1803. BOOK VI. stances of France, at that time in a situation very little calculated for sending an army to India, the value attached to this contingency would not have been great. Neither would it be easy to show, that her chances of success, had France conducted an army to India, would not have been fully as great, at the close of the Mahratta war, as before. A prospect of deliverance from the English would probably have roused the whole Mahratta nation, then peculiarly exasperated, to have joined the invaders. As for the loss of Scindia's French officers, it would have been easy to supply their place, and to incorporate with the European battalions as many native troops as their funds could maintain. In regard to pecuniary supply, Scindia could not be less capable of aiding them after the war, than before. He was totally incapable at both times. GovernorGeneral estimates very low the evils produced by the treaty of Bassein. The Governor-General not only made a very high estimate of the advantages arising from the treaty of Bassein: He had a contrivance for making a very low estimate of the estimate of the expense which it produced. It produced indeed a war, which laid upon the East India Company a frightful load of debt. But the contending armies of Scindia and Holkar could not, the Governor-General informs us, have been kept in the field, without ravaging the territories of the English and the Nizam; and to stand protected against this danger, armies must have been placed on the frontiers, which would have cost nearly as much as the war. This is one of those vague assertions, which, without much regard to their foundation, are so often hazarded, when they are required to serve a particular purpose; but which answer that purpose only so long as they are looked at with a distant and a careless eye. In the present case, it may safely be affirmed, that all the expense which a plan of defence required would have been the merest trifle in comparison with the enormous expenditure of the war. That much would have been required for defence, is fully contradicted by the Governor-General himself; who confidently affirmed his belief, that the treaty of Bassein, however alarming and odious to Scindia and Holkar, would yet be unable to move them to hostilities, because they knew their own weakness, and the dreadful consequences of a war with the British power. If for the mighty interests, placed at stake by the treaty of Bassein, it was yet improbable they would dare to provoke the British anger, it was next to a certainty, that they would be careful not to provoke it for the sake of a little plunder. The question To have placed the subsidiary force with the Nizam upon his frontier, and to of the good have increased to the necessary extent the troops stationed in Mysore, presented treaty of Bas- but little demand for expenditure, beyond what the maintenance of that portion or evil of the of the army would have required in any other station. If some little expense CHAP. XI. must have attended these movements, it would be absurd to speak of it coolly 1803. as fit to be compared with the huge expenditure of the Mahratta war. run upon the war. sein depends We are now then prepared to exhibit, in a few words, the statement of profit in the long and loss by the treaty of Bassein. What was gained by it was the dependance question of good or evil of of the Peshwa, and nothing more: What was lost by it was all that was lost by the Mahratta the Mahratta war. The loss by the Mahratta war is the excess of what it produced in evil above what it produced in good. Of the good and the evil which was produced by the Mahratta war, nothing can be spoken with precision till it is known what they are. An account, therefore, of the events, and of the results of the war, will usefully precede the portion which remains of the inquiry into the nature and effects of the treaty of Bassein. 1803. GovernorGeneral's instructions to the Commander-inchief. CHAP. XII. " ·Objects to which the Operations of the Army in the North were to be directed— Objects to which the Operations of the Army in the South were to be directed -Minor Objects of the War-General Lake takes the Field-History of the French Force in the Service of Scindia, and of his Possessions in the Dooab -History of the Emperor Shah Aulum continued-Battle of Allyghur, and Capture of the Fort-Battle of Delhi, and Surrender of the Emperor to the English-Agra taken-Battle of Laswaree-French Force in the Service of Scindia destroyed, and his Dominions in the Dooab transferred to the English-Operations of the Army under General Wellesley in the South -Ahmednuggur taken-Battle of Assye-Boorhanpore and Asseerghur taken-Scindia makes an Overture toward Peace-Battle of ArgaumSiege and Capture of the Fort of Gawilghur-Operations in Bundelcund— in Cuttack—in Guzerat-Negotiation with the Rajah of Berar-Treaty concluded-Negotiation with Scindia-Treaty concluded-Engagements with the minor Princes near the Jumna-Scindia enters into the defensive Alliance—Governor General's Account of the Benefit derived from the defensive Alliances, and the Mahratta War-Investigation of that Account. BOOK VI. FOR the war, as soon as it should begin, the Governor-General had prepared a most extensive scheme of operations. To General Lake, the Commander-inchief, at that time present with the army on the upper frontiers, instructions had been sent on the 28th of June; pointing out, not only the necessity of placing the army under his command, with the utmost expedition, in a state of preparation for the field, but also, though briefly, and in the form of notes, the objects to the attainment of which the operations of that army would immediately be directed. On the consequent exertions of the Commander-in-chief, to make ready for action, the Governor-General bestows unqualified praise. "By the indefatigable activity," says he, " zeal, ability, and energy of General Lake (whose personal exertions have surpassed all former example, and have been the main source of the success of the war in that quarter) the army of Bengal, on the north-west frontier of Oude, was placed, towards the close of the month of July, in a state of preparation and equipment favourable to the immediate attack CHAP. XII. of M. Perron's force, as soon as authentic advices should be received of the commencement of hostilities in the Deccan." * 1803. which the directed to aim In this part of the extensive field, which the plan of the Governor-General Objects at The first of Commanderembraced, he gave notice of two military, and two political, objects. The first of the military objects was to conquer the whole of that portion of Scindia's do-in-chief was minions which lay between the Ganges and the Jumna; destroying completely in the north. the French force by which that district was protected; extending the Company's frontier to the Jumna; and including the cities of Delhi and Agra, with a chain of posts, sufficient for protecting the navigation of the river, on the right bank of the Jumna. The second of the military objects was of minor importance; the annexation of Bundelcund to the British dominions. The political objects were also two. The first, to use the language` of the Governor-General, was, "the possession of the nominal authority of the Mogul ;" that is to say, the possession of his person, and thereafter the use of his name, to any purpose to which the use of that name might be found advantageous. Together with the city of Delhi, the person of the Mogul had for a series of years been subject to Scindia; more immediately, at that particular moment, to Perron, as the vice-gerent of Scindia in that part of his kingdom. The acquisition of the country would, of course, place the Mogul, too, in British hands. The second of the Governor-General's political objects was, an extension of his general scheme of alliance. He desired that the whole of the petty states, to the southward and westward of the Jumna, from Jynegur to Bundelcund, should be united in "an efficient system of alliance" with the British government.† Such were the ends to be pursued in the north; for the accomplishment of which the Commander-in-chief was vested with the same sort of powers, which had already been conveyed to General Wellesley, for the more secure attainment of those which were aimed at in the south. General Wellesley was expected, Objects at with the force under his command, to defeat the confederate army of Scindia Wellesley was and the Rajah of Berar; to protect from all danger, in that direction, the domi- to aim in the nions of the Company and their allies; and to establish, in their subsidizing form, the governments of the Nizam, the Peshwa, and Guickwar. which General south. The province of Cuttack separated the Company's dominions in Bengal, from Minor objects the northern circars. By the conquest of this district, the territory of the 1. The con of the war: * Papers ut supra, p. 154, 234. + Gov.-Gen.'s Letter to the Commander-in-chief, dated 27th of July, 1803. Ibid. P. 156. tack. 1803. BOOK VI. English nation in the northern part of India would be united, on the eastern coast, with that in the south, and would extend in one unbroken line from the quest of Cut- mountains on the frontier of Tibet to Cape Comorin; the Mahrattas on that side of India would be deprived of all connection with the sea, and hence with the transmarine enemies of the Anglo-Indian government; a communication not liable to the interruption of the monsoons would be formed between Calcutta and Madras; and an additional portion of the Bengal frontier would be delivered from the chance of Mahratta incursions. The province of Cuttack belonged to the Rajah of Berar. Preparations were made for invading it about the time at which the operations of the principal armies should commence. 2. Of Baroach, and Scindia possessed the port of Baroach, and a contiguous district on the coast other posses- of Guzerat. The government of Bombay was made ready to seize them, as soon as the war should be declared. sions of Scindia in General Lake General Lake took the field with an army of 10,500 men, consisting of about takes the field. 200 European artillery, three regiments of European, and five of native cavalry, one regiment of European, and eleven battalions of native infantry. Beside this force, about 3,500 men were assembled near Allahabad for the invasion of Bundelcund; and about 2000 were collected at Mirzapoor, to cover Benares, and guard the passes of the adjoining mountains. History of The army of Scindia, to which General Lake was to be opposed, was under Scindia's French force. the command of a Frenchman, named Perron, and stated by the GovernorGeneral, on grounds of course a little uncertain, to have consisted of 16,000 or 17,000 infantry, formed and disciplined on the European plan; with a large body of irregular infantry, from fifteen to twenty thousand horse, and a train of artillery, which the Governor-General describes, as both numerous and well appointed.* To understand the nature of the power of Scindia, in this quarter of India, a * Vide Gov.-Gen.'s Notes relative to the late transactions in the Mahratta empire. Ibid. p. 235. It is instructive to observe the prevalence of exaggeration: Col. Collins in his letter from Scindia's camp, dated 7th of April, 1802, says; "Since my arrival at this court, I have obtained more accurate information of the state of the regular infantry in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindia than I heretofore possessed. I believe your Lordship may rely on the correctness of the following statement. General Perron commands four brigades of native infantry, each consisting of ten battalions of sepoys. The complement of a battalion is 716 firelocks, and every corps is commanded by two or three European officers." Ibid. p. 17. By this statement Perron's infantry amounted to 28,640, more than one half beyond the estimate of the GovernorGeneral, which yet we may suppose beyond the mark. |