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convey, are falfe and impoffible; and that, therefore, they must prove ultimately deftructive to true liberty: that the general benefit of the whole muft ever be a hrft principle: and that the people have only force to lend, to fuch as have capacity to direct it. After touching properly on equality, it is asked, "Is it not then difgraceful to the cause of liberty, and to the understandings of mankind, to find fo many, who live in "conftant and profligate violation of the liberty, peace, and happiness, of all who may unfortunately have only perfonal "concerns with them, continually presenting themselves as the "most redoubtable patriots: and to find them received, and applauded, as affectionate and ftrenuous affertors of the juft "liberties of mankind?" The author writes as if he was a man of virtue; but certainly not as if he was a friend to any religion; a circumftance we are forry to remark concerning one whose sentiments, upon the subjects he here treats, are rational, and likely to be useful. The motto from Montefquieu is well chofen, and deferves to be repeated in a tranflation. "It is true, that in democracies the people feem to do what they choofe; but political liberty confifts not in doing what we "choose. In a state, that is, in a fociety which has laws, li berty can only confift in the power of doing what we ought "to choofe, and in not being conftrained to do what we ought not to choose." Montefq. tom. I. p. 255.

As fpecimens of the author's mode of reafoning and writing, perhaps we cannot make a better choice than in the following pallages:

"As to the establishment of the power of a few, continued he, fuch eftablishment has ever been, and ever muft be, because it is not in the nature of man, or of human fociety, to be otherwife. Change and modify conftitutions and governments into as many forms as it is poffible for the human mind to conceive, the legislative and executive parts must always be left in the hands of a few: and, clearly, for the reasons we have given above; i. e. becaufe but a few are at all competent to the exercife of fuch high and important employments. That the government of a nation, therefore, is always in the hands of a few, can be no objection to its poffeffion of true li berty.

"A fuperior direction in all human affairs, where many are con cerned, is naturally neceffary; and men infenfibly fubmit to it of themselves: and they certainly are under the highest obligations, and owe the moft fenfible gratitude to thofe who with ability and integrity will undertake and execute faithfully, their public or private concerns for them.`

"It is but a forry return to a truly great man, for fuch important favours, to be told malignantly, that he is but a fervant of the people; and to infinuate that his talents and virtues fuffer no degradation in

being

being contemptuously debased below the meanest of the people; as if he were of lefs importance in nature, or in the ftate, than those whose interefts and happiness depend on his fuperior understanding.

Such language is well fuited to licentioufnefs and fedition; but its unprincipled falfity and callous injuftice, the effects of party rage, are moft violent attacks on genuine liberty, and tend only to bring it, and every idea of public virtue, into contempt.

"The true friends of liberty will be generously just to all men, and with internal fatisfaction will acknowledge the merits of all men. They perceive fuch juftice to be neceffary to the maintenance, fup port, and encouragement of all virtue, and confequently of trut liberty.

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Superior talents with integrity, and fuperior stations legally and properly filled, will always be objects of respect among the wife and the prudent. They know how neceffary to the preservation of order, and good government, fuch qualifications are; and how vicious and impolitic it is, to endeavour to degrade, and bring into the contempt of the weak, the ignorant, and the debauched, thofe virtues and talents, without which no juft liberty can exift." P. 30.

"Do you think, then, faid I, with indifference, about the establishment of constitutions and forms of governments? Are not fome much preferable to others, and well worth contending for?

"If, as has been juft fhown, (anfwered he,) there be various degrees of liberty in nations, either legal, or tolerated, in proportion to their civilization, as a lover of true liberty, you may be fure I would choose the bigbeft legal degree that could be obtained without injuftice and cruelty. A conftitution and form of government, wifely and cautionfly established, fuch as the English is, has a natural tendency in itfelf to produce every degree of liberty a nation may be capable of receiving, in a regular progreffion to the highest degree, without any guilty violence, and without dangerous interferences, from mal-contents, who labour to involve a happy people in difcontent and mifery, because they feel themselves diflatisfied with their own ungovernable fanaticifm, or with a deficiency of all principle in morals and politics.

Indifference muft, doubtlefs, be very criminal, concerning the conflitution and government of our own country. But certainly a forward interference in the internal business and government of other nations unneceffarily, muft always be unjuftifiable. Reforms and revolutions have expanded into Quixotifm, and propagation into Jesuitism and Crufades, in a neighbouring nation.

.

"Coolness is indifpenfably neceffary in the fearch of truth; we muft, therefore, farther obferve, that every nation naturally comprehends in itself a mixture of all the forms of government, which men difcourfe of, under the various names of monarchy, oligarchy, ariftocracy, democracy, and the for fuch powers, in every nation, and under every form of government, muft find their place of action, in which they will exert themfelves with fach energy as they may fe verally poffefs. For, however correctly men may form ideas, and

fix them to these words, as really and accurately fignificant of the Jimple existence of any fuch governments as they are ufually meant to defcribe, yet no fuch correctnefs ever exifted in nations, or in human

nature.

"And this is another inftance of the abufe of words, which are fuppofed to reprefent what has no existence in nature; for there never was a fimple monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, in the world.

And as to the word republic, though it be ufually applied to every government without a King, yet, in its original and true fignification, (the public weal) fome kings, at leaft, have fo well under flood, and attended to the public weal, that their governments might much more justly merit the appellation of republican, than many of those which are always denominated republican, though often fevere and tyrannical enemies to the public weal, and liberties of their countries.

"A king wifely and juftly limited, (names apart,) is but the firft republican in a free nation; and it is not very eafy to conceive, how he can have any fubftantial intereft feparate from it; and muuh lefs against it, fince himself, and his fucceffors, can have no rational hope of fatisfaction, or fecurity, but in its profperity and duration. It is his home and his country, at leaft in as high, and as clear a sense, as it can be that of any other man." P. 54.

Mr. Barwis's Dialogue cannot fail, on the whole, to add to his reputation; and, with thinking men, to be of fervice to the caufe of national liberty.

ART. XVII. The Neceffity of a speedy and effectual Reform in Parliament. Manchefter. 8vo. 72 pages. 1S.

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MR. George Philips, of Manchester, the author of this pamphlet, is one of those writers to whom the public is, at leaft, obliged for frankly avowing what he and his friends mean by a reform. They mean, it feems, that every individual exifting in the nation, whether male or female, excepting infane perfons and minors, fhould have precifely an equal share in the nomination of reprefentatives. Any thing fhort of this, Mr. P. thinks, will only amufe the people for a while, and thus retard the accomplishment of an adequate reform. One would fuppofe, from the earneftnefs of fuch authors upon this topic, that they conceived the whole fum of human happiness to be concentred in the privilege of having a vote at an election that without this nothing could be enjoyed, and with it nothing could be wanting. Mr. P. is very bold in his affumpe tions. He takes for granted, that the neceffity of a reform in parliament is univerfally acknowledged. He affumes, that the

agitation

agitation of the public mind in November laft arofe chiefly, if hot folely, from the depraved condition of the representation: whereas it has fince appeared, that the public was alarmed by fear of change, not agitated by defire of it. He declaims much on the inevitable power of wealth, and the neceflity of ftrengthening the hands of poverty; whereas, in truth, property is that which moft requires protection in fociety. To protect property is, indeed, the chief end of fociety; for perfons would feldom be attacked, but for the fake of property. He takes it for undeniable, that reprefentatives are only meant to declare the public will, and on this principle he attacks Mr. Burke's arguments against the dictating power of conftituents, which have been generally received as conftitutional and juft; and were delivered not at Malton, as Mr. P. infinuates, but in the great and populous city of Briftol. The truth appears to be, that, in every queftion, the thing required by public intereft, is the right decifion, which, if one man of knowledge and abilities be more likely to difcover than a million of ordinary perfons, it is better for that million to trust to the one, than to themfelves. The whole pamphlet turns upon the French doctrine, that the will of the people is political perfection: if that be denied, as in England it is, very generally, nothing is here proved: not even the neceffity of a reform: ftill lefs of fuch a reform as Mr. P. requires.

The author profeffes, p. 55, that his aim extends no further than to an adequate reform in the reprefentation, and declares his refpect for the public opinion, which prefers our prefent conftitution to all other forms; but whoever does not fee that a reform of representation, made on the principles of equal right to dictate laws, muft totally fubvert all branches of the conftitution, has furely very little claim to the praife of political fagacity.

The fum of Mr. Philips's pamphlet is comprised in eight proposals, which speak fufficiently for themfelves: " 1. An ad"miffion of every citizen (minors and infane perfons excepted)

to an equal right of voting.-2. The formation of elective "diftricts, confifting as nearly as poffible of an equal number "of electors.-3. Voting by ballot, and closing the poll in one "day, together with fome fubordinate regulations to prevent "diforders, and undue influence.-4. Abolifhing qualifications, fo that each citizen be eligible to a feat in parliament, "and allowing falaries to the members.-5. Annual parlia"ments.-6. Exclufion by rotation, fo that no perfon be a re"prefentative for more than three years fucceffively, nor above "two thirds of the members of one parliament eligible to the "next-7. Separation of minifters from the legislative affembly, BRIT, CRIT. VOL. I, MAY 1793.

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bly-8. Authorizing conftituents to difcharge their reprefen"tatives."

Mr. Philips, if his principles be admitted, is neither an inconclufive reafoner, nor an inelegant writer. Our readers will be able to appreciate his talents by the following extra&s:

"Shall we continue then to be deluded with the unmeaning clamour of a combination, and mutual balance of three eftates, if that eftate, in which the MAJESTIC FORM OF THE PEOPLE was originally recognised, have fo departed from its priftine character, as to retain little more of it than the name? If the people fhould affume to themselves the power of fending a majority to represent then in the Houfe of Lords, would not the crown and the peerage exclaim against such a proceeding, as an infringement, and violation of the conftitution? And ought not the rights of the people to be as dear to them, as hereditary distinctions to their owners? And is not the recognition of their authority, in the conftitution, as effential to its wellbeing, and even existence, as either the monarchy, or ariftocracy? "That the power of fending members to the House of Coinmons fhould be lodged any where, but in the great mafs of the people, is as dangerous to their rights and liberties, as it is inconfiftent with the boafted principles of our government. But this danger is much increased, and becomes much more ferious and alarming, if that power be vested in bodies, endowed with all the executive, and a great, fhare of the legislative, authority, and who poffefs privileges and interefts diftinct from those of the rest of the nation. N

"Shall the man then who has remarked the progress of these dangers, which threaten deftruction to the beft principles of our conftitution, be deterred by courtly proclamations, or minifterial profecutions, from calling on his countrymen to look at them, and beware?

"The baleful dregs

"Of thefe late ages, this inglorious draught
Of lervitude and folly, have not yet

(Blefs'd be th' Eternal Ruler of the world!)
"Defil'd, to fuch a depth of fordid fhame,
"The native honours of the human foul ?”

AKENSIDE.

"That all men have a right to be confulted, either directly or indirectly, about the laws formed for their government, is a dictate of reason, and admitted in theory to be one of the fundamental principles of our conftitution. The king and the peers being perfonally concerned in enacting laws, have no claim at all to be reprefented. But reprefentation is the only way by which the public will is collected, and brought into action; and as no one can have a greater claim than another, in cafes in which the rights of all are equally concerned, representation, which respects equally the rights of all, ought to be to conducted as to recognize alike the claims of every individual." P. 26.03

The author has not mentioned, at what period of our hiftory this majestic form of the people was allowed to have a greater influence than it has at prefent.

ART.

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