character of the British government in practice, however different its theory; and it presents the singular phenomenon of a nation, the individuals of which are as faithful to their private engagements and duties, as honourable, as worthy, as those of any nation on earth, and whose government is yet the most unprincipled at this day known." He then speaks of the general causes why princes should be superior to other men, and by way of illustration gives a sketch of 'the principal monarchs of Europe, which, in the style of broad caricature, retains enough of resemblance to the origi nals to be readily acknowledged.

In all his letters written about this time he still maintains the opinion that the repeal of the embargo was unwise, and that its continuance would have produced the withdrawal of the British orders in council*. He says that the members of Congress from Massachusetts believing that civil war would be the certain alternative of the continuance of the embargo, caused its repeal. He seems to be confident that it was the settled purpose of Great Britain to claim the ocean as her conquest, and to prohibit any vessel from navigating it, but on paying such a tribute as would enable her to maintain a navy adequate to the support of her dominion. He expresses these opinions of Great Britain to General Dearborn, of Massachusetts †, and says, "Radically hostile to our navigation and commerce, and fearing its rivalry, she will completely crush it, and force us to resort to agriculture, not aware that we shall resort to manufactures also, and thus render her conquests useless at least, if not injurious to herself in the end, and perhaps salutary to us, as removing out of our way the chief causes and provocations of war." He

*It is but justice to add, that such was also Mr. Madison's conviction, and he has more than once told me that the administration had indisputable evidence of the fact.

In a letter dated July 16, 1820,

adds, that "the change in Massachusetts, by driving her to agriculture, manufactures, and emigration, might not lessen her happiness."

This view of the future condition of the United States, supposing it just as to the hopes of Great Britain, greatly overrated her power, and made too low an estimate of our means of resistance, as, happily, a very few years afterwards abundantly testified. The same experience also corrected another error into which too many of our politicians had then fallen. It taught us to make a juster appreciation of the value of American commerce to Great Britain, which, though very conducive to her prosperity, is not of that vital importance to her manufactures or colonies that we had been accustomed to suppose. It must be recollected that the amount of cotton then exported from the United States was not one-eighth of what it is at present. This article is of more importance than all the other products of the United States, and the privation of this portion of their supply would indeed be seriously felt by English manufacturers.

In answer to a letter received from the editor of a Washington journal, J. B. Colvin, he examines a question of political casuistry: "Whether circumstances do not sometimes occur, which make it a duty in officers of high trust, to assume authority beyond the law." This question he does not hesitate to answer in the affirmative, on very satisfactory grounds; but, as he properly observes, though it is a very clear one in principle, it is sometimes an embarrassing one in practice. He refers, by way of illustration, to several examples drawn from our own history, and he applies them to the justification of General Wilkinson, in arresting some of Burr's associates in New Orleans, and sending them to Washington for trial. One of the illustrations, though hypothetically put, suggests a doubt whether it might not have been nearly according to the fact. It is thus: "Sup

pose it had been made known to the executive of the Union, in the autumn of 1805, that we might have the Floridas for a reasonable sum; that that sum had not indeed been so appropriated by law, but that Congress were to meet within three weeks, and might appropriate it on the first or second day of their session. Ought he, for so great an advantage to his country, to have risked himself by transcending the law and making the purchase? The public advantage offered in this supposed case, was indeed immense but a reverence for law, and the probability that the advantage might still be legally accomplished by a delay of only three weeks, were powerful reasons against hazarding the act. But suppose it foreseen that a John Randolph would find means to protract the proceeding on it by Congress, until the ensuing spring, by which time new circumstances would change the mind of the other party. Ought the executive, in that case, and with that foreknowledge, to have secured the good to his country, and to have trusted to their justice for the transgression of the law?" He thinks he ought. He very properly considers, however, that this principle applies only to officers invested with great powers, when the safety of the nation or some of its very high interests are at stake, and that in ordinary cases, "the example of overleaping the law is of greater evil than a strict adherence to its imperfect provisions."

This autumn he made a visit of more than ordinary length to his estate in Bedford. Here he was more withdrawn from the public than at Monticello, both because he had a far more limited acquaintance in the neighbourhood, and was more out of the way of visitors from distant parts of the Union than at Monticello, which had long since been a place of attraction to zealous republicans. In these visits to Poplar Forest, of which he made several in the year, he was always accompanied by some of his granddaughters, and he

generally remained there several weeks. And though he was here relieved from that press of company which was but too frequent at Monticello, he exercised a liberal hospitality even in this place, and was also in the habit of dining with two or three gentlemen in the neighbourhood, one of whom had always belonged to that party of which, as a mass, he thought so unfavourably, and spoke so harshly. Amidst his strong, and what must often be termed intemperate and unphilosophical prejudice against the federalists, he could always separate individuals from their sect, and not only his guests, but often also his friends, were selected from the ranks of the party which so bitterly reviled him, and whose hatred he so cordially reciprocated.

Poplar Forest. Mr. Jefferson's sentiments towards Great Britain. Let ter to Mr. Law. National debt of England. Letter to Dr. Rush. ani Renewal of intercourse with Mr. Adams. Letter to Destutt Tracy. 9 Thoughts on the federal and state governments. Separation. Correspondence with Mr. Adams. Letter to Mr. Maury-to the President. Common law of England. On his return to public life. Thoughts on manufactures. On the party divisions of the United States. General Washington. Letter to Madame de Staël. On a navy. Publication of his letters to Dr. Priestley. Explanation to Mr. Adams.

1813.

WHILE Mr. Jefferson held the opinion expressed in the preceding chapter, that it was the fixed purpose of the British government to assert the same supremacy on the ocean which they had actually maintained in the strait which separates their Island from France, it is not surprising that the belief should have given a keener edge to his resentment and ill-will, already sufficiently excited by provocations ancient and recent. These sentiments he was at no pains to disguise, and they accordingly furnished one of the themes of party reproach against him. It was a favourite theme too with his enemies, partly because it gave more colour to their imputation of his blind devotion to the interests of France, even in preference to those of his own country, and partly because it was certain to bring upon him the ill-will of a numerous and weighty class of the community, composed of those natives of Great Britain who were domiciliated in the United States, and who, for the most part, possessed of