and wants of its own, which may not be inconsistent with those of the greater whole, here a new duty comes before the representative assembly, and one just as binding on one part or one interest of a country as on another. Of course, interests may clash, and men will be one-sided and selfish; but there is no doubt what the function of the legislator is. Just at this point appears—let us be allowed to add-one superiority of this system over that of city communities. When the private person, unlettered perhaps, and warped by others, goes to the assembly, he has an excess of the feeling of power, but a defect of the sense of responsibility, since he acts alone for himself. But the representative acts in trust for others, who have a right to expect that he will do what they ought to do if they could be in a mass in his stead. This, therefore, like all other delegation, calls forth the moral feelings-especially the value of esteem for fidelity-more than most personal transactions of a similar kind. Many a merchant will impose on a customer without scruple, on the ground that every one must judge of goods for himself, who would feel that a crime would be committed by a clerk who should practice imposition on an employer.

The forms and rules of debate in modern legislative assemblies could never be observed in assemblies where the whole body of citizens met together. A session of ten days consecutively would be impossible in a city-state, and would shut out the industrious classes, unless they were paid for their attendance, in which case only the lower class, who could make nothing more by ordinary work than by their pay at the ecclesia, would be present. Even they would be tired out by sessions of a number of days together. But representatives can meet almost daily for half a year, and the various kinds of business can be maturing for weeks and months in the rooms of committees.

It is not to be denied, however, that as representatives are left very much to themselves within a constitution, they can. abuse great trusts. In general their temptation is to follow the wishes of their constituents timidly and unrighteously. A

new election, the attacks of newspapers in the interests of parties, any fear of loss of influence, are sufficient motives for their support of a bad measure or law. But there have not been wanting also cases in the history of representative governments where they have showed themselves open to corrupt motives; and within the last few years in the United States, instances of this kind have either been frequent, or at least suspicion of bribery within legislative halls has been very general and seemingly well founded. The modern occasions. for receiving bribes have been connected with the chartering of great companies, whose vast business will, it is thought, enable them to be at great expense in starting well. The greater the enterprise, if it requires, like means of locomotion, or like any companies founded on a principle of monopoly, or like subsidies given for public purposes, some legislative sanction, the more dangerous is it to a democratic community. In fact, this special danger, which is peculiarly a modern one, appears in all communities, but most in those where the representatives are not men of substance belonging to the upper class of the community. And the hope of getting a share in the gains acquired by knavish politicians may be a motive on the part of some men for seeking places in the legislatures. They go, it is to be feared, wishing to be bribed, not intending to vote against their convictions, but to make gain out of their convictions, like many members of parliament in the time of Charles II. of England.

The principal remedy for such baseness within the political sphere is some restriction on the power of special legislation -for conviction of bribery is and always was exceedingly difficult. It is significant of the feeling in this country, that in the latest revisions of state constitutions, the power, formerly lodged in the legislatures, of giving special charters, and the general power of special legislation are in great measure taken away. Thus, in the new constitution of Illinois, made and adopted in 1870, which seems to have led the way in confining legislative power within narrower limits, there are as many as twenty-five cases enumerated, in which the general

assembly is prohibited from passing any local or special laws. Among these are "granting to any corporation, association, or individual, the right to lay down railroad tracks, and amending existing charters for such purposes, and granting any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever;" and in all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law, it is declared, shall be enacted (art. iv., sec. 22). Other restrictions--such as that upon the rate of taxation which county authorities are allowed to assess, upon the competence of the general assembly itself to create banks without the consent of the people by a general vote, or to create corporations by special laws-are dictated, it is probable, at once by the desire to throw business out of the legislature which could be provided for in some other way, and by that of avoiding all that is called lobbying and private solicitation of members of that body. Similar provisions are introduced into the new constitutions since 1870, discussed in the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Missouri. This exhibits to us the clear conviction that restrictions are needed on legislative as well as on executive and on municipal power. And this conviction seems to have arisen out of the experience of the dangerous and unsatisfactory character of much of the special legislation of the past in this country-a legislature, more than any other public body, being exposed to corrupt or temporary or local influences, and exposing those who are concerned in it to the evil arts of interested persons.

Of course the representatives are accountable for the arts and fraud which they may themselves have used in securing their places. In the ancient city-states attempts to procure office by fraud were common enough. Modern democracies suffer from this source of corruption no more than modern aristocracies, and probably less.

3. Qualifications for suffrage. In the period when aristoLimitation of suf- cratical and democratical elements were confrage tending in the ancient city-states, the contest was manifested by various devices ftrict the suffrage, or

to extend it, or to make it at least less efficient. Aristotle mentions some of these devices (Pol., vi. or iv., 10, § 5 and onw.). Many, says he, "even of those who aim to make polities aristocratic, commit an error not only in giving the wealthy more than their share, but also in deceiving the plebs; for in time it is necessary that out of good falsehoods evil truth should grow, since the ambitious desires of the rich do more harm than those of the people." He then speaks of five sophistical artifices in dealing with the people, having reference to the assembly, the magistrates, the courts of justice, the wearing of heavy armor, and the exercises in the gymnasia. The first ruse, that in regard to the assembly, was to impose a fine for non-attendance, either on the rich alone, or a greater fine on them than on others. Next it was made easy for the poor to be excused from office by a sworn statement of the inconvenience (éçópvvodai), but for the other class it continued difficult. "In respect to serving in the dicasteries, a fine was imposed in the same way on the wealthy for failure in this duty, but the poor were free to perform it or not; or a large fine was imposed on the former and a small fine on the latter, as was the case in the laws of Charondas. In some places, all who got themselves registered had a right to participate in the duties of the assembly and of the courts, and heavy fines were levied upon those who after registration failed to do their duties in either of these places, it being the object that the fine might keep citizens from being registered, and that when not registered they might be kept from the ecclesia and the dicasteries." Similar was the legislation in regard to owning heavy armor, which allowed the poor not to own it and fined the rich if they did not; and which fined the latter for not sharing in gymnastic exercises, while the poor could be excused from them. Such laws acted unequally on the two classes, with the evident intention of keeping the one away from political life and of unfitting them for military duties, in order that they might not exercise their rights, and also that the others might be active citizens and soldiers. In democracies, he adds, the sophisms

-or devices to throw the greater weight of power upon one class rather than on the other-are of just the contrary kind : the less wealthy get pay for their attendance in the ecclesia and the courts of justice, while the rich stay away without being fined. Hence, it is evident that, if there were a due mixture of political expedients, the rich ought to be fined for staying away and the poor paid for coming; all would then have an active share in the government, while, where the devices spoken of are used, only one part has it in their hands.

When there was no balancing or controlling oligarchic principle, especially where such a principle had been overcome after a struggle or a haughty abuse of power, the suffrage was extended to all free native citizens and to their sons from an early age. Universal suffrage was a thing necessary for a city-state when democracy had become dominant, that is, where there was no class in other respects privileged

Democratic insti

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Of the Roman constitution it is enough here to say that the plan of classes, with centuries containing tutions at Rome. an unequal number of voters, had the effect that the centuries of the higher classes or the more wealthy citizens, although casting a smaller number of votes, if unanimous, could always elect their candidate, since a majority not of votes, but of centuries, decided. And as the centuries of the higher classes were called first, it might be that an election was certain without calling for the suffrages of the lower classes, which must have lessened the interest of the more humble citizens in the elections.

The principle which here prevailed, of determining elections by the majority of centuries within classes, entered into the reformed comitia in such a shape as to unite the voting by tribes and by centuries together. There remained still the centuries of equites, although they did not vote first, and every one of the five classes had thirty-five centuries of junVOL. II.-8