action for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant in failing to supply proper material for a scaffold, and the defective construction of such scaffold, upon which plaintiff was employed to work, can not be maintained, except where plaintiff is able to prove, by competent testimony, that the defects existed either in construction or materials; that defendant or his agents knew of such defects, and plaintiff did not know of them prior to exposing himself to the danger. Plaintiff can not recover if he knew of the hazard before the accident, or if it was the result of his own negligence. In the absence of positive proof of negligence, the accident and injury would be attributable to misadventure, inevitable fate, or other causes for which defendant would not be liable. [Citing Schultz v. Pacific R. R., 36 Mo. 32; Wooden v. Baltimore, etc., R. R., 32 Md. 410; Greenleaf v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 29 Iowa, 14; Wharton on Neg. § 212-13]. Employers are bound to use reasonable care in supplying suitable apparatus for the performance of the work, and are liable for injuries caused by their negligence in this respect. [Citing Gibson v. P. R. R., 46 Mo. 163; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230.] Where the evidence offered by the plaintiff does not support the issue, a demurrer to the evidence should be sustained. The demurrer to evidence admits the facts, and every inference legitimately to be drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff. In sustaining demurrer to the evidence, the court applies the law to the facts. [Citing Schuchardt v. Allens, 1 Wall. 369-71; Reed v. Deerfield, 8 Allen, 524; Todd v. O. C., etc., R. R., 7 Allen, 207; Brown v. European, etc., R. R., 58 Me. 389; Brooks v. Somerville, 106 Mass. 275; Denny v. Williams, 5 Allen, 4; Bailey v. Kimball, 26 N. H. 351; Mason v. Lewis, 1 Greenl. (Ia.), 494; Ellis v. Ohio, etc., Trust Co., 4 Ohio St., 628; Thrings v. Cent., etc., R. R. Co., 7 Robt. (N. J.), 616; Gray v. McNeal, 12 Ga. 424; Stuart v. Simpson, 1 Wend. 376.] The court does not weigh the evidence. Evidence insufficient to support a verdict is quoad hoc no evidence. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by HAYDEN, J.-Nolan v. Schickle.

ATTORNEY AT LAW-AUTHORITY TO COLLECT AND SATISFY JUDGMENT REVOKED BY CLIENT'S DEATH-SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT.-1. The authority of an attorney at law to collect and satisfy a judgment recovered by him is revoked by the death of his client, and without a new retainer by his personal representative, he will have no authority to intermeddle with the collection. 2. If an attor ney of a judgment-plaintiff collects the same and enters satisfaction of the judgment after the plaintiff's death, the entry will be set aside on motion by the personal representative of the deceased creditor, although it may affect a purchaser of real estate from the judgment-debtor. Opin1on by SCOTT, J.-Turnan et al. v. Timke.

COUNTY COURT-POWER TO LIMIT TIME OF OBJECTING TO JUDGMENT FOR TAXES-APPEAL.-1. The county has the power to make a rule limiting the time for filing objections to judgment against delinquent lands for taxes, and may enforce the same by refusing to receive objections after the expiration of a reasonable time thus fixed. 2. The statute allowing an appcal from the county to the circuit court from judgments against lands for taxes being repealed on July 1, 1875, no appeal will lie to the circuit court where final judgment is rendered after that day, although the application for judgment is made and the land-owner defaulted in June, 1875. 3. The entry of an order defaulting a defendant is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies. Opinion by DICKEY, J.-Hess v. People ex rel. Miller.

SWORN ANSWER AS EVIDENCE-CERTIFICATE OF EVIDENCE-MATTERS NOT OFFERED AT HEARING.-1. An intervening defendant in a proceeding for a mechanic's lien, who fails to show any title or interest in the property sought to be affected, has not such a standing in court as will enable him to call in question a decree establishing the lien. 2. A sworn answer, so far as responsive to the allegations of a petition for a mechanic's lien, is competent evidence, but in relation to new matter therein set forth not called for in the petition, is not evidence, but a mere matter of pleading. 3. The circuit court has no power at a term subsequent to the rendition of a decree, to permit evidence not introduced at the hearing, nor until after the decree, to be incorporated into the certificate of evidence or bill of exceptions, and if it does, it will be stricken out. Opinion by DICKEY, J.-L. S. & M. S. R. R. v. McMillan

et al.

TRUSTEE'S SALE-PARTY PARTICIPATING IN, NOT ALLOWED TO URGE INADEQUACY OF PRICE RIGHT OF TRUSTEE TO PURCHASE AFTER SALE-SUFFICIENCY OF POWER OF ATTORNEY TO SELL AND CONVEY LANDWHEN EQUITABLE TITLE PASSES UNDER AN UNSEALED POWER-TRUST DEED CONSTRUED AS TO NOTICE OF SALE REQUIRED.-1. Where the owner of land, sold under a a power in a mortgage, attends the sale, and through his attorney bids upon the same, and allows it to be sold to another, he will not be permitted years after, and when valuable improvements have been made on it by subsequent purchasers, to impeach the sale on the ground that the property has sold for less than its true value. 2. While public policy and fair dealing will not allow a trustee, either directly or indirectly, to become a purchaser of property at his own sale, yet, after the sale is made and the property has passed beyond his control, he will have the same right to purchase it as a stranger, if the transaction is in good faith. 3. A power of attorney to sell and convey, under which a conveyance of land is made, must be in writing, and of equal dignity with the deed executed, in order to be valid at law. It must be under seal. 4. A power of attorney not under seal will be suflicient to authorize the attorney to sell land, but not to make a conveyance. 5. Where a trust deed authorizes the trustee, his legal representatives or attorney, to sell the land conveyed on default of payment, and a sale is fairly made under a power of attorney not under seal, and the purchase-money paid and a conveyance executed by the attorney, the sale will be good in equity, and the purchaser will acquire the equitable title to the premises, and may set up such title in bar of a suit in equity to have the sale set aside. 6. Where a trust deed or mortgage, with a power of sale, provides that the mortgagee may sell after having advertised such sale sixty days in a newspaper published in etc., by posting up notices in four places in the county, the word "by" will be regarded as inserted by mistake in place of the word "or," and it will be sufficient if notice is given by publication or by posting. Opinion by CRAIG, J.-Watson et al. v. Sherman et al.

advancement or not, depends on the intention of the parent at the time the gift is made.-Bradsher v. Cannady. MUNICIPAL LAWS MUST BE EXECUTED BY MUNICIPALITY ALONE-RECITALS IN CHARTER.-Municipal laws must be executed by the municipality itself, unless some statute provides expressly otherwise. The legislature, in conferring corporate powers, have selected the depository of the powers intended to be exercised, and in doing so have, by implication, prohibited its exercise by any other agency. An amended charter of a municipal corporation, ratified in 1874, reciting that the original charter was passed in 1825, is evidence of the existence of such original charter, but does not prove that the corporation had peculiar powers in such original charter.-State v. Threadgill.

FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS - CAVEAT EMPTOREFFECT OF FRAUD-1. When representations are made by one party to a contract, which may be reasonably relied on by the other, and these representations are false and fraudulent, and cause injury and loss to the party relying on them, such party is entitled to relief. 2. The maxim of caveat emptor does not apply in cases where there is actual fraud. 3. Where, in the sale of land, the quantity represented is the inducement to the purchase, and fraud in the sale is alleged and found, it is not a proper ground for the abatement of the price; but it vitiates the whole contract, and is sufficient ground for rescinding and setting aside the sale in toto.-Hill et al. v. Brower.

ACTS OF AN OFFICER UNDER AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW. -The act of March 9, 1875, requiring sheriff's sales in certain cases to be advertised in a German newspaper, was decided to be unconstitutional and void. 50 Ind. 424. Held, that the act being void, costs arising from the advertisement of such sales in German newspapers were improperly incurred, and the sheriff can not retain the surplus arising from such sales for the payment of such costs. Reversed. Opinion by WORDEN, C. J.-Martin v. Reissner.

JURISDICTION-WHEN IT MUST BE SHOWN AFFIRMATIVELY EVIDENCE.-The record of a court of limited jurisdiction must affirmatively disclose such a state of facts as warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. 27 Ind. 133; 37 Id. 306. The judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, however irregular, is not void, and can not be impeached collaterally, but may be attacked for fraud. When the court has no jurisdiction, the judgment is void. The record of a justice of the peace is conclusive evidence of the facts therein contained. In a prosecution for bastardy the court committed error in rejecting as evidence the judgment of the justice before whom, it was claimed, there had been an agreed and final disposition of the case. Judgment reversed. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Britton v. The State.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION PLEADING — DAMAGES.—A complaint, charging that the defendant "maliciously and without probable cause," accused the plaintiff of theft and had him prosecuted therefor, is not bad for failing to aver that the accusation was "falsely " made. If it were necessary for the complaint to show that the charge was falsely made, that fact prima facie appears by the averment that the person accused was tried and acquitted of the charge. But the evidence in such a case only necessarily relates to the points of probable cause, malice and prosecution ended. An instruction to the jury that they might include in their verdict, as an item of damages, if the evidence justified it, a reasonable attorney's fee for defending the malicious prosecution, is justified by the authorities. [Sedgwick on Damages, 6th ed., p. 110; Field on Damages, 544.] Judgment affirmed. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Zeigler v. Powell.

INDICTMENT FOR MURDER-SURPLUSAGE-PREMEDITATED MALICE.-An intent to do a thing is not to be confounded with an attempt to do the thing. The first may exist without any steps being taken for the accomplishment of the purpose, while the other implies the taking of such steps. Where an indictment charged that a murder was committed in an attempt to perpetrate a rape, and also that the murder was effected by means of poison, held, 1, that, as the allegations were sufficient to show a murder by poisoning, and insufficient to show a murder in an attempt to commit rape, the allegations in respect to the latter charge should be regarded as surplusage. 2. Under the statute (2 R. S. 1876, 426, §§ 7 and 8), a purpose to kill is essential to the crime of murder in the first degree; but where the purposed killing is charged to have been by administering poison, it is not necessary to allege that it was done with premeditated malice, or with malice at all, to constitute murder in the first degree, as the purposed killing by poison carries with it conclusive evidence of premeditated malice. Judgment reversed. Opinion by WOR DEN, C. J.-Bechtelheimer v. The State.

ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE-OFFICER DE FACTO.-Where an office is in dispute between two persons, and the one in the actual possession of the office steps out of the place where the business is usually performed, but with no intention of abandoning the office or of giving it to the other person, and such other person, with full knowledge of the facts steps in and immediately proceeds to do business as though he was in fact the officer; held that, as between spch two persons, the one previously in possession must be considered as the officer de facto. Opinion by VALENTINE, J.Braidy v. Theritt.

CRIMINAL LAW-WHEN CONFESSIONS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE-AFFIDAVIT READ ON TRIAL-ERROR.-1. A criminal offense was committed in the city of Lawrence. On the next day the defendant was arrested therefor by the city marshal, but was immediately discharged. In eight or nine days thereafter the defendant was again ar rested by the marshal, who, at this time, said to the defendant that "it would be better for him (the defendant) to make a clean breast of it, and tell me (the marshal) all about it." The marshal testified on the trial of this case that he may have said more than this by way of inducement to the defendant to confess; but another witness, who was present and heard all the conversation between the marshal and the defendant, testified that this was all that was said by the marshal for that purpose. What the defendant said is not shown; but the defendant himself testified that he made no confession at that time nor at any other time. Afterwards, but on the same day, the defend; ant was put into the custody of a constable to be taken to the county jail. While on their way to the jail, by way of the defendant's mother's house, the defendant made a confession of his guilt to the constable. The constable was not present at the interview between the defendant and the marshal, and no one was present at the time the defendant made his confession to the constable, except the consta ble himself. No inducement was at any time held out to the defendant to confess, except the foregoing language of the marshal; held, that the said confession must be considered as having been voluntarily made, and that the court below did not err in permitting said constable to tes tify on the trial concerning it. 2. An affidavit purporting to state what the evidence of four absent witnesses would be, if present, was read on the trial by the defendant in a criminal prosecution upon an agreement of the county attorney, that such affidavit might be read to the jury as the deposition of such witnesses; afterwards the court refused (though requested to do so by the defendant) to instruct the jury to treat said alleged evidence, as though witnesses had been personally present at the trial and had testified to such evidence on the witness stand; held, not error. Opinion by VALENTINE, J.-State v. White.

The Central Law Journal.

SAINT LOUIS, MARCH 23, 1877.

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CURRENT TOPICS.

THE publication of so-called evidence taken before a committee of investigation of the Missouri Legislature, which it is now announced has closed its labors, serves as a text from which to consider the evils which this kind of investigation promotes. These investigating committees, both legislative and congressional, appear, during the last few years, to have degenerated into mere engines for the promotion of political defamation or personal spite. That investigations may become necessary from time to time, there can hardly be . any doubt. It is not against investigation qua investigation that we protest, but we do most heartily object to that system which permits ex parte testimony, taken before a body frequently partisan in character, and always more or less engaged in fishing for evidence, to be published to the world during the progress of the investigation. Under this outrageous system, the reputation of no man is safe. His most innocent acts may, by a malicious or ignorant witness, be made to appear in a disgraceful light, and so published to the world, and himself held up to obloquy, before he has ever had notice that his acts were under consideration, or before an opportunity has been given him to explain that which may be easily susceptible of explanation. Much as has been said and written against the system of taking testimony before grand juries, there is at least this to be said in its favor, that no publication is permitted thereof, and no word of information allowed to go abroad, until the accused is actually in court and prepared to make his defense. With these smelling committees the case is entirely different; and it is a notorious fact that they are frequently raised for the express, though not expressed, purpose of bringing out statements in the public prints which shall redound to the assassination of private character and the gratification of personal or political malice. How the evil is to be cured is another question. Congress and the various legislatures within their respective spheres claim to be omnipotent in these matters; and though some few of these committees have, we believe, had sense of decency sufficient to withstand popular clamor for open investigation, and thus averted some of the evils, it is not in human nature to expect that a general reform in this matVol. 4.-No. 12.

ter will take place, until it is made the subject of positive statutory or constitutional provision. Perhaps the shortest way of reaching the matter would be by a constitutional amendment, expressly prohibiting the publication of this class of testimony, until the committee shall have completed their investigations and made their reports, and then only permitting it, when the parties accused or suspected shall have been arraigned for the alleged offenses. A milder. but less direct remedy suggests itself in an amendment to the libel laws, holding both newspapers publishing, and persons giving oral circulation to the information obtained by such committees, strictly accountable in damages to the parties thereby injured. The subject, however, is too wide to be thoroughly discussed in a brief article. We simply call attention to the evil with the hope, that some effectual means for its correction may be devised.

THE author of several elementary works on the law, Mr. Josiah W. Smith, has lately laid down with considerable force some rather novel ideas which he considers to be the true principles of judicial decision. Mr. Smith was presiding in an English county court the other day, where the question was raised, whether the terms of a certain statute had been complied with. Having ruled that they had, the defendants' counsel asked leave to appeal. Mr. Smith thereupon informed the parties and their counsel, that he did not feel himself bound or even justified, in a case in which he was clear, to give any dissatisfied party the opportunity of appealing, and thereby exposing the opposite party to the expense and vexation resulting therefrom; that he was confirmed in that view more and more every year, when he saw the manner in which the decisions of the High Court of Justice were week by week overruled by the Court of Appeals, and when he saw the Court of Appeals itself overruled by a higher tribunal. He therefore refused to allow an appeal, and at the same time took occasion to express his views on the subject of judicial decisions at some length. Equally eminent judges," he said, "have been and are governed by different systems or theories of judi-cial decision, leading to opposite results; the one: mainly proceeding on technical refinements; the other on principles of natural justice, common sense, and public policy; the one deciding on general rules or principles, the other looking to the exceptive circumstances of each case as much as to general rules or principles. The adoption of the former system by some judges has led to endless uncertainty, frequent litigation, both original and appellate, incalculable expense and vexation, and the grossest injustice and contravention of public policy. And it has been the prolific source of a mass of refined trash and learned rubbish which strains the brains, occupies the public time, and exhausts the bodily and mental powers of the judges, to no purpose but to defeat moral right and sound expediency." To remedy this, what was needed was an enactment like one which he

had prepared, and which was to the following effect: "Subject to any plain enactment or plain agreement to the contrary, and subject to the established rules of law, where an exception to such rules is not called for by the circumstances, all cases in litigation other than cases of construction shall, in the discretion and to the best of the judgment of the judge or judges deciding the same, be decided, so far as may be, according to justice, moral right, and public policy, and all cases of doubtful construction shall, in the discretion and to the best of the judgment of the judge or judges deciding such last-mentioned cases, be decided according to the presumable intention of the parties or testators. But the operation of this enactment shall be subject to any previous decisions of the superior courts, clearly and absolutely governing the cases in litigation, in the opinion of the judge or judges deciding such cases." This, he said, was his view on the subject. There was so much uncertainty in the law, arising from the different modes of decision adopted by different judges, that he did not think himself justified, much less bound, to expose the party in whose favor he decided to the vexation and expense and uncertainty of a trial of the case in the courts of law. When he saw a different mode of interpretation adopted, he should be ready to alter his practice.

WE HAVE heretofore taken occasion to animadvert on the facilities that a loose system of bar discipline affords to shysters-particularly those affecting the secret divorce business-to bring disgrace on the whole profession; and we have called attention to the cards of these miserable libels on the name of attorney, as published in the daily journals. From these cards it would appear that most of their nefarious trade is carried on in Chicago; but a circular which has just fallen into our hands shows how and where the final processes are brought about. This circular is issued by a fellow signing himself George A. Webster, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, and is addressed to the members of the legal profession in the states. The exordium "respectfully" draws "attention to the divorce law of Utah, which is certainly the most liberal now in force in the United States." Attention is then called to an act of Congress of June 22d, 1874, entitled "An Act in relation to Courts and Judicial Officers in the Territory of Utah," the 3d section of which provides that "Probate Courts in their respective counties shall have jurisdiction in suits of divorce for statutory causes," etc. Then follows a brief synopsis of the divorce statute of the Territory, by sec. 2 of which it appears, that "if the court is satisfied that the person applying is a resident of the territory, or wishes to become one, then the court may decree a divorce for any of the following causes, to wit: Impotence, desertion, habitual drunkenness, inhuman treatment, conviction of felony; or, when it shall be made to appear, to the satisfaction and conviction of the court, that the parties can not live in peace and union together, and their welfare requires

separation." A quotation from section 5 of the same act makes it appear that the actual residence of the parties, or either of them, within the jurisdiction of the court is unnecessary; a mere wish to become a resident is sufficient. Further on it is shown by quotation of Congressional acts and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that such divorces, so obtained, which are valid in Utah, are also valid everywhere. Under sec. 5 of the divorce law of Utah, he says, "a proper and timely warning is given defendant, either by publication in a newspaper, here or elsewhere, as ordered by the court, frequently at suggestion of counsel." His document then concludes as follows: "You have doubtless noticed the number of soliciting advertisements for divorce practice, by parties in Chicago and other places. These solicitors all procure their divorces in this Territory, and I have represented and acted for many of them myself. But learning that most of the cases came from the profession through these brokers, 1 concluded to inform the profession as to the facts, and solicit direct, thus securing less division of fees and greater satisfaction."

THUS MUCH Mr. George A. Webster. We presume he has quoted the statute of Utah correctly, and if he has, it only remains to say on that head, that such a law is as great a disgrace to the Territory, as he is to the courts in which he professes to practice. The mainspring of the evil, however, appears to be found in the act of Congress, which gives the Mormon Probate Court of Utah jurisdiction in such cases, with no other limit than may be imposed by a Mormon legislature. If this be not offering a direct premium to successful rascality, we fail to see what it is; and it calls for speedy attention, either in the way of amendment or repeal, so that the terrible evils now rampant may, in some measure, be checked. In the meantime the only remedy to hand at once is, for the courts to take prompt action in preventing these traders in family sorrows from practising before them. It is to this end, and with the faint hope that our suggestion may be acted upon, that we give Mr. George A. Webster, attorney at law, the benefit of the foregoing gratuitous advertisement.

IN THIS Connection there is some comfort to be gleaned from the fact, that another shyster, one Gale, has just been disbarred by the New York courts for nefarious practices, in procuring what appears to have been a collusive divorce, in the courts of that state. The fact of the divorce being collusive within the knowledge of Gale was not, however, the cause of his being disbarred, though it ought to constitute sufficient cause at any time. He was shown by the evidence adduced to have induced the woman to go to a hotel with him, where he registered her and himself under a false name as man and wife, and where he detained her against her will all night, making use of this fact to show, when the cause came up, that she had been guilty of adultery. When the divorce was obtained, she was absent in New Jersey, and supposed that it

had been granted on the ground of desertion. Upon discovery of the true state of the case, she applied to have the decree set aside, which was done on production of evidence that, though thus entrapped into a suspicious situation, she had remained in a room, separate from Gale, during the night of her detention at the hotel; and it was on this evidence that the proceedings, which had such a satisfactory termination were instituted against him. Gale, however, has still a large field for his industry in the courts of Utah, and will doubtless turn up soon as a worthy co-laborer in infamy with George A. Webster.

THE publishers of Judge Dillon's work on Municipal Corporations sent to the Chief Justice of England an author's copy of the book. This called forth from the head of the Common Law Bench of Great Britain the following letter, which will be read with interest, not only for what this eminent and distinguished judge says of the work, but for the just sentiments he expresses upon the legal and general relations of the two countries:

LONDON, December 30, 1876. SIR:-I have read your work on Municipal Corporations with very great interest, and admiration of the learning, historical and legal, which it exhibits. It affords a most valuable exposition of the law of both countries on the important subject of which it treats.

I pray you to believe that the respect paid by the Jurists of the United States to the authorities of this country, in regard to the law which both nations have derived from a common source, is most cordially reciprocated. There is scarcely a discussion of any importance in which American decisions, and American authors are not cited, and the judgments and dicta of a Marshall or a Story are familiar to us, as those of a Mansfield or an Ellenborough. May this ever be so! While, as an Englishman, I desire that a community of origin and a community of interests (when the latter are properly understood) should draw the two nations closer and closer, as a lawyer I could wish that a common jurisprudence should assist to cement the bonds of international amity.

We have had recently in our Court of Criminal Appeal a very interesting discussion, on a great question of international law, in the case of the "Franconia." I take the liberty of sending you herewith a copy of my judgment in the case. The review of the authoritiesmany of them American-may give it an interest in your eyes.

With the assurance of my great and sincere respect, I remain your most obedient servant,

Hon. John F. DLLON,

Etc,, etc., etc.

COCKBURN.

NOTICE OF PROTEST-BY WHOM GIVEN. As a general rule, the notice of dishonor of commercial paper is given, in the first instance, by the holder in whose hands payment or acceptance is refused. It has even been laid down as a rule that notice from another could never be sufficient, but that it must in every instance proceed from the holder himself. Buller, J., in Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167-70. And Lord Eldon, in ex parte Barclay, 7 Ves. 596-7, decides the question in the same way, for the reason that notice from

any one else than the one who intends to avail himself of it, in order to charge the party notified of the simple fact that the bill or note had been presented and payment refused, would not be notice that a third party intended to rely upon him for payment. It is true that there are three facts which the notice is supposed to communicate to the drawer or indorser: 1. That the paper was duly presented. 2. That acceptance on payment was refused. 3. That the holder looks to the party to whom notice is given for payment. But when the party has been regularly notified of the dishonor, it would seem to follow that he was looked to for payment. Such, at least, is the obligation he assumes when he draws or indorses the paper, and though it is customary, and perhaps prudent, to state in the notice that the recipient thereof is looked to for payment, such information would seem to be supererogatory, and its omission could hardly vitiate the notice. Lord Denman, in the case of Chapman v. Keane, 3 Adolph & Elliss, 193-6-7, flatly declares that the rule requiring notice to come from the holder, laid down in Tindal v. Brown, is not good law. The circumstances of the case of Chapman v. Keane were essentially different from those of the case overruled. The plaintiff had indorsed the bill to another, who had left it in the hands of plaintiff's clerk, with instructions to collect, or, in case of default in the payment, to give notice of its dishonor. The bill was duly presented, payment refused, and the clerk gave the notice to the defendant in the name of the plaintiff, instead of the real holder of the bill. Plaintiff subsequently took up the bill, and in the action brought thereon it was held that the notice was sufficient, notwithstanding it was not from the holder at the time such notice was given. This case was decided upon the authority of Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Camp. 373, and Wilson v. Swabey, 1 Stark. 34, where it is laid down that notice of any antecedent party to the bill would operate to the benefit of a holder or subsequent indorser. See also Riddle v. Mandeville, 5 Cranch, 322; Rogerson v. Hare, 1 W. W. &, D. 65; Crocker v. Getchel, 23 Me. 392; Stafford v.. Yates, 18 Johns. 327; Glasgow v. Patte, 8 Mo. 339; Glasscock v. Bk. of Mo., Ib. 443; Batchelor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 406. Mr. Chitty, in his valuable work on Bills of Exchange (Chitty on Bills, ch. 10,. p. 527, 8th ed.) declares the rule to be that it suffices if the notice be given after the bill is dishonored, by any person who is a party to the bill, and who would be entitled to re-imbursement after paying the same, and that such notice will inure to the benefit of all antecedent parties, and render any further notice from them unnecessary; the object of the notice being to enable the parties to have recourse to the maker, acceptor or drawer, it makes no difference from whom the notice is received. And in Thompson on Bills, § 4, pp. 496-7, the law is regarded as settled, that notice from any party to the bill will be sufficient, if it conforms, in other respects, to the requirements of the law, and, when given by the last indorser to