my must fall back to interpose between him and Richmond, and that the surest defence of Washington would be a vigorous attack on the Southern city. The President could not free himself from the spectre that haunted him of a Southern army marching on Washington as soon as the expedition of McClellan should leave it uncovered. He was therefore desirous of attacking the enemy's batteries on the south bank as the preliminary of the campaign. But the mere rumour of the movement to the Peninsula proved the soundness of McClellan's opinion, for the Confederate army at once fell back from Manassas, Centreville, and the Occoquan; unpursued, because the state of the roads protected the retreat. The retiring troops destroyed behind them the bridges of the roads to Richmond, thus, as McClellan pointed out, affording an additional guarantee that Washington would not be menaced. A council of war was of opinion that the safety of the capital would be assured by leaving 65,000 men in front of it, and that the remainder of the forces might move on the Peninsula.

On the 19th March McClellan submitted the details of his plan to the President. "The proposed plan of campaign," he says, "is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, taking the line by Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond being the objective point." A combined land and naval attack was then to be made on Yorktown, and, that point seized, a new base was to be established on the York river, 66 with every facility for bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James." This last passage is remarkable, both on account of the strategic movement" which is thus foreshadowed, and of the subsequent operations of Grant.

66

The divisions of the Federal army were collected in spots convenient for embarkation; and the unsuspecting General prepared to begin

the campaign which was, as he hoped, to give him a place among the great conquerors of history. He would have been startled indeed had anybody suggested to him that he left the most formidable of his enemies behind him at Washington, in the person of that merry old gentleman who had just conferred with him with such friendly facetiousness, and had managed to shed some rays of jocularity on the stern topic of the approaching struggle. It might have been thought that Mr Lincoln, already embarrassed by the unaccustomed problems of statesmanship which he was endeavouring to solve, would have been glad to leave the conduct of the war to those whose business it was to study the matter. But the same system which had called him from a humble and laborious handicraft to the helm of the State, had also invested him with supreme control over the Federal armies. Whether his military ardour had been roused by discussing the plan of campaign with McClellan, or whether his fears for the safety of the city that contained him and his Ministry, so near the menacing lines of the Confederates, rendered him regardless of any other consideration than how best to protect it, we know not; but it is certain that, as soon as he had taken leave of McClellan, his fingers itched to be moving the pawns and knights on the military chessboard. This impulse he at once proceeded to gratify by removing 10,000 men, forming Blenker's division, from McClellan's command, and giving them to Fremont, in Western Virginia. "If you could know the full pressure of the case," writes Mr Lincoln to McClellan, "I feel sure you would justify it.' As there was no military reason which could be unknown to McClellan, it is evident that the transfer of this division was due entirely to political motives, Fremont being at that time the favourite of a party sufficiently strong to make Mr Lincoln desire to conciliate it. "I expressed," says McClellan, "my re

gret that Blenker's division had been given to Fremont from any 'pressure' other than the requirements of the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the President's positive and emphatic assurance that I might leave, confident that no more troops beyond these 10,000 should, in any event, be taken from me, or in any way detached from my command.” In the first days of April the movement to the Peninsula began. The divisions which first landed at Fort Monroe moved by the two roads up the Peninsula towards Yorktown, where it was known strong fortifications existed. These McClellan designed to turn by landing the First Corps (M'Dowell's) at a point above the town, and he hoped by a rapid march behind the lines to cut off the troops that held them before they could reach Richmond. Then, based on the bank of the York, he meant to move his whole force upon Richmond, calculating that he might reach the town before the enemy could concentrate a sufficient force on that line to withstand him. Having seized Richmond and isolated Norfolk, he believed that the Confederate army of the Potomac, seeing its communications with Tennessee and Georgia threatened, must seek a general engagement, which he would await in position. If victorious, his columns, in concert with the western armies, would commence grand advance into the heart of the Confederacy, leaving the conquered territory secure behind them.

a

For the execution of this comprehensive plan, rapidity and numbers were essential. For the first disturbing element that appeared the President was not to blame. The course of the Warwick river was incorrectly laid down in the maps of the region-and one of the columns stumbled unexpectedly against a strong line of defence prepared behind the stream. was while he was perplexed by this first obstacle in his path, and by his ignorance of the wild woody

It

region into which he was plunging, that McClellan received the following telegram, dated 4th April:

"Gen. McClellan By directions of the President, Gen. M'Dowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your command; and the General is ordered to report to the Secretary of War; letter by mail.-L. Thomas, Adjt.-Gen."

This diminution of his force rendered the turning of Yorktown, which operation the First Corps was destined to perform, impossible. No wonder that McClellan should say, "To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different and a less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error."

The succession of adverse incidents had in fact given a totally different aspect to the projected campaign. The failure of the navy to co-operate, and the deprivations of successive bodies of troops, amounting in all to more than 50,000 men, were incidents to stagger the most practised general. It may well be doubted whether a commander, finding himself in such a predicament, is bound by any rule of duty to persist in the execution of a plan so hopelessly marred. Probably a threat on his part to withdraw his army from the Peninsula would have induced Mr Lincoln to send M'Dowell's corps to him, and to restore his authority over General Wool's division. Had he but retired like wrathful Achilles to his tent, a deputation, in which Mr Lincoln might have figured in the double character of Nestor and Thersites, would probably have waited on him, beseeching him to resume his arms and lead his myrmidons to the field. But McClellan's fault seems to have been too much moderation, too conscientious an

obedience. Had he not been so good a citizen he might have been a better general. His submissiveness was too extreme to coexist with some of the faculties that make up a commander. Not only had he received the indignities we have recapitulated, but at the outset of the campaign he, who had been entreated for, the safety of the country to assume the direction of all the armies of the Republic, had been deprived of the command-inchief, and reduced to the position of General of the Army of the Potomac, not merely without warning, but without being apprised of the important change in his position, which he first learnt from the newspapers. Yet with all this load of ill treatment heaped on him, he patiently set about the siege of Yorktown; while the President assumed towards the man he had so deeply injured a tone which might have roused a Quaker to fury. Once more," ," he says, "let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. . . . The country will not fail to note-is now noting that the present hesitation to advance upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated."

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McClellan, thus goaded, displayed both prudence and temper. Refusing to be pushed into precipitate action, he set about a regular siege of Yorktown. On the 6th of May, after a month's labour, his batteries would have been ready to open, but on the 4th the enemy evacuated the position. The Federal divisions immediately pushed on in pursuit. The Confederates stood at Williamsburg to cover the withdrawal of their trains, and held their ground long enough to accomplish their purpose, the Federals suffering in the action that took place there a loss of more than 2000 men. Here McClellan paused to make new arrangements for approaching the Chickahominy. In the mean time one of M'Dowell's divisions, under Franklin, had joined him. But his enterprise had long since lost its original character

of a surprise. The Confederate commander, J. E. Johnston,_confronted him, leaning upon Richmond, and all the Southern troops in the Peninsula, whom it had been intended to cut off or drive apart, had fallen back upon the main army.

Part of McClellan's army moved by water up the York river to its tributary the Pamunkey, establishing there at the White House a permanent depot; while the remaining divisions moved on by land till they came into communication with the right wing again by the roads leading from the Pamunkey upon Richmond. These roads are three in number, of which the central crosses the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge; that on the right, nine miles distant, at New Bridge; that on the left, six miles distant, at Long Bridge; and beside the central one, and crossing the Chickahominy a mile up the stream, runs the railway from White House to Richmond.

where bridges had been constructed. These bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy on our approach, and it was necessary not only to reconstruct these, but to build several others.

"The west bank of the river, opposite the New and Mechanicsville bridges (New on road from Coal Harbour to Richmond-Mechanicsville on road from Hanover Town to Richmond), was bordered by elevated bluffs, which afforded the enemy commanding positions to fortify, establish his batteries, enfilading the approaches upon the two principal roads to Richmond in one night, and resist the reconstruction of the important bridges. This obliged us to select other less exposed points for our crossings.

McClellan's left therefore crossed at the ford of Bottom's Bridge, and pushed on to intrench itself and cover the rebuilding of the bridge -the centre moved on New Bridge -and the right, driving the Confederates from Mechanicsville, occupied the village, and thus embraced in the front of the army the road to Hanover.

All this time McClellan believed himself (erroneously as we imagine) to be confronted by a greatly superior foe. Anticipating an immediate battle before Richmond, opposed by numbers which he estimated at nearly double his own, he had not ceased to urge on the President the necessity of sending every man that could be raised, to reinforce him for the struggle. On the 18th May Mr Stanton wrote:

"The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock, by way of the Potomac and York river, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General

M'Dowell has been ordered to march

extending your right wing to the north of Richmond."

As McClellan observes, this rendered it impossible for him to use the James river as a line of operations. He had desired that his reinforcements should be sent by water, so that they might approach him by the roads he had already moved on, and thus leave him free to rest the army on the James. But he was now forced to extend, not his left towards the James, but his right to the Hanover road, to unite with M'Dowell. The serious issues thus raised between him and the Presi dent are two in number-viz., 1st, Was Mr Lincoln's expectation of a counter-attack on Washington a delusion that uselessly deprived McClellan of the reinforcements which might have given him success? 2d, Was McClellan right in attributing so great a superiority to the James as a line of advance!

With reference to the first question, we have the light of subsequent events to guide us. Had the two armies been facing each other in the open field, it is clear that the Confederates would have made a false move in detaching upon before Richmond. But it must be Washington while an enemy was remembered that the Confederates

held a fortified position, and the

its occupants to hold in check supe, very essence of such is to enable rior numbers.

"Strong defences," says McClellan, "had been constructed around Richmond." These defences, then, might have checked McClellan as they subsequently checked Grant; and the Confeder ates no doubt were as willing in 1862 as they have proved themselves in 1864 (or indeed as they proved themselves in the former McClellan) to carry the war north year as soon as they had defeated of the Potomac. Mr Lincoln's ap prehensions, then, were by no means unfounded.' And granting them to

did

cover Washington from attack by

the way of Manassas, until his junction with McClellan should be effected. For though he would not directly interpose to protect the capital, yet it would be impossible for an enemy to approach the Potomac without laying bare his flank and rear to M'Dowell, posted on the Fredericksburg road, and based on Acquia. Therefore we think McClellan wrong when he says, "Frankness compels me to say that the march of M'Dowell's force upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas."

The chief objection to the Government plan was, that it caused the two Generals to move from different bases, and by different lines, up to the time of junction, rendering them liable to be separately attacked. But there were reasons for expecting that, in such a case, the first attack would be made on McClellan. For an enemy's force advancing to meet M'Dowell would lay open its communication with Richmond to McClellan-whereas, McClellan once disposed of, the attack on M'Dowell would be made in security; as was in fact presently illustrated by the defeat of Pope, when he took M'Dowell's place. Moreover, McClellan was immediately at hand and threatening Richmond, and if the Confederates should assume the offensive, the obvious course was to assail him rather than seek a more distant and inferior enemy. But if McClellan was to be the object of attack, the sooner he was reinforced the better, and the shortest route to that end was by land. Granting, then, that there was nothing so improbable as McClellan supposed in a counter attack on the Federal capital, and that the Confederates would be VOL. XCVI.--NO. DLXXXIX.

likely to fall upon his own army as the preliminary to such a movement (which, in fact, is what actually took place), the advance of M'Dowell by the Fredericksburg road served the double purpose of supporting McClellan and protecting Washington in the readiest way. It only remains to consider whether an advance by the James would have compensated for the loss of these advantages.

Now, ignorant as McClellan certainly was of the precise character of the ground round Richmond, and of the defences of the city, it was a mere guess that he could reach it more easily on the James than elsewhere. Several reasons induce us to think that the guess was an unlucky one. For afterwards, when the country was better known, Grant, who might have begun his campaign on the James if he pleased, advanced by the Rappahannock; and when he was driven to take the line of the James, while the obstacles between him and Richmond seemed to accumulate, the way was left clear for the operations of Early north of the Potomac. Thus the advance of the united forces of McClellan and M'Dowell between the Chickahominy and the James, or on the right bank of the James by Petersburg, would certainly have uncovered Washington, without mending their chance of getting to Richmond.

Perhaps McClellan's chief reason for wishing to adopt the new line was, that he would thereby be freed from the perplexities with which the passage of the Chickahominy was surrounded. For the only crossing he had secured was that of Bottom's Bridge, and to attempt to pass his whole army there was to expose the heads of his columns to a defeat of which their rear would be the helpless spectators. Meanwhile, half his army, separated from the rest by the stream, was exposed to the attack of the whole Confederate army, and it was absolutely necessary to leave a force on the left

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