then, that the legislature has no power to make local laws, adapted to peculiar situations, looking, not to the liberty or imprisonment of the citizen, but to the regulations of confinement, as to which point there is no necessity for a decision, this would not avail the appellant here.

The appellant claims that the court below erred in not granting a new trial, because, as the judge who tried the case died before the time for perfecting the bill of exceptions expired, there was no way to attain justice except by granting a new trial. The argument is that the accused had a right to an appeal; a right to a review, by the higher court, of the alleged errors of the lower court on the trial; that the rulings can be preserved only by a bill of exceptions, and that this can be allowed only by the judge who tried the case; that the death of the judge can not deprive the accused of a right which the law secured him; that, though the granting of a new trial does not procure the allowance of the bill of exceptions, it does secure the right of a review, by the appellate court, of the proceedings of the court below, and that this is the only way in which, under the circumstances, that right can be obtained. It is evident that the errors may be such as can be preserved only by a bill of exceptions, and, if the constitutional principle is to be regarded which secures an equal operation of the law as to all, a right of appeal in a criminal case can not be granted to some, while in the same class of cases it is denied to others. A bill of exceptions, generally speaking, can not be prepared without some delay, and it is common practice for counsel to take time for this purpose. The statute makes the rules of practice as to bills of exceptions in civil cases apply to trials for criminal offenses. Wag. St., p. 1105, § 26; and see State v. Marshall, 36 Mo. 400. The appellant had ten days' time granted him to file his bill of exceptions, as a part of the proceedings by which the appeal was allowed. Before this time expired, Judge Colvin became seriously ill, and ceased to perform his duty. A provisional judge was appointed on the 29th of March. On the 3d of April, when the ten days expired, the opposing counsel consented to an extension of time for filing the bill. An order of court was made accordingly, and, before this extended time had expired, Judge Colvin died. It is to the court or judge who tries the case, that the appealing party must look for the allowance of his bill. The law does not oblige him to consult the opposing counsel. It appears, in this case, that various questions as to the admission of testimony, and as to the giving of instructions, arose during the trial; and as, before the time allowed to the appellant to perfect his bill of exceptions, the judge who tried the case became incapable of action, and as it does not appear that the appellant was negligent in the matter, we think that the court below should have granted the motion for a new trial. The reasons which influenced the supreme court in their opinion in Woolfolk v. Tate, 25 Mo. 597, and Cocker v. Cocker, 56 Mo. 180, seem to apply with still stronger force to the circumstances of this case.

Accordingly the judgment of the court below will be reversed, and the case remanded. All the other judges

concur.

DURING a trial, last month, in an English court, the jury were locked up all night. On coming into court the next morning, the learned judge expressed to them his regret that he had been obliged to lock them up, and said that it seemed strange that this obligation should exist while he was able to permit the prisoner to go out on bail. Those interested in the matter should, he thought, look into it, and determine whether some discretion should not be given to the judge to permit the jury to go to their homes when a case of felony lasted over one day.

United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Missouri, March Term, 1877.

Before HON. JOHN F. DILLON, Circuit Judge, and HON. SAMUEL TREAT, District Judge.

A lease of certain real property in St. Louis was made for ten years with a covenant by the lessor for periodical renewals extending through terms aggregating a period of 500 years; the amount of the rental at the end of each ten years was to be ascertained by assessors to be appointed by the parties; the lessor fraudulently sought to evade the provisions of the lease in respect to renewal; the lessee, on the faith of the covenant for renewal, had expended in buildings on the demised premises $113,000;-the lessor sued the lessee at law for use and occupation,-whereupon the lessee filed this bill in equity to stay the action at law until the lessor appointed an assessor as required by the lease; held, that a general demurrer to the bill should be disallowed; and the lessee being willing to comply with the lease as to renewal, the court entered an order staying the proceedings at law, until the lessor should appoint an impartial assessor to make the valuation, reserving the right to discharge or modify the order as justice might require.

Catherine Biddle brought an action at "w in this court against Peter Tscheider et al., for use and occupation. In her petition she simply alleges, that she is the owner of a certain lot of ground (describing it); that Peter Tscheider et al. had occupied said lot of ground during one year with her permission; that the value of the occupation of such premises was worth the sum of dollars; that Peter Tscheider et al., the occupants, are bound in law to pay her that amount for such occupation, and therefore she prays judgment. In defense to that action Peter Tscheider et al. set up, as a bar to the action, a clause in an original lease for ten years, dated the 28th day of May, 1864, between Catherine Biddle and Peter Tscheider et al., that within the last quarter of said term of ten years the said Catherine Biddle, lessor, and the said Tscheider et al., lessees, should appoint two assessors -one each-who should proceed to ascertain the value of the said lot of ground, as a naked lot, without reference to the improvements; and, after having ascertained the true and fair market valuation of said lot, they should fix and agree upon the rent which should be paid by the lessees for another term of ten yearswhich rent, however, should not be less than six per cent. upon the value of the property, so ascertained; that, after the said assessors had so agreed upon the amount of the rental of said property, then Catherine Biddle should execute to the said lessees another lease of the lot for ten years, at the rental so fixed by the assessors. If the assessors so appointed by the parties should not agree as to the valuation of the lot, or to the rent to be paid upon that valuation, then they should select a third assessor to assist them. Then, when and if these three assessors should unanimously agree upon the valuation of the said lot, and the rental to be paid for said lot, Catherine Biddle should execute a new lease for the said lot to said lessees for ten years at the rental so fixed, and so on for each succeeding term of ten years for the period of five hundred years. The answer then proceeds to aver that the parties have made five different attempts to have the rental of said lots fixed and determined by assessors, as provided in said original lease; that these five efforts have failed; that the failure is attributable entirely to the bad faith of Catherine Biddle, who, it is charged, appointed incompetent and prejudiced men as her assessors, and

instructed and limited them as to value, with a view of forcing upon respondents, the lessees, an extravagant valuation of said premises; that, by reason of her instructions, no agreement could be had among the assessors; that the only rent which Catherine Biddle is entitled to receive for said property is the rent which shall be fixed in the manner provided in said lease; and, as no rent has been fixed in the manner provided in said lease, Catherine Biddle could recover no rent whatever for the use and occupation of her said property, and that the suit for use and occupation should be dismissed and its progress stopped.

To this answer Catherine Biddle demurred, on the ground that it was not a sufficient or legal defense to the action. After argument the demurrer was sustained, and all that portion of the answer setting out the agreement to appoint assessors, and to grant a new lease, upon the basis of their finding, was stricken out. The case was set down regularly for hearing on the 30th day of September, 1876. On that day Peter Tscheider et al. filed the present bill in equity in this court, in which they set out substantially the agreement and facts set out in the answer as a bar to the action of use and occupation, and which the court held to be bad on demurrer; that no rental had been fixed in the manner provided in said agreement; that no new lease or renewal had been executed in accordance with the terms of said agreement; that the said lease was obtained for the purpose of enlarging a church edifice thereon, and erecting thereon a dwelling-house for the religious body using the church edifice; that, relying upon the covenants of the lease, the lessees have enlarged said church edifice and erected a building on the demised premises, at a cost of $113,240.27; that the complainants are ready to comply with the lease in all its parts, and have five times appointed assessors, who were disinterested, to meet assessors appointed by the lessor; but the attempts to procure a valuation failed, because the lessor appointed men as assessors, whose opinions as to valuation were previously known, and whom they had instructed or restricted not to go below a certain valuation, which was excessive and fifty per cent. more than the value of the property; that the lessor's assessors made excessive valuations accordingly, whereas the lessees' assessors made fair valuations; that the lessor has purposely and fraudulently prevented any valuation of the rental, as provided by the lease, with a view to extort an unconscionable rental from the lessees, who aver their willingness to appoint an assessor to meet one appointed by the lessor, who refuses to make such an appointment; that "defendant, Catherine Biddle, is now seeking to recover, in an action at law in this court, for use and occupation of said premises, against your orators, Peter Tscheider and Joseph Weber, an exorbitant and excessive rent. They there

fore pray that the further prosecution of said case of Catherine Biddle against Peter Tscheider and Joseph Weber be enjoined."

The prayer of the bill of Peter Tscheider et al., as amended, is as follows: "They therefore pray that plaintiffs and defendant be required to appoint assessors, as required and contemplated by said lease, and in accordance with the terms and provisions thereof, and proceed to an ascertainment of the rental value of the premises, as in and by said lease contemplated and provided; and that defendant be ordered and directed to execute to said lessees a renewal term of said lease as therein provided, and unless she do so, and in the meantime, the further prosecution of the said case of Catherine Biddle against Peter Tscheider and Joseph Weber be enjoined, and for such other and further relief as the equity of the case may require, and to your honors may seem meet."

The cause is now before the court on the demurrer of Catherine Biddle to the bill of complaint. E. T. Farish, for complainants; Grover & Ellis, for defendant.

DILLON, Circuit Judge:

On the demurrer the averments of the bill in equity are admitted on the record. The lessees obtained a lease for ten years, with the right to periodical renewals for five hundred years, the rental to be ascertained by assessors in the manner provided in the lease. The lessees have entered into possession, and, on the faith of the efficiency of the covenant to renew, have made improvements on the demised premises, costing over $100,000. At the end of ten years the lessor, instead of complying in good faith with the covenant as to renewal, acts in bad faith and fraudulently, to prevent a valuation and a renewal. Hence, no renewal has been had. The lessees are still in possession. The lessor brings an action at law in this court for the use and occupation of the premises-of the whole premises, and not simply of the premises aside from the improvements made by the lessees. On a demurrer to the answer at law, we held that the unexecuted provisions of the lease as to renewal, although attributable to the fault of the lessor, were no answer to the action; and this holding was in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri, in a case which arose under a similar lease. Finney v. City, 34 Mo. 303; and its sequel, Garnhart v. Finney, 40 Mo. 449; and see, also, Biddle v. Ramsey, 52 Mo. 153. And if, under such circumstances, the lessor can recover at law for use and occupation, he could recover the possession in ejectment if he had seen fit to adopt that remedy. The lessees being without fault, and willing to comply with the lease, what are their rights and remedies? They may, it is said, sue the lessor at law for a breach of the covenant in respect to renewal, and recover damages. This was so held in Garnhart v. Finney, supra, and has been adjudged in other cases. Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491; Hopkins v. Gilman, 22 Wis. 476. It will be observed that it is so held, although the obligation to renew does not become consummate until the valuation is fixed, and such valuation is to be ascertained by arbitrators who had never been appointed or had never acted. But, assuming that, on the facts stated in the present bill, the lessees might sue the lessor for damages-is this their only remedy? If so, it is obvious that the law is so defective as to shock the sense of justice, and that it rewards the party who fraudulently seeks to evade his obligation, at the expense of the party who has trusted the covenants of the lessor, and expended large sums of money on the faith that he would observe those covenants. If this lease contained a simple covenant to renew at a fair valuation, this covenant, it is admitted, could be specifically enforced, and the court would settle the valuation or rental to be paid. The lessee, in such a case, is not remitted to an action at law for damages, but may go into equity for a specific execution of the covenant to renew. This is settled law.

Is the right, the equity, to a renewal in these lessees any the less cogent and persuasive, because they have provided the means for ascertaining the rental on the renewal, and the lessor purposely and fraudulently thwarts the execution of those means? As an original proposition, after much reflection, I should say that it was in accordance with sound principle to hold, that if the lessor were guilty of the fraudulent conduct charged in the bill, he subjected his conscience to be laid hold of by a court of equity, who would say to him, "you have agreed to renew-the lessee has expended large sums of money on the faith of that agreement-you refuse to execute the provisions for the

fixing of the valuation by arbitrators-you can not, therefore, object if the court, with the concurrence of the lessees, proceeds to fix the valuation under the provisions of the lease." Some adjudications, however, have been made, with which it might not be easy to reconcile the view just stated. Milner v. Gery, 14 Vesey, 400; Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491; Hopkins v. Gilman, 22 Wis. 476.

These cases proceed upon the idea that such provisions as those in this lease, are in effect an agreement to arbitrate, and that agreements to arbitrate will not be specifically enforced in equity. I agree to the reasonableness of the doctrine, that a court of equity will not enforce a specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate. The grounds of this doctrine, and the cases in its support, are given by Mr. Justice Story in Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story C. C. 800. To refuse judicially to enforce an agreement to arbitrate, occasions no injustice; for the courts remain open to the parties with better provisions for securing justice, than are possessed by arbitrators. So, where the refusal of a court to appoint, or compel the appointment of arbitrators, or substitute its judgment for the judgment of arbitrators, will occasion no injury which can not be fully and adequately redressed by an action at law, as in the ordinary case of an agreement to sell, it is entirely consistent with sound principle, for a court of equity to decline to interfere. In this view, I can agree to the actual decision on the facts of the cause of Sir Wm. Grant, the Master of the Rolls, in the leading case, Milner v. Gery, 14 Vesey, 400, without assenting to the reasoning of that great judge, that equity is absolutely disabled from interfering to compel a specific execution, unless the price of the property has been ascertained in the prescribed mode. That was the case of an agreement to sell-the parties could be placed in statu quo-no mala fides was imputed, and the failure of arbitrators to agree was not owing to bad faith;-under such circumstances, the refusal of the court to appoint its own master, to fix upon the price, can be well justified. But such a case as that made by the present bill is entirely different:here the parties can not be put in statu quo,-here mala fides is imputed,-here a remedy at law for damages does not satisfy the covenant, or the demands of enlightened justice. It is a well-settled principle, that courts will not compel the specific execution of a mere agreement to arbitrate; but I am strongly convinced that it is erroneous to apply that principle to cases like the present, where it would result in manifest and gross injustice. The cases, somewhat like the one before us (Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491; Hopkins v. Gilman, 22 Wis. 476), which, while asserting that the lessees have a remedy at law, but none in equity for specific performance, deserve further consideration before assenting to their entire correctness. In Greason v. Keteltas, the refusal of the lessor to appoint arbitrators, or take steps for an appraisal, was held to subject him to liability at law for the value of the buildings, on a valuation fixed by the court, although the covenant was, that this valuation was to be fixed by arbitrators. If such refusal on the part of the lessor is a breach of the covenant, so as to render him liable for damages, or to pay for the improvements on a judicial valuation, why is it not such a breach of duty as to justify à court of equity, where substantial justice requires it, to compel the lessor either to make the appointment, or to make one for him, or otherwise judicially ascertain the valuation?

Where is the equity of the party who purposely and fraudulently seeks to evade the contract on his part, to insist that a valuation by arbitrators is a sine qua non to equitable relief? Is he not in such a case estopped to set up his own wrong and fraud in defense to

the relief to which his adversary is otherwise clearly entitled? I suggest these views, that attention may be directed to this subject, and not because they are absolutely essential in this stage of the cause to support the present bill.

I admit that in specific performance the court must enforce the contract made by the parties, and that it can not ordinarily modify this contract, or make another and enforce that; but this sound and necessary principle does not preclude the operation of the principle of estoppel where this principle is necessary in order to do justice. Where the covenant to renew on an appraisal by third persons has, as in this case, been acted on by the lessee, and where the failure to secure a renewal will work injustice for which an action for damages is not a complete remedy, and where the lessor fraudulently thwarts the appraisal, why is he not estopped to set up the want of an appraisal, caused by himself, as a bar to appropriate equitable relief? The leading decisions from Mitchell v. Harris, 2 Ves. 129, to Scott v. Avery, 5 House of Lords Cases, 811, and Dawson v. Lord Otho Fitzgerald, Law Rep. Exch. 6 (s. c. 3 Cent. L. J. 477), have been critically examined, and, when properly understood, I do not think that in their essential facts they are in conflict with the above views. And the right to some equitable relief in cases like the present is directly decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, under a lease exactly similar to the one before us, in Biddle v. Ramsey, 52 Mo. 159, and is also recognized by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in the case of Hopkins v. Gilman, before cited.

In this connection it may be useful to refer to a provision in the English Common-Law Procedure Act of 1854, the 11th section whereof provides that "whenever the parties to any deed or instrument in writing, to be hereafter made or executed, or any of them, shall agree that any existing or future differences between them or any of them shall be referred to arbitration, and any one or more of the parties so agreeing, or person or persons claiming through or under him or them, shall nevertheless commence any action at law, or suit in equity, against any person or persons claiming through or under him or them, or against any person or persons claiming through or under him or them, in respect to the matters so agreed to be referred, or any of them, it shall be lawful for the court, in which action or suit is brought, or a judge thereof, on application by the defendant or defendants, or any of them, after appearance, and before plea or answer, upon being satisfied that no sufficient reason exists why such matters can not be or ought not to be referred to arbitration, according to such agreement as aforesaid, and that the defendant was, at the time of bringing such action or suit, and still is, ready and willing to join and concur in all acts necessary and proper for causing such matters so to be decided by arbitration, to make a rule or order staying all proceedings in such action or suit on such terms, as to costs and otherwise, as to such court or judge may seem fit; provided, always, that any such order may at any time afterwards be discharged or varied as justice may require." 17 and 18 Victoria, c. 125, § 11; Daniels' Chancery Practice, 4 Am. ed., vol. 2, p. 1861. It may be true, as suggested by the defendant's counsel, that this statute had its origin in the doctrine of the cases in the English courts before referred to, which, to a large extent, nullified agreements to refer matters in dispute to arbitration; but, if so, it shows that the cases which are relied upon by the defendant's counsel were productive of such results that this enactment was deemed expedient. However it may be in England, I see no reason for the position that such a statute in this country is necessary, in order to

justify a court of equity in making, by analogy, such a rule or order as is therein provided for, when justice requires it, and no good reason exists for not making it. A rule or order will accordingly be entered in this case, staying the prosecution of the law action for rent until the further order of the court. If the law action would settle the amount of rental on a renewal, there might or would be good reason for allowing it to proceed. But it will not have that effect. Such a rule or order does not contravene the principle contended for by the defendant, that, before there can be a decree for renewal, the rental must be fixed by arbitrators, and can not be fixed by the court, since the object of the rule or order is to compel the defendant (lessor) to himself appoint the assessor who is to represent him. If he appoints an impartial person, without instructions, and he is met by an impartial person appointed by the lessee, it is probable an agreement as to the rental will be reached. The defendant is, of course, at liberty to answer the bill and contest its averments. When the answer is filed or the proofs are in, the court can discharge or vary the order here made, as justice may require. The demurrer to the bill is accordingly disallowed, and the rule or order, as above suggested, in respect to the law action, will be entered. Treat, J., dissents.

ORDERED ACCORDINGLY.

BOOK NOTICES.

Surgical

CIVIL MALPRACTICE.-A Treatise on Jurisprudence. With Chapters on Skill in Diagnosis and Treatment, Prognosis in Fractures, and on Negligence.-By MILO A. MCCLELLAND, M. D. New York: Published by Hurd & Houghton. Boston: H. O. Houghton & Company. Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 1877.

This is a work of some five hundred and fifty neatly printed pages, made up mostly of decisions and abstracts of the decisions of trial and appellate courts, many of which, the author candidly admits, "might well have been omitted." But in our opinion, it would have been a happy omission if he had neglected to compile any part of the book. It is an aggravated case of malpractice in bookmaking. And yet the book is not wholly without value. The Table of Cases shows that sixty-three cases are referred to. In many instances the opinion of the court is given in full. These cases give the book some value for those who do not have access to the reports. The original matter, of which there is fortunately but very little, is mostly trash.

M. A. L.

COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW.-BY JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP. Sixth Edition. Two volumes. Boston: Little, Brown & Cɔ. 1877.

Mr. Bishop is unquestionably the most successful American commentator or writer on criminal law. His successive volumes on Criminal Law, the present work, Criminal Procedure, treating of Pleading Evidence, and Practice in criminal cases, in two volumes, and Statutory Crimes, in one volume, when followed by his projected book on Precedents, are intended to cover, and do cover the whole domain of criminal jurisprudence. The great popularity of Mr. Bishop's works is undeniable. Edition follows edition in close succession. The favor with which they are regarded by the profession shows no abatement, but rather increase and strength. Is it deserved? Unhesitatingly, yes. They show exhaustive research, accurate study, original and independent thought. Mr. Bishop has a manner and style of his own, imitated from no one, and difficult to imitate. It spices them with the flavor of novelty and

originality, and we expect to meet some agreeable surprise in expression or criticism or suggestion in almost every page, and are seldom disappointed. A distinctive feature of this author's works, to use his own language, is "that they are throughout a fresh enunciation of legal doctrine, made on a personal and full examination by the author of the original sources of the criminal law, English and American, old and modern, together." The "original sources" are, of course, the statutes and adjudications. Whoever will make a comparison of Mr.Bishop's work with the standard English treatises on criminal law-Mr. Russell's for instance-will perceive on what different principles they are constructed. The latter makes the statute the basis, and the author contents himself with an accurate and close statement of the exact points decided under the various clauses of the statute, and upon repealed or modified statutes when they throw light upon the exist ing statute. Of original views, or criticism or reflections, we have little or none. The merit and usefulness of such works are obvious, and their value consists in the faithful and exact reflection of the adjudications. This fulfills the plan, and satisfies the aim of their authors. Mr. Bishop's plan and purpose are more ambitious. He is more of a commentator, and less of a digester. Each mode has its advantages, and it is fortunate that the more difficult work of preparing treatises on the plan of Mr. Bishop has fallen into such competent hands as his. On a close or difficult point in criminal law we never feel satisfied, until we have seen how it is regarded by this distinguished author. The solid foundations upon which he has built are demonstrated by the exhaustive examination of and reference to the adjudged cases. In these two volumes 9514 cases are cited-affording to every inquirer, by means of the text and the notes, the data of the most minute investigation. His success and confirmed popularity justify the pride which the learned and laborious author evidently feels in his books. "Some readers," he says, "will call it vanity;" but if it be such, it is a pardonable vanity, agreeable and not at all offensive. In his characteristic way he says: "Not a single instance has ever occurred in which any judge has examined the author's original view so as to understand it, without adopting and following it. And this has been going on for more than twenty years, as uniformly as the sun has risen in the morning and set at evening. Nor has any instance ever occurred, within the author's knowledge, in which any legal person, who has taken pains to understand a position depending on juridical views which might be deemed his own, has undertaken to assail it by legal argumentation. The author does not claim abilities superior to those professed by even the humblest of our profession; but, in his own hands, the plan has been promotive of harmony in the decisions, and he mentions the fact as a tribute to truth itself." (Introd. p. XII.) We might expand this notice, but it is not necessary in relation to a work which is found in the library of almost every lawyer, and with which he would not D. willingly part.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

2. HOMESTEAD PROCEEDS OF SALE OF-EXEMPTION. -A, the owner of land, worth less than $1,000, and which is exempted as a homestead, contracts a debt, then sells his land upon time, and, removing to another county in the same state, purchases a second tract of land on credit,worth less than $1,000, which he occupies as a homestead. Can B, the creditor, subject to the payment of his debt the purchase money due A for his first tract of land, when the second tract has not been paid for? The question arises under a statute containing only the usual words, exempting from "sale under ex

ecution, attachment, or judgment of any court, except to foreclose a mortgage given by the owner of a homestead, or for purchase money due therefor, so much land, including the dwelling house and appurtenances owned by the debtor, as shall not exceed in value $1,000." I have found no direct adjudication settling the question. In the case of Thompson v. Heffner, 11 Bush, 353, the court decided that where an exchange of real estate is made, if either of the parties thereto is entitled to a homestead in the property he parted with, he will take the same right in the property he receives; and in the course of the opinion the court say: "In the exchange the exempted homestead in one paid for a like exemption in the other, and nothing was withdrawn from the creditors. If instead of exchanging our residence for another, the first had been sold and the second purchased, the rule might be different." LEX.

[The question here is,whether the proceeds of the debtor's homestead, due but not payable, that is, payable at a time certain in the future, are exempt under the statute cited. The homestead being worth less than the sum limited in the statute, no judgment is a lien upon it. The homestead being exempt, everything that comes out of it is also exempt. It follows that the proceeds of sale are exempt. In Illinois, under a statute very much narrower than that given by Lex, the whole current of decided cases, without a single exception, confers upon the debtor the right to sell his homestead. If the right to sell be restricted, then his right to the enjoyment of it is not complete. See 53 Mo., 375; 57 Ib., 104; 58 Mo., 425. O. B. S. 3. HOMESTEAD — JUDGMENT AGAINST MARRIED WOMAN.-I have obtained judgment against the separate estate of a married woman. The husband is insolvent, and the wife owns in her separate right the dwelling-house in which she resides, and no other property. Can she claim the property exempt as a homestead, so as to defeat the judgment against her separate estate? C.

[The property is certainly exempt, if it was her homestead at the time she contracted the debt. If it were her husband's property, and occupied by his family as a homestead, it would be exempt; the rule must be the same where it is the wife's, and she is the debtor; the family is hers. Young v. Graff, 28 Ill., 20; Tourville v. Pierson, 39 Ib., 446. Under the law of this State, all judgments against a married woman, except such as are upon proceedings in equity, are, as against her, invalid -not even attachment, where she is an absconding debtor, is valid. Gage v. Gates, 62 Mo., 412. O. B. S.

RECENT LEGISLATION.

MISSOURI LEGISLATURE-SESSION OF 1877. AN ACT to amend section two (2) of an act entitled "An Act providing for the vacating of streets, alleys, public squares and grounds of towns and cities, and providing for the change of names of such towns and cities," approved January 30th, 1866.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SEC. 1. That section two of an act entitled "An Act providing for the vacating of streets, alleys, public squares and grounds of towns and cities, and providing for the change of names of such towns and cities," approved January 30th, 1866, is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 2. If no opposition be made to such petition, the County Court may vacate the same with such restrictions as they may deem for the public good; but if opposition be made, such application shall continue until the next term of the court, when, if the objector consent to such vacation, or if

two-thirds of all the real-estate holders of the town or city petition therefor, the court may grant the prayer of the petition. The part so vacated, if it be a lot, shall vest in him who may have the title thereof, according to law; and if the same be a street or alley, the same shall be attached to the ground bordering on such street or alley, and all title thereto shall vest in the persons owning the property on each side thereof in equal proportions, according to the length or breadth of such ground, as the same may border on such street or alley; and whenever a public square or common shall be vacated, the property thereof shall be disposed of in such manner as the proper authorities of said town or city may direct.

Approved March 16th, 1877.

SEC. 2. The fees for such services shall be paid in advance, and it shall be the duty of the Register of Lands to pay the same into the State Treasury on the last day of each month, and take duplicate receipts therefor from the Treasurer, one of which shall be filed in his office, the other to be filed with the State Auditor, who shall charge the Treasurer with the amount thereof, to the credit of the revenue fund.

SEC. 3. The Register of Lands shall keep an account of all such fees received by him, in a book to be provided for that purpose, called the "Register of Fees," which shall be open at all times to inspection by the public.

SEC. 4. An emergency exists for the taking effect and going into force of this act immediately, the emergency being that there is now no law in force regulating the fees of the office of Register of Lands; therefore this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

Approved March 16th, 1877.

AN ACT to amend an act entitled "An Act for the incorporation of insurance companies other than life insurance companies, and for the regulation of insurance business, other than life assurance business, approved March 4th, 1869," being article 3, chapter 76 of Wagner's Missouri Statutes.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SEC. 1. That section 2 of the act entitled "An Act for the incorporation of insurance companies other than life insurance companies, and for the regulation of insurance business other than life assurance business," approved March 4th, 1869, being art. 3, ch. 76, of Wagner's