space of ten days the commissioner issued 8,223 warrants. Out of these cases only a very small number of the accused were brought before him; and of that number, 71 were bound over, of whom 4 were committed, and the remaining 67 discharged on their own recognizance. The commissioner applied to the court to have his account against the government for the sum of $14,000 approved and allowed. His claim was, however, disallowed, not being "according to law and just." The court held that, although the commissioners of the United States circuit courts are quasi judicial officers charged with quasi judicial duties, and their decision upon certain matters can only be reviewed upon a writ of habeas corpus, yet Congress has invested the circuit and district courts with the power of revising the acts of United States commissioners, so far as to enable them to decide whether "the services were actually and necessarily rendered, and were according to law and just." Two questions were passed upon by the court in considering the legality of the claim: 1. That the warrants were issued by the commissioner, but not signed by him, he having used a stamp on which was engraved a fac-simile of his signature. 2. That the warrants were issued by the commissioner without his first having considered whether there was probable cause for the proceeding. Upon the first ground, the warrants were held void. As to the second, the court, Billings, J., said: "Now, the warrant must issue upon probable cause, supported by an oath. Probable cause and the oath are not matters which can be dealt with by machinery. You can not put an oath into one end of a machine and let it come out a warrant, as the pulp passes into paper in the paper factory. When the Constitution of the United States solemnly says there must be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, before the law shall lay its hand upon a citizen, it means that that oath or affirmation shall present the case to the full and candid investigation of the magistrate, and the warrant must not issue without it. My view of it is that the committing magistrate should swear the affiant and weigh the facts deposed to, both with reference to the circumstances of the accuser and the accused, and then, when upon the affidavit he is, after a judicial examination, satisfied that there is probable cause, and not before, he issue his warrant. Now upon the facts which I have stated, less than one minute being allowed to the consideration of each case, it is idle to contend that there was any obedience or deference to this article four of the Constitution, which lays its power upon the court and the commission

er alike. There is no inherited principle-no constitutional provision-not even that which declares the sanctity of the writ of habeas corpus, which gathers within its terms or associations more of the inestimable results of the centuries of struggle, or in which resides greater security for the personal liberty of the citizens, than this article which the commissioner disregarded. I feel that it is the duty of the court to sustain the commissioners in all proper efforts to enforce the law, but they must act legally and constitutionally. Proper arrests should be encouraged; indiscriminate arrests in unconsidered cases should be reprobated. It seems to me that upon any other view of the case a commissioner might revolutionize a government."

THE EFFECT OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION.

No attempt will be made in this article to prescribe any rules for determining the circumstances in which statutes of limitation may be set in motion. Assuming that such a statute has operated to its fullest capacity, an effort will be made to ascertain what its effect has been upon the rights of the party against whom it may be pleaded. In this effort, the first thing to be done is to direct attention to the distinction between the cases in which the statute has been acting in the creation of a title by prescription, and those in which it has merely extinguished some remedy for the enforcement of a contract or other obligation. If A takes and holds possession of the real or personal property of B, under such circumstances and for such a period of time that the latter can no longer maintain any action whatever against the former for its recovery, then A thereby obtains title by prescription. Such title is as effective, both for assault and for defense, as if acquired by any other valid mode of transfer. In other words, A has lost his right as well as his remedy. Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1; Newby v. Blakey, 3 Hen. & Munf. 57; Brent v. Chapman, 5 Cranch, 358; Sims v. Canfield, 2 Ala. 555; Newcomb v. Leavitt, 22 Ala. 631; Winburn v. Cochran, 9 Tex. 123; Chiles v. Davis, 58 Ill. 411; Hale v. Gladfelder, 52 Ill. 91; Johnson v. Lancaster, 5 Ga. 39; Watkins v. Woolfolks, 5 Ga. 261; Arrington v. Liscom, 34 Cal. 365; Cannon v. Stockmon, 36 Cal. 535; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 605. The title so acquired must be recognized in other states, into which the property may be subsequently removed. "In such cases, it is not the statute of limitations of another state, that is relied on, or pleaded, but a title acquired by operation of such statute; and when a title becomes perfect under the laws of one state, it is valid in any other state." Fears v. Sykes, 35 Miss. 635; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. (U. S.) 418; Mosby v. Williams, 5 How. (Miss.) 520. After title has been acquired by prescription, it can not be divested by an act of the legislature. Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kas. 340; Specher v. Wakeley, 11, Wis. 436; Morton v.

Sharkey, McCahon's R. 113; Cooley's Const. Lim., 1st ed. 365.

In all cases where statutes of limitations do not operate to divest the title of the owner of real or personal property, they act on the remedy only. Of course, the legislature may, by the use of apt words in such statutes, extinguish the right as well as the remedy. But the vast majority of statutes of limitation do not purport to deal with the right, They simply prescribe certain periods of time within which specified actions must be brought. They do not assume to extinguish nor release anything; and if they create any presumption of payment or release, such presumption is not conclusive. They close the doors of the courts upon obligees without otherwise impairing the force of obligations. Hendricks v. Comstock, 12 Ind. 238; Carson v. Hunter, 46 Mo. 467; Lord v. Shaler, 3 Conn. 134; Bentinck v. Franklin, 38 Tex. 458; Brichett v. Davis, 21 Pick. 410; Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160; Sichel v. Carillo, 42 Cal. 493; McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Peters, 312; McCormack v. Brown, 36 Cal. 184; Rawle v. Ins. Co., 39 Barb. 357; McCarthy v. White, 21 Cal. 495; Johnson v. A. & S. R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 416.

The practical result of this rule is, that if the obligee has any other remedy than the one barred by the statute, he is at liberty to pursue it. If he holds property by way of pledge, his rights as pledgee are not impaired by the loss of his remedy by action for his debt. Spears v. Hartley, 3 Esp. 81; Jones v. Merchants' Bank, 4 Robt. 221. If he has an attorney's or other lien, it continues as before. Higgins v. Scott, 2 Barn. & Ad. 413; In re Broomhead 5 D. & L. 52; s. c. 16 L. J. Q. B. 355; In re Sharpe, W. W. & D. 354; s. c. 1 Jur. 405. If he is a mortgagee, vested with the legal title, he may proceed to foreclose the mortgagor's equity of redemption. Pratt v. Huggins, 29 Barb. 277; Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Brown, 11 Mich. 265; Sparks v. Pico, 1 McAllister. 497; Almy v. Wilbur, 2 W. & M. 371; Thayer v. Mann, 19 Pick. 535; Eastman v. Foster, 8 Met. 19; Bush v. Cooper, 26 Miss. 6; Miller v. Trustees, 5 S. & M. 650. If property has been vested in trustees, with power of sale, for the purpose of securing the diacharge of the obligation, they may proceed to execute their trust. Bush v. Cooper, 26 Miss. 611; Bank of Metropolis v. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. 32. If the obligee holds a judgment which, though it can not be enforced by action, is still a lien on property, he may by execution obtain its satisfaction. Waltermire v. Westover, 14 N. Y. 16.

In the class of cases not resulting in title by prescription, the statute of limitations affects the remedy only, and forms no part of the obligation. Whether the obligation can be enforced by action, is to be determined by the statute of the state where the remedy is sought, and not by the law of the country where the obligation arose. An obligation, barred by the statute at the place at which it was contracted, may nevertheless be prosecuted to judgment in a state having either no statute,

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