crumbled to pieces beyond hope of restoration; and longer holding out would but result in saddling Bavaria with a heavier contribution. Von der Pfordten yielded, and signified before evening his acquiescence in the terms proposed. Orders were then sent to Manteuffel to stay all hostile operations, and the preliminaries of peace were signed. But the final treaty of peace, signed at Berlin on the 22nd August, was less onerous for Bavaria than the preliminaries; it imposed, indeed, a contribution of 30,000,000 gulden; abolished shipping dues on the Rhine and Main, where those rivers were under Bavarian jurisdiction; and transferred all the telegraph lines north of the Main to Prussian control; but it required no such cessions of territory as were exacted by the preliminaries. The causes of this apparent lenity, which to those acquainted with the Prussian character must have appeared inexplicable, will be explained presently. The treaty with Wurtemberg, signed on the 13th August, imposed a war indemnity of 8,000,000 florins on that kingdom, and provided for its re-entry into the Zollverein. A similar treaty with Baden, signed on the 17th August, burdened the Grand Duchy with a war indemnity of 6,000,000 gulden. Peace with Hesse Darmstadt was only concluded on the 3rd September. Great resentment was felt in Prussia against the Grand Duke, who had been throughout a staunch friend to Austria. On the other hand, the Court of Russia, for family reasons, intervened with urgency on behalf both of Wurtemberg and of Hesse Darmstadt; and the terms imposed on these states were consequently more lenient than had been expected. Darmstadt was required to give up Hesse Homburg and certain other portions of its territory to Prussia; it was, however, indemnified to a considerable extent at the cost of what had been the independent states of Hesse Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort; the general effect being to consolidate and render more compact the territories both of Prussia and of Darmstadt, where they were conterminous. Hesse Darmstadt, moreover, though, in respect of that portion of her territories which lay south of the Main, she was a South-German state, agreed to enter the NorthGerman Confederation. With regard to the little principality of Hohenzollern, the cradle of the royal house of Prussia, which, enclosed as it is within the territory of Wurtemberg, the troops of that kingdom had easily overrun during the war, its restitution was so completely taken for granted that, in the treaty with Wurtemberg, Prussia disdained to make the slightest mention of it.

Besides the public treaties with the states of South Germany which have been just described, Prussia concluded with them at the same time certain secret articles, which were not divulged until long afterwards. According to these, Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg severally entered into a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia, with guarantee of their respective territories, and the concession of the supreme command in time of war to the King of Prussia. Count Bismarck know that he had been playing a perilous game; he had mortified and exasperated the French Emperor, immediately after the close of the war, by refusing to cede to

him a foot of German territory. (a refusal on which we shall have more to say presently); French vanity had been wounded by the victories-French jealousy had been aroused by the aggrandisement-of Prussia. The whole North-German Confederation did but represent a popu lation of 25,000,000; if Germany was to be safe against France, she must be able to dispose, at need, of the military resources of a population of at least equal magnitude. Weighing all these things with that profound forecast which characterised him, Count Bismarck would seem to have purposely imposed at first harsh conditions on Bavaria, in order that he might obtain, as the price of their subsequent remission, the adhesion of that kingdom to an arrangement which would bring its excellent soldiers into line with those of Prussia. Upon all these SouthGerman states he is said to have skilfully brought to bear an argument derived from the recent demand of France for German territory-a demand which, he said, would infallibly be renewed; which it would be difficult under all circumstances to resist; and which, if it had to be conceded, could hardly be satisfied except at the expense of one or other of them. Isolated, they could not resist dismemberment; united with Prussia, and mutually guaranteeing each other's territories, they were safe.

These secret treaties between Prussia and the SouthGerman states first came to light in April of the following year. Count Beust, who was then the Austrian Premier, commenting on the disclosure in his despatches to Austrian representatives at foreign Courts, remarks that Austria will make no complaint and ask for no explanations; at the same time, with much dry significance, he directs their attention to the fact, that the Prussian Government had actually concluded these treaties with the SouthGerman states before it signed the Treaty of Prague, the fourth article of which is by them rendered null and meaningless. The Count justly points out that an offensive alliance between two states forces the weaker of the two to endorse the foreign policy and follow in the wake of the stronger, and practically destroys the independence of the former.

A French writer thus sums up the final results of the war, so far as Prussia was concerned :-"Entire supremacy in North Germany; the military direction of the South at once, and its direction in economic affairs prepared for the future; Austria overthrown, excluded from the German body politic, decisively weakened, an exclusive supremacy thus ensured over the whole of Germany—such were the political advantages. Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, Frankfort, and certain minor territories, in all 1,300 square (German) miles [about 32,000 square miles English], and 4,500,000 inhabitants annexed to the monarchy, its total population augmented by one-fifth, and raised to 24,000,000 souls; 61,000,000 thalers* paid as war indemnities, military ports, an opening for maritime development, a continuous, compact, coherent territorysuch were the material advantages which were joined, for Prussia, to the prestige of extraordinary successes, pre

*About 228,000,000 francs; but, according to Rustow, the amount was only 171,000,000 francs:

A.D. 1866.]

245

We have spoken of the treaties with South Germany; but the comprehensive Treaty of Confederation, by which Prussia welded together the Powers of North Germany for common political and military purposes, has still to be described. In August, in view of the speedy assembling of a North-German Parliament, the Governments of Prussia, Mecklenburg Schwerin, Mecklenburg Strelitz, Saxe Weimar, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe Altenburg, Saxe Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg Sondershansen, Schwarzburg Rodolstadt, Waldeck, Reuss (of the younger line), Schaumburg Lippe, Lippe, Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, concluded an offensive and defensive treaty for the maintenance of the independence and integrity, as well as of the internal and external security of their states, and undertook a common defence of their territory. In the pact then drawn up it was stipulated that the aims of the new Confederation should be defined by a Confederate Constitution on the basis of the Prussian outlines of the 10th June, 1866, and that in the making of this constitution a common Parliament should co-operate. In the spectacle of Count Bismarck thus quietly proceeding-after having humbled a great empire and shattered Germany in pieces -to take up again "the Prussian outlines of the 10th June," and work them out as if nothing had happened, there is seen, it must be confessed, a colossal strength, a moral grandeur, which appeal wonderfully to the imagination. It was further provided that the troops of the Confederates were to be under the supreme command of the King of Prussia, and that the various Governments were to take the necessary steps for the election of deputies to sit in the common Parliament. Every NorthGerman citizen who should have attained the age of twenty-five was to be entitled to vote, and deputies were to be elected in the ratio of one to every 100,000 of the population.

The only states north of the Main which, after the conclusion of this treaty, had not joined the North-German Confederation were Reuss (of the older line), Saxe Meiningen, and Saxony. But the Princess Caroline, Regent of Reuss, concluded a similar treaty with Prussia soon afterwards. Duke Bernhard of Saxe Meiningen disapproved of the new order of things; but as it was impossible for him to stand alone in his opposition, he abdicated (September 20), and the new Duke, George, gave in his adhesion to the Confederation. Saxony, as we have seen, entered the Confederation under its treaty with Prussia of the 21st October. Lastly, Hesse Darmstadt acceded to the Confederation, in respect of the portion of its territory situated north of the Main, by its treaty with Prussia of the 3rd September. With these accessions, the total population of the states composing the North-German Confederation was raised to about 29,000,000.

In spite of the brilliant success of Count Bismarck's policy, the party of retrenchment and reform in the

over the national expenditure, however powerless they were to direct the national policy. Soon after the peace, a Loan Bill was introduced into the Lower House, the object of which was to enable the Government to borrow 60,000,000 thalers; but the Chamber refused to sanction more than 40,000,000 thalers. In the debate on this question, Count Bismarck used some remarkable words. "The financial question," he said, "is the chief point; and if the right moment be allowed to pass, the accomplishment of Prussia's aims may be deferred for years, and her very existence again endangered. Money must be at the disposal of the Government. We must have our hands on our swords, and our purses well filled." There can be no doubt that these words refer to France. The shadow of a yet more tremendous struggle than that from which his country had just emerged seems already to be passing over the mind of the Prussian statesman.

In the beginning of September, a deputation from Hanover obtained an interview with the King of Prussia, in the vain hope of inducing the monarch to refrain from destroying the independence of their country. The address which they presented contained the following passage:-" It cannot be agreeable to your Majesty to dethrone a prince whose dynasty has been connected with the country for nearly a thousand years, and who, equally with your Majesty, wears his crown by the grace of God; to dethrone him simply because, taking a different view of the Federal law, up to that time valid, to the view entertained by your Majesty's advisers, he considered himself legally prevented from unhesitatingly adopting your Majesty's German policy, and thus, by an unfortunate concatenation of circumstances, was ultimately forced to employ his army against your Majesty's troops, whom they had previously never opposed, but by whose side they had often victoriously fought in joyful brotherhood of arms."

The King's reply, though it ended with asserting "necessity-the tyrant's plea "-for the annexation of Hanover, was, in its tone, far from unfeeling or ungenerous. He said that he should have held the Hanoverians in less esteem if they had not adopted some such step to testify their faithful attachment to their hereditary dynasty, so closely allied in blood to his own. He claimed the speedy and signal overthrow of Austria as a “visible interposition of Providence in favour of Prussia." Nor was he insensible to the gravity of what he was doing. "Notwithstanding the wonderful successes which have given me the right of freely deciding upon the course I should adopt, it did not require either addresses or deputations to make me aware of the importance of the measure which you desire to see withdrawn. Nevertheless, I again offer you my thanks. We have frankly said to each other what we think; and I prefer that, because it holds out a hope of a better understanding in future. The most careful consideration, which has been painful because of my relationship to the House of Hanover, imposes annexation upon me as a duty. I owe it to my people, to compensate it for the immense sacrifices it has made; and, therefore,

of the kingdom." On the 2nd October, he addressed a formal protest against the annexation to all the Cabinets of Europe.

A bill was also introduced in the Prussian Chambers about the same time for the formal annexation to Prussia of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, "except a portion to be agreed upon hereafter by a contract with the Grand Duke of Oldenburg." This reservation must have been insisted upon by Russia, the imperial family of which is nearly allied to the House of Oldenburg. In bringing forward this measure, Count Bismarck was wholly silent as to Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, which provided that the inhabitants of Northern Schleswig should be invited to signify by vote their political preference; and that if they expressed by their votes the

portance. The negotiations for the peace were carried on at Vienna. Italian diplomatists are famous for their subtlety and address; but in the present case the uniform ill-success of the Italian arms paralysed their diplomacy, and Austria refused to cede one foot of territory beyond what she had already ceded to France. The Italian plenipotentiary was urgent that at least Riva, at the northern end of the Lake of Garda, might be ceded to Italy, which already owned nine-tenths of the shores of the lake; and Count Mensdorff, as if tired by his pertinacity, consented to sell Riva-a town of 5,000 inhabitants-for the sum of 10,000,000 florins! The offer was not accepted.

After much discussion, the treaty between Austria and Italy was signed on the 3rd October. Italy was to assume a portion of the debt attaching to the ceded territories,

PRUSSIAN FESTIVAL OF VICTORY AT BERLIN: UNTER DEN LINDEN ON THE NIGHT OF THE ILLUMINATIONS.

and to receive them from the hand of France, as arranged by the Austro-French Treaty concluded at Vienna on the 24th August. Accordingly, Peschiera was handed over by the French Commissioner, on the 10th October, to the Italian municipality. Venice was evacuated by the Austrians on the 19th instant, amid marks of respect from the crowd. On the 11th, General Menabrea, the Italian negotiator at Vienna, received from Count Mensdorff the far-famed iron crown of Lombardy.

The French Emperor, while handing over Venetia to Italy, was resolved that so good an opportunity for a plébiscite on the Napoleonic model should not be lost. He wrote thus to the King of Italy on the 11th August: "Your Majesty knows that I accepted the offer of Venetia in order to preserve it from all devastation, and prevent a useless effusion of blood. My purpose always has been to restore it to itself, so that Italy should be free from the Alps to the Adriatic. Mistress of her own destinies, Venetia will soon be able to express her will by universal suffrage." The Italian Government probably thought this a superfluous formality; nevertheless, it was necessary to comply. The voting took place about the end of October; 641,758 votes were given in favour of the incorporation of Venetia with Italy, and 69 against it.

For the French Emperor, in spite of the efficacy of the French intervention in favour of Austria, the events of this year must have been full of secret mortification. In Mexico, the empire which he had built up at such a heavy cost was crumbling to pieces; and he did not feel himself strong enough on the throne-nor was he, in fact, gifted with sufficient strength of moral and intellectual fibreto persevere in the enterprise against the ill-will of the American Government, and the carpings of the opposition at home. He made up his mind to withdraw the French troops from Mexico, and get out of the affair with as little loss of credit as possible. We reserve, however, for the present, an examination of the state of affairs in Mexico in 1866, that we may exhibit a complete and connected narrative of the course and fate of that unfortunate empire, when we have to speak of its collapse. In spite of checks and disappointments, Napoleon still wore a bold front, and in his public utterances continued to assume the oracular and impassable character which had so long imposed on the world. In replying (March 22, 1866) to the address of the Corps Législatif, the Emperor said: "Fifteen years ago, when nominal chief of the state, without effective power, and without support in the Chamber, but strong in my conscience and in the suffrages which had elected me, I ventured to declare that France would not perish in my hands. I have kept my word." What hardihood! thus to refer to the dark deed of treachery and violence by which he had risen to power, as if it ought to be only a subject of pride for him, and of congratulation for France. Within five years after the boast was uttered France was to "perish in his hands," as nearly as a great nation can perish.

In the sitting of the Corps Législatif on the 12th June, an important letter from the Emperor to M. Drouyn de Lhuys was read, in which it was declared that France would only require an extension of her frontiers, in the

event of the map of Europe being altered to the profit of a great Power, and of the bordering provinces expressing by a formal and free vote their desire for annexation. The last clause was a judicious reservation, particularly as the doctrine of the popular sovereignty, expressed through plébiscites, was not at all consonant to Prussian ideas, so that there was no chance of Rhine Prussia, or any part of it, being allowed the opportunity, supposing it had desired it, of voting for annexation to France. However, notwithstanding the imperial declaration, the map of Europe was altered to the profit of a great Power, and France obtained no extension of territory. Soor after the close of the Austro-Prussian War, the Emperor asked from the Prussian Government the concession of a small strip of territory to the extreme south of her Rhenish provinces, including the valuable coal-field in the neighbourhood of Saarbruck and Saarlouis. Count Bismarck met the request with a decided refusal, on the ground that the state of national feeling in Germany rendered the cession of a single foot of German territory to a foreign Power an impossible proceeding. The Emperor's mortification must have been extreme; he concealed it, however, and nothing can be more hopeful or optimistic than the tone of the circular which he caused to be sent on the 16th September to the French diplomatic agents abroad. Its object was to convince the nation and all the world that France had not been humiliated, nor disappointed, nor disagreeably surprised, by the late events; on the contrary, that she was perfectly satisfied with what had happened. The formation of the Holy Alliance fifty years before might indeed have been called a menace for France; at that time the chief Powers of Europe were banded together for the attainment of their own purposes, and she could get no allies. But the day of Holy Alliances was gone by; every nation was now free to choose its allies according to its political preferences. No principle dear to France had been outraged by what had happened in Germany. That very principle of nationality, by understanding and promoting which Prussia had risen to greatness, was a French principle. It would be found that the first Napoleon had caused two hundred and fifty-three independent states to disappear in Germany, and had founded, in germ, the nationality and kingdom of Italy. As to annexations, France desired none in which the sympathy of the populations annexed did not go with her-in which they had not the same customs, the same national spirit with herself. From the elevated point of view occupied by the French Government, "the horizon appeared to be cleared of all menacing eventualities;" great and anxious questions had been settled without too violent shocks, and without the dangerous co-operation of revolutionary passions. “A peace which reposes upon such bases will be a durable peace." Yet at this very time, if M. Rouher spoke the truth in the address which he presented to Napoleon III in the name of the Senate on the 16th July, 1870,* the

* M. Rouher said, "Your Majesty was able to wait, but has occu pied the last four years in perfecting the armament and organisa tion of the army."