sion of the alleged criminal act. Judgment reversed. Opinion by NIBLACK, J.-White v. The State of Indiana. PROMISSORY NOTE-DESCRIPTION OF PERSONS.-A note in the usual form, "we promise," etc., and signed by the makers as "trustees of the First Universalist Church," does not purport to bind the church, but the parties who signed it. The signers did not promise for or on behalf of the church, but as individuals, for and on behalf of themselves. The description, as trustees, must be regarded merely as a description of their persons (citing 19 Ind. 44), and the makers were personally liable. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by WORDEN, C. J.-Hayes et al. v. Crutcher.

REPLEVIN BAIL-CONVEYANCE TO DEFRAUD CREDITORS -RIGHTS OF PARTIES.-A replevin bail is a surety merely, and is entitled to all the protection and immunity of other sureties. His property can not be levied on until the property of the principal, subject to levy and sale on execution, has been exhausted. A contract for the sale or convey. ance of property to hinder or delay creditors is illegal as to creditors only; as between the parties, and as to all others than creditors, it is valid and can be enforced like any other contract. [Citing 34 Ind. 433, and 42 Id. 421]. Judgment reversed.-Clark et al. v. Haverstick.

TENANCY-FORFEITURE — DEMAND-WAIVER.-Forfeitures are not favored in law and must be strictly construed. To entitle a landlord to re-enter and possess the premises for non-payment of rent, under a lease containing a clause of forfeiture upon non-payment of rent, he must demand the specific amount of rent due, just before sunset of the day upon which it became due, and upon the premises leased, where no place of payment is mentioned. The acceptance of rent paid after it became due, is a waiver of his right to enter under the forfeiture. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-Bacon v. The Western Furniture Company.

LIBEL CORPORATIONS-PLEADING.-It has always been the law in Indiana that a plaintiff, suing in a name importing that it is a corporation, need not expressly aver that it is such. In New York the same rule is applied where a party is sued by a name importing that it is a corporation, and there is no reason why this rule should not be recognized in this state. Where the complaint avers that the libel was printed and published, it is sufficient, both at com. mon law and under the code, and it is not necessary that the complaint should aver in detail the manner and extent of publication. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Indianapolis Sun Company v. Horrell.

JUDGMENT-PAYMENT BY SHERIFF, NO EXTINGUISHMENT.-Where an execution comes into the hands of a sheriff, and he holds it without levy on the property of the judgment-debtor until after the return day, and then pays the amount of the judgment to the creditor himself, the judgment is not extinguished by such payment, but is still alive for the benefit of the sheriff. Such a payment by the officer is compulsory within the meaning of the statute, and entitles the officer to all the rights he would acquire, if the payment had been compelled by means of a judgment and execution against him. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by WORDEN, C. J.-Burbank v. Slinkard.

CRIMINAL PLEADING — INSUFFICIENT INDICTMENT.Under the statute of Indiana the indictment must contain a statement of the facts constituting the offense in plain and concise language, and have substantially all the allega. tions of a good indictment at common law. An indictment charging the commission of a murder by the firing of a pistol loaded with powder and balls, without alleging that the pistol was fired at the murdered man, or that he was wounded by the balls, from which wounds he died, does not contain a plain and certain statement of the facts constituting the crime, and is insufficient. Judgment reversed. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Shepherd v. The State of Indiana. BASTARDY-ALLOWANCE FOR SUPPORT OF CHILD.— Where the mother of a bastard child, when it is 16 months old, gives it to an orphan asylum to be taken care of, and the asylum binds the child out until it shall attain the age of eighteen years, the party taking it to support, clothe, and maintain the child, a judgment requiring the putative father of the child to pay money to the party to whom the child is thus indentured, is clearly erroneous. Such party is entitled to nothing, because he is to receive the services of the child when they become of value as compensation for maintaining it during the period of helplessness. The mother is entitled to a just sum for the 16 months she supported the child, but has no right to call further upon the

putative father to aid in its support. Judgment reversed in part. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Young v. The State er rel. Converse.

NOTES.

IN City of Chicago v. Hering, Adm., recently decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, where it was sought to recover damages resulting to the next of kin from the drown. ing of a child less than four years old, in a ditch of water immediately in front of the residence of his parents, it was held that no negligence could be imputed to the parents for their failure to keep a constant watch upon the child, nor to the mother for failing to resuscitate him when discovered; and that the city was guilty of gross negligence in permitting the existence of a ditch filled to the depth of five feet with water, and without guards, in the midst of a populous district. A verdict for $800 in such a case was held not to be excessive. This decision is in harmony with most of the later authorities. See Isabel v. Han. & St. Joe R. Co., 2 Cent. L. J. 590, and note.

OBITUARY-HON. ETHER SHEPLEY, for twelve years a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, and, for seven years more, Chief Justice, died recently at his resi dence near Saco, in that state, from the effects of an accident received some time since. Mr. Shepley was born in Groton, Mass., November 2d, 1789, and had, therefore, at the time of his decease, passed the age of eighty-seven years. He received his elementary education at Groton Academy, from which he passed to Dartmouth College, where he graduated in 1811. Mr. Shepley began the study of the law in South Berwick, Me., and completed it in Massachusetts. On being admitted to the bar he established himself at Saco, where he soon entered upon an extended and lucrative practice. In 1819, when the question of separating Maine from Massachusetts was exciting deep interest, Mr. Shepley, whose opinions were well known, was chosen to the General Court, and facilitated the measure. He was also chosen the same year a member of the convention which framed the constitution of Maine. In 1821 he was appointed United States Attorney for the District of Maine, which office he held for twelve years, extending through the whole of one and parts of two other presidential administrations-clear proof of his efficiency and popularity as an officer. In 1833 he was elected to the Senate of the United States, as successor to the famous John Holmes. He

gave a warm support to the administration of Gen. Jackson, making several speeches on the removal of the United States Bank deposits, and other measures of the day. His tastes, however, were those of a lawyer and a jurist rather than of a politician, so that when he was appointed, in 1836, to the bench of the Supreme Court of Maine, he cheerfully accepted the place. In 1848 he became Chief Justice, and so continued until his constitutional term expired in 1855, The last public office held by Judge Shepley was that of sole commissioner to revise the laws of Maine, which task he ably discharged. The deceased jurist was the father of Gen. Geo. F. Shepley, now Judge of the First Federal Circuit, and John R. Shepley, Esq., of the firm of Glover & Shepley, of this city.-Hon. ONIAS C. SKINNER, sometime a Judge of the Supreme Court of Illinois, died at his residence in Quincy on the 4th instant. Judge Skinner was born in Oneida county, New York, in 1815. In 1830 he came West, and was admitted to the bar in 1841, and commenced practice in Ohio. The following year he removed to Illinois. In 1849 he was elected a member of the legislature, and in 1851 to the position of a circuit judge. His legal attainments, his fitness for a higher place in the judiciary of the state, were recognized in 1855 by his elevation to the supreme bench of the state. As judge of the Supreme Court he was regarded by the bar as the equal of the best jurists of that day. About the year 1859 he resigned his position on the bench to return to his practice, and secured the appointment of Hon. Pinckney H. Walker, still on the bench, as his successor. The cause of resignation was the small salary of $1,200, then paid Supreme Judges. Since then he has been engaged in the practice of law at Quincy. He was recognized as one of the ablest lawyers in the state, and was extraordinarily successful. Before the jury he was always powerful, and rarely failed to carry his points. In 1870 he accepted the position of member of the convention that framed the present consti tution of the state, in which body he held the important post of chairman of the judiciary committee.

The Central Law Journal.

SAINT LOUIS, FEBRUARY 23, 1877.

The mails sometimes fail to deliver this paper punctually and regularly to subscribers. Where we are notified of such failure WITHIN A MONTH after it occurs, we will, if possible, replace the numbers without charge. Otherwise, subscribers are expected to pay extra for numbers needed to complete file.

Hereafter we decline clubbing with the SOUTHERN LAW REVIEW, or with any other periodical. Subscribers, in remitting subscription price of the JOURNAL, should remember that its price is FIVE DOLLARS, NET. They should not, therefore, remit cheques on their own banks, nor deduct cost of exchange.

cery division is said to be attributable to the persistence of suitors in bringing common-law actions in that division, for the reason, as suggested by a leading member of the bar, that they prefer this branch of the court where they are able to have their cases tried by a judge without a jury-a statement, which, if made a few years ago, would have been regarded as a joke, but which at present, under the recent amendment to the law, is possibly correct. The protests, which come from the profession concerning the loss which is brought upon litigants by the law's delay, are to be found in the newspapers, and some of them furnish information both amusing and instructive. They complain of the loss and inconvenience to both lawyer and client, which, under ordinary circumstances, the inadequacy in the number of supreme court judges entails, but are particularly exercised that causes of great importance are laid aside to permit the judges to settle some question of ecclesiastical law or discipline, and that "the real work of litigation is neglected while this trumpery question of candles, vestments, and attitudes, about which no sane man ought to care one pinch of snuff, is being solemnly argued before a bench of judges strong enough to decide on the most vital question which could come before a court of law." "The evil," writes an old practitioner, "is most crying. The remedy for it does not consist in codification, as the Lord Chief Justice vainly suggests, or in any other sweeping measure of law reform. Our common-law procedure acts and our judicature acts-monuments of the enlightened jurisprudence of our time-have already done as much for the change of our law and practice as is necessary for many. years. If the provisions of Vol. 4.-No. 8.

these acts were successfully carried out by the bench and the bar, litigants would have no cause of complaint." To remedy the complaints, numerous suggestions have been advanced by many members of the bar, the principal ones being, the appointment of more judges, the selection for the bench of younger men, the referring of cases involving accounts to arbitrators before trial, the utilization for the purpose of trials of questions of fact of local courts, and the payment of official referees by the government.

THE question which is now agitating the minds of some 30,000 policy-holders of the Saint Louis Life Insurance Companies, is, "does life insurance insure?" We feel assured that in some cases it does not, and of this fact we have lately had a most pointed demonstration. A gentleman residing in Alabama placed in our hands a policy for $5000, of the Mound City Life Insurance Company, now called the Columbia Life Insurance Company, for advice as to what course he should pursue with reference thereto. Upon this policy he had made seven annual payments, amounting in the aggregate to $788.20 in cash, and had given premium notes for $368.45, upon which he had paid interest at the rate of eight per cent. per annum in advance. This is what is called a "participating policy;" that is to say, the holder of it is entitled to participate in any dividends which may have accrued from the profits of the company's business. A careful computation shows that these dividends have amounted in seven years to $23.55, or a little over three dollars a year! It would naturally be supposed that, when an insurance company had received this amount of premiums in cash, on which it has had the benefit of interest, and, in addition to this, a considerable amount of cash paid by way of interest on the so-called loan secured by the policy, he would be entitled to a paid-up "participating policy," to say the least, considerably in excess of the amount of premiums paid in. Instead of this, the secretary of the company informs us that, on surrender of this policy in compliance with its terms, the outstanding indebtedness will be canceled, and a paid-up all-cash participating policy will be issued, for $312.00, considerably less than half the amount of premiums paid in cash, to say nothing of interest paid on premium notes. Comment upon this case might be considerably prolonged; but it would be useless to draw comparisons between what this man was no doubt promised by an over-zealous agent, and what he is now offered by an insolvent company. We might repeat the inquiry made in a former issue: What has the insurance department of this state been doing all these years, that such a result should come to pass? So far as public opinion is concerned, that department has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. It might also be useful to inquire whether the criminal code might not be so amended as to reach abuses of this character. Is there not room for a statute which will make the agents of these concerns, who fraudulently entrap people

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into their delusive schemes, and the managers who mal-administer the assets, amenable to the criminal justice of the country? Gibbon somewhere says that corruption and fraud are the prices paid for liberty. The American people have paid these prices in too great a measure, and one almost wishes that we could have an hour or a day of the despotism of Russia, or of Japan, so that the knout, the exile to Siberia, and the headsman's axe might cure some who have been too thrifty and ambitious.

SPIRITUALISM, after sustaining, in the person of Dr. Slade, a considerable discomfiture by virtue of the English vagrant act, has achieved a marked victory over its persecutors through the uncertainty of the art of criminal pleading. The conviction of the medium was obtained under the fourth section of "An act for the punishment of idle and disorderly persons, and rogues and vagabonds, in that part of Great Britain called England,” which provides that "every person pretending or professing to tell fortunes, or using any subtle craft, means or deceit, by palmistry or otherwise, to deceive and impose on his majesty's subjects," shall be liable to the penalties imposed by the act. The case coming before the sessions on appeal, it was found that the words, "by palmistry or otherwise," had been omitted from the conviction. Thereupon it was contended by the counsel for the defendant that, in omitting these words, the conviction was bad; that, if these words were mere surplusage, the section was wide enough to cover any imaginable fraud, including cheating at cards, false pretences and forgery, at common law. The court took this view of the case and quashed the conviction; and, under the principles of criminal pleading, it would seem that its decision was correct, although no one contended that the craft which the defendant practiced was at all in the nature of palmistry. An English legal periodical, in commenting on the decision, is obliged to enter its protest in regard to the absurd and irrational system of criminal pleading at common law. "An indictment," it says, "for burglary would be bad without the word 'burglariously,' though it set out the existence, in fact, of all the elements that constitute a burglary. The allegation for want of which the conviction in Slade's case was held bad was, that the subtle craft was by palmistry or otherwise.' But the 'craft' alleged in that case clearly was not by palmistry. It is at least a very awkward device to have to say that it was by palmistry or otherwise; and, can anything be more absurd, than that a question of some importance should be burked by the interposition of such a trumpery technicality as this? Can anything show more distinctly the vices of the existing system of criminal pleading? We may add that we see a possibility of considerable difficulty arising in future from this application of the ejusdem generis theory with regard to the framing of criminal pleadings. Suppose, for instance, that a by-law of a railway company forbade a passenger from taking any

6

'dog, cat, or other animal' into a railway carriage with him, and the question was whether the taking of a parrot into the carriage was an offence under the by-law, the conviction would have to allege, it would appear, that the parrot was a dog, cat, or other animal.' It could hardly say, it was 'another animal' only, and to say that it was 'an animal other than a dog or cat' would seem equally to fail to hit the mark." But the end is not yet. Since what we have quoted above was written, a rule nisi has been issued from the Court of Queen's Bench to the sessions to hear the case upon its merits, where the defendant will have an opportunity of showing that he is neither a rogue nor a palmister.

THE St. Louis Globe-Democrat replies to the strictures contained in our issue of last week upon its inconsiderate attack upon the whole legal profession, in an article much more temperate and candid; so much so that we are glad to say that we concur in a great deal which it says. We must, however, protest against the attempt of the GlobeDemocrat to array this journal among "the supporters of legal extortion, corruption and oppression." We have used our earnest endeavors since this journal was established to oppose legal extortion, corruption and oppression, and in every way to elevate the standard of the legal profession. Whenever the Globe-Democrat or any other newspaper will put its finger upon some specific act of extortion or oppression, we will join heartily with it in arraigning the person or persons guilty of such act, before the bar of public opinion. It is needless to attempt to disguise the fact that the standard of professional ethics among a portion of the American bar, like the standard of journalism, has sunk very low. Bar associations are unfortunately liable in too great a degree to the impeachment of the newspaper in question. A stream can not rise higher than its fountain, and no class of men can be expected to frame laws for the punishment of offences of which they themselves are guilty. Bar associations are liable to become swamped with members of the profession whose interest is not to prevent those practices which bring the profession into disrepute. We have good authority for the suggestion that if liars and swearers were hung, "then the liars and swearers were fools; for there are liars and swearers enough to beat the honest men and hang up them." Whenever the honest members of the legal profession commence a struggle against the dishonest practices which have brought the profession into popular disrepute, they may well be thankful for assistance from whatever quarter it comes; and in that event we shall be glad to take hold of the celebrated towline of the Globe-Democrat, and give a long pull, a strong pull and a pull altogether, for the purpose of hoisting the legal profession out of the quagmire into which it has been sunk through the practices of its unworthy members. We must add, as a mere incident to this discussion, a word about" divorce shysters." We certainly hope that the newspaper

in question will at once set itself right before the public, and show the sincerity of its professions, by expelling from its columns the advertisements of Goodrich and Sims. Goodrich advertises himself as an attorney at law; but it is well known that he is not an attorney at all, but that he was disbarred a year ago by the Supreme Court of Illinois, through the efforts of the Chicago Bar Association. He would be now what he professes to be, an attorney at law, if it had been left to the newspapers to disbar him. Therefore, when a newspaper publishes his advertisement, in which he announces himself to the public as an attorney at law, it publishes what a well-informed newspaper manager must know is a direct falsehood. In our judgment the case is as bad as that of a lawyer who, for money paid him by his client, pronounces a deliberate falsehood in a court of justice. Sims, the other Chicago divorce man, whose card the Globe-Democrat publishes, is not even a lawyer, but an ignorant fellow who can not write good English, and who undoubtedly gets his nefarious work done, as Goodrich does, through lawyers in apparent good standing, who are unknown to the courts as having any connection with these men. A bill has been introduced into the Illinois Legislature, if we recollect aright, making it a misdemeanor in any newspaper to publish the cards of such persons. We hope it will pass, and that some of the reformers in our own Legislature will seize upon the occasion, and get a similar bill through before the adjournment.

ENJOINING THE PUBLICATION OF LIBELS. In almost every large city of the United States, and perhaps in England, the business of blackmailing is carried on to a considerable extent. Small publications, ostensibly assuming the character of newspapers, and perhaps pretending to a small degree of respectability, are really maintained for the purpose of extorting money from such individuals or corporations as prefer submitting to robbery rather than to libel. Nor are the persons who thus submit to extortion much to be blamed. The natural appetite for libel is very difficult to satiate. Every man against whom a libel is published may expect that it will be widely read, and, to say the least, not altogether discredited. Recourse to proceedings at law augments the publicity of the libel, and, except in rare instances, proves as damaging to the libeled as to the libeler. Hence in several recent cases the aid of equity has been sought. In the city of San Francisco an injunction was recently, after full deliberation, issued out of one of the district courts, restraining the publication of a libel. In all the other cases in this country coming within our knowledge, the right to preventive relief has been denied. The subject is still of sufficient importance to justify a review of the authorities and of the reasons which have been urged in their support.

The Court of Star Chamber exercised jurisdiction in cases of "scandalous libeling" (1 Spence

Eq. Juris. 350); but this court, through the tyrannical exercise of its authority, became so odious, that it was abolished by statute 16 Car. I., c. 10. In 1680, about half a century after the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber, an information was filed in the crown office against Henry Carr, or Care, for printing and publishing a book entitled "The Weekly Pacquet of Advice from Rome, or the History of Popery." 7 State Trials, 1111. Carr was tried before Lord Chief Justice Scroggs, at Guildhall, in July, 1680, and through the manifest efforts of the Chief Justice and of Sir George Jeffries, the Recorder, was found guilty by the jury. In the same year, the House of Commons presented articles of impeachment against the Chief Justice, specifying eight different offences. 8 State Trials, 197. In the third of these specifications it is charged that Scroggs, with the other judges of the Court of King's Bench, before the conviction of said Carr of any crime, "did make a rule against the printing of the Weekly Pacquet of Advice from Rome, or the History of Popery;" and his conduct in this respect is claimed to have been "most apparently contrary to all justice, in condemning not only what had been written without hearing the parties, but also all that might for the future be written on that subject; a manifest countenancing of popery and discouragement of protestants, an open invasion of the right of the subject, and an encroachment and assuming to themselves a legislative power and authority." The articles of impeachment were presented to the House of Lords, where, soon after, the "affair was dropped." 8 State Trials, 216. This futile impeachment of Scroggs has frequently been referred to as affording strong assurance, that his action in granting a rule against a libel was thought worthy of the most severe censure. But all of the proceedings, both in the trial of Carr and on the impeachment of the judges, show that the whole controversy was religious and political. Scroggs was intent on suppressing all attacks on the Roman Catholic Church. His adversaries inclined to frenzy at anything savoring of popery; and neither side thought or cared anything about the abstract question, whether, in a proper case, the publication of a libel could be prevented. While a cause is pending, the courts will not permit the parties thereto to be prejudiced before the hearing; and they will take such steps as may be necessary, to prevent or punish any publication which, by defaming either of the parties or witnesses, or by misrepresenting the proceedings, or by any other means, seeks to prevent the administration of justice or to bring it into disrepute. Townshend on Slander and Libel, § 231; 2 Atk. 469; Daw v. Eley, 17 W. R. 245; s. c., L. R. 7 Eq. 49; In re C. & S. R. W. Co. & W. Co., 17 W. R. 463; s. C., L. R., 8 Eq. 580; Tichborne v. Tichborne, 15 W. R. 1072; L. R., 7 Eq. 55.*

In the year 1742,Lord Hardwicke, in a case calling for the application of the rule just stated, went outside the question before him, and said: "Whether it is a libel against public or private persons, the

only method is to proceed at law." 2 Atk. 469. In 1810 an action was tried before Lord Ellenborough, to recover for injuries done to a picture claimed to be of a libelous character. His Lordship is reported as saying: "If it was a libel upon the persons introduced into it, the law can not consider it valuable as a picture. Upon an application to the Lord Chancellor, he would grant an injunction against its exhibition." Du Bost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. 512. The case of Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, decided in 1818, involved the right of the complainant to an injunction against the publication of letters written by himself. Lord Eldon, however, thought proper to remark in the course of his decision, that “the publication of a libel is a crime, and I have no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of crimes, excepting, of course, such cases as belong to the protection of infants." In 1848, Lord Langdale, Master of the Rolls, refused an injunction to prevent the defendant from advertising certain pills under a name tending to indicate that they were prepared or prescribed by the plaintiff. To justify this refusal, his lordship said: "I think the granting the injunction in this case would imply that the court has jurisdiction, to stay the publication of a libel, and I can not think it has." Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112; s. C., 17 L. J. R. In the same year, Lord Chancellor Cottenham, in Fleming v. Newton, 1 H. L. R. 375, doubted the authority of courts of equity to restrain the publication of libels. In 1861, the case of the Emperor of Austria v. Day & Kossuth, 3 DeG. F. & J. 230, s. Cc., 9 W. R. 712, was decided by Lord Chancellor Campbell. In this suit the Emperor of Austria sought to prevent Kossuth and others from printing or circulating paper purporting to represent public paper money of Hungary. The case did not in any respect involve the law of slander or libel. The Chancellor, however, thought proper to make the following remark: "I have no hesitation in saying that Lord Ellenborough was wrong, when he laid down, in Du Bost v. Beresford, that "the Lord Chancellor would grant an injunction against the exhibition of a libelous picture."

In 1868, Vice-Chancellor Malins decided that he would interfere by injunction to restrain the issuing of certain placards and advertisements, whereby the defendants intimidated plaintiff's workmen, and prevented workmen from hiring themselves to plaintiff. Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551. A year later the same judge enjoined a defendant from publishing a statement that the plaintiff was a partner in a certain bankrupt firm. Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 491, s. c., 17 W. R. 482. In 1872, the same judge restrained the publication of a circular, threatening to prosecute all dealers who should engage in selling certain lampburners, of which the plaintiff was the patentee.

*It appears from a note to Burnett v.Chetwood,2 Merivale, 441, that an injunction once issued to restrain the publication of a translation of a book from Latin into English. The chancellor in this case did not base his action on the ground that the book was libelous. He claimed the right to suppress it, because of its hurtful tendency on the public.

Rollins v. Hinks, 20 W. R. 287, L. R. 13 Eq. 355, 41 L. J., Ch. 358; 26 L. G. 56. In each of the cases decided by Vice-Chancellor Malins, the advertisements or circulars were shown to have a damaging effect upon the complainant's property, and the decisions were such as to support the general rule that equity will, where there is no adequate remedy at law, interfere to restrain any proposed libel, which, if not restrained, would destroy or impair the complainant's right of property. But these decisions of Vice-Chancellor Malins, as well as the dictum of Lord Ellenborough, in Du Bost v. Beresford, are now unquestionably overruled in England. Prudential Life Insurance Association v. Knott, 23 W. R. 249; L. R. 10 Ch. App. 142; 44 L. J., Ch. 192; 31 L. T. 866, 7 Ch. L. N. 405. In the case last cited, the complainants sought to enjoin the publication of a pamphlet containing, it was alleged, statements which were unfounded in fact, and which were highly injurious to the 'complainant's trade and business. Lord Chancellor Cairns delivered the principal opinion of the court, and, in doing so, said: "Now, the comments and expressions contained in this pamphlet either amount to a libel on the company in their business, or they do not. If they do not, and are therefore innocuous, I am at a loss to see on what principle the court of chancery is to interfere, either as a censor morum, or as exercising some right of criticism to restrain the expression of opinions which might be held justifiable in a court of law. If, on the other hand, these comments amount to a libel, I have always understood it to be clearly settled, that the court of chancery has no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel, because it is a libel." His lordship then proceeded to consider the claim that his interference was warranted by the fact that the libel would injure property, and, after reviewing the prior decisions, he determined that this fact did not invest him with authority to grant the desired relief.

Injunctions against libels have not been frequently considered in the courts of last resort in America; and when under consideration, the question has usually been complicated by local statutory or constitutional provisions, guranteeing in general terms the freedom of speech or of the press. The leading American case was decided by Chancellor Walworth in 1839. Brandreth, who had acquired considerable notoriety as the maker and vendor of certain pills, sought to enjoin the publication of a pamphlet, which he considered as a libel upon himself. In the opinion of the Chancellor, some stress was laid upon the statute of the state, and some upon the fact that the pamphlet was not alleged to be likely to injure the complainant's business. But aside from these circumstances, it is evident that the injunction would have been denied. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 23. Other American cases have been decided which, while not necessarily involving the law of libel, show that the courts in this country are fully committed to the view finally adopted in England. Singer