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1. That we practife that our felves, which we condemn in Papifts, viz. Swearing with Jefuitical Equivocations and mental Refervations.

svig 2. That we take the glorious and dreadfull Name of God in vain; and play faft and loofe with Oathes: in as much as what we fwear to Day in one Senfe, we may fwear the direct contrary to Morrow in another. And 3. It will give Strength to that Charge which is layed to the Presbiterian Party, in fpecial, both (y) by Jefuites and (z) Setaries; that there is no Faith to be given to Proteftants, whatever they fwear; because they may fwear one Thing in their Words, and in their own Senfe mean another.

The fecond Way is, to take the Covenant with thefe or the like general Salvo's expreffed, viz. So far as lawfully I may; So far as it is agreeable to the Word of God, and the Lawes of the Land; faving all Oathes by me formerly taken, &c. But

1. We believe this mocking of God would be fo far from freeing us from the Guilt of Perjury, that thereby we should rather contract a new Guilt of moft vile and abominable Hypocrifie.

2. It seemeth all one unto us (the Thing being otherwife fuppofed unlawfull) as if we fhould fwear to kill, fteal, commit Adultery, or forfwear our felves, fo far as lawfully we may.

3. If this would fatisfie_ the Confcience, we might with a good Confcience not only take the prefent Covenant, but even fubfcribe to the Council of Trent alfo; yea, and to the Turkish Alcoran; and fwear to maintain and defend either of them, viz. fo far as lawfully we may, or as they are agreeable to the Word of God.

Thirdly, for the fecond Article in particular, in the Branch concerning the Extirpation of Church-Government, we are told, that it is to be understood of the whole Government, taken collectively and in fenfu compofito, fo as if we do endeavour but the taking away of Apparitors only, or of any other one kind of inferiour Officers belonging to the Ecclefiafticall Hierarchy, we fhall have fufficiently discharged our whole Promife in that Particular without any Prejudice done to Epifcopacy. But

1. Neither the Compofers of the Covenant by their Words, nor the Impofers of it by their Actions, have given us the leaft Signification that they meant no more.

2. Yea rather, if we may judge either by the Caufe or the Effects, we may well think there was a Meaning to extirpate the whole Government, and every Part thereof in the Article expreffed. For

1. The Covenant being (as we have no Cause to doubt) framed at the Inftance of the Scots, and for the easier procuring of their Affiftance in the

(y) Hæretici nec Deo, nec hominibus fervant fidem.-Speciatim hoc addo, Calviniftas in hac re deteriores effe quam Lutheranos. Nam Calvinista nullam fervant fidem: Jura, perjura.--Lutherani moderatiores funt. Becan. 5. Manual. Controv. 14. n.4. & 6.

(z) Invent Oathes and Covenants for the Kingdom, difpence with them when he pleaseth, fwear and forfwear as the Wind turneth, like a godly Prefbyter. Arraig. of Perfec. in Epift. Ded.

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late War, was therefore in all Reason fo to be framed and understood, as to give them Satisfaction, and (confidering what themfelves have (a) declared against Epifcopacy) we have little Reason to believe the taking away Apparitors, or any Thing leffe than the rooting out of Epifcopacy it felf, would have fatisfied them.

2. The Proceedings alfo, fince the entring of this Covenant, in endeavouring by Ordinance of Parliament to take away the Name, Power, and Revenues of Bishops do fadly give us to understand, what was their Meaning therein.

- Fourthly, as to the Scruples that arife from the Soveraignty of the King, and the Duty of Allegiance as Subjects; we find two feveral Ways of anfwering, but little Satisfaction in either.

I. The former, by faying (which feemeth to us a Piece of unreasonable and ftrange Divinity, that Protection and Subjection standing in relation either to other, the King being now difabled to give us Protection, we are thereby freed from our Bond of Subjection. Whereas

1. The Subjects Obligation (Jus fubjectionis) doth not fpring from, nor relate unto the actual Exercife of Kingly Protection; but from and unto the Princes Obligation to protect (Jus protectionis.) Which Obligation lying upon him as a Duty, which he is bound in Confcience to perform, when it is in his Power fo to do; the relative Obligation thereunto lyeth upon us as a Duty which we are bound in Confcience to perform, when it is in our Power fo to do. His Inability therefore ro perform his Duty doth not discharge us from the Neceffity of performing ours, fo long as we are able to do it.

2. If the King fhould not protect us, but neglect his Part, though having Power and Ability to perform it; his voluntary Neglect ought not to free us from the faithful Performance of what is to be done on our Part. How much less then ought we to think our felves difobliged from our Subjection, when the Non-protection on his Part is not from the Want of Will, but of Power?

II. The latter (wherein yet fome have triumphed) by faying that the Parliament being the fupreme Judicatory) of the Kingdome, the King, wherefoever in Perfon, is ever prefent there in his Power, as in all other Courts of Juftice: and that therefore whatfoever is done by them is not done without the King, but by him. But craving Pardon first if in Things without our proper Sphere we hap to fpeak unproperly or amiffe; we must next crave leave to be ftill of the fame Mind we were, till it fhall be made evident to our Understandings, that the King is there in his Power, as It is evident to our Senfes that he is not there in his Perfon: Which fo far as

(a) By the Covenant, both Houses of Scotland: And that we as well as they Parliament, and many Thoufands of other stand bound to endeavour the Extirpation His Majeftie's Subjects of England and thereof in England and Ireland. Scots De-. Ireland and bound as well as we to hin-clar. to the States of the United Provinces, der the fetting up of the Church Govern- 5. Aug. 1645. recited in Anfwer to the ment by Bifhops in the Kingdome of Scots Papers, pag. 23.

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our natural Reason and fmall Experience will ferve us to judge, all that hath been said to that Purpose can never do,

For, first, to the Point of Prefence:

1. We have been brought up in a Beliefe that for the making of Lawes, the actual (b) Royal Affent was fimply neceffary, and not only a virtual Af fent fuppofed to be included in the Votes of the Two Houfes: otherwise what Ufe can be made of his Negative Voice? or what need to (c) defire bis Royal Affent, to that which may be done as well without it.

2. The (d) Statute, providing that the King's Affent to any Bill fignified unto bis Great Seal fhall be to all Intents of Law as valid and effectual, as if he were perfonally prefent, doth clearly import that as to the Effect of making a Law, the King's Power is not otherwife really prefent with the two Houses, than it appeareth either in his Perfon or under his Seal: Any other real Prefence is to us a Riddle, not much unlike to that of Tranfubftantiation: an imaginary Thing, rather devised to serve Turns, than believed by those that are content to make Use of it.

3. Such Prefence of the King there, when it fhall be made appear to us either from the Writs, whereby the Members of both Houses are called together, or by the ftanding Lawes of the Land, or by the acknowledged Judgement and continued Practice of former and latter Ages, or by an Exprefs from the King himself, clearly declaring his Mind to that Purpofe, we fhall then as becometh us, acknowledge the fame, and willingly fubmit thereunto.

And as for the Argument drawn from the Analogy of other Courts, wherein the King's Power is always fuppofed to be virtually prefent, under Submission we conceive it is of no Confequence.

1. The Arguments à minore and à majore are fubject to many Fallacies and unless there be a Parity of Reason in every requifite Refpect between the Things compared, will not hold good: A petty Conftable (they fay)

(b) 'The old Formes of Acts of Parliament were, The King willeth, provideth, ordaineth, eftablisheth, granteth, &c. by the Affent of Parliament, &c. See Statutes till 1. Hen. IV. After that, The King, of the Affent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the Special Inftance and Request of the Commons of this Realm hath ordained, &c. See Statutes 1. Hen. IV. till 1. H.VII. A Form of fuch Petition of the Commons, See 1. Rich. III. 6. Prayen the Commons in this prefent Parliament affembled, that where, &c. Please it therefore your Highnefs, by the Advice and Affent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in this your prefent Parliament affembled, and by the Authority of the fame, to ordain, &c.

No Bill is an Act of Parliament, Ordi

may do fomething which a Juftice of Peace cannot do: And the Steward of a petty Mannor hath Power to adminifter an Oath, which (as we are told, the House of Commons it felf hath no Power to do.

2. That the High Court of Parliament is the fupream Judicatory, we have been told it is by Vertue of the King's Right of prefiding there, he being (e) the Supream Judge, and the Members of both Houfes his Council: which being fo, the Reafon of Difference is plain between that and other Judicatories in fundry Refpects.

1. The Judges in other Courts are deputed by him, and do all in his Name, and by his Authority; and therefore the Prefence of his Power in thofe Courts of minifterial Jurifdiction is fufficient, his perfonal Prefence not neceffary, neither hath he any perfonall Vote therein at all. But in the High Court of Parliament, where the King himself is the fupream Judge, judging in his own Name and by his own Authority, his Power cannot be prefumed to be really prefent without either the actual Prefence of his Perfon, or fome virtuall Representation thereof fignified under his Great Seal.

2. The Judges in inferiour Courts, because they are to act all in his Name, and by his Authority, do therefore take Oaths of Fidelity for the right exercifing of Judicature in their severall Places; fitting there, not by any proper Intereft of their own, but onely in Right of the King, whofe Judges they are, and therefore they are called the King's Judges and his Minifters. But in the High Court of Parliament, the Lords and Commons fit there in Councel with the King as Supream Judge, for the Good of the whole Realm; and therefore they are not called the King's Judges, but the King's Councel; and they have their feverall proper Rights and Interests peculiar and diftinct both between themselves, and from that of the Kings; by reafon whereof they become diftin&t (f) Orders, or as of late Times they have been ftiled (in this Senfe as we conceive) (g) three diftinct Eftates. Each of which being fuppofed to be the best Confervators of their own proper Intereft, if the Power of any one Eftate fhould be prefumed to be virtually prefent in the other two, that Eftate must needs be inevitably liable to fuffer in the proper Interefts thereof. Which might quickly prove deftructive to the whole Kingdome: The Safety and Profperity of the whole confifting in the Confervation of the juft Rites and proper Intereft of the main Parts, viz. The King, Lords, and Commons, inviolate and entire.

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3. The Judges of other Courts, forafmuch as their Power is but minifterial and meerly judicial, are bounded by the prefent Laws, and limited alfa by -75 their own Acts: fo as they may neither fwerve from the Laws, in giving Judgment, nor reverse their own Judgments after they are given But the High Court of Parliament, having (by reafon of the King's Supream Power prefiding therein) a Power Legislative as well as Judiciall, are not fo limited by any earthly Power, but that they may change and over-rule the Laws, and their own Acts at their Pleasure. The King's Perfonall Affent therefore is not needfull in those other Courts, which are bounded by those Laws whereunto the King hath already given his Perfonall Affent; but unto any Act of Power befide, beyond, above, or against the Laws already established. We have been informed, and it feems to us very agreeable to Reason, that the King's Perfonall Affent fhould be abfolutely neceffary: Forafmuch as every fuch A&t is the Exercife of a Legislative rather than of a Judiciall Power; and no A& of Legiflative Power in any Community (by Confent of all Nations) can be valid, unless it be confirmed by fuch Perfon or Perfons as the Soveraignty of that Community refideth in. Which Soveraignty, with us, fo undoubtedly refideth in the Perfon of the King, that his ordinary Style runneth, Our (b) Soveraigne Lord the King: And he is in the Oath of Supremacy exprefly acknowledged to be the onely Supreme Governour within his Realms. And we leave it to the Wisdome of others to confider what Mifery and Mischief might come to the Kingdom, if the Power of any of these three Estates fhould be fwallowed up by any one or both the other, and if then under the Name of a Judiciall, there fhould be yet really exercised a Legiflative Power.

4. Since all Judiciall Power is radically and originally in the King, (who is for that Caufe ftyled by the Laws (i) the Fountain of Justice) and not in any other Perfon or Perfons, but by Derivation from him: it feemeth to us evident, that neither the Judges of inferiour Courts of minifteriall Juftice, nor the Lords and Commons affembled in the High Court of Parliament, may of Right exercife any other Power over the Subjects of this Realm, than fuch as by their refpective Patents and Writs iffued from the King, or by the known eftablished Laws of the Land, formerly affented unto by

b) The Crown of England hath been fo free at all Times, that it hath been in no earthly Subjection, but immediately to God in all Things touching the Regality of the faid Crown. 16. Rich. II. 5. Omnis fub eo eft, & ipfe fub nullo, nifi tantum fub Deo. Parem autem non habet Rex in regno fuo, quiaItem nec multò fortiùs fuperiorem aut potentiorem habere debet, quia fic effet inferior fuis fubjectis. Bract. conten. 1. Rubr. 36.

--- Cui autorgarogi, legibus ipfis legum