tract. The finding that there was a public highway was contrary to the evidence.

The judgment in favor of William D. Abraham was on a note signed by the complainant and Martha E. Weber, and it was a lien upon the property descended from his wife except his homestead estate. He was praying for an assignment of dower, and it would become a lien upon the dower when assigned. An execution cannot be levied on unassigned dower, (Newman v. Willetts, 48 Ill. 534,) which can only be reached by the aid of a court of equity, but when dower is assigned it becomes a life estate and is subject to execution. The court did not err in declaring the judgment a lien but did err in awarding six per cent interest upon it, which was contrary to the statute.

There was no evidence of any judgment for costs in the Appellate Court. It was alleged in the answer of the town of Canteen but there was no proof of it, and the court erred in subjecting the interests of the complainant to a lien for such costs.

William D. Abraham, the intervening petitioner, has assigned cross-errors, the first of which is that the court erred in not setting aside a sufficient sum for the payment of debts that are a charge upon the estate of Martha E. Weber. That question has not arisen and will not arise unless there shall be a sale of the lands, since there will be no money to set aside unless there shall be a sale which produces money. The second and fourth alleged errors relate to the allowance to complainant's solicitor of a solicitor's fee, but there is nothing in the abstract of record about a solicitor's fee and it does not appear that any allowance was made. The third assignment of the cross-error is that the court erred in entering a decree giving the complainant a lien for taxes paid by him, but there is nothing in the abstract of the decree on that subject. None of the crosserrors are well assigned.

The decree is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree in harmony with the conclusions stated in this opinion, making perpetual the injunction against the town of Canteen and village of Fairmont City, subjecting the interest of the complainant to the Abraham judgment, with interest at five per cent and costs, and disallowing the claim of the town of Canteen for costs in the Appellate Court, in which respects the decree heretofore entered was erroneous.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(No. 11723.-Reversed and remanded.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Olden C. Cofoid, County Collector, Appellant, vs. THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.

Opinion filed February 20, 1918.

I. PRACTICE—when Supreme Court must decide case according to law then existing. Where the law authorizing a judgment of ouster in quo warranto is changed pending an appeal, the Supreme Court must decide the case according to the existing law and not according to the law as it existed when the judgment of the lower court was rendered. (People v. Gunn, 281 Ill. 244, followed.)

2. TAXES the act of 1917 validated high school taxes. The act of 1917, curing defects in the organization of high schools coming within its terms, validated the boards of education, and the acts attempted to be performed by them under the general School law, in all cases where such boards had not been previously adjudged illegal in quo warranto proceedings, or where, if adjudged illegal, the cases were pending on appeal. (People v. Mathews, ante, p. 85, and People v. Leigh, ante, p. 17, followed.)

APPEAL from the County Court of Putnam county; the Hon. DANIEL H. GREGG, Judge, presiding.

JAMES E. TAYLOR, State's Attorney, (GEO. W. HUNT, of counsel,) for appellant.

WATTS A. & CAREY R. JOHNSON, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: Appellant made application at the June term, 1917, of the county court of Putnam county, for judgment and order of sale of appellee's real estate for delinquent taxes levied for high school purposes in Township High School District No. 535, in said county, for the year 1916. The objections thereto were sustained and judgment denied on June 9, 1917, and appellant prayed an appeal to this court. Subsequently the legislature passed the validating act of June 14, 1917, which then became effective. On June 16, 1917, appellant filed a motion to vacate the order of the court sustaining the objections, insisting that the curative act validated the high school district and the acts of the high school board in levying said taxes. On June 23, 1917, the court overruled the motion and again sustained the objections of appellee and denied judgment. This appeal was perfected.

It is agreed that appellant made a prima facie case for judgment; that said school district was organized June 5, 1916, under section 6 of the act of June 5, 1911, which act was declared invalid by this court in the case of People v. Weis, 275 Ill. 581; that said board of education was elected in the territory comprising said district June 17, 1916, and on June 22, 1916, the members met and organized as required by law; that thereafter they pretended to assume, do and perform the powers delegated to a township high school board of education under the general School law until April 21, 1917, at which time a judgment of ouster was entered against them in the circuit court of said county in a certain suit then and there pending, entitled People v. Gunn, said proceeding being an information in the nature of quo warranto; that they then and there, in pursuance and in compliance with an order of the circuit court in said cause, prayed and perfected an appeal to this

court; that said board rented a building and conducted a high school therein for the years 1916 and 1917, employed teachers, purchased a laboratory, supplies, guides and text books, and contracted for and extended the credit of the district to pay the teachers and for supplies, books, rent, etc.

Appellee's objections to said taxes are, that said high school district was organized under the void act of June 5, 1911; that the township high school board of education and the high school district had no legal existence, as held by the circuit court under the information, and that said taxes are for those reasons illegal and void.

Since the perfection of the appeal in this case this court has considered said case of People v. Gunn, 281 Ill. 244, wherein it was held that we were bound to dispose of the case under the law in force at the time our decision was rendered and not as it was at the time of the judgment in the circuit court. The district in that case was held to be legally organized by virtue of the curative act and the judgment of the circuit court was reversed. It was also held by this court in People v. Mathews, (ante, p. 85,) People v. New York Central Railroad Co. (ante, p. 19,) People v. Leigh, (ante, p. 17,) People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. (ante, p. 23,) and in other cases decided at the last term of this court, that the General Assembly had the power to validate boards of education elected under the void act of June 5, 1911, and that the validating act did validate all such school boards and every act of such boards of education attempted to be performed by them under the general School law, in all cases where such boards had not been previously adjudged illegal in quo warranto proceedings, or in all such cases where said boards had been adjudged illegal and ousted by some lower court or courts and which cases were pending on appeal in this court. For the reasons assigned in the cases cited the judgment of the county court is held to be erroneous and the taxes not subject to the objections raised thereto by appellee.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to the lower court to enter judgment for said taxes and an order of sale against appellee's property. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(No. 11886.-Reversed and remanded.)

THE CITY OF LEWISTOWN, Appellant, vs. EVERETT HARRISON, Appellee.

Opinion filed February 20, 1918.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-municipal police regulation may differ from State law on the subject if not inconsistent therewith. A city cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a State law or are repugnant to the policy of the State as declared by general legislation, but the police regulations of a city may differ from those of the State upon the same subject if not inconsistent therewith. (City of Decatur v. Schlick, 269 Ill. 181, followed.)

2. SAME-city may prohibit the barter or exchange as well as the sale of intoxicating liquor. Under the provisions of the Cities and Villages act a city has power, without proceeding under the Local Option law, to regulate as well as prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, and in the exercise of such power it may prohibit the barter or exchange as well as the sale of intoxicating liquors.

3. PRACTICE-formal exception to entry of judgment need not be incorporated into record. Under section 81 of the Practice act, as amended in 1911, the incorporating into the record of formal exceptions, including the exception to the entry of the judgment, is not necessary in order to preserve the rulings of the trial court for review, and the ruling of the court in refusing to admit an ordinance in evidence may properly be questioned on appeal though no formal exception was taken to the entering of the final judgment.

4. SAME-city need not offer to prove a violation of ordinance which court has refused to admit in evidence. The law does not require the doing of useless or frivolous things, and in a prosecution for the violation of an ordinance which the court has refused to admit in evidence the city is not required to offer to introduce evidence to show a violation of the ordinance and obtain a ruling on such offer in order to prevent the question of the validity of the ordinance from being a mere moot question.