MASSACHUSETTS POLITICS. 287 But as these pa- CHAPTER XXIV. connection with the eastern part of it. pers mentioned no names, and stated no acts; as their imputations related only to what it was supposed might 1812. be done under a conjectural state of circumstances; as the Federalists, in and out of Congress, indignantly denied any knowledge of any scheme of disunion; and as the president, upon a call for information, much pressed by the Federalists, declared that he had no more, the excitement, at first very great, speedily died away. In the discussions on this affair in the British Parlia ment, soon after the Henry papers reached London, the ministry denied having known any thing of Henry's" mission till it was all over. As to Craig's action in the matter, taken on his own responsibility, they maintained that, so far from attempting to stir up insurrection, or to bring about a severance of the American Union, as had been alleged, he had only done what the doubtful state of affairs, and the danger of his province, made perfectly proper-sent an agent to Boston to obtain information. Nor was the expected effect produced in Massachusetts. The Democrats had, indeed, attempted to perpetuate their power by a new arrangement of the Senate districts, contiguity and compactness having been entirely sacrificed in an attempt to secure to a minority of the whole number of voters the choice of a majority of the senators. This "Gerrymandering" process, as the Fed. eralists called it-and the word still maintains its place in the American vocabulary-gave occasion to loud complaints. Nor did the governor's urgency against the licentiousness of the press, and his attack upon a judge of the Supreme Court for having laid it down as the law of Massachusetts that the conduct of magistrates was a lawful subject of comment, upon which indictments for CHAPTER libel would not lie, tend, perhaps, to add to the real XXIV. strength of the party. Dropping Gore, upon whom the 1812. stigma rested of being of the Essex Junto, and substituting their old candidate Strong, a man of the Revolution as well as Gerry, the Federalists, after a very vehement April 6. struggle, elected him by a plurality of 1600 out of 104,000 votes. The Republicans, by the help of their Gerrymandered districts, secured a large majority of the May. Senate; but in the election shortly after. for members of the House, the triumph of the Federalists was very decisive. The politics of New York, at this moment, were even more an object of interest at Washington than those of Massachusetts. The winding up of the Bank of the United States, and the failure to procure a charter in Pennsylvania, again unsuccessfully attempted the past winter, had led to an application to the New York Legislature to establish a proposed "Bank of America" in the city of New York, with a capital of six millions of dol lars, a right to be reserved to the stockholders in the late Bank of the United States to subscribe five millions of it. Notwithstanding the offer of a bonus of $600,000, Governor Tompkins was vehemently opposed to this project. De Witt Clinton declared himself opposed to the new bank, but thought the question of its charter ought not to be made a party test. Clinton had his eye on the presidency, for which he meant to obtain a nomination from the New York Legislature at its present session; and a promise of support from the friends of the bank was understood to be the price of his neutrality. Solomon Southwick, editor of the Albany Register, then the leading Democratic paper in the state, and some other active Democrats, were very zealous for the bank; bought up, as was alleged, and, indeed, afterward proved as to THE PRESIDENTIAL QUESTION. 289 XXIV. some of them, who were also accused of holding out to CHAPTER members of the Legislature similar corrupt inducements. By this combination of influences the charter passed the 1812. House, all the Federalists and a part of the Republicans voting for it. As it was certain to pass the Senate also, Tompkins resorted to an extraordinary power, which the March 27. Constitution of New York, as it then stood, had conferred upon the governor, (but never exercised except in this single instance,) of proroguing the Legislature for sixty days, giving as a reason that attempts had been made to bribe the members. The nomination of Clinton was postponed also, as the friends of the bank would not go into caucus until the charter had finally passed. A Virginia legislative caucus had already nominated Feb. 12. presidential electors, with a view to Madison's re-election. Imitative Pennsylvania had followed the example. March 7. But the leaders of the war party at Washington refused to accept Madison as the Republican candidate, unless he would first commit himself decidedly to war. The congressional caucus was accordingly delayed, by way of intimation that it might, perhaps, become necessary to select some other person. Madison was thus placed in a most painful position. His own sober judgment and that of Gallatin, his most confidential adviser, were altogether against war. Their mature experience, unimpassioned tempers, and unenterprising dispositions, had little in common with the enthusiasm of the young war leaders. They knew well how the quasi war of 1798, with its army, navy, taxes, and eight per cent. loans, had contributed to break down the old Federal party; and they listened, not without serious alarm, to the prophecies of Randolph, Macon, and other old-school Republicans, of a similar result likely to follow now. Both on patriotic and party grounds they looked forward to war XXIV. CHAPTER with no little dread. On the other hand, the Aurora, the Baltimore Whig (Smith's organ), and other influen1812. tial newspapers, were filled with constant flings at the feebleness and irresolution of the administration. Not only did De Witt Clinton stand ready to accept a nomination at the hands of the war party, but even Monroe, notwithstanding Madison's recent reconciliation with him and his present seat in the cabinet, might prove, on the ground formerly taken of his superior vigor and energy, a still more formidable competitor. April We greatly miss, at this important crisis, light like that shed on the motives of the Federalists of 1798 by the published collections of their private letters; nor is it likely that the conduct of Madison and Gallatin will ever be so cleared up. The idea of being ignominiously thrown overboard by the upstart and imperious leaders of the war party, must, no doubt, have been in the highest degree mortifying to these veteran politicians, to whom habit had rendered official station almost a necessary of life. What a triumph, too, would it give to the Feder alists, who had all along predicted war as the necessary result of the Jeffersonian policy? On the other hand, Madison and Gallatin might find excuse for submitting their own better judgment to the storm of popular passion, in the Republican doctrine of the right of the majority to rule; and they might hope, by still clinging to the helm, to diminish the calamities to which the country and the Republican party might be exposed, under more reckless and less experienced leadership. Whatever might have been Madison's motives, this at least is certain, that, yielding to the urgency of the war party, he reluctantly consented to take the leadership in a new step toward war-a confidential message to Con EMBARGO PRELIMINARY TO WAR. 291 XXIV. gress, recommending, "under existing circumstances and CHAPTER prospects," an embargo for sixty days. committee. A bill for that purpose was accordingly introduced by 1812. Calhoun, who had become, by Porter's withdrawal, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. To an inquiry in Committee of the Whole whether this bill were really intended as a precurser to war, Grundy replied that it was. As a peace measure, it would never have been recommended either by the president or by the A New York member wished to know what was the situation of our fortresses, and our prepar ations generally. He referred to a letter of Judge Livingston's, in which it was stated that the forts at New York had neither cannon nor men; to which Clay replied, with great vehemence, that he did not want, on this subject, Brockholst Livingston's opinions, or those of any body else. Gentlemen who said so much about want of preparations were really opposed to war. He viewed the embargo as a war measure, and should support it as such; and war we should have in sixty days. After the injuries we had received, the stand we had taken, the pledges we had given, was Congress, by now yielding, to cover itself with indelible disgrace? The conduct of France in burning our vessels--a new and very flagrant instance of which had just been reported-did not cause him the least embarrassment. That might be a subject for further consideration. Weak as we were said to be, we could fight France, too, if necessary. He had no doubt that the late Indian war on the Wabash had been excited by the British. What was to be thought of the sending an emissary to one of our principal cities to excite a civil war? We had complete proof that Great Britain would do every thing to destroy us; and resolution and spirit were our only security. War, after all, was not |