and Blair v. Smith, supra; Vosburgh v. Teator et al., 32 N. Y. 568; Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N. Y. 363; Boyd v. Graves, 4 Wheat. 512; Heirs of Houston v. Mathews, 1 Yerg. 118; Lewallen v. Overton, 9 Hump. 76. Where land is vacant, the constructive possession followed the true title, and possession taken under a writ habere facias possessionem issued against persons in possession who do not claim under the holders of the true title is good only while it is an actual possession; and in case of a subsequent vacancy there can be no constructive possession in favor of those claiming under the writ as against the owner of the title. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-Turner v. Baker et al.

NOTE by the Reporter.-In this case the court appears to be considerably exercised by the consideration of the doctrine of estoppel in pais, and the statute of frauds, as applied to cases in which the title papers call for certain boundary lines between the lands of contiguous owners, while the acts of the parties clearly indicate that they had agreed upon boundary lines different from those given in the deeds. Is not the solution of the difficulty found in the well-known principle that executed agreements are not within the statute of frauds, and that, the acts of the parties being evidence (Quaere, conclusive evidence?), of such an agreement, the same is valid becaase executed without reference to the doctrine of estoppel in pais at all ?]

Associate Justices.

LIABILITY OF COUNTY BOARD OF JURY WITNESS FEES.-A county is not liable for the board of a jury in a capital case, during the pendency of the trial. A witness in a criminal action has no claim upon the county, until the liability of the county for the costs is passed upon by the court. Young v. Commissioners of Buncombe.

WHEN A GRANT IS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE only, the conversion to another and different use is forbidden by a necessary implication. So, where the law prescribes that "all the real estate held by the North Carolina Railroad Company for right of way, for station places, of whatever kind, and for workshop locations, shall be exempt from taxation," etc: Held, that such exemption covers only such real estate as is actually held and used for the purposes expressed.-R. & D. R. R. Co. v. Commissioners of Alamance. POWERS OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-LEVY OF TAXPERSONAL CREDIT.-The statute (Battle's Revisal, chapter 27, section 8), enumerating the duties and powers of county commissioners, makes no grade among them, and gives no preference to one over another. A court has no power to interfere with the domestic administration of the affairs of a county, so long as the board of commissioners act intra vires; therefore, where it was alleged that a board of commissioners had not levied a sufficient tax to defray the ordinary expenses of the county, including the support of the poor, on account of the levy of a tax for repairing the courthouse, held, to be no ground for interference by the courts. A tax, levied professedly and improperly for one purpose, can be collected and applied to any other legitimate purpose. It is not fraudulent for a board of county commis. sioners to superadd their personal credit to the credit of the county, in a contract concerning the necessary expenses of the county.-Long v. Commissioners of Richmond. JURY PANEL-DOWER INTEREST OF WIFE IN REAL ESTATE OF HUSBAND-INDICTMENT FOR BURGLARY-DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.-The statutory requirement that a tales juror shall be a freeholder, does not apply to the original panel. The finding of the court below, as to whether a challenged juror has paid his taxes, is final, and can not be reviewed in this court. The dower or homestead interest of a wife in the real estate of her husband is a mere right, which may never vest; not an estate; therefore, in an indictment for burglary for breaking into A's house, it is proper to charge that the house is the property of A alone.

While a husband and wife live together, the husband has a special property as bailee in the wife's separate personal estate. Therefore, in an indictment for burglary, where a certain quilt, proven to have been stolen, was the separate property of A's wife, and was charged in the indictment as the property of A, held, not to be error. The verdict of a jury must be recorded substantially as rendered.-State v. Wincroft

SLANDER-WORDS CHARGING INFAMOUS OFFENSE.Words falsely spoken, charging one with an infamous offense, or with an infectuous disease, or impeaching his trade or profession, are, per se, actionable. When the words spoken do not on their face import such degradation, the plaintiff must aver some special damage, and must show by proof that he has, in fact, sustained a loss, in order to recover. If, at the time of the utterance of the alleged slanderous words, the person concerning whom they are spoken is not liable to an infamous punishment by reason of the offense charged, the words are not, per se, actionable. Therefore, when the defendant, in 1870, said of the plaintiff that he had sworn falsely in 1867 before the Board of Registrars of Davidson County, then acting under the provisions of the act of Congress, entitled, "An Act to Provide More Efficient Government for the Rebel States," which act ceased to operate in this state before 1870, held, that the plaintiff, no special damage being alleged, could not recover.-Pegram v. Stoltz.

BANK RECEIVING CHECK for CollecTION-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-When a bank receives a check for collection, and retains it for four days, without presenting it for payment, or making any effort for its collection, or giving any notice to the depositor of its non-payment, the bank is liable, if loss thereby ensues. In such case, a promise thereafter made by the depositor to pay to the bank the amount due by reason of the loss, is nudum pactum. When paper is placed in the hands of a bank for collection, the bank must take the necessary steps to secure its prompt payment, by presentation at maturity. If it is not paid, the bank, in order to fix the liability of the drawer, must have it protested, and due notice of its dishonor given to the depositor. If it is not presented, the fact, that if it had been presented, it would not have been paid, does not excuse the liability of the bank. When one voluntarily assumes an agency to manage the interests of another, such agent will not be allowed to sacrifice the interests of his principal to his own. Therefore, when a bank received a check upon itself for collection, being at the same time a large creditor of the drawer, and failed, without excuse, to notify the depositor of the non-payment of the check, held, to be, in law, negligence. In such case, the bank makes the check its own, and is fixed with its full amount.-Bank of New Hanover v. Kenan.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY-FACTS ADMITTED.-A court has no power to state to a jury what facts are proved; nor to state what facts are admitted by the parties, unless they are so admitted as facts to go to the jury as proof. Where no such admissions are made by the pleadings, nor appear in the evidence, an instruction which so assumes and states facts to be admitted as true, will be held erroneous. Judg. ment reversed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-Mathers v. Story.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-QUALIFIED ESTATE OF THE LESSOR.-1. A lessor of real estate can not give his lessee a larger estate in the demised premises than he himself has; and where the lessor has only the special and qualified estate of an administrator with the will annexed, the leasehold estate under him terminates when the order of the proper court terminates the estate of such administrator. 2. When the lessee has notice of the sale of the demised premises, he is bound to know that his lease under the ad

ministrator is determined by such sale and conveyance. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by HowK, J.-Burbank v. Dyer.

JUDGE AND JURY-ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION.— After a jury had been out about fifteen hours in consultation, they came into court and reported that they could not agree. The court then asked them how much they lacked of agreeing, and the foreman replied: " About twelve dollars." The court thereupon told the jury they ought to agree; that it would be better for both parties they should overcome that difference, than to have another trial of the cause. Held, that this conversation by the court with the jury was not an instruction of law, but rather a direction as to fact, over which the court had no authority. Neither questions of expediency nor of policy have anything to do with the administration of justice. The court should not have inquired of the jury what the difference between them was, and the jury should not have answered the question. Judgment reversed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-Newall v. Hutchinson.

FORECLOSURE-RIGHT OF REDEMPTION - TENDER.-A purchaser under a decree of foreclosure of a junior mortgage may redeem against a senior mortgagee, before foreclosure, and after foreclosure, if he has not been made a party to the suit. A junior judgment-creditor stands, in this respect, upon the same footing; and where one purchases land at sheriff's sale on a judgment, subject to a senior mortgage-lien, which is afterwards foreclosed without making the purchaser at the sheriff's sale a party, the lat. ter has the right to pay off such older lien and protect his title; and in cases of this kind, where the court can decree the amount due, and make it a lien on the land, it is not necessary to make a tender before suit, nor to bring the money into court, but it is sufficient to make the offer in the pleadings to pay the amount, when it is ascertained. Judgment reversed. Opinion by HowK, J.-Coombs v. Carr.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-DEFICIENCY IN LAND SOLD.Where the lands in a conveyance are estimated to contain so many acres, or the words "more or less" are added, if there be a small portion more than the specified quantity, the vendor can not recover it; and if there be a small quantity less, the purchaser can not obtain any compensation for the deficiency; and even a large excess or deficiency has not been considered a ground for relieving a vendor or purchaser, in the absence of fraud; representation, or other equitable circumstances affecting the particular case. In the absence of such conditions, a deficiency of one-tenth in the quantity of land purchased will not entitle the purchaser to compensation therefor, and such a deficiency will not constitute a good defense to a suit on a note given for the purchase price of the land. Judgment reversed. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-King v. Brown et al.

CONSTRUCTION OF WILL-UNCERTAINTY-INTENTION OF TESTATOR.-Where a will bequeathed all of the testator's real estate "to the County of Owen," to be sold, and the proceeds invested as a permanant fund for the education of the colored children of said county; Held: 1, That the testator intended to devise his estate to "The Board of Commissioners of Owen County," and that the name of the devisee was given with such certainty that it could readily be ascertained to what corporation the testator intended to devise his estate. 2. That the County of Owen, in its corporate capacity, was capable of holding as trustee the real estate so devised to it. 3. That the will was not void for uncertainty as to the cestui que trust. The beneficiaries were limited to the colored children of said county, and there was no vagueness or uncertainty as to the persons intended. Judgment reversed. Opinion by HOWK, J.-Craig, Admr. etc. v. Secrist et al.

IN Maule v. Stokes, 3 Weekly Notes, 373, a ground rent created in 1806 was payable in "current silver money of the United States," and the tenant, in 1875, tendered an installment of the rent in silver dimes. The tender was held insufficient, under sec. 3586, Rev. Stats. which reads: "The silver coins of the United States shall be a legal tender at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding five dollars in any one payment." The decision overruled that of Kohler v. Parrish, 2 W. N. 488 in which it was held that a mortgage created in 1846 for the payment of $5,000 in lawful silver money of the United States, could be paid in silver half dollars.

NEGLIGENCE.-The plaintiff's evidence showed substantially the following facts: The plaintiff's intestate was a laborer in the employ of the defendant, assisting the defendant to build a bridge. Said intestate fell from said bridge and was killed. The fall was caused by a heavy step of the intestate on a defective board or plank, causing the plank or board to break in the middle, and allowing the intestate to fall about 25 feet. This plank was a part of a scaffold. The intestate and his co-laborers had erected said scaffold on the very morning that said accident occurred. How this particular plank came to be placed in said scaffold is not shown. There were plenty of good planks at the bridge from which to make a good scaffold. Whether any one knew, prior to the accident, or even sus. pected that this plank was defective, is not shown. The evidence, so far as it went, tended to show that all the planks were tested before they were used. It was not shown that the defendant was negligent in any respect whatever, and no negligence was shown against any one, unless it may be inferred from the foregoing facts. The defendant demurred to the plaintiff's evidence on the ground that it did not prove any cause of action against the defendant. The court below sustained the demurrer. Held, that the court below did not err in its decision. Opinion by VALENTINE, J.-Kelly v. Detroit Bridge Co.

HOMESTEAD.-A husband and wife gave a mortgage to G on their homestead and on other real estate belonging to the husband. Afterwards L obtained a judgment lien upon all the property belonging to said husband, except said homestead. Afterwards the husband and wife sold and conveyed to W a portion of the real estate, not occupied as a homestead, but covered by said mortgage and said judgment lien. Afterwards the husband died. His wife and family still occupy said homestead. The plaintiff in this action has a claim of $800 against the decedent's estate for money loaned to the decedent during his lifetime, which claim has been allowed by the probate court; but such claim is not secured in any manner by lien or other. wise. The estate is insolvent and unable to pay all its creditors in full. The plaintiff now seeks by this action to have the assets of the estate marshalled; to have G com pelled to exhaust that portion of said real estate, occupied as a homestead, in payment of said mortgage, before resorting to any other property belonging to the estate; to have L compelled to exhaust said real estate belonging to Win payment of his (L's) judgment lien, before resorting to any other property belonging to the estate; and to have the administrator, in the meantime, restrained from paying said mortgage or said judgment lien from the proceeds of any property except said homestead, and said property sold to W. Held, that the plaintiff has no such superior equities over the family of the deceased as occupiers of said homestead, or over W as the purchaser of said land, as can be enforced, either in law or equity, and therefore, that this action can not be maintained. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. -Calby v. Crocker et al.

HABEAS CORPUS-FALSE PRETENSES.-1. Under section 672, Gen. Stat. 1868, p. 763, the judge or court, issuing a writ of habeas corpus on a petition complaining that the person in whose behalf the writ is applied for is restrained of his liberty without probable cause, may, even in case there is no defect in the charge or process, summon the prosecu ting witnesses, investigate the criminal charge, and discharge, let to bail, or recommit the prisoner, as may be just and legal. 2. On the hearing and determination of a cause arising upon a writ of habeas corpus, before a judge or court investigating the criminal charge against a person committed by an examining magistrate for the offense of having obtained money or property by false pretenses, the prosecutor, when examined as a witness, may testify that he believed the pretenses, and, confiding in their truth, was induced thereby to part with his money or property. 3. It is not necessary, to constitute the offense of obtaining goods by false pretenses, that the owner has been induced to part with his property solely and entirely by pretenses

which are false, nor need the pretenses be the paramount cause of the delivery to the prisoner. It is sufficient, if they are a part of the moving cause, and, without them, the defrauded party would not have parted with the property. 4. A pretense which is false when made, but true by the act of the person making the same, when the prosecutor relies thereon and parts with his property, is not a false pretense within the statute. 5. To hold a person for trial, who is charged with obtaining money or property by false pretense, it must appear that the pretense relied upon relates to a past event, or to some present existing fact, and not to something to happen in the future. A mere promise is not sufficient. Opinion by HORTON, C. J.-Ex parte Snyder.

EQUITABLE JURISDICTION.-A court of equity will grant relief against judgments obtained by fraud, surprise, or mistake, or when, from any cause, manifest injustice has been done. Judgment reversed. Opinion by GANTT, J.— Horn v. Queen.

COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR NUISANCE.-A county is not liable at the suit of a private person, for damages occasioned by reason of the erection of a county jail in near proximity to his residenee, nor if the jail be kept in so filthy a condition as to become an actual nuisance to persons living near it. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by LAKE, C. J.-Wehn v. Gage Co.

ACTION ON UNDERTAKING IN ATTACHMENT.-In an action on an undertaking in attachment, the petition should allege that the order of attachment was wrongfully sued out or obtained. It is not enough to state in the petition, that the attachment was quashed, and the property released by proceedings in error. Judgment reversed. Opinion by LAKE, C. J.-Eaton v. Bartscherer.

DESCRIPTION IN DEED.-When, in a mesne conveyance, the premises are described according to the government surveys, but without designating the county or state in which the lands are situated, and the deed was executed in the state, it will be presumed that the deed was intended to convey lands situated in this state. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by MAXWELL, J.-Butler v. Davis.

ATTORNEY'S LIEN ON JUDGMENTS.-An attorney has a lien upon a judgment to the extent of his reasonable fees and disbursements in the suit in which it was obtained. And this right is paramount to the rights of the parties in the suit. But he must file his notice of a lien, and the right to a lien against a debtor is restricted to the claim set forth in the notice. Judgment modified. Opinion by MAXWELL, J.-Griggs & Ashby v. White.

BEST EVIDENCE.-Where, in an action on notes given for a threshing machine, the defendant set up as a defense a breach of warranty, alleging that the warranty was in writing, and left with the agent of the plaintiff, the defendant can not introduce evidence on the trial of the cause, to show by parol what the contract was, without first taking the necessary steps to require the plaintiff, or their agent, to produce the contract. Judgment reversed. Opinion by MAXWELL, J.-Birdsall v. Carter.

TAXATION ACcording to Value-DebtORS.-1. Every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property and franchises, and can not be compelled to pay a tax greater than in proportion to the value of such property. 2. Under the provisions of section 21 of the general revenue laws, in the assessment of personal property, the tax-payer is entitled to have a deduction of bona fide debts owing by him, from the gross amount of his credits. Judgment reversed. Opinion by GANTT, J.-Jones v. Seward Co.

FORECLOSURE AGAINST ESTATE OF DECEDENT.-Under our statute, an action to foreclose a mortgage, executed by the deceased in his lifetime, may be brought and prosecuted to final judgment within the time fixed by the court

for the payment of debts by the administrator. Such mortgage is not barred, as to the property which it covers, by a failure to present it to the court for allowance, as a claim against the estate. But unless so presented, the holder is confined to the mortgaged property, and can not share in the general assets of the estate. Judgment reversed. Opinion by LAKE, C. J.-Nul v. Jones.

RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN GOODS LEVIED UPON-LIABILITY OF SHERIFF.-1. A trial of the right of property in goods levied upon by third parties under sections 486, 487, and 488 of the code can only be had at the instance of the claimant. 2. If in such proceeding the jury find against the claimant, he can not afterwards maintain an action against the officer. If the jury find in favor of the claimant, the plaintiff in execution may tender the undertaking prescribed, and require the sale to proceed; and the officer will not be liable to the claimant, his remedy being upon the undertaking. Judgment aflirmed. Opinion by MAXWELL, J-Storms v. Eaton.

WARRANTY.-When the soundness of a piece of machinery is guaranteed by a warranty, one of the conditions of which is, that in case of a defect being discovered in any portion of it, the seller shall be liable only on condition of the production of the defective piece at the manufactory, or to the agent by whom it was sold, this is a condition precedent, and must be complied with, or there can be no recovery. Where the very defect complained of is fully and clearly covered by the warranty, no liability can be established against the seller, on the ground of fraud in not disclosing the defect, if known by him at the time of the sale. In such case, the purchaser must rely on the contract of warranty. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by LAKE, C. J.-Miller v. Nichols, et al.

COMPETENCY OF DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY IN MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PROBABLE CAUSE-CONVERSION NOT LARCENY.-1. In an action for a malicious prosecution, the defendant is competent to testify as to his belief in the guilt of the plaintiff, when the prosecution was commenced; that he instituted the prosecution without malice, or in accordance with the opinion of counsel first obtained. 2. It is the duty of the court to determine whether the proof of certain facts constitutes probable cause, and it is error to submit this question to the jury. It is the duty of the jury to say what facts are proved, and to decide on the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses. 3. Mere conversion of property is not larceny, and information of such convertion constitutes no grounds of probable cause as a defense to such action. Judgment reversed. Opinion by GANTT, J.-Turner v. O'Brien.

ADMINISTRATION - PAYMENT TO HEIRS - PROMISSORY NOTE-CONSIDERATION-ILLEGAL CLAIMS.-1. The payment to the heirs of a debt due the estate of a decedent, and the possession of a receipt from them, does not discharge the debtor from liability to the administrator. 2. The settlement of an illegal and unfounded claim, upon which no proceedings had been instituted, does not constitute a sufficient consideration for a note. Opinion by BECK, J.-Tucker v. Ronk.

PROMISSORY NOTE- CONSIDERATION - PRACTICE-INSTRUCTION-VERDICT.-1. In an action upon a promissory note, it was pleaded that the title to the land for which the note was given had failed; but it appeared that the claimant under the adverse title had not succeeded in establishing his claim in an action for that purpose; held that the plea constituted no defense to the action. 2. A verdict, returned in conflict with an instruction of the court and entirely unsupported by the evidence, will not sustain a judgment. Opinion by DAY, J.-Dawson v. Graham.

PROMISSORY NOTE-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-COUNTERCLAIM.-1. A contract for the sale of intoxicating liquors for purposes forbidden by law is void, and such sale, when the

object thereof is known to the seller, will not constitute a sufficient consideration for a promissory note for the purchase price. 2. If liquors thus sold have been paid for, the amount paid may be recovered back in an action at law; or, in an action by the seller against the purchaser upon a general account, the amount of such payment may be pleaded as a counter-claim. Opinion by BECK, J.-Tal man v. Johnson.

PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT-BILL OF EXCEPTIONSFRAUDULENT SALE.-1. Affidavits impugning the correctness of a bill of exceptions signed by the judge will not be considered by the Supreme Court, unless they are presented to sustain another bill of exceptions purporting to contain a correct statement of the evidence, and signed by two bystanders. 2. A sale of personal property without a change of possession or visible change of ownership raises the presumption that the sale is fraudulent. 3. Where there is evidence tending to support the finding of the court, it will be sustained like a verdict of the jury under similar circumstances. Opinion by SEEVERS, C. J.-Woodworth v. Byerly.

MORTGAGE-COVENANT-PRACTICE.-1. A valid covenant may be inserted in a mortgage, binding the mortgagor to pay the amount secured thereby at the time specified. 2. A mortgagee is not confined to the remedy of foreclosure, but may maintain an action at law upon the note, bond or other obligation secured by the mortgage. 3. If the covenant for payment or obligation is contained in the mortgage, that may be made the basis of the action at law. 4. If separate actions are commenced upon the covenant for payment of the money and for the foreclosure of the mortgage, the plaintiff may elect which he will pursue, and his election of the one will have the effect to continue the other. Opinion by BECK, J.-Brown v. Cascaden.

PRACTICE-REFEREE-CONTINUANCE-CONCLUSION OF LAW.-1. Where, upon a trial before a referee, one of the parties asked for a continuance on the ground that, although the time for taking testimony had expired, yet a deposition had not arrived, for the taking of which the commission had issued in due time; held that, upon a proper showing, this would be sufficient ground for continuance, but that, the affidavit not being verified, the motion was properly overruled. 2. A referee's report reciting that he was duly sworn before proceeding to discharge his duties, the failure to file with his report the affidavit required by statute, is not a fatal objection to it. 3. Where, by the terms of the submission, the referee was only empowered to find the facts, and, notwithstanding this, he also returned his conclusions of law, and the court rendered judgment on his report, it was held that prejudice must be shown by the act of the referee, to invalidate the report. Opinion by SEEVERS, C. J.-Shindler v. Luke.

GARNISHMENT-NOTICE-SERVICE-DELAY IN PROCEEDINGS-ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGMENT-ATTORNEY'S LIEN.1. In a proceeding of attachment by garnishment, notice of the process to the defendant in the principal action is not necessary. 2. The garnishment process may be served before the defendant is served with notice of the commencement of the action. 3. That one or more terms intervened between the service of the garnishment process and the rendition of judgment against the garnishee was held not to imply an abandonment of proceedings. 4. A judgment debtor may be garnished, even though he has appealed from the judgment, if no supersedeas bond has been filed. 5. The assignment of a judgment, after service of the garnishment process, confers upon the assignee no rights prejudicial to the plaintiff in the garnishment proceeding. 5. The claim by an attorney of a lien upon a judgment must be given in writing to bind the judgment-creditor, or those claiming through him. Opinion by BECK, J.—Phillips v. Germon.

CONTRACT-CONSTRUCTION-EVIDENCE-WAIVER.-1. By the terms of a contract between W and a railway company, he became bound to pay the latter fifteen hundred dollars, if within a specified time it should have completed its road to West Union and have done half the grading between that place and the point of intersection with the M. & St. P. Railway; held, that the company had not complied with the contract by completing the road between West Union and the point of intersection named, while it failed to construct its road to West Union from the other direction, and that the road must have been completed to West Union on the one side, and half the grading done on the other. 2.

A cotemporaneous agreement was not admissible to vary the terms of the written instrument. 3. If before the expiration of the time of performance W had said that he was satisfied with the mo·lification of the terms of the contract, and had then promised payment, notwithstanding the modification, it might have been regarded by the company as a waiver of the conditions. Opinion by ADAMS, J.-B. C. R. & M. R. R. v. Whitney.

NOTES.

FOR a specimen of eccentricity, a testator residing in Bellingham, Mass., takes the lead. The will gives his wife the use of a portion of the house he owned in Bellingham, with the use of front garden in common with others; also the use and improvement of one stall in the barn, together with storage for hay, during her widowhood; four cords of wood to be consumed during her widowhood, said wood to be cut off a lot near the house; the use of the kitchen furniture and cooking stove, and one seat in a pew on the lower floor of the Second Congregational Church of Medway, on condition of her paying one-fourth of the tax assessed on said pew from year to year, also to pay all the taxes that may be assessed on the real estate. Each bequest contains the proviso, "as long as she remains a widow."

THE Nova Scotians are by no means the first people who have been in trouble about a Great Seal. When the Prince of Orange, in 1688-9, took the reins of goverument in England, there was no Great Seal. It was part of his Catholic Majesty's luggage when he left Whitehall; but James did not keep it for many minutes. With the impression on his mind that the government of the kingdom could not be carried on without it, he dropped it into the Thames with his royal hand. About a century later, when Lord Thurlow was High Chancellor, his house in Great Ormond street was broken into on the 24th March, 1784, and the Great Seal of England was among the property stolen. It was never got back from the thieves, but was replaced the next day by a new one. Later, William IV. was very angry with Lord Brougham for taking the Great Seal to foreign parts in his valise. A young lady once made it her pleasure to obtain the Seal from the gallant old lawyer, and compelled him to go down on his knees to her on a rather public occasion, before she would restore it to his custody.

A RECENT London letter, in speaking of the bench and bar of England, says: There has been an impression that the humorous judges, and those with some flavor about them, have passed away with Maule and Westbury, and that the bench is more and more occupied with dry perfunctionaries. But some little incidents have recently sent a smile around the court, which seem to warrant a more hopeful view. The other day a lawyer was arguing before Baron H, and assumed a laughing tone at the case of his opponent, giving a little titter at each statement, as if the opposite side were too preposterons to be considered. The judge leaned forward and gently interrupted the barrister with, "Mr. —, I am at a loss to know why you use this triumphant tone. Of course, if there were a jury present, I should not say a word; but you surely don't expect that tone to have any effect on me?" The barrister was funereal during the rest of his speech. In another case. Baron C was listening to a barrister, who seemed dis posed to indulge in not only length, but eloquence. The judge interrupted, saying, "Mr. - is your client in court?" The barrister looked around, and said, “He was here a moment ago, your lordship, but he seems to have gone." "Then," said the judge, appealingly, "couldn't you spare me all this?" The court-room of Mr. Justice B-was the scene of rather an alarming outburst of feeling on the part of the judge. A case came before him presenting a combination of every kind of villainy in the defendant; and, as the clear evidence came out, the judge grew red and white, and was fairly boiling when the time came to charge the jury. "Gentlemen of the jury," said the judge, "it is a perfectly clear case, and a most nefari ous one. The defendant has unquestionably robbed the plaintiff, and has basely betrayed his daughter and aban doned her in a foreign land. I-I only wish it had been my daughter!" The lawyers gasped as this thunder rolled, and beheld the irate judge shaking his fist across the room at the cowering caitiff.

IT WOULD SEEM, from the amendment to the

SAINT LOUIS, APRIL 13, 1877.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE Boston University School of Law deserves a general recognition for what it is doing to elevate the standard of the legal profession. It has added another year to its course; or rather, the optional year will hereafter be required for graduation. The candidate must also have graduated in arts, science, or philosophy. We hope the Boston University School of Law will persist in its resolution of extending the term of study required for graduation, until there shall be one law school in the United States which does not grant a diploma without four years of study added to the requisite preparation. The preparatory study to make a good lawyer can not certainly be less than that required to make a good soldier; and the four years' term of the West Point Military Academy, with its attendant discipline, would seem to furnish a good analogy for the law schools. In the great Roman Law School the term was five years, and then a great many shipshod lawyers were undoubtedly turned loose to put to hazard the rights of the people.

THE Tennessee Legislature has devised a mode of relieving the crowded dockets of the Supreme Court of that State. It has passed a bill, which we print elsewhere, providing for a special commission of arbitration for the hearing and trial of causes now pending before the Supreme Court. This commission is given power to hear and determine such civil causes as may be submitted to it by the Supreme Court, with the consent of the parties on both sides. Its decisions shall be reported to the Supreme Court, where they shall become, and have the force and effect of judgments or decrees of that court, subject to the approval or disapproval of the court. Jurisdiction of causes can only be acquired by the commission with the consent of the parties thereto, or their solicitors; which consent may be presumed, unless objections thereto in writing be filed in the Supreme Court within ten days after the cause is ordered by the Supreme Court to be transferred to the commission for hearing, trial, or decision. The members of the commission have already been appointed. They are Hons. L. D. McKisick of Shelby, Howell E. Jackson of Madison, and John T. Caithel of Gibson County. They are now in session at Jackson, having convened on the first Monday in April, contemporaneously with the Supreme Court. The commission is composed of able lawyers, and is, we understand, satisfactory to the bar of the State, who are very generally agreeing to refer their cases, under the provisions of the bill. A similar commission existed in Tennessee two or three years ago.

Vol. 4.-No. 15.

that that body has been seized with a sort of mental griping in the direction of religious reform. The act in question, if literally carried into effect, would lead to the most absurd results. It would prevent the publication of any daily newspaper on Monday morning, because such papers must be edited and put in type, for a considerable part, on the previous day. It would prevent the publication of any Sunday daily paper, because such papers must be printed and circulated after midnight of Saturday. We humbly conceive, however, that the public morals would not suffer by the suspension of one or two of the Sunday sheets of which we have knowledge. The St. Louis Globe-Democrat of Sunday, April 8, contained no less than a dozen pimping advertisements. These advertisements, in the "personal" column of that journal, are every week getting more brazen and filthy. The cards of "widow ladies" seeking the acquaintance of "elderly gentlemen of means,” and of “bachelors of means " seeking the acquaintance of “discreet ladies," for "mutual pleasure," or "a little quiet fun," are disgustingly common in those columns. But the infamy culminates when a prostitute is permitted to advertise that she has changed her den from one well-known house of prostitution to another. The Legislature should pass an act to the effect that when any newspaper publishes an advertisement apparently intended to bring about illicit intercourse between men and women, its proprietor or manager shall be subjected to fine and imprisonment, and that the question whether an advertisement is apparently intended to produce this result shall be a question of fact for the jury.

FOR some reason which, perhaps, can not be explained in any other way than because it is prohibited in the ritual, and bishops have still a vote in the legislation of the country, the proposal to change the law in Great Britain which prohibits the marriage of a man with his deceased wife's sister, though often urged both in and out of Parliament, has always met with the strongest opposition, and has, without exception, been defeated. A bill was lately introduced in the House of Commons, and passed notwithstanding the opposition of the government. The absurdity of the English law consists in the fact that the ban has long ago been removed in the colonies; the result being that marriages of this kind between persons domiciled in England are absolutely invalid, but, when solemnized between persons domiciled in the colonies, they are valid both in the colony and in England-the only disability attaching to the issue of such marriages being that they can not inherit land in England. When solemnized between persons not domiciled in the colonies, such marriages are not recognized in England at all. The bill in question is confined in its terms to domiciled colonists, so as to prevent evasions of the law in England, and, as was said during the