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CHAPTER inferior officers, such as weighers, gaugers, measurers, I. and inspectors; a naval officer, to act as a check upon the 1789. collector, and in that capacity to countersign all docu

ments; and a surveyor, whose duty it was to superintend the inferior officers, and to place an inspector on board all vessels as soon as they arrived, charged to ascertain the quantities of goods on board on which duties were payable, and to allow none to be landed without a permit. The less important districts had a collector and surveyor, and the least important a collector only.

Masters of vessels arriving from foreign ports were required to deliver to the first custom-house officer coming on board two manifests or written statements of the cargo, with the names of the consignees. They were also required to enter their vessels at the custom-house within forty-eight hours after their arrival, and to swear to the truth of the manifest; nor might any goods be landed, except in open day and with a permit, under pain of forfeiture. To obtain a permit, the consignee must enter the goods at the custom-house, under oath, and pay the duties. All tonnage duties and all amounts of fifty dollars or less were to be paid in cash. When the duties exceeded that sum, four months credit was allowed on imports from the West Indies; six months on other goods, and in the case of Madeira wine, twelve months credit. False entries, and all other attempts at evasion of duties, were punishable with forfeiture, and false swearing by fine and imprisonment. This system. of collection, except the credit on duties, was mainly derived from the usages of the old royal and recent state custom-houses, and, with some slight modifications in the details, and the abolition of the credit system, still continues in force. To aid the provisions of this act, the merchants of all the principal ports entered into as

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sociations for the prevention of smuggling; and the CHAPTER revenue system was found to work much more easily, and proved more productive than had been expected.

A fourth act relating to trade and navigation provided for the registration of all American vessels engaged in foreign commerce, and the enrollment of those employed in the fisheries and coasting trade, except those under twenty tons burden, which were to have a license. This was with the view of ascertaining, not the tonnage only, but the ownership and the American character of the vessels, an authenticated copy of the register, which the vessel carried with her, serving for that purpose both at home and abroad. On every change of ownership a new register was required, without which the legal title did not pass. By the same act the coasting-trade was regulated, the vessels employed in that business being subject to restrictions in entering and clearing, and with respect to their cargoes, deemed necessary to prevent smuggling.

Another act assumed for the United States the support of all light-houses, buoys, beacons, and public piers, on condition that within one year the states within which they were respectively situated should vest in the United States not only the property in these structures, with the lands appertaining to them, but exclusive jurisdiction also within their circuit, reserving, however, the right of the state to serve civil and criminal process therein. Such cessions, under a provision in the Constitution to that effect, have ever since been uniformly required in case of all light-houses, forts, arsenals, dockyards, and other structures erected for the use of the United States.

Having thus made provision for collecting a revenueindeed, before all these bills were perfected-the House

1789.

CHAPTER or navigation, or the purchase of public lands or securities, state or national.

I.

1789.

The Department of War was also reorganized, very much on the old footing, the secretary of that department to have the superintendence of naval as well as of military affairs. Of the old Continental navy not a vessel remained; the existing military establishment, a regiment of foot and a battalion of artillery, were continued in service upon the terms and pay fixed by the late Continental Congress, and pay and subsistence at the same rates were to be allowed to such militia as the president might call into service for defense of the frontiers. Provision was also made for the invalid pensions due under the regulations of the Continental Congress, and hitherto payable by the states.

The reorganization of the general post-office was delayed till more complete information could be obtained, the establishment being, meanwhile, continued as it then stood. Franklin, the first Continental postmaster general, had been succeeded in that office by his son-in-law Richard Bache, and he by Ebenezer Hazard, who still held it.

As introductory to the passage of these acts, the general system of the executive departments had been considered by the House in Committee of the Whole. The Department of the Treasury being under consideration, Gerry, who had acted in the earlier days of the Continental Congress as the head of the Committee on the Treasury, was very strenuous for a board of commissioners instead of a single secretary. He seemed to be jealous lest the heads of departments should outshine the Senate, make themselves necessary to the president, and establish a hateful oligarchy. Wadsworth and Boudinot, whose practical experience entitled their opin

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ions to great weight, were very positive as to the supe- CHAPTER riority of a single office over a board in all the great points of decision, promptitude, responsibility, and econo- 1789. my. They drew a very strong contrast between the administration of the Continental finances by Robert Morris and by the various treasury boards, his predecessors, whose negligence and incapacity, so Wadsworth affirmed, had doubled the public debt. According to Wadsworth, the clamor raised against Morris had chiefly originated with those whose services he had dispensed with, or whose profits out of the public he had curtailed. Gerry's scheme found but very little support; yet a good deal of jealousy was felt of the treasury, and when the bill establishing the department came to pass, special exception was taken to the clause authorizing the secretary to digest and report plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, as if it were an infringement of the exclusive power of the House to originate money bills.

A much more doubtful point was raised on a motion to declare the heads of the departments removable at the pleasure of the president. It was maintained by Smith of South Carolina and others, that, as the Constitution made no provision for removals from office except by impeachment, all officers, unless a limit were fixed by law to the duration of their offices, would hold during good behavior. Others thought that, as the power of removal naturally belonged to the power that appointed, in all cases where the consent of the Senate was necessary for an appointment, their concurrence would also be required for removal. The power of removal in the president alone was represented as exceedingly dangerous, making him little short of a monarch, and all the public officers his mere creatures. These views were urged by Bland and

CHAPTER White of Virginia, Gerry, Huntington of Connecticut, 1. Livermore of New Hampshire, Jackson, and others. 1789. Madison, Benson, Goodhue, Lawrence, and Vining main

tained that, as the responsible executive head of the government, the president had, and ought to have, the constitutional power of removing all executive officers at pleasure. The bill for establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs being under consideration, this debate was earnestly renewed, and was kept up for four days. Smith of South Carolina now joined the party who insisted on the right of the Senate to be consulted on the question of removals. Sherman was inclined to the same opinion; but as the president was the head of the executive, the heads of the departments might, in that view, be considered as "inferior officers," and their appointment and removal subject, therefore, under the Constitution, to be regulated by law. He was, however, decidedly opposed to giving the president the power of removal. Ames, Boudinot, Baldwin, and Scott, seconded by those who had taken the same side in the former debate, insisted on the president's constitutional right; and they dwelt with great emphasis on the absolute necessity of such a power, if the president were to be held responsible for the execution of the laws. "The decision now made," said Madison, "will become the permanent exposition of the Constitution, and on that permanent exposition will depend the genius and character of the whole government."

It was suggested by those opposed to the president's power of removal that a suspending power during the vacation of the Senate might answer all necessary purposes. But where, it was asked, did those who denied the president's constitutional power to remove discover the constitutional power to suspend? That power, be

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