CHAPTER them; and Monroe still thought, should that treaty fail to IX. be ratified, or should Pinckney's negotiation with Spain 1795. not succeed, that it was yet possible to accomplish the

whole through the means of the French government, upon terms which "perhaps" would require no offensive movement, or any act which could rightly subject us to the imputation of a breach of neutrality.

While thus again pressing his favorite scheme of throwing the United States unreservedly into the arms of France, and intrusting the settlement of all our external difficulties to her fraternal care, Monroe was engaged in a curious correspondence with Jay on the subject of the British treaty and its communication to the French government. Shortly after his first note, announcing the signature of the treaty, Jay had again written to Monroe, promising to make to him a confidential communication, in cipher, of its principal heads. Having mislaid the key of the cipher, Monroe sent a Mr. Purviance, a confidential person, to Jay at London, to receive such oral or written communication as he might see fit to make, it being, according to Monroe's letter, of great consequence to American affairs at Paris to remove all doubts on the part of that government as to the contents of the treaty. Nothing, indeed, would satisfy, he added, but a copy of the entire treaty, to which "our ally" thought itself entitled.

While civilly declining to send a copy of the treaty, or to make any communication of its contents except Feb. 5. confidentially, Jay took the occasion to read Monroe a much-needed lecture on national independence and the duty of ministers. "You must be sensible," so he wrote, "that the United States, as a free and independent nation, have an unquestionable right to make any pacific arrangements with other powers which mutual

IX.

convenience may dictate, provided those arrangements CHAPTER do not contradict or oppugn their prior engagements with other states." Upon this point, the only one as to which 1795. France could have any rights, explicit assurances had already been given, to which Jay now added a verbal extract from the treaty, saving all privileges granted by prior treaties to other states. "It does not belong," added Jay, "to ministers who negotiate treaties to publish them, even when perfected, much less treaties not yet completed, and remaining open to alteration or rejection. Such acts belong exclusively to the governments which form them. I can not but flatter myself that the French government is too enlightened and reasonable to expect that any consideration ought to induce me to overleap the bounds of my authority, or to be negligent of the respect which is due to the United States. respect, and my obligations to preserve it, will not permit me to give, without the permission of my government, a copy of the instrument in question to any person or for any purpose; and by no means for the purpose of being submitted to the consideration and judgment of the councils of a foreign nation, however friendly."

That

By a minister sincerely desirous to sustain the neutral policy of his government-capable also of the idea, to attain to which would not seem to require any great knowledge of the world or diplomatic experience, that the French, however friendly to the United States, might still, as enemies of England, have purposes of their own to serve a knowledge of the contents of the British treaty might have been very beneficially employed in preparing the French government, as opportunity offered, for those clauses likely to be least palatable, as tending to place the two belligerents on an equal footing. The communication originally proposed by Jay was no doubt

CHAPTER intended for such a purpose. That Monroe might have IX. no ground of complaint, Jay soon afterward authorized 1795. John Trumbull, the painter, who had acted as his sec

retary of legation, and who was about to pass through Paris on his way to Strasburg, where one of his great Revolutionary paintings was under the hands of the engraver, to make a confidential communication to Monroe, such as had been originally promised. But this communication Monroe refused to receive, or any other which he was not at full liberty to lay at once before the French government. Thus repulsed, Trumbull communicated to an American merchant at Paris, with intent that he should transmit it to Monroe, a slight sketch of the provisions of the treaty, which Monroe, as soon as he reMarch. ceived it, hastened to convey to the Committee of Safety. Baffled by the wise caution of Jay, Monroe and the French government were obliged to wait the publication of the treaty in regular course, not, however, without an attempt to obtain a copy of it from Thomas PinckMay. ney, who passed through Paris on his way to Spain, and

But

upon whom Monroe urged the furnishing the French government with a copy as a means of securing their countenance and aid in his Spanish negotiation. Pinckney could not be thus induced to a breach of Jay's confidence and a disregard of the duty which he owed to his own government.

As soon as the Senate of the United States had advised the ratification of the treaty, but before the presi dent had decided upon it, or the treaty itself had been June 20. made public, a copy had been communicated to Adet, the newly-arrived French minister, the special representative of the party then in power in France, for his observations. Adet complained of the seizure of enemy's goods in American vessels, recognized in the treaty, as a

IX.

belligerent right, and of the list of contraband articles CHAPTER agreed to, as granting to England rights which France had not; also of the hospitality stipulated for British 1795. ships of war, as inconsistent with the restrictions upon the enemies of France contained in the French treaty. He also urged that the stipulation to make no new treaties inconsistent with the privileges granted to Great Britain would prevent the negotiation of a new commercial treaty with France, as she would hardly be disposed to relinquish the privileges which she now enjoyed. In reply to these objections, Randolph insisted that, in recognizing what Great Britain claimed as her rights, long exercised under the law of nations, the United States could not be said to grant her any thing to the disadvantage of France. If, by a treaty relinquishment of similar rights, France had placed herself at a disadvantage, she had doubtless considered of that before entering into the engagement, and had found indemnification for it, among other things, in the counter-stipulation of a right to make prize of American goods found on board enemy vessels, a privilege which, under the law of nations, she did not possess. The other two objections were disposed of as mistakes of construction. France was expressly se

cured in all the privileges she at present enjoyed; and, in case of a new treaty, she might still retain these privileges by leaving the existing treaty so far in force. These explanations seemed for the moment satisfactory to Adet; at least, he made no immediate reply to them.

Meanwhile, the renewal of the British provision order increased the anxiety of the French government on the subject of the British treaty. That order threatened to prove a serious obstruction to the supply of American provisions, of which, at that moment, France stood greatly in need. The hope of such supplies had,

IX.

CHAPTER indeed, been a leading motive for the decree abolishing the monopoly of all importations, and again opening for1795. eign commerce to individual enterprise; and Monroe had done his best to promote this object, by reiterated assurances of the vast profits to be made by Americans who might again adventure in French trade. All doubts as to the treaty were, however, soon removed by the arriAug. val of American newspapers, in which it was printed at length. But the Revolution of the year Three, which was then brewing, and the expectation that the president might yet be frightened by the outcries of the French party in America into a rejection of the treaty, kept the French government for some time quiet.

Monroe, meanwhile, begun to feel the awkward predicament in which he had placed himself. That the administration had injured him was a point upon which he had no doubt; so he states in a defense of himself which he published after his return, and in which all the papers connected with his mission are given at length. The injury consisted, it is to be presumed, in having continued to persevere in their own policy, and in not having come over to his; for Monroe seems to have taken it for granted that, in appointing him minister to France, the government had virtually made over to his good discretion all their relations, not with that country only, but with Great Britain also. That the government had compromised their own credit and that of the United States in not standing up to Monroe's unauthorized commitments to France, was equally clear to his mind. Under such circumstances, it was a natural and obvious idea at once to resign. But Monroe had the interests of his country to defend as well as his own honor, and before taking that step-so, at least, he represents the matter in his book-he put to himself this