"perceived agreement or disagreement of the terms of a pro"pofition" ergo, truth is that agreement or difagreement. Why then is this abftract matter erected into a divinity? Gentle reader, you fhall know. It is because Mr. G. has difcarded all other divinity from his fyftem, and nothing can be carried on, by any fyftem-maker, without the intervention of fome omnipotence. The Being of a God, indeed, he neither affirms nor denies; but, complying with the common ufage with refpect to a few current phrases, such as "would to God," &c. he fpeaks of it coolly, as an hypothesis as yet undetermined. and of God him felf, if he fhould exift, as fubordinate to this idol, truth. Upon the hypothefts of a God, it is not the choice, apprehenfion, or judgment of that being, fo properly as the "truth which was the foundation of that judgment, that has "been the fource of all contingent and particular existences. "His existence, if neceffary, was neceffary only as the fenforium of truth, and the medium of its operation." p. 307. That is, the being of a God can only be neceifary, as the fenforium of the agreement, or disagreement of propofitions, and the medium of its operation. As far as nonfenfe can be blafphemy, this is fo.

In reality, this affertion fo prematurely hazarded, through fear of laying open the fufpicious doctrines of neceffity, and human mechanifm, fprings chiefly out of them. For if man be neceffarily determined to act, by his perception of that which is beft, truth, when perceived, must have force to compel him to every thing he can do, But, rather unhappily, this force is extended by Mr. G. much further than to what he can do; as we fhall fee presently. Indeed, in our progrefs, we meet with one or two more omnipotents; for reafon is affirmed to be omnipotent, in p. 708; and mind alfo, at p. 862. and throughout the laft chapter but one of the work.

2. On the second principle, the perfectibility of man, we need not much expatiate, it is not proved, it is only furmifed from his progrefs in the formation of language, and of writing. After ftating thefe two points, and touching upon the wonderful distance between favage man, and man highly cultivated, the author fays, "fuch was man in his original "ftate, and such is man as we at present behold him. Is it

poffible for us to contemplate what he has already done, with"out being impreffed with a strong prefentiment of the im"provements he has yet to accomplish? There is no fcience "that is not capable of additions; there is no art that may not "be carried to ftill higher perfection. If this be true of all "other sciences, why not of morals? If this be true of all other "arts, why not of focial inftitution?" P. 50. And thus, with a why not? is this great queftion fettled, and ever after taken

for granted and thus folidly is it concluded, that because men can invent speaking and writing, they can, by their own powers, make themselves immortal! for this is the only real foundation of those curious opinions, which we shall have occafion to notice presently. This author has no notion of Eft quadam prodire tenus, without the datur ultra.

3. Man is a machine. Left we fhould be thought to exaggerate, in bringing forward this pofition, we will cite the author's own words: " Man, like every other machine, the operations of "which can be made the object of our fenfes, may be faid," &c. P. 716. Now, What fort of a machine is he? Not a material automaton, as Hartley's fyftem makes him, but an automaton moved by thought, in such a way that thought stands always in the middle place between perception and action: thus, perception produces thought, and thought action; both neceffarily. Infomuch, that nothing originates from mind, and we speak incorrectly when we call ourselves the authors of any thing. Is it not credible that this new teacher fhould have written thus? Let him testify of himself:

"In fact we perpetually annex wrong and erroneous ideas to this phrafe, that we are the authors. Though mind be a real and efficient cause, it is in no cafe a firft caufe. It is the medium through which operations are produced. Ideas fucceed each other in our fenforium according to certain neceffary laws. The most powerful impreffion, either from without or from within, conftantly gets the better of all its competitors, and forcibly drives out the preceding thought, till it is in the fame irresistible manner driven out by its fucceffor." P. 340.

Even the circulation of the blood, and the motion of the heart, are the effect of thought. This is curiously argued, becaufe they both begin together. P. 338. But what brings percipiency or mind, and thence thought, into action, we are not told.

4. Every thing is the refult of abfolute neceffity. This neceffity arifes in man, as we have feen, by the mechanism of thought which doctrine, of course, annihilates all merit and demerit. Mr. Godwin, for he is, as we have faid, a confiftent writer, by no means fhrinks from this confequence, but affirms it explicitly. He fays, "under the fyftem of neceffity, the "ideas of guilt, crime, defert, and accountableness have no

place." And he proceeds, "Correlative to the feelings of "refentment, indignation, and anger against the offences of "others, are thofe of repentance, contrition, and forrow for our own. As long as we admit of an effential difference between "virtue and vice, no doubt, all erroneous conduct, whether of

"ourselves

"ourselves or others, will be regarded with difapprobation. "But it will in both cafes be confidered, under the system of "neceflity, as a link in the great chain of events, which could not "have been otherwife than it is. We fhall, therefore, no more "be difpofed to repent of our own faults than those of others." P. 314. Thus, with refpect to removing criminals from fociety, he fays, "Society Society is authorifed to animadvert upon a "certain individual; in the case of murder, for example, not "because he has done an action that he might have avoided, "not because he was fufficiently informed of the better, and ob"ftinately chofe the worfe; for this is impoffible, every man neceffarily does that which he, at the time, apprehends to be " beft: but because his habits and character render him dangerous to fociety, in the same fenfe as a wolf, or a blight, would "be dangerous." P. 624. How mistaken then was Medea, when the faid, Video meliora proboque, deteriora fequor! Mr. G. would have faid, that is impoffible.

But again, he speaks yet more fully, on the subject of punish

ment:

"The juftice of punishment, therefore, in the ftrict import of the word, can only be a deduction from the hypothefis of free-will, and must be false, if human actions be neceffary. Mind, as was fufficiently apparent when we treated of that fubject, is an agent, in no other fenfe than matter is an agent. It operates and is operated upon, and the nature, the force and line of direction of the firft, is exactly in proportion to the nature, force and line of direction of the fecond. Morality in a rational and defigning mind is not effentially different from morality in an inanimate fubftance. A man of certain intellectual habits is fitted to be an affaffin, a dagger of a certain form is fitted to be his inftrument. The one or the other excites a greater degree of difapprobation, in proportion as its fitnefs for mifchievous purposes appears to be more inherent and direct. I view a dagger on this account with more difapprobation than a knife, which is perhaps equally adapted for the purposes of the affaffin; because the dagger has few or no beneficial uses to weigh against those that are hurtful, and because it has a tendency by means of affociation to the exciting of evil thoughts. I view the affaffin with more disapproba tion than the dagger, because he is more to be feared, and it is more difficult to change his vicious ftructure or take from him his capacity to injure. The man is propelled to act by neceffary causes and irrefiftible motives, which, having once occurred, are likely to occur again. The dagger has no quality adapted to the contraction of habits, and, though it have committed a thousand murders, is not at all more likely (unlefs fo far as thofe murders, being known, may operate as a flight affociated motive with the poffeffor) to commit murder again. Except in the articles here specified, the two cafes are exactly parallel. The affaffin cannot help the murder he commits, any more than the dagger." P. 689.

Under

Under this curious fyftem it is easy to perceive how juftice alone becomes the bafis of all morality; the perception of the true relations of things being all the virtue of which mankind is capable. Hence all affections and paffions are obliterated; promises and oaths annihilated. Gratitude, in particular, is declared to be not only not a virtue, but a vice! (P. 83 & 199.) Nor are any of the relative affections, filial or parental love, &c. left in better plight. (P. 83, &c.) Thus are all promises and oaths condemned; nor is any duty fpared except fincerity, which flows from truth and juftice. But it does not equally appear why all government and property fhould be annihilated, without attending more closely to the author's arguments than those who have thus far studied our account of his first principles will think it worth their while to undertake. The key to the former pofition, however, is this, adopted with much praife, from that illuftrious writer Mr. Paine, that "as government is neceffary "to prevent evils, it is itself an evil." P. 79. i. e. what removes evils is an evil; which is exactly as wife as it would be to affirm, that because the fun is neceflary to prevent the deftruction cold would otherwise occafion, the fun himself is an evil :

"Who drives fat oxen, muft himself be fat."

Property is overturned in the following manner: No man has a right to any thing but because he wants it, and if one man can be proved to want a thing more than another man, it is his of courfe. Thus falls property.

"So much for Buckingham!"

But it is impoffible to conceive the complete infanity into which this strange hypothesis has conducted its author, without reading the concluding chapters of the eighth and laft book. Here the whole abfurdity is concentrated, and bursts out in its full fplendour. It is here literally conjectured, on the occafion of a colloquial rant of Dr. Franklin,* not only that man may make engines fo perfect, that one may perform what numbers now co operate to do ; but, that by the mere exercife of the powers of his own intellect, he may become immortal!

"Let

* Uttered only as a bold illuftration of his idea, how far the powers of mechanism and philosophical contrivance might be carried. See p. 845.

+ Some pleasant inftances occur in chap. vi. B. viii. The firft is moderate: "Hereafter it is by no means clear that the moft extenfive operations will not be within the reach of one man; or, to make use of a familiar inftance, that a plough may not be turned into a field and perform its office without the need of fuperintendence !" P, 845. But

Let us here return to the fublime conjecture of Franklin, that "mind will one day become omnipotent over matter." If over all other matter, why not over the matter of our own bodies? If over matter at ever fo great a diftance, why not over matter which, however ignorant we may be of the tie that connects it with the thinking principle, we always carry about with us, and which is in all cafes the medium of communication between that principle and the external univerfe? In a word, why may not man be one day immortal ?

It is afferted, that it is the fault of man himself, (foolish man!) that ever he grows old; Mr. G. will, doubtlefs, be always young:

Why is it that a mature man foon lofes that elasticity of limb, which characterises the heedlefs gaiety of youth? Because he defifts from youthful habits. He affumes an air of dignity incompatible with the lightness of childish fallies. He is vifited and vexed with all the cares that rife out of our mistaken inftitutions, and his heart is no longer satisfied and gay. Hence his limbs become stiff and unwieldy. This is the forerunner of old age and death." P. 863.

We are taught that fleep is a mere diforder, and may be altogether abolished. This, indeed, is a previous ftep to our acquiring earthly immortality; for, as the author juftly obferves, before death can be banished, we must banish sleep, death's image." P. 867. Rightly, therefore, faid Chrononhotonthologos:

"If thou purfueft me, thou detefted Somnus,

"I'll tear thine eyeballs from the leaden fockets,
"And force thee to outftare eternity."

We are told, moreover, that intellectual medicine is the best kind, and that we may cure all diforders by thinking of them. We are in this ftate to have no wives, because "marriage is

law, and the worst of all laws."" Add to this, that marri"age is an affair of property, and the worst of all properties." p. 850. It is alfo a fraud. 851. But, as long as any of our weakneffes remain, the intercourfe between the fexes is to be regulated only by the common rule of juftice, as to preference. As foon as, by thefe inftitutions, the world becomes in danger of being over-peopled, then, by a fublime effort of mind, we are to rife above all defire of increafing the fpecies, and the race, at that period on earth, is to continue for ever: for, as we are told,

this is not enough, complete, concerts are to be performed by one man: but we are to have no theatrical exhibitions, because this includes a vicious (not morally vicious) co-operation; and because no man will imprison his own ideas to repeat thofe of others. P. 846.

" we