Графични страници
PDF файл
ePub

lated motions of the air. For as the function of the human understanding is no other than merely (to appear to itself) to combine and to apply the phenomena of the association; and as these derive all their reality from the primary sensations; and the sensations again all their reality from the impressions ab extra; a God not visible, audible, or tangible, can exist only in the sounds and letters that form his name and attributes. If in ourselves there be no such faculties as those of the will, and the scientific reason, we must either have an innate idea of them, which would overthrow the whole system, or we can have no idea at all. The process, by which Hume degraded the notion of cause and effect into a blind product of delusion and habit, into the mere sensation of proceeding life (nisus vitalis) associated with the images of the memory; this same process must be repeated to the equal degradation of every fundamental idea in ethics or theology.

Far, very far, am I from burthening with the odium of these consequences the moral characters of those who first formed, or have since adopted the system! It is most noticeable of the excellent and pious Hartley, that in the proofs of the existence and attri- | butes of God, with which his second volume commences, he makes no reference to the principles or results of the first. Nay, he assumes, as his foundation, ideas which, if we embrace the doctrine of his first volume, can exist no where but in the vibrations of the ethereal medium common to the nerves and to the atmosphere. Indeed, the whole of the second volume is, with the fewest possible exceptions, independent of his peculiar system. So true is it, that the faith, which saves and sanctifies, is a collective energy, a total act of the whole moral being; that its living sensorium is in the heart; and that no errors of the understanding can be morally arraigned, unless they have proceeded from the heart. But whether they be such, no man can be certain in the case of another, scarcely, perhaps, even in his own. Hence it follows, by inevitable consequence, that man may perchance determine what is an heresy; but God can only know who is a heretic. It does not, however, by any means follow, that opinions fundamentally false are harmless. An hundred causes may co-exist to form one complex antidote. Yet the sting of the adder remains venomous, though there are many who have taken up the evil thing; and it hurted them not! Some indeed there seem to have been, in an unfortunate neighbor-nation at least, who have embraced this system with a full view of all its moral and religious consequences; some

who deem themselves most free,
When they within this gross and visible sphere
Chain down the winged thought, scothing assent,
Proud in their meanness; and themselves they cheat
With noisy emptiness of learned phrase,
Their subtle fluids, impacts, essences,
Self-working tools, uncaused effects, and all
Those blink omniscients, those almighty slaves,
Untenanting Creation of its God!"

Such men need discipline, not argument; they must be made better men, before they can become wiser.

The attention will be more profitably employed in attempting to discover and expose the paralogisms, by the magic of which such a faith could find admission into minds framed for a nobler creed. These, it appears to me, may be all reduced to one sophism as their common genus; the mistaking the conditions of a thing for its causes and essence; and the process by which we arrive at the knowledge of a faculty, for the faculty itself. The air I breathe is the condition of my life, not its cause. We could never have learnt that we had eyes but by the process of seeing; yet having seen, we know that the eyes must have preexisted in order to render the process of sight possible. Let us cross-examine Hartley's scheme under the guidance of this distinction; and we shall discover, that contemporaneity (Leibnitz's Lex Continui) is the limit and condition of the laws of mind, itself being rather a law of matter, at least of phenomena considered as material. At the utmost, it is to thought the same as the law of gravitation is to loco-motion. In every voluntary movement we first counteract gravitation, in order to avail ourselves of it. It must exist, that there may be a something to be counteracted, and which by its re-action, aids the force that is exerted to resist it. Let us consider what we do when we leap. We first resist the gravitating power by an act purely voluntary, and then by another act, voluntary in part, we yield to it in order to light on the spot which we had previously proposed to ourselves. Now, let a man watch his mind while he is composing; or, to take a still more common case, while he is trying to recollect a name; and he will find the process completely analogous. Most of my readers will have observed a small water insect on the surface of rivulets, which throws a cinque-spotted shadow, fringed with prismatic colors, on the sunny bottom of the brook; and will have noticed, how the little animal wins its way up against the stream, by alternate pulses of active and passive motion, now resisting the current, and now yielding to it in order to gather strength and a momentary fulcrum for a further propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of the mind's self-experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at work, which relatively to each other are active and passive; and this is not possible without an intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive. (In philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in all its degrees and determinations, the IMAGINATION. But in common language, and especially on the subject of poetry, we appropriate the name to a superior degree of faculty, joined to a superior voluntary control over it.)

Contemporaneity then, being the common condition of all the laws of association, and a component element in all the materia subjecta, the parts of which are to be associated, must needs be co-present with all. Nothing, therefore, can be more easy than to pass off on an incautious mind, this constant companion of each, for the essential substance of all. But if we appeal to our own consciousness, we shall find that even time itself, as the cause of a particular act of association, is distinct from contemporaneity, as the con

dition of all association. Seeing a mackerel, it may happen that I immediately think of gooseberries, because I at the same time ate mackerel with goose

CHAPTER VIII.

berries as the sauce. The first syllable of the latter The system of Dualism, introduced by Des Cartes-Refined

first by Spinoza, and afterwards by Leibnitz, into the doctrine of Harmonia præstabilita-Hylozoism-MaterialismNeither of these systems, on any possible theory of association, supplies or supersedes a theory of perception, or explains the formation of the associable.

word, being that which had co-existed with the image of the bird so called, I may then think of a goose. In the next moment the image of a swan may arise before me, though I had never seen the two birds together. In the two former instances, I am conscious To the best of my knowledge, Des Cartes was the that their co-existence in time was the circumstance first philosopher who introduced the absolute and that enabled me to recollect them; and equally con- essential heterogeneity of the soul as intelligence, scious am I, that the latter was recalled to me by the and the body as matter. The assumption, and the joint operation of likeness and contrast. So it is with form of speaking, have remained, though the denial cause and effect; so too with order. So am I able to of all other properties to matter but that of extension, distinguish whether it was proximity in time, or conon which denial the whole system of dualism is tinuity in space, that occasioned me to recall B on grounded, has been long exploded. For since imthe mention of A. They cannot be indeed separated penetrability is intelligible only as a mode of resist from contemporaneity; for that would be to separate ance, its admission places the essence of matter in an them from the mind itself. The act of consciousness act or power, which it possesses in common with is indeed identical with time, considered in its essence. spirit; and body and spirit are therefore no longer (I mean time per se, as contra-distinguished from our absolutely heterogeneous, but may, without any abnotion of time; for this is always blended with the surdity, be supposed to be different modes or degrees idea of space, which, as the contrary of time, is there- in perfection, of a common substratum. To this posfore its measure.) Nevertheless, the accident of see- sibility, however, it was not the fashion to advert. ing two objects at the same moment, acts as a distin- The soul was a thinking substance; and body a guishable cause from that of having seen them in the space-filling substance. Yet the apparent action of same place; and the true practical general law of each on the other pressed heavy on the philosopher, association is this: that whatever makes certain parts on the one hand; and no less heavily, on the other of a total impression more vivid or distinct than the hand, pressed the evident truth, that the law of rest, will determine the mind to recall these, in pre- causality holds only between homogeneous things, ference to others equally linked together by the com- i. e. things having some common property, and cannot mon condition of contemporaneity, or (what I deem a extend from one world into another, its opposite. A more appropriate and philosophical term) of continu- close analysis evinced it to be no less absurd, than ity. But the will itself, by confining and intensify- the question, whether a man's affection for his wife ing* the attention, may arbitrarily give vividness or lay north-east or south-west of the love he bore todistinctness to any object whatsoever; and from wards his child? Leibnitz's doctrine of a pre-estabhence we may deduce the uselessness, if not the ab- lished harmony, which he certainly borrowed from surdity, of certain recent schemes, which promise an Spinoza, who had himself taken the hint from Des artificial memory, but which in reality can only pro- Cartes' animal machines, was in its common interpreduce a confusion and debasement of the fancy. tation too strange to survive the inventor-too repugSound logic, as the habitual subordination of the in- nant to our common sense (which is not indeed entidividual to the species, and of the species to the ge-tled to a judicial voice in the courts of scientific phinus; philosophical knowledge of facts under the rela-losophy; but whose whispers still exert a strong secret tion of cause and effect; a cheerful and communica- influence.) Even Wolf, the admirer, and illustrious tive temper, that disposes us to notice the similarities and contrasts of things, that we may be able to illustrate the one by the other; a quiet conscience; a condition free from anxieties; sound health, and, above all, (as far as relates to passive remembrance,) a healthy digestion; these are the best-these are the only ARTS OF MEMORY.

*I am aware that this word occurs neither in Johnson's Dictionary, nor in any classical writer. But the word "to intend," which Newton and others before him employ in this sense, is now so completely appropriated to another meaning, that I could not use it without ambiguity: while to paraphrase the sense, as by render intense, would often break up the sentence, and destroy that harmony of the position of the words with the logical position of the thoughts, which is a beauty in all composition, and more especially desirable in a close philosophical investigation. I have therefore hazarded the word intensify; though I confess it sounds uncouth to

my own ear.

systematizer of the Leibnitzian doctrine, contents himself with defending the possibility of the idea, but does not adopt it as a part of the edifice.

The hypothesis of Hylozoism, on the other side, is the death of all rational physiology, and, indeed, of all physical science; for that requires a limitation of terms, and cannot consist with the arbitrary power of multiplying attributes by occult qualities. Besides, it answers no purpose; unless, indeed, a difficulty can be solved by multiplying it, or that we can acquire a clearer notion of our soul, by being told that we have a million souls, and that every atom of our bodies has a soul of its own. Far more prudent is it to admit the difficulty once for all, and then let it lie at rest. There is a sediment, indeed, at the bottom of the vessel, but all the water above it is clear and transparent. The Hylozoist only shakes it up, and renders the whole turbid.

profane to examine too closely, Datur non intelligitur. But a revelation unconfirmed by miracles, and a faith not commanded by the conscience, a philosopher may venture to pass by, without suspecting himself of any irreligious tendency.

Thus, as materialism has been generally taught, it is utterly unintelligible, and owes all its proselytes to the propensity so common among men, to mistake distinct images for clear conceptions; and, vice versa, to reject as inconceivable whatever from its own nature is unimaginable. But as soon as it becomes intelligible, it ceases to be materialism. In order to explain thinking, as a material phenomenon, it is necessary to refine matter into a mere modification of intelligence, with the two-fold function of appearing and perceiving. Even so did Priestley in his controversy with Price! He stript matter of all its material properties; substituted spiritual powers, and when we expected to find a body, behold! we had nothing but its ghost! the apparition of a defunct substance!

But it is not either the nature of man, or the duty of the philosopher, to despair, concerning any important problem, until, as in the squaring of the circle, the impossibility of a solution has been demonstrated. How the esse assumed as originally distinct from the scire, can ever unite itself with it; how being can transform itself into a knowing, becomes conceivable on one only condition; namely, if it can be shown that the vis representativa, or the sentient, is itself a species of being; i. e. either as a property or attribute, or as an hypostasis or self subsistence. The former is, indeed, the assumption of materialism; a system which could not but be patronized by the philosopher, if only it actually performed what it promises. But how any affection from without can metamorphose itself into perception or will, the materialist has hitherto left, not only as incomprehensible as he found it, but has aggravated it into a comprehensible absurdity. For, grant that an object from without could act upon the conscious self, as on a consubstantial object; yet such an affection could only engender something homogeneous with itself. Motion could only propagate motion. Matter has no inward. We remove one surface but to meet with another. We can but divide a particle into particles; and each atom comprehends in itself the properties of the material universe. Let any reflecting mind make the experiment of explaining to itself the evidence of our sensuous intuitions, from the hypothesis that in any given perception there is a something which has been communicated to it by an impact or an impression ab extra. In the first place, by the impact on the percipient or ens representans, not the object itself, but only its action or effect, will pass into the same. Not the iron tongue, but its vibrations, pass into the metal of the bell. Now in our immediate perception, it is not the mere power or act of the object, but the object itself, which is immediately present. We might, indeed, attempt to ex-dream-world of phantoms and spectres, the inexpliplain this result by a chain of deductions and conclusions; but that, first, the very faculty of deducing and concluding would equally demand an explanation; and, secondly, that there exists, in fact, no such intermediation by logical notions, such as those of cause and effect. It is the object itself, not the product of a syllogism, which is present to our consciousness. Or would we explain this supervention of the object to the sensation, by a productive faculty set in motion by an impulse; still the transition, into the percipient, of the object itself, from which the impulse proceeded, assumes a power that can permeate and wholly possess the soul,

I shall not dilate further on this subject; because it will (if God grant health and permission) be treated of at large, and systematically, in a work, which I have many years been preparing, on the PRODUCTIVE LOGOS human and divine; with, and as the introduction to, a full commentary on the Gospel of St. John. To make myself intelligible as far as my present subject requires, it will be sufficient briefly to observe-1. That all association demands and presupposes the existence of the thoughts and images to be associated. 2. The hypothesis of an external world exactly correspondent to those images or modifications of our own being, which alone (according to this system) we actually behold, is as thorough idealism as Berkeley's, inasmuch as it equally (perhaps, in a more perfect degree) removes all reality and immediateness of perception, and places us in a

cable swarm and equivocal generation of motions in our own brains. 3. That this hypothesis neither involves the explanation, nor precludes the necessity, of a mechanism and co-adequate forces in the percipient, which at the more than magic touch of the impulse from without, is to create anew for itself the correspondent object. The formation of a copy is not solved by the mere pre-existence of an original; the copyist of Raphael's Transfiguration must repeat more or less perfectly the process of Raphael. It would be easy to explain a thought from the image on the retina, and that from the geometry of light, if this very light did not present the very same difficulty. We might as rationally chant the Brahmin creed of the tortoise that supported the bear, that supported the elephant, that supported the world, to And how came the percepient here? And what is the tune of "This is the house that Jack built." The become of the wonder-pressing MATTER, that was to sic Deo placitum est we all admit as the sufficient perform all these marvels by force of mere figure, cause, and the divine goodness as the sufficient weight, and motion? The most consistent proceeding reason; but an answer to the whence? and why? of the dogmatic materialist is to fall back into the is no answer to the how; which alone is the physicommon rank of soul-and-bodyists; to affect the mys-ologist's concern. It is a mere sophisma pigrum, and terious, and declare the whole process a revelation (as Bacon hath said) the arrogance of pusillanimity, given, and not to be understood, which it would be which lifts up the idol of a mortal's fancy, and com

"And like a God, by spiritual art,
Be all in all, and all in every part."

Cowley.

[blocks in formation]

initio, identical and co-inherent; that intelligence and being are reciprocally each other's Substrate. ] presumed that this was a possible conception (i. e. that it involved no logical inconsonance) from the length of time during which the scholastic definition of the Supreme Being, as actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate, was received in the schools of Theology, both by the Pontifican and the Reformed divines. The early study of Plato and Plotinus, with the commentaries and the THEOLOGICA PLATONICA, of the illustrious Florentine; of Proclus, and Gemistius Pletho; and, at a later period, of the "De Immenso et Innumerabili," and the "De la causa, principio et uno," of the philosopher of Nola, who could boast of a Sir Philip Sydney and Fülke Greville among his patrons, and whom the idolaters of Rome burnt as an atheist in the year 1660; had all contributed to prepare my mind for the reception and welcoming of the Cogito quia sum, et sum quia Cogito; a philosophy of seeming hardihood, but certainly the most ancient, and therefore, presumptively, the most natural.

Why need I be afraid? Say rather how dare I be ashamed of the Teutonic theosophist, Jacob Behmen? Many, indeed, and gross were his delusions; and such as furnish frequent and ample occasion for the triumph of the learned over the poor ignorant shoemaker, who had dared to think for himself. But while we remember that these delusions were such as might be anticipated from his utter want of all intellectual discipline, and from his ignorance of rational psychology, let it not be forgotten that the latter defect he had in common with the most learned theologians of his age. Neither with books, nor with booklearned men, was he conversant. A meek and shy quietist, his intellectual powers were never stimulated into feverous energy by crowds of proselytes, or by the ambition of proselyting. JACOB BEHMEN was an enthusiast, in the strictest sense, as not merely distinguished, but as contra-distinguished, from a fanatic. While I in part translate the following observations from a contemporary writer of the Continent, let me be permitted to premise, that I might have transcribed the substance from memoranda of my own, which were written many years before his pamphlet was given to the world; and that I prefer another's words to my own, partly as a tribute due to priority of pub

AFTER I had successively studied in the schools of Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, and Hartley, and could find in neither of them an abiding place for my reason, I began to ask myself, is a system of philosophy, as different from mere history and historic classification, possible? If possible, what are its necessary conditions? I was for a while disposed to answer the first question in the negative, and to admit that the sole practicable employment for the human mind was to observe, to collect, and to classify. But I soon felt, that human nature itself fought up against this wilful resignation of intellect; and as soon did I find, that the scheme, taken with all its consequences, and cleared of all inconsistencies, was not less impracticable, than contra-natural. Assume, in its full extent, the position, nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensa, without Leibnitz's qualifying præter ipsum intellectum, and in the same sense in which it was understood by Hartley and Condillac, and what Hume had demonstratively deduced from this concession concerning cause and effect, will apply with equal and crushing force to all the other eleven categorical forms, and the logical functions corresponding to them How can we make bricks without straw? Or build without cement? We learn all things indeed by occasion of experience; but the very facts so learnt force us inward on the antecedents, that must be pre-lication, but still more from the pleasure of sympathy, supposed in order to render experience itself possible. The first book of Locke's Essays (if the supposed error, which it labors to subvert, be not a mere thing of straw; an absurdity, which no man ever did, or, indeed, ever could believe) is formed on a Σόφισμα Ετεροζήτηςέων, and involves the old mistake of cum hoc: ergo propter hoc.

The term Philosophy, defines itself as an affectionate seeking after the truth; but Truth is the correlative of Being. This again is no way conceivable; but by assuming as a postulate, that both are, ab

"And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin "-Pope. † Videlicet; quantity, quality, relation, and mode, each consisting of three subdivisions. Vide Kritik der reineu Vernunft, p. 95, and 106. See, too, the judicious remarks in Locke and Hume.

in a case where coincidence only was possible.

Whoever is acquainted with the history of philosophy, during the two or three last centuries, cannot but admit, that there appears to have existed a sort of secret and tacit compact among the learned, not to pass beyond a certain limit in speculative science. The privilege of free thought, so highly extolled, has at no time been held valid in actual practice, except within this limit; and not a single stride beyond it has ever been ventured without bringing obloquy on the transgressor. The few men of genius among the learned class, who actually did overstep this boundary, anxiously avoided the appearance of having so done. Therefore, the true depth of science, and the penetration to the inmost centre, from which all the lines of knowledge diverge, to their ever distant cir

cumference, was abandoned to the illiterate, and the simple, whom unstilled yearning, and an original ebulliency of spirit, had urged to the investigation of the indwelling and living ground of all things. These, then, because their names had never been enrolled in the guilds of the learned, were persecuted by the registered livery-men as interlopers on their rights and privileges. All, without distinction, were branded as fanatics and phantasts; not only those whose wild and exorbitant imaginations had actually engendered only extravagant and grotesque phantasms, and whose productions were, for the most part, poor copies and gross caricatures of genuine inspiration; but the truly inspired likewise, the originals themselves! And this for no other reason but because they were the unlearned men of humble and obscure occupations. When, and from whom among the literati by profession, have we ever heard the divine doxology repeated, "I thank thee, O Father! Lord of Heaven and Earth! because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes?" No! the haughty priests of learning not only banished from the schools and marts of science all who had dared draw living waters from the fountain, but drove them out of the very temple, which, mean time, "buyers and sellers, and money-changers were suffered to make "a den of thieves."

and so unusual, the man's body should sympathize with the struggles of his mind; or that he should at times be so far deluded as to mistake the tumultuous sensations of his nerves, and the co-existing spectres of his fancy, as parts or symbols of the truths which were opening on him? It has indeed been plausibly observed, that in order to derive any advantage, or to collect any intelligible meaning, from the writings of these ignorant mystics, the reader must bring with him a spirit and judgment superior to that of the writers themselves:

"And what he brings, what needs he elsewhere seek ?" Paradise Regained. -A sophism, which, I fully agree with Warburton, is unworthy of Milton; how much more so of the awful person, in whose mouth he has placed it? One assertion I will venture to make, as suggested by my own experience, that there exist folios on the human understanding, and nature of man, which would have a far juster claim to their high rank and celebrity, if in the whole huge volume there could be found as much fulness of heart and intellect as burst forth in many a simple page of GEORGE FOX, JACOB BEHMEN and even of Behmen's commentator, the pious and fervid WILLIAM LAW.

The feeling of gratitude which I cherish towards these men has caused me to digress further than I had foreseen or proposed; but to have passed them And yet it would not be easy to discover any sub- over in an historical sketch of my literary life and stantial ground for this contemptuous pride in those opinions, would have seemed to me like the denial literati, who have most distinguished themselves by of a debt, the concealment of a boon. For the writtheir scorn of BEHMEN, DE THOYRAS, GEORGE FOX, ings of these mystics acted in no slight degree to pre&c.; unless it be, that they could write ortographical- vent my mind from being imprisoned within the outly, make smooth periods, and had the fashions of au- line of any single dogmatic system. They contributed thorship almost literally at their finger's ends, while to keep alive the heart in the head; gave me an inthe latter, in simplicity of soul, made their words distinct, yet stirring and working presentiment, that immediate echoes of their feelings. Hence the fre- all the products of the mere reflective faculty partook quency of those phrases among them, which have of DEATH, and were as the rattling twigs and sprays been mistaken for pretences to immediate inspiration; in winter, into which a sap was yet to be propelled as for instance, "it was delivered unto me," "I strove from some root to which I had not yet penetrated, if not to speak," 39.66 I said, I will be silent," "but the word they were to afford my soul either food or shelter. If was in my heart as a burning fire," "and I could not they were too often a moving cloud of smoke to me forbear." Hence, too, the unwillingness to give of- by day, yet they were always a pillar of fire through. fence; hence the foresight, and the dread of the cla- out the night, during my wanderings through the mors which would be raised against them, so fre- wilderness of doubt, and enabled me to skirt, without quently avowed in the writings of these men, and crossing, the sandy deserts of utter unbelief. That expressed, as was natural, in the words of the only the system is capable of being converted into an irrebook with which they were familiar. "Woe is me ligious PANTHEISM, I well know. The ETHICS of that I am become a man of strife, and a man of con- SPINOZA may, or may not, be an instance. But, at no tention-I love peace: the souls of men are dear time could I believe, that in itself, and essentially, it unto me: yet because I seek for light, every one of is incompatible with religion, natural or revealed; them doth curse me!" O! it requires deeper feeling, and now I am most thoroughly persuaded of the conand a stronger imagination, than belong to most of trary. The writings of the illustrious sage of Konthose to whom reasoning and fluent expression have igsberg, the founder of the Critical Philosophy, more been as a trade learnt in boyhood, to conceive with than any other work, at once invigorated and disciwhat might, with what inward strivings and commo-plined my understanding. The originality, the depth, tion, the perception of a new and vital TRUTH takes and the compression of the thoughts; the novelty and possession of an uneducated man of genius. His meditations are almost inevitably employed on the eternal, or the everlasting; for the world is not his friend, nor the world's law." Need we then be surprised, that under an excitement at once so strong 36

subtlety, yet solidity and importance, of the distinctions; the adamantine chain of the logic; and, I will venture to add, (paradox as it will appear to those who have taken their notion of EMANUEL KANT, from Reviewers and Frenchmen,) the clearness and evi

« ПредишнаНапред »