ons we could not have any paffions; for a thing muft be pleasant or painful, before it can be the object either of love or of hatred. As it appears from this short sketch, that paffions are generated by means of prior emotions, it will be neceffary to take first under confideration emotions and their.causes. Such is the conftitution of our nature, that upon perceiving certain external objects, we are inftantaneously confcious of pleasure or pain. A flowing river, a smooth extended plain, a fpreading oak, a towering hill, are objects of fight that raise pleasant emotions. A barren heath, a dirty marsh, a rotten carcass, raise painful emotions. Of the emotions thus produced, we inquire for no other caufe but merely the prefence of the object. It must further be obferved, that the things now mentioned, raise emotions by means of their properties and qualities. To the emotion raised by a large river, its fize, its force, and its fluency, contribute each a fhare. The pleasures of regularity, propriety, convenience, compofe the emoti on raised by a fine building. If external properties make a being or thing agreeable, we have reafon to expect the fame effect from those which are internal; and accordingly power, difcernment, wit, mildnefs, fympathy, courage, benevolence, render the poffeffor agreeable in a high degree. So foon as thefe qualities are perceived in any perfon, we inftantaneously feel pleafant emotions, without the flightest act of reflection or of attention to confequences. It is almoft unneceffary to add, that certain qualities oppofite to the former, fuch as dullnefs, peevishnefs, inhumanity, cowardice, occafion in the fame manner painful emotions. Senfible beings affect us remarkably by their actions. Some actions fo foon as perceived, raise pleasant pleafant emotions in the fpectator, without the leaft reflection; fuch as graceful motion and genteel behaviour. But as the intention of the agent is a capital circumstance in the bulk of human actions, it requires reflection to discover their true character. If I fee one delivering a purse of money to another, I can make nothing of this action, till I difcover with what intention the money is given. If it be given to extinguifh a debt, the action is agreeable in a flight degree. If it be a grateful return, I feel a stronger emotion? and the pleafurable emotion rifes to a great height, when it is the intention of the giver to relieve a virtuous family from want. Actions are thus qualified by the intention of the agent. But they are not qualified by the event; for an action well intended is agreeable, whatever be the confequence. The pleafant or painful emotion that arifeth from contem plating human actions, is of a peculiar kind. Human actions are perceived to be right or wrong; and this perception qualifies the pleasure or pain that refults from them *. * In tracing our emotions and paffions to their origin, it once was my opinion, that qualities and actions are the primary causes of emotions; and that these emotions are afterward expanded upon the being to which these qualities and actions belong. But I have difcovered that opinion to be erroneous. An attribute is not, even in imagination, feparable from the being to which it belongs; and for that reafon, cannot of itself be the cause of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of any being or fubftance but by means of its attributes; and therefore no being can be agreeable to us otherwise than by their means. But ftill, when an emotion is raifed, it is the being itfelf, as we apprehend the matter, which raises the emotion; and it raifes it by means of one or other of its attributes. If it be urged, That we сав Not only are emotions raised in us by the qualities and actions of others, but also by their feelings. I cannot behold a man in diftrefs, without partaking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his pleasure. The beings or things above defcribed, occafion emotions in us, not only in the original furvey, but when they are recalled to the memory in idea. A field laid out with tafte, is pleafant in the recollection, as well as when under our eye, A generous action described in words or colours, occafions a fenfible emotion, as well as when we fee it performed. And when we reflect upon the diftrefs of any perfon, our pain is of the fame kind with what we felt when eye-witneffes. In a word, an agreeable or disagreeable object recalled to the mind in idea, is the occafion of a pleasant or painful emotion, of the fame kind with that produced when the object was prefent. The only difference is, that an idea being fainter than an original perception, the pleasure or pain produced by the former, can in idea abstract a quality from the thing to which it belongs; it might be anfwered, That an abstract idea, which ferves excellently the purposes of reafoning, is too faint and too much ftrained to produce any fort of emotion. But it is fufficient for the prefent purpose to anfwer, That the eye never abftracts. By this organ we perceive things as they really exift, and never perceive a quality as feparated from the fubject. Hence it must be evident, that emotions are raifed, not by qualities abftractly confidered, but by the fubftance or body fo and fo qualified. Thus a fpreading oak raifes a pleafant emotion, by means of its colour, figure, umbrage, &c. It is not the colour ftrictly fpeaking that produces the emotion, but the tree as coloured: it is not the figure abftractly confidered that produces the emotion, but the tree confidered as of a certain figure. And hence by the way it appears, that the beauty of fuch an object is complex, refolvable into several beauties more fimple. former, is proportionably fainter than that produced by the latter. Having explained the nature of an emotion and mentioned several caufes by which it is produced, we proceed to an obfervation of confiderable importance in the fcience of human nature, that fome emotions are accompanied with defire, and that others, after a fhort exiftence, pafs away without producing defire of any fort. The emotion raised by a fine landscape or a magnificent building, vanifheth generally without attaching our hearts to the object; which alfo happens with relation to a number of fine faces in a crowded affembly. But the bulk of emotions are accompanied with defire of one fort or other, provided only a fit object for defire be fuggefted. This is remarkably the cafe of emotions raised by human actions and qualities. A virtuous action raiseth in every fpectator a pleasant emotion, which is generally attended with a defire to do good to the author of the action. A vicious action on the other hand, produceth a painful emotion and of confequence a defire to have the author punished. Even things inanimate often raise defire. The goods of fortune are objects of defire, almost univerfally; and the defire, when more than commonly vigorous, obtains the name of avarice. The pleasant emotion produced in a fpec tator by a capital picture in the poffeffion of a prince, feldom raiseth defire. But if fuch a picture be exposed to fale, defire of having or poffeffing is the natural confequence of the emotion. If now an emotion be fometimes productive of defire, fometimes not, it comes to be a material inquiry, in what refpect a paffion differs from an emotion. Is paffion in its nature or feeling diftinguishable from emotion?. I have been apt to think that there must be a diftinction, when the emotion feems C 4 Ch. II. feems in all cafes to precede the paffion, and to be the cause or occafion of it. But after the stricteft examination, I cannot perceive any fuch diftinction betwixt emotion and paffion. What is love to a miftrefs, for example, but a pleasant emotion raised by a fight or idea of the perfon beloved, joined with defire of enjoyment? In what elfe confifts the paffion of refentment, but in a painful emotion occafioned by the injury, accompanied with defire to chaftife the author of the injury? In general, as to every fort of paffion, we find no more in the compofition, but the particulars now mentioned, an emotion pleafant or painful accompanied with defire. What then shall we fay upon this fubje&t? Are passion and emotion fynonymous terms? This cannot be averred. No feeling nor agitation of the mind void of defire is termed a paffion; and we have discovered that there are many emotions which país away without raifing defire of any kind. How is the difficulty to be folved? There appears to me but one folution, which I relish the more, as it renders the doctrine of the paffions and emotions simple and perfpicuous. The folution follows. An internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it paffeth away without raifing defire, is denominated an emotion: when defire is raised, the motion or agitation is denominated a paffion. A fine face, for example, raiseth in me a pleasant feeling. If this feeling vanish without producing any effect, it is in proper language an emotion. But if fuch feeling, by reiterated views of the object, become fufficiently ftrong to raise defire, it is no longer termed an emotion, but a paffion. The fame holds in all the other paffions. The painful feeling raifed in a fpectator by a flight injury done to a stranger, being accompanied with no defire of revenge, is termed an emotion. But this injury raifeth in the ftranger a ftronger |