would be paid to said cross-complainant, but that he has never received anything but a nominal consideration for said alleged conveyance; that Morgan J. Lewis' attorneys pretended to represent his interests and he placed implicit confidence in them, but for the purpose of depriving the cross-complainant of his interest in the premises they conspired with Frank M. Lewis and Roy Lewis and their attorneys to obtain a deed from Morgan J. Lewis on the representation that he would receive a fair consideration therefor, but that he received practically nothing but a nominal consideration, and if any real consideration passed from Frank M. Lewis the same had been appropriated by the attorneys and Frank M. Lewis and Roy Lewis, and that they refused either to pay anything but a nominal consideration or to account to Morgan J. Lewis for the proceeds of the sale.

Counsel for the appellants in their argument claim that the first deed, that of October 25, 1899, was secured from Morgan J. Lewis by fraudulent means; that the second was secured under circumstances amounting to moral duress; that the proceeds of the sale to Frank M. Lewis were appropriated by the attorneys of Morgan J. Lewis and Roy Lewis by mutual agreement; that the sale of the lands to Frank M. Lewis was in fraud of the reversionary interest of Thomas J. Lewis, one of the appellants; that Frank M. Lewis did not have title to the lands adverse to John B. Lewis, and therefore the latter could not maintain a suit for partition. The last proposition is based upon the fact that Frank M. Lewis had no money to pay for the land and borrowed money of his father for that purpose, and is of no importance. Thomas J. Lewis' claim to a reversionary interest is based upon his testimony and that of two of his sisters that the agreement of the devisees to convey to Morgan J. Lewis was on the condition that the property should come back to them after his death. The agreement was in writing and contains no such condition, but declares

the intention to be to give Morgan J. Lewis the share in his father's estate he would have received had the codicil not been made. The cross-bill does not charge any fraud or mistake in the execution of this agreement. There is no evidence tending to show either fraud or duress in procuring the execution of the first trust deed or the second trust deed. As to the sale to Frank M. Lewis, the consideration of $19,000 was less than the full value of the lands, but the court had expressed an adverse opinion in regard to the suit which was pending, and the settlement of that suit provided funds for the payment of Morgan J. Lewis' attorneys' fees and expenses in prosecuting that suit and provided him with an annuity of $960 a year for life. The agreement for the settlement of the suit and the sale of the land and the disposition of the proceeds was entered into by him with full knowledge of all the circumstances, after consultation with his attorneys and months of negotiation. There is no evidence of any fact concealed from him or any misrepresentations made to him. The cross-bill makes no specific charge of fraud and the record contains no evidence of it. Morgan J. Lewis appears to have been in bad health most or all of the time after his father's death and sometimes in need of money, but there is no evidence that Carrie N. Lewis, Roy Lewis, Frank M. Lewis or John B. Lewis attempted to take any advantage either of his condition of health or his financial straits.

A considerable part of the appellants' brief is taken up with a discussion of the amount paid to Morgan J. Lewis' solicitors as a part of the settlement of June 18, 1915. That controversy has nothing to do with the suit for the partition of the land. It has no place in this lawsuit. It is an entirely different subject matter from the controversy in regard to the land, and the court properly dismissed the bill as to this controversy without prejudice to any future action which the appellant Morgan J. Lewis may take.

The decree will be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

(No. 11282.-Reversed and remanded.)

MARGARET BENNETT, Defendant in Error, vs. EMERY E. BENNETT, Exr., Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed December 19, 1917-Rehearing denied Feb. 7, 1918.

1. WILLS—what agreement by widow does not estop her from insisting on certain construction of will. On an appeal by the executor to reverse a decree finding that the widow is entitled under the will to one-third of the entire estate of the testator, treated as personal property, the widow is not estopped to insist that such construction of the will was correct because she agreed by her attorney, during the proceedings to settle the estate in the county court, to accept her homestead and the value of her dower in cash,

2. SAME-equitable conversion defined. Equitable conversion is that change in the nature of property, presumed to exist only by intendment of equity, by which, for certain purposes, real estate is considered as personal property or personal estate as real, and transmissible and descendible as such.

3. SAME―when devise is treated as a gift of money and not of land. A devise of real estate which by the provisions of the will is to be converted into money and that money distributed among the devisees, must, as to such devisees, be treated as a gift of money and not of land.

4. SAME―construction of will giving widow "what the law allows her." Where a will gives a widow "her lawful part," "what the law allows her," or uses words of like purport, she is entitled thereunder to such part of the testator's estate as she would have received if he had died intestate.

5. SAME when conversion is only for purpose of distribution among devisees. Where a testator gives to his widow the "part or portion of my estate which may be legally due her by virtue of her rights under" the laws of Illinois, and by subsequent provisions directs a sale of his real estate and the distribution of the proceeds to certain devisees after payment of debts and the amounts due the widow and specific legatee, the conversion is only for the purpose of such distribution, and the widow is not entitled to one-third of all the estate as personalty but is entitled only to her statutory rights of homestead and dower and the widow's award.

6. SAME-executor is entitled to have costs of appeal paid out of assets of estate. An executor is entitled to an appeal for the purpose of obtaining a proper construction of the will, and he will be permitted to appeal without being required to assume liability for costs, except in the ordinary way out of the assets of the estate and in due course of administration.

DUNCAN, J., dissenting.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Third District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams county; the Hon. ALBERT AKERS, Judge, presiding.

WILSON & SCHMIEDESKAMP, and CARL E. EPLER, for plaintiff in error.

M. FINLAY CARROTT, and SAMUEL WOODS, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the court: Alvin Bennett, a resident of Adams county, died testate in that county August 30, 1913, leaving him surviving a widow, Margaret Bennett, who was his third wife, and eight children by a former wife. The provisions of his will, which was executed April 19, 1912, are as follows:

"First-It is my will that all of my just debts be paid by my executor as hereinafter named, as soon as convenient after my decease.

"Second-It is my will and I hereby direct my executor to pay to my wife, Margaret Bennett, the part or portion of my estate which may be legally due her by virtue of her rights under and in conformity to the laws of the State of Illinois.

"Third-It is my will that the remainder of my personal property be sold by my executor, either by private or public sale, as he may deem to the best interest of my estate, in the manner and form that my executor may designate.

"Fourth-It is my will and I hereby direct my executor to sell at public sale, according to the laws of the State of Illinois, any and all of the real estate of which I may die seized, for cash in hand, to the highest and best bidder.

"Fifth-After the payment of all my just debts and the payment of what money may be due my wife, Margaret Bennett, as her part or portion of my estate, and the pay

ment of all costs connected with the settlement of my estate, it is my wish that the remainder be divided as follows:

"Sixth-I give, devise and bequeath to my daughter, Olive Bennett, the sum of five hundred dollars ($500) in cash.

"Seventh-It is my will that the remainder, after deducting said bequest of $500, be equally divided among my surviving sons and daughters, share and share equally.

"Lastly-I hereby nominate and appoint my son, Emery E. Bennett, executor of this my last will, and require him to give the necessary bond for the execution of this trust." * * *

The real estate of the testator at the time of his death consisted of a farm of 120 acres in Adams county and a residence property, which was his homestead, in the village of Camp Point. The personal property, including cash on hand at the death of the testator, and rents received after his death, amounted to about $1400. The costs of administration and the debts, including the widow's award, which was paid to her partly in cash and partly in chattels selected by her, amounted to more than his personal property. The will was admitted to probate, and the executor named in the will qualified and proceeded to administer upon the estate. When the year in which the widow might elect to renounce under the will had about expired there was an opportunity to sell the real estate to advantage and the attorney for the widow and the attorney for the executor met in the office of the county judge and her attorney urged that the real estate be sold under the provisions of the will. The attorney for the executor was willing to do so provided the widow would agree not to renounce under the will. Some talk was also had about the widow's interest in the estate. The attorney for the executor testified on the hearing of the appeal in the circuit court that she was only claiming a homestead right in addition to her widow's award, which had been allowed, and a dower interest in