against the subsequent opinion given in the name of the emperor himself. On the 24th of November, Mons. Champagny the minister of foreign relations at Paris, writes to General Armstrong that the American government could not complain of the measures of the French government while they allow their ships to be visited by English ships and submit to other wrongs. That France had been forced to adopt those measures, and had had recourse to more rigid precautions in consequence of the intimate relations between the United States and England. That the inconvenience is justly to be imputed, not to France but England. She should be combated with her own arms. England disregards the rights of nations, and it is only in forcing her to a peace, that they can be recovered.

On the 2nd of April, 1808, General Armstrong, in pursuance of his instructions, remonstrated against the condemnations of American property, under the Berlin and Milan decrees, which he shows to be clear infractions of the treaty of 1800. He insists that the only pretext of justification, the acquiescence of the United States in the wrongs they sustained from the British government, is not true in fact, and though it were, has no foundation in reason or law. He avers that the United States have not submitted, and would "not submit to the usurpations of Great Britain, nor to those of any other nation.*"

On the 4th of July, General Armstrong answers Mons. Champagny's letter of the 15th of January. He says the United States have the right to elect their own policy with regard to England as they have with regard to France, and without it they cannot be considered independent; that the peremptory tone of Champagny's note was less adapted to the accomplishment of its object than to offend against the respect due to an independent nation; and that the alter

* Wait's State Papers, 56.

native presented to the United States in the last paragraph of an acquiescence in the views of France against Great Britain, and a confiscation of all American property sequestered, is equally derogatory to both governments: To France as it imputes to her propositions founded in wrong to individuals; and to the United Stales, as it implies a sacrifice of her rights and honour to her pecuniary interests.

To the several remonstrances made by the American minister against the captures and burning of American property, no answer was given by the French government.

In Mr. Madison's letter to Mr. Pinkney, dated February 19th, 1808, he says that among the considerations which advised the embargo, was the probability of such orders as were actually issued by the British government on the 11th of November, 1807-the language of the British gazettes, with other indications having left little doubt that such were meditated. The appearance of these orders in council, he says, had done much towards reconciling all descriptions of persons to the embargo.

In a subsequent letter * to Mr. Pinkney, dated the 14th of April, after stating what reparations for the attack on the Chesapeake would be deemed satisfactory, if the adjustment should be made in England, Mr. Madison urges the same considerations to Great Britain to repeal the illegal orders which had been previously presented to France. He says, It would be happy for all parties, the belligerents as well as the United States, if truth could, in this case, be made to prevail; and if the retaliatory rivalship of the former against the latter could be converted into an emulation, as politic as it would be magnanimous in both, to take the lead, in a fair,

* It appeared by Mr. Rose's letter to Mr. Madison of March 17, that the British government did not require of the United States more than that they should discharge deserters from their service. This order, therefore, went a step farther.

lawful, and conciliatory course, towards a nation which had done no wrong to either. Should the experiment be made on either side, it would probably be followed on the other; and it could never happen that the side first doing justice, would suffer on that account." He was further informed that by an order of the navy department, no foreign seamen, whether deserters or not, would be permitted to serve on board American ships of war.

In Mr. Madison's letter of the 2nd of April, he notices the power of suspending the embargo, and urges the consequences of a repeal by our nation, as a strong consideration with the British government.

He also wrote to Mr Armstrong on the 29th of May, 1803, to inform him of the power given to the president to suspend the embargo, and requested him to inform the French goverir. ment that the effect of revoking her decrees would be to compel Great Britain to follow her example, or to be at war with the United States; and, on the other hand, should Great Britain revoke her orders in council, France could not persist in her decrees without forcing a contest with the United States.

On the 18th of July, 1808, Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Pinkney, and after noticing the other points of controversy with Great Britain, he calls the minister's attention to a new order in council of a most extraordinary character, which, by patronising vessels without registers, invites American citi zens to violate the laws of their own country. It was a farther aggravation, that American vessels were, according to a cir cular letter of Mr Huskisson, alone within its purview. He speaks in strong terms of reprobation of such an act against a nation towards which it professes friendship; an act which sets the odious example of openly encouraging smugglers, and which is so inconsistent with their declared principles of public law. He also speaks of the indignation excited in

the United States against those American citizens who traded under British licences.

>>The same offer which General Armstrong had made to the French government, Mr. Pinkney made to the British, in the most formal manner; but it was unhesitatingly rejected. On the 23rd of September, Mr. Canning, in reply to Mr. Pinkney, said that, as the application made to the French government by the United States had not met with a favourable reception, his majesty could not change his course. That he saw nothing in the embargo to induce the change. If it were regarded as a measure of hostility, it was manifestly unjust towards him. The redress should be first made by the party originating the wrong; and if it was an innocent municipal regulation, as it had been represented, with which no foreign state had any concern, then his majesty had no right to complain of it. There is no reciprocity between a voluntary self-restriction, and the surrender of the right of retaliation. That the Berlin decree was meant not only to impair the prosperity of Great Britain, but to aunihilate her political existence, and the embargo, though not so intended, did come in aid of the blockade of the European continent. That these efforts had proved unavailing; and if the system of attack was broken up into fragments, harmless and contemptible, it was yet important to the reputation of England, which constitutes much of her power, that this advantage should not appear to have been purchased by any concession on her part. He professes every disposition to be on amicable terms with the United States; says the depression of other countries is not desired by his nation; that the prosperity of America is essentially that of Great Britain, and her strength and power are not for herself, but for the world. That when a re-adjustment of the present differences should take place, both nations would better appreciate the value of each other's friendship, and that it would not here

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after be imputed to Great Britain that she envied American industry, or was compelled to court an intercourse with her. He adds, with an offensive display of charitable feeling, because so intended, that his majesty would do any thing to repeal the embargo, short of appearing to deprecate it as a measure of hostility, with a view of removing "an inconvenient restriction upon the American people." But the continuance of the President's proclamation is adverted to as an inauspicious omen of mutual conciliation.

As the embargo was palpably injurious to Great Britain, whose wealth and power are drawn from her commerce, and as Mr. Canning himself virtually admitted that it had an injurious bearing on her interests, an offer to repeal it, and thus restore to Great Britain a most important branch of her trade, furnished a very proper ground on which America could require a repeal of the orders in council, which on their face were admitted to violate the rights of neutrals, and which were professed to be only temporary, and to be acts of necessary retaliation on France. The offer was made, because it was believed on good reason that it would be more likely to promote the views of Great Britain than the orders in council, both in extending her trade and in bringing the United States into collision with France. Mr. Canning then had no foundation for assuming that the removal of the embargo was merely a benefit to the United States, and to refuse the proffer made to them, as if it had been a boon asked, and not a matter of reciprocity. Such a disingenuous piece of affectation would not have been resorted to, if it had not been to taunt the American government with the reproach, more than once adroitly insinuated, that the measure meant to injure Great Britain had inflicted yet greater injury on the United States. If it were intended to administer to the pride of the British nation, this document may be regarded as cleverly fulfilling its purpose; but it was not the produc