which this kind of republic depends, cannot be long maintained; and that the government, which appears fo beautiful on paper, will, in practice, at least when applied to extenfive dominions, either be disturbed by contention, or will degenerate into an aristocratical tyranny, which, of all others, is the most oppreffive and vexatious. It is on thefe principles that we are firmly attached to the civil conftitution of our country: we with, indeed, to fee abufes reformed which have crept into its adminiftration, and which are, in fact, oppofite to its genuine fpirit: but we are perfuaded that it cannot be effentially altered, without endangering that liberty, toward the preservation of which, we confider the monarchical and ariftocratical parts of our government as not lefs neceffary than the democratical. The prefent author is of opinion, (and, we think, with great juftice,) that a mixed government, in which the three forms are combined, is the moft eligible. He reprefents the Felicians as having long languished under the government of weak and oppreffive monarchs: but at length a Prince, whom he calls Juftamat, fucceeds to the throne, on the death of his elder brother, during whofe reign he had been fent to vifit foreign countries with his friend and preceptor Veriloc. The young King, on his acceffion, is refolved to reform the government effectually, by giving his people a free conftitution, and by fecuring it to them by a voluntary refignation of all that power which might, by an unworthy fucceffor, be abused, to the deftruction of the liberty and profperity of his fubjects. Such is the mode in which the author has chofen to deliver his political fentiments to his countrymen; and these opinions deserve their notice, whatever we may think of some part of the fuperftructure which he has raised on them. His general idea of government coincides with the conftitution established by the first national affembly of France: but he wifely forefees, that, from the democratic part, an aristocratic body will naturally arife; and he fuppofes, that it is much better to allow this, and to limit its influence, than to leave its authority to be determined by eventual circumftances and the paffions of the moment. The principal point to which we can object is, that, in his regulations on this head, he supposes the nobles to be actuated by principles of honour and virtue, which are not, generally fpeaking, to be found in mankind; and which, however commendable in themfelves, would be despised as romantic by moft profeffional politicians; to whom rigid virtue, when it interferes with the views of ambition or intereft, generally appears contracted and contemptible. If we abate thefe defects, this author's fentiments of liberty deferve the attention of every nation that would wish to enjoy PP 4 it, it. He reprefents freedom, not as confifting in the abolition of all fubordination and reftraint, not in the power of every individual to govern, but as indifpenfably requiring the most implicit fubmiffion to juft and equal laws, which constitute the will, not, indeed, of every perfon individually confidered, but of the nation in general, as pronounced by reprefentatives fairly elected. Man, fays the author, is born for fociety; it is certain that fociety obliges us to the performance of certain duties: but from our duties refult our rights, and from these rights arises that liberty which is neceffary, not only to render us happy, but even to confer on us that degree of dignity and perfection, of which our nature is fufceptible. A right is no other than a prerogative, which mankind have either tacitly or formally agreed that an individual fhall enjoy: had they not impofed this obligation on themselves, they might arbitrarily disturb him in his enjoyment; he would then be deftitute of all fecurity, and his right, however juft in theory, would, in fact, entirely vanish. Hence no man can enjoy any right whatever, which does not oblige him to the performance of duties toward others; and this is a fufficent proof, that every right, which we can enjoy in fociety, arises from, at least, a tacit convention with our fellow-creatures. To this convention, two conditions are effential, viz. that the rights conceded be not inconfiftent with the common intereft of the contractors, and that the obligations refulting from them be reciprocal; for who would deem it his duty to refpect the rights of others, if they, in their turn, fhewed themselves utterly regardless of their obligation not to violate his rights? Thus, in order to acquire rights, we are under a neceffity of contracting obligations to our fellow-creatures: but they cannot render us liable to duties, except by conferring rights on us. Hence the liberty of every man, as a member of fociety, must confift in the free exercife of his rights, and muft extend to whatever does not violate the rights of others; it must therefore be limited by our duties, by that obligation impofed on each to refpect the rights of others. By this mode of reafoning, the author endeavours to prove, that liberty is not founded on the abfolute independence of man in a folitary ftate, which fome writers have affected to confider as that of nature, but is the refult of focial relations and conventions. Liberty confifts in the power of acting conformably to the dictates of our own will, independently of the will of others but as there cannot be rights without duties, this independence cannot be univerfal and arbitrary: it must be regulated by common laws, which all are equally bound to obey : it is only by rendering all dependent on thefe laws, that they сад can be made independent of each other as far as the obligations of duty will permit; and it is in this legal independence that civil liberty properly confifts:-but, though rights, when confidered as focial, refult from mutual convention and a common law, yet they may be ftyled natural, as they are derived from the nature of things, and particularly from that of man, who, as an intelligent Being, is intended to ftudy the relations in which he ftands to all around him, and to act conformably to them. The free difpofal of his own perfon and poffeffions, in such a manner as he conceives moft conducive to his own advantage, and as is not inconfiftent with focial order, is all that an individual can claim from his fellow-creatures; the right of property, therefore, thus applied to perfons and poffeffions, may be confidered as including all the rights in which we ought to be maintained by fociety. The controul of others, nay even the moft legal public authority, is not, properly fpeaking, a right; because a right is conceded for the particular advantage of him who enjoys it but this is not the cafe with respect to authority, which is inftituted for the common benefit of those over whom it is exercised. The magiftrate, who governs us, does not exert a right, but performs a duty infeparable from that authority, which is entrusted to him in order to promote the common good. The author introduces his patriot monarch as founding the conftitution of his government on focial equality. This principle, which formed the bafis of the French conftitution eftablished in 1791, has been treated by the bigoted advocates for power as christianity has been by infidels. They have first mifrepresented the principle, and have then fhewn the abfurdity and mischievous confequences, not of the principle itself, but of their own mifreprefentation of it: were it, as thefe men chuse to defcribe it, neceffarily fubverfive of all focial order and fubor-, dination, we should be the first to deteft it, because convinced that it must be deftructive of liberty. It may, indeed, be abused by the licentious and wicked: but fo may every other principle, however juft and good; this is a reafon why it should be properly explained and guarded: but to reject it merely on this account, is not lefs abfurd than it would be to renounce chriftianity, only because it has fometimes been perverted into a fanction for the worst of crimes. In the explanation of this principle, the writer diftinguishes between an equality in fact, and an equality of right. The former, which implies an equality of conditions or itations in fociety, can never take place. The impoffibility of this equality is thewn at large by confiderations deduced from the inequality which is evident in the capacities and abilities of different per fons; fons; from the various purfuits to which their endowments lead; and from the very nature of property, whether perfonal or real. Were an agrarian law, fays he, to be enacted, and the land belonging to a nation to be equally divided among the inhabitants, the feveral thares, though alike with refpect to extent, might be very different in point of fertility; or were they fo diftributed as to be equal in this refpect, ftill not only the abilities of the poflefiors to improve them, but alfo a thoufand accidental circumftances which influence the fuccefs of agriculture, must be various, and, in a very fhort time, muft occalion a very great inequality in the value of thefe feveral portions. If any number of perfons be candidates for a certain poffeffion, they may be faid to be equal with respect to this, as each has an equal right to the acquifition of it: but as foon as one of them has acquired it, this equality vanithes: the property conferred on the fuccessful candidate gives him an exclufive right of enjoying it; and obliges the reft, not only to forbear disturbing him, but alfo to maintain him in the fecure poffeffion of it. The fame may be obferved with regard to efteem and external respect, which may be confidered as a kind of public treasure, deftined to reward that merit, and thofe talents, which are rendered useful to the cornmunity. It cannot, therefore, be faid, that the man, who has been of no fervice to the States, has a right to a fhare of this national treasure, equal to that which he may claim, who has either faved his country from imminent danger, or has effentially promoted its profperity. It would likewife be abfurd to fuppofe, that focial equality gives every individual an equal right to be entrufted with public authority, either civil or military, and thus confounds thofe degrees of fubordination, which are neceffary to public crder, and effential to the well-being of the community. All these, and various other, falfe ideas of equality, which are fo eagerly advanced by the enemies of liberty, and fo readily adopted by the licentious, are here detailed, and their abfurdity is fully fhewn. The equality of right, which is the prinsiple here recommended, relates to the laws; it is that of men confidered as subjects of the laws. Men are equal in right, when they are governed by a common law, which fecures to every individual, without diltinction, the fame common right :-but as their ufe of this common right depends on their own inclinations and abilities, as they are feverally led, by the concurrence of these with other accidental circumftances, to apply it to objects variously productive of advantage, they must, though equal in right, become unequal in fact. Equality in right, as thus explained, is, indeed, fo far from being a novelty, that it is the fundamental prin aple of that ex 6 cellent conftitution under which we have the happiness to live, and must be that of every free government. In proof, we might refer to fome of our molt refpectable writers both on law and politics: but it is the fashion to defpife these authorities as favouring of republicanifm, that idle bugbear with which the. fervile adherents of power always endeavour to terrify weak minds. Befide, this reference is unnecellary, as the principle itself is fufficiently evident in the restraints impofed even on the regal authority, by exprefs acts of parliament, as well as by the maxims of common law. We shall not dwell long on the particular plan of organization, which this author propofes. He divides the nation into plebeians and citizens: the former have no fhare in the govern. ment while they continue plebeians, but they may become citizens, on fulfilling the conditions requifite to the attainment of this rank, which is acquired neither by birth nor wealth, but merely by merit; the candidates for this rank must be twenty years of age, muft undergo a public examination on the principles of the .conftitution, and other branches of moral and political knowlege, and must take an oath prescribed on the occafion : the citizens are diftributed into various orders, regulated by their moral character, and by the fervices which they have rendered. to the nation. The highest of these ranks forms a kind of nobility, which is in fome meafure hereditary: but the fon of one of thefe nobles cannot fucceed to his father's dignity, without being first made a citizen, and giving proofs, in a very fevere public examination, of a virtuous difpofition and of extenfive knowlege. All the regulations relative to the feveral orders of citizens are in themselves very good; the only objection which we have to make to them is, that they could not long continue to be observed, except among fuch imaginary citizens as our author has here created, who are never to be fwayed by intereft, corrupted by power, nor blinded by ambition. The first promotion, which a citizen can obtain, is the rank of notable, and of this order confists the affembly of the ftates of each province, which are forty in number; from this affembly, two hundred and forty, that is fix from each province, conftitute the Supreme Court, to which the administrative and judicial powers are entrufted. The legislative power is compofed of twenty-four deputies from each province, who form the national affembly. Befide thefe, the King is affifted by a grand council of fixtyfour members, and a privy council of twenty-four. All the members of these councils must be chofen by the King, and be approved by the nation-but in this, as in feveral other circumftances, the author's expreffion is very indefinite; for it is uncertain |