INDEX.

The figures standing alone denote pages of Vol. I. For the first references under
a title to Vol. II., ii. is added. The sections of Vol. II. begin with § 177.

power divided up, 129; dokimasiæ,
130; courts of justice, 130, 131; trials,
132; evils of the system of courts, 133;
pay to dikasts and in the ecclesia, 133.
134; its effects, 134; liturgia and trier-
archy, 135-138.

AUSTIN, J., on rights, 128-130; remarks
by Mr. Stephen on his theory, 129; by
the author, 130; his definition of sover-
eignty, 203.

BABEUF, his conspiracy, 317; his com-
munism, 316-318.

BAGEHOT, W., on the English constitu-
tion, cited, 557; criticised, 559, 560.

lation of Aristotle's politics cited, i
38, and elsewhere.
BECCARIA, Marquis, on penalties, 336,
342-344.

BEDAWEENS, their institutions, 452.
BENTHAM on liberty, 34; his rationale
of punishment noticed, 352-354.
BETHMAN-HOLLWEG cited, 126.
BLOOD-REVENGE, 39, 373, 438.
BONALD on the state, 149.
BONIFACE VIII., Pope, his claims against
princes, 461.

commercial aristocracy, 42. A. in Ve-
nice, remarkable as increasing continu-
ally, 43; rise of Venice, 44, 45; tribunes
and classes of people, 45, 46; dukes,
46, 47; could not become hereditary,
ibid.; office of doge, 48-50; methods
of electing the doge, 49; his limited
power, 50; the grand council, 50-55;
mode of election, 51; the "closing" of
the council, 52-54; doge's council and
the pregadi, 55; the quarantia, 56; the
ten, ibid.; the three inquisitors, 58. A.
in Florence, 60-95; can F. be called an
aristocracy, 93-95. See Florence. A., its
origin, 95-97; is not found in all nations
and races, 97, 98; titles of nobility, 98; BARTHÉLEMY-SAINT-HILAIRE, his trans-
efficiency of a noble class, 99. A. in a
republic, evils of, ibid., British A. as
fitting into the polity, 100; dangers of
privileged classes in the future, 100,
101; municipal aristocracy, 101.
ARNOLD, Dr. T., on institutions, ii. 353.
354; on relation between church and
state, 487-493; opposed to Warburton's
theory and agreeing in the main with
Hooker's. The force and wisdom of a
state ought to be united, the church
should have power to raise its condi-
tion morally and physically, 487; no
true distinction between physical and
secular things, no priestly order in
Christianity, 488; the state has or ought
to have a religion, ibid.; its business is
not secular alone, ibid.; he considers
excommunication a penalty, 490; a
perfect church may punish opinions,
ibid.; he would exclude non-Christians
from citizenship, 491; what he calls a
Christian state, 492; objections to his
highly ideal view, 493.
ASSOCIATION, right of, 80-83; limitations
of, 82, 277 et seq.; secret, 279.
ATHENS, under kings, § 161; tribes and
smaller divisions, 458, 460, 489, 490;
slow development of institutions at first,
ibid.; a democracy, ii. 123-138. Solon's
reforms, 123; democratic changes after
Solon, 125; the demi, ibid.; the lot,
126; ostracism, 127; office open to all,
ibid.; democracy under Pericles, 128;
laws and psephismata, ibid.; executive

BRODRICK, Hon. G. C., on choice of
municipal officers in England, ii. 382;
on unions" taking the place of town-
ships, 387.
BUCHEZ, on right of property, 68; his

theory examined, 69, 70.
BURKE, his dislike of abstractions, 184:
his political views those of the whigs.
ibid.; accepted contract as a source of
political rights, ibid.; on revolution.
415.

CALHOUN, J. C., on representation of
interests, ii. 292, 293.

CAPITAL punishment, of old in the hands
of the family of the murdered pers. n
372; the goël among the Hebrews, id
Penalty for murder at Rome, 373.
among the ancient Germans, ibid., in
India, 374 right to punish capital's.
374; expedience of so doing, 375-
CARTHAGE, its government, § 181, s. 35-
42; relation to Tyre and Phoenic.n

colonies, 36, 37; pentarchies of Aris- | CICERO, on justice, 124; on the state,
totle, nothing known of them, 38. See
Aristocracy.

CASUISTRY, political, or special questions
of political ethics examined, 382-430.
Can the individual give up his allegi-
ance? 383-385. Extent of obedience to
law and magistrate, 386, 387. Obliga-
tion to vote, 388. Relations of individ-
uals to parties, 389-393. Collisions of
law and conscience, 394-396. How
ought the state to deal with bad institu-
tions? 396-402. Right of resistance to
law, or right of revolution, 402-406.
Opinions on this right-Plato's, 406;
Aristotle's, 407; among the Jews, 408;
in the middle ages, 408; right to resist
the suzerain under the feud. syst. ibid.;
theories after the reformation, 409; Mil-
ton on this right, 411-413; opinions in
England in 1688, 413; Locke's, 414;
Burke's, 415; French theory of the
right, 416; opinion in the United States,
416, 417. Kant on resistance to politi-
cal authorities, 417, 418; Stahl, 419;
Fichte, 420; R. Rothe, 421, 422. Teach-
ings of the New Testament, 423-425.
The private individual has no right of
revolution, but only the people, 426.
Practical consideration alone can justify
in any given case, 426, 427. A people
has this right, 428, 429. The right and
its exercise for the good of the world,
430.

CHANGES, political, causes of. See Polit-
ical Changes.

CHARACTER of candidates for office not
enough considered, 391; effect of with-
holding votes on account of bad charac-
ter, 392.
CHARITY. See Poor, Public Charity.
CHINESE monarchy, 501; absolute patri-
archal, ibid.; checked by the opinion of
the wise, ibid.; a certain right of revolu-
tion acknowledged, 502.
CHRISTIANITY, its relation to personal
rights, 30, 31.

CHURCH, medieval, its theory of the
state, 148; revived in recent times, 149.
See Relations of Church and State, and
Religion.

VOL. II.-39

148.

CIRCASSIA, institutions of, 443; especially
brotherhoods, 444; mutual responsi-
bility, ibid.

CITIES, rise of, 463-465; city-states, their
early kingly government, 487-492; as
aristocracies, §§ 178, 179; as democra-
cies, ii. 103-107. See Athens. Govern-
ment of cities, 374-383. See Municipal.
CITIZEN, is he bound to vote? 388; or to
hold an office, if elected? ibid.
CLISTHENES begins the extreme democ-
racy at Athens, ii. 126, 127.
COLLISIONS of law and conscience, 394-
397; rules of action in such cases, 395;
over-scrupulosity possible, 396. C. of
rights, 34.

COLONIES, Greek, ii. 160; Roman, 151-.
153; Spanish, 160-163; English, 163.
Motives in colonizing, Roman, 160;
Spanish, 161; English, ibid.
COMBINATION enhances crime, 358.
COMMONS, house of, in England, its rise
and growth, 565 et seq.; weakness at
first, 566; annual parliaments, 567;
neglect of this rule, 567, 568; power of
granting supplies and of petitions first
sources of power, 568 et seq.; employed
in political measures, 571, 572; inde-
pendence, 572; jealousy of churchmen,
573; acts as an extraordinary court,
574; privileges of parliament, 574-576;
boroughs often sent non-resident repre-
sentatives, 576; controlled by neigh-
boring land-owners, 577; rotten bor-
oughs, 577, 578; reform's of 1832, 1867,
578; great powers of parliament, 579.
COMMUNISM and socialism what, 313. 314
Babeuf's plan of communism, 316;
other plans, 318, 319; evils of, 320-322.
COMMUNITIES early, family and village,
51-60; writers on early c., 52, 53; no-
tices of in Greek and Roman writers,
53, 54; German c., 54; Scandinavian,
55; Slavonic c.. 56; survival of old Cel-
tic, 56; in India, 57; in Java, 58; in
Mexico, ibid.; Sir H. S. Maine on the
kinds of, 59; property of two communi-
ties as distinct as of two persons, 60.
COMPOSITE governments, ii. 146 et seq.

two kinds: a state's tie to conquests
or colonies; and confederations, 147;
Persia and its provinces, 148; Roman
provinces, 151-156; provincial govern-
ment, 157, 158. Roman, Spanish, Eng-
lish colonies, 159-164; English de-
pendencies, 164, 165. See Colonies,
Confederations.

CONFEDERATIONS, nature of, ii. 166;
kinds, 168; a delicate kind of govern-
ment, 172; under what conditions prac-
ticable, 173; confederate monarchies,
174; origin of early c., 175; amphic-
tyonia, sense of the word, ibid.; the
amphictyonic council, 176-179; its mem-
bers, 176; meetings, 176, 177; connec-
tion with Delphi, 176; officers, etc.,
177; agency in historic times, 178, 179.
The Ætolian league, 180, 181. The
Achæan league, 181-193. See Achæ-
an. The Lycian league, 193, 194;
dissolved by the Romans, 194. Ger-
manic confederations, 194-208. See
Germanic Confederations. Swiss con-
federations, 208-223. See Swiss Con-
federations. Dutch United Provinces,
223-236. See Dutch United Provinces.
United States of America, 236-257. See
United States. General remarks on
confederations, § 215.

CONFINEMENT. See Imprisonment.
CONFISCATION, 362.

CONNECTICUT, its steadiness in its earlier
history, i. 140; its charter, ibid.; in-
equality of suffrage districts, 143.
CONSENT of a people to its government,
is it necessary? 286; meaning of the
term, ibid.
CONSTITUTION of a state what? 283;
forms of, 284; interpretation of, 285;
is usually a limitation of power, 285, n.
CONSTITUTIONAL monarchy, 579, 580;
secure inviolability of sovereigns, 580-
585; legislatures lack control in them
over armies, 585.
CONSTITUTIONS, written and unwritten,
545-547, 579.

CONTRACTS, right of, 72-80; nature of,
72; importance of increases with civili-
zation, 73: how it begins, 74; why
binding, 74, 75; transfers but not cre-

ates rights, 75, 76: immoral contracts
void, 76, 77; quasi-contracts, nada
pacta, 77; the consideration what, ibid.
Two kinds of contracts, 78, 79. Con-
tract used to explain civil society, 79;
and the state, ibid. See Hobbes, Spi-
noza, Rousseau.

COOLEY, Judge, on constitutional law,
285.

CORPORAL punishment, 365; in Ger
many, ibid.; elsewhere, ibid.; almost
unknown to the Romans, in the case of
freemen, ibid.; a questionable form of
punishment, 366.

CORRECTION not the main end in penalty,
330, but an important end, 354.
COURCELLE Seneuil, on indirect elec-
tions, ii. 298, 300; on election of chief
magistrate in France, 276.

CRUELTY to animals, ii. 431-433. See
Moral Legislation.

CRIMES, their relative greatness, 354,
355; difficulty of proportioning crime
and penalty, 356; aggravating or ex
tenuating circumstances, 357-360; com-
pound crimes, 359; crimes committed
to relieve want, ibid.; crimes that are
difficult of detection, ibid.; estimates of
crime fluctuating, 356; frequency of,
as affecting penalty, 359; repetition of
offence, as enhancing penalty, 360; epi-
demic crimes, 377; political crimes,
378; public opinion in relation to pen-
alty, 379; limitations of time in prosecu-
ting for crimes, 381. Crimes against
religion, ii. 508-513. See Religion.
CURTIS, G. T., on the old confederation,
ii. 243, 248.

DAHLMAN, Staatslehre cited, 582, 583
DECLINE and decay of states, ii. 595-606.

National decay not inevitable, 595
causes which are thought to bring it on,
596-602; unequal distribution of prop-
erty, 596; accumulation of capital, 597.
598; exposure of industrial countries
to panics, 598; is there a natural old age
of states? 599; effect of a nation's loss
of self-esteem, 599, 600; decay of
genius and culture, 600; political dis-
couragements, 601; decay of faith and

morals, 601, 602. Are the institutions | DEPARTMENTS of government, 290; 98,
of modern society self-sustaining? 602,

603. Can morals be pure without reli-
gion? 603, 604. Need of religious faith
in advanced societies, 604, 605; condi-
tions of prosperity according to Plato,
605; they are ineffectual, ibid.; reli-
gious and moral forces can save some
states, but not all, 606; and can revi-
vify others, ibid.
DEFINITIONS of rights, 131-137; by
Paley, 131; Abicht, ibid.; Lieber, ibid.;
Von Rotteck, ibid.; Zachariae, 132;
Whewell, 132; Röder, 133; Ahrens,
134, 135; Stahl, 135, 136; Trendelen-
burg, 136; Lorimer, 136, 137.
DEMOCRACY, Aristotle on, 466, 467, § 154;
definition of, ii. 102; distinction between
form and spirit, ibid.; democracies with
a great number of slaves, ibid.; those
where suffrage is restricted, 103; some
politics of doubtful nature, ibid.; city-
democracies, their advantages as to
education of citizens, 104; as to politi-
cal value of citizens, ibid.; disadvan-
tages of, 105. Demagogues in democ-
racies, 106; moderating principles in
modern democracies, a constitution,
107; a representative system, 108; its
advantages, 108, 109; feeling of trust,
ibid.; temptation of representatives,
109, 110; modern limits on special
legislation, 110, III. French democ-
racy, 115; democracy in United States,
116, 117. Eligibility to office in democ-
racies, 117. Representation and suf-
frage in democracies, 116, 118. Extreme
democracy, its marks, 119-122; Athe-
nian democracy, 201; Solon's re-
forms, the seisachtheia, 123; the sen-
ate, 124; subsequent democratic insti-
tutions, 125-138. See Athens. Mod-
ern democracy in France and United
States, 138-145. Practical ends in the
latter, 139; few changes made by the
revolution, 140; greater, since, 141,
142; doctrine, its sway in France, ibid.;
logical equality of political rights there,
143; contrasted with United States,
ibid. perils of democracies from
changes in society, 144, 145.

ii. 259-347. Necessity of division of
power, 259; which is supreme? 260,
261; their essential differences, 262;
independence, 262, 263; yet not entire
separation, 263, 264; danger of conflict,
264, 265. Executive departments, 266-
288; legislative, 288-326; judicial, 327-
347.
See Executive, Judicial, Legisla-

tive.
DILKE, A. W., on the Russian mir, ii.
389, 390.

DIONYSIUS of Halicarnassus, on mixed
governments, 471; on Roman colonies,
ii. 151.

DISPOSITION testamentary. See Testa-
ment.

DIVISIONS of rights, 36, 37.
DIVORCE, 100-102.

DOKIMASIÆ at Athens, ii. 130.
DONATISTS, their protest against the
state's use of force in matters of opin-
ion, ii. 473.

DUTCH United Provinces, ii. 223-236.
Utrecht Union, 223-235; defects of this
instrument, 226, 227; Duke of Anjou,
as general stadtholder, fails and resigns,
227; William of Orange stadtholder in
Holland and Zeeland, ibid.; Earl of
Leicester general stadth., ibid.; diffi-
culties preventing entire union, 227-
229; Maurice stadtholder in Holland,
Zeeland, elsewhere, 229; religious dis-
putes, 230; William II., ibid.; this of-
fice vacant, ibid.; John De Witt, the
perpetual edict, 231, 232; William of
Orange (III. of England), stadth., 232,
233; office again vacant, 233; restored
and made hereditary, ibid.; destruction
of the republic, 234; remarks on the
constitution, 234, 235; M. Passy's com-
parison of Swiss and Dutch republics
and their destiny, 235, 236.
DUTIES not the origin of rights, 31.
Duties of individuals towards parties,
390.

DUVERGIER d'Haurane on the way to
elect the chief magistrate in France, ii.
272-275.

EARLY institutions, 431-465.