On April 13, 1913, the original bill was filed by James Sloan praying the cancellation of said instrument and for the return to him of the notes and securities. The three beneficiaries, among others, were made parties defendant to the bill, which was afterwards dismissed as to Cora Sloan Clausen, who joined her father as complainant in an amended bill. As grounds for the relief prayed, the amended bill charged that the execution of the instrument was procured by fraud and undue influence; that James Sloan had not sufficient mental capacity to execute it and to know and understand what he was doing, and that the instrument was of a contractual nature and never became operative because Cora Sloan Clausen refused to accept it or consent to be bound by its terms. Defendants answered the bill, denying its allegations and denying that complainants were entitled to the relief prayed upon any ground set up and relied on in the bill. The cause was referred to the master in chancery to take the testimony and report his conclusions. The mas ter reported that the allegations of fraud and undue influence and lack of mental capacity of the complainant James Sloan were not sustained. He further reported that the evidence showed Cora Sloan Clausen, when she first learned of the execution of the instrument, refused to accept and be bound by it; that her acceptance was material and essential to the validity of the contract, and that her refusal to accept it made it a wholly different instrument and agreement from that which James Sloan had intended to make and enter into, and that he never intended to enter into said contract unless Cora Sloan Clausen should also consent to be bound by it. The master recommended that a decree be entered in accordance with the prayer of the amended bill. Exceptions to the master's report were overruled by the chancellor and a decree entered in accordance with the recommendation of the master, which decree was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Second District. As we agree with the circuit and Appellate Courts that because of the failure of one of the parties to accept and be bound by the contract no trust was perfectly created, we deem it unnecessary to discuss any other question. The written instrument was in the first instance an offer on the part of James Sloan to give to his three children named the property described in the instrument, which gift would not become binding and irrevocable until its terms and conditions were assented to and accepted by them. The terms of the gift imposed burdens on the beneficiaries which they could not be required to perform unless they agreed to them. James Sloan was to receive the income from the property during his life, to be paid to him by Horan, who was to handle, invest and re-invest the property as agent or trustee and pay said income to the donor. A further condition of the gift was that the donor was to receive a sum equal to the net income the property was then producing, the principal sum to be preserved intact so as to produce said amount, and this without reference to whether a part or all of the property might be lost by the makers of the notes becoming insolvent. The beneficiaries could not claim the benefits of the trust without accepting the conditions and burdens imposed by it. If they accepted the burdens they would be obligated to see to the payment to their father, annually, of an amount equal to the net income the property was producing at the date of the agreement, whether the property continued to produce that amount or not. Reciprocal promises of the beneficiaries were necessary to mutuality in the contract. Without such promises or agreement there was no liability on the part of the beneficiaries to pay James Sloan anything if by reason of losses the property should not be sufficient to produce the income reserved to the donor. None of the children accepted the terms of the trust agreement in writing. It was perhaps not essential that the donees signify their acceptance in writing, but it was necessary that with knowledge of the terms of the gift they should in some way manifest their willingness to perform the obligations imposed upon them by the terms of the gift. Dr. John F. Sloan manifested his satisfaction with it by actively assisting in procuring its execution, and the master found Frederick J. Sloan was advised of the execution of said instrument soon after it was executed and that he approved and ratified it. Cora Sloan Clausen never assented to the agreement, but as soon as she learned of it repudiated it and refused to accept or be bound by it. James Sloan never proposed to give his property to three of his children through the medium of an agent or trustee if two, only, of them would accept the terms upon which the gift was made. His offer contemplated and intended that all of them should accept and agree to perform the obligations imposed by the terms of the gift. When one of the three refused to consent, the terms upon which the gift was offered were not complied with. Cora Sloan Clausen could not be held liable to pay James Sloan anything if the income from the property should diminish, after having refused to accept the gift on the terms it was proposed to be made. Until its acceptance by all three of the proposed beneficiaries the proposal to make the gift was subject to be withdrawn and the gift revoked. The gift could only be made irrevocable by acceptance, upon the terms and conditions imposed, by all of the donees who were to become liable to discharge the obligations its acceptance created. We cannot assume the donor would have consented to make the gift if two, only, of the donees agreed to accept it upon the terms imposed. The intention of the donor being that the three children should jointly assume the obligations imposed by the gift, it would not become binding and irrevocable when assented to by only a part of them. Appell v. Appell, 235 Ill. 27; 9 Cyc. 660; 6 R. C. L. 858. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. (No. 11889.-Cause transferred.) JOSEPH BRAYSHAW, Admr., Appellee, vs. JOHN E. TRISLER, Appellant. Opinion filed February 20, 1913. Appeals and erRORS—when freehold is not involved. No freehold is involved in an ordinary proceeding by an administrator to pay debts nor where the question for determination is as to the existence of a lien upon land. APPEAL from the County Court of Champaign county; the Hon. Roy C. FREEMAN, Judge, presiding. GREEN & PALMER, (WILLIAM G. PALMER, and ORIS BARTH, of counsel,) for appellant. DOBBINS & DOBBINS, for appellee. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree of the county court of Champaign county ordering a ten-acre tract of farm land to be sold to pay certain claims allowed as debts against the estate of Giula P. Thompson, deceased. She died intestate, a resident of Champaign county, on November 28, 1910. At that time she was the owner in fee simple of the ten acres of land here in question and of an undivided twothirds interest in a twenty-acre tract. The original inventory filed in her estate stated that she was the owner in fee simple of all the thirty acres but that H. C. Parrish and H. R. Parrish claimed some interest therein. She left her surviving her husband, Joseph H. Thompson, and four sons and two daughters. One of her sons, James P. Thompson, was on December 14, 1910, appointed administrator of her estate and duly qualified. Some time later he joined with his father and a brother and sister in instituting partition proceedings in the circuit court of Vermilion county, which culminated in a decree for partition of said thirty acres of land. The commissioners in the partition proceedings reported that the thirty-acre tract was not susceptible of partition, and fixed the value per acre of the north ten acres (the property here in question) at $195, the middle ten acres at $190 and the south ten acres at $185. The premises were thereupon ordered sold by the master in said partition proceedings. He first tried to sell the tracts separately and received no bids therefor. He then put the entire thirty-acre tract up, and appellant, John E. Trisler, became the purchaser at $200 an acre and paid for the tract $6000 in cash. The sale was approved by the circuit court, and the master in chancery on June 16, 1914, executed a deed of said thirty acres to Trisler. In the partition proceedings no reference was made to there being any unpaid debts of Giula P. Thompson and no provision was made by the decree of the circuit court for the payment of claims, although James P. Thompson was a party to the proceedings. Trisler at once entered into possession of said land and paid the taxes for 1914 and each year since that date. The petition in this case to sell the north ten-acre tract which Trisler had purchased as part of the thirty-acre tract was filed February 26, 1917. The county court found in the proceedings to sell real estate to pay debts that there was still due and owing by the estate of Giula P. Thompson, $699.37, made up of the following claims:, |