itation placed upon the exercise of such right by the judgment of the Appellate Court. While there is much in the pleadings which shows that appellee is particularly hostile towards the officers of the appellant company and which leads one to seriously question whether he is actuated by any other motive than that of harassing and annoying that company, no facts are alleged which show an abuse by him of the exercise of his rights as a stockholder under our statute. The fact that he is interested in a competing corporation and has displayed a hostile attitude towards the company and its officers does not deprive him of his legal rights as a stockholder under our statute. So far as his acts in connection with the rival corporation are concerned, there is nothing in the answer to show or from which the inference may be drawn that the information upon which he was acting was obtained by him from the books and records of the corporation by virtue of his being a stockholder therein. On the contrary, we think it satisfactorily appears that such information of its business methods and affairs was obtained by him before he left its employ and while he was acting as its general manager. The mere fact that by such examination he may be able to obtain information that will be of benefit to the rival company is not sufficient to deprive him of his statutory rights. When the time comes, if it appears that he is using his right of examination of the records and books of account of the appellant company for the purpose of ascertaining its secret formulas and business. methods for the benefit of the rival corporation, it will be time enough to deal with that question. Until that time comes his rights as a stockholder under the statute ought not to be abridged. To hold otherwise would be to deprive stockholders in rival or competing corporations of their statutory rights, in violation of the express provisions of the statute and for no other reason than that they owned stock in rival or competing corporations.

In this connection it is to be borne in mind that appellee is a stockholder in this corporation and to that extent is interested in the proper conduct and management of its business and affairs and entitled to be informed as to how its business and affairs are being conducted; also that for years the company has been doing a prosperous business and has been a constantly growing concern until its business has grown from a company having but from 200 or 250 salesmen to one now having from 1200 to 1500, and that it has branch houses in several places in this country and in Canada. For several years preceding 1908 it paid large dividends on its stock, but since 1908, when appellee severed his connection with the company, it has paid no dividends on its stock whatever. Under these circumstances appellee may well be actuated with an honest desire to inquire into the manner of conducting its business and affairs with a view of ascertaining why no dividends are paid. To deprive appellee of his right to examine the affairs of the company would not only deprive him of a statutory right but perpetrate a legal wrong as well. Such examination should be made at such time or times and under such conditions as would not unduly hinder and embarrass the company in the conduct and management of its business.

It is further insisted that the petition is insufficient, in that it does not allege appellee made a proper application to the appellant company to examine its records and books, and that it conclusively appears that appellee has been at all times at liberty to examine the reports made by a disinterested auditor hired by the company. The petition alleges that in April, and again in May and July, 1914, appellee made written application to the company to examine its records and books of account and that on each occasion such permission was refused to him by the company. This was sufficient to show a demand and a refusal by the company. As to the other matters alleged, the statutes give a stockholder the right to examine the records and books of ac

count of the corporation. This statutory right cannot be put off or defeated by the corporation hiring someone else to make an audit of its business and affairs. There is no merit in either of these contentions.

It is further insisted that the petition was insufficient for the reason that it was not properly verified. So far as we are advised from the record and the opinion of the Appellate Court, that question was not raised in that court and it is now too late to raise it here for the first time. Nor do we think the question properly arises on the record under the practice pursued in the lower court. W. T. Rawleigh and the W. T. Rawleigh Medical Company filed their general and special demurrers to the petition in the lower court. This was an admission of the truth of all matters well pleaded in the petition. The object of requiring a verification of the petition is to show the court that the facts therein stated are true. After such facts have been admitted by demurrer it is too late to raise the question as to the sufficiency of the verification to the petition. Such question can only be raised by motion to strike the petition for want of sufficient verification before joinder of issue of law or fact. Bancroft v. Eastman, 2 Gilm. 259; Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Randolph, 186 Ill. 89.

Appellee also assigns cross-error on the action of the Appellate Court in ordering the costs of the appeal to be taxed to him. The matter of the taxation of costs on appeal is one which rests largely in the sound discretion of the court making such order. In the instant case the judgment of the lower court awarding the writ was erroneous in awarding appellee a larger measure of relief than he was entitled to under the showing made in this case. In order to correct this error in the judgment of the lower court it was necessary for appellants to prosecute their appeal to the Appellate Court, where the error in the judgment of the lower court was corrected. In such case we think there

was no error in that court taxing the costs on such appeal

to appellee.

For the reasons given the judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 11614.-Reversed and remanded.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. MAUD LINDLEY, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed February 20, 1918.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-when court's remarks in ruling on competency of evidence constitute prejudicial error. Where the proof as to whether a defendant is guilty of stealing an automobile is not clear the record should be free from substantial error, and remarks by the court in refusing the admission in evidence of a chattel mortgage by which the defendant claimed to have obtained the car, having a tendency to discredit the paper as evidence in the minds of the jury, constitute prejudicial error, although the court afterwards, of its own motion, admits the mortgage in evidence.

2. SAME when it is prejudicial error to admit evidence of another crime to show guilty knowledge. If the guilt of a defendant charged with receiving a stolen automobile is not clear it is prejudicial error to admit evidence intended to show guilty knowledge by connecting the defendant with the theft of another automobile some time after the larceny of the one in question, where such evidence merely tends to raise a suspicion of the defendant's connection with the latter crime, notwithstanding the court subsequently orders the evidence stricken from the record.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. DAVID M. BROTHERS, Judge, presiding.

MAX LUSTER, and FRANK A. MCDONNELL, for plaintiff in error.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, and EDWARD C. FITCH, (DANIEL G. RAMSAY, and GEORGE C. BLISS, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: Maud Lindley, a married woman, resides in the city of Chicago, where she keeps a rooming house. Her husband either conducts or works in a plumbing shop in Kokomo, Indiana. Mrs. Lindley was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county in June, 1917, some of the counts of the indictment charging her with the larceny of an automobile on October 28, 1916, and others charging her with buying, receiving and aiding in concealing an automobile that had been stolen from its owner, well knowing said property had been stolen. She was tried, convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary by the judgment of the criminal court, and brings the case here for review by writ of error.

Benjamin F. Cartwright, residing at 3134 Franklin boulevard, in Chicago, was the owner of a Studebaker automobile which he kept in his private garage on the premises where he resided. On or about October 28, 1916, it was stolen from the garage. It was found in May, 1917, in the garage of Ed. E. Hill, in Kokomo, Indiana, where it had been stored by plaintiff in error. She explained her connection with and possession of the automobile in the following manner: She had formerly resided in and near Kokomo. While visiting there during the summer of 1916 a man giving his name as Edward Fields introduced himself to her, claiming he recognized her because he formerly lived there and used to deliver papers to her family when they resided on East Jackson street, in Kokomo. Along about November 1, 1916, Fields either called on plaintiff in error personally or called her by telephone and told her he was going to drive from Chicago to Kokomo the next day and inquired if she did not wish to accompany him. She consented to do so, and the following day plaintiff in error and her brother went with Fields and another man in an automobile driven by Fields, to Kokomo. After arriving there Fields later saw plaintiff in error and told her he had expected to receive $250 that day from someone in Ko