must abandon it only for a state of war. The day is not distant when that will be preferable to a longer continuance of the embargo. But we can never remove that, and let our vessels go out and be taken under these orders, without making reprisal. Yet this is the very state of things which these federal monarchists are endeavouring to bring about; and in this it is but too possible they may succeed. But the fact is, that if we have war with England, it will be solely produced by their measures. I think that in two or three months we shall know what will be the issue.”

The question which now occupied the minds of all was, what course the country should pursue in its present difficultics. The alternatives were war, embargo, or submission; and for the latter there were no open, probably no real advocates. But the nation was greatly divided on the other alternatives. Many, especially in the navigating states, were for the repeal of the embargo, with any consequence that might result from its repeal. There was also a further diversity as to the course to be taken after it was repealed

some were willing to let the merchants arm and defend their ships others were for open war, but here again they differed. The federal party were generally for war with France and most of their opponents for war with England; while a few, regarding the provocations received from those nations, by the United States, rather than their means of resenting it, were for going to war with both. These ques. tions greatly agitated the public minds, and engrossed the journals so as to take away much of the interest usually felt in a presidential election. Mr. Madison having received the recommendation of a large majority of the members of Congress of the republican party, was regarded throughout the Union as the choice of that party, and it constituting a majority of the nation, he was accordingly elected. Mr. C. C. Pinckney of South Carolina, was the candidate of the federal party, and received the votes of all the New England

states, except Vermont, the vote of Delaware, two votes in Maryland and three in North Carolina; making in all forty-seven votes. George Clinton received six of the nineteen votes of New York, and James Madison all the rest, amounting to 122 votes. George Clinton was elected vicepresident. The effort made in Virginia to procure the vote of that state for Mr. Monroe proved utterly abortive, and his friends could succeed no farther than to obtain for him three votes in New York, for the office of vice-president.

It has been urged by Mr. Jefferson's enemies that he was prompted to recommend the embargo by way of "a cooperation with the French emperor, to diminish, and as far as possible to destroy, the commerce of Great Britain; and thereby compel her, at least, to make peace, if not absolutely to subject her to the control of the imperial conqueror; when it was apparent that the object of his ambition was universal empire." But the whole tenor of Mr. Jefferson's correspondence and acts disprove this injurious imputation.

That one of the considerations which recommended the embargo was that it would be deeply injurious to the commerce of Great Britain was unquestionable, and considering the great and continued injuries received by the United States from that nation, it would have implied a baseness of spirit not to have sought such retaliation. But that he preferred it as a less evil to his country than war, is equally evident. All his letters written at this time show that he looked to war as the certain alternative if the belligerents continued their hostile edicts, and the embargo only as less injurious to the United States than war. His correspondence further shows that he regarded Bonaparte's usurpations in the same light as the federalists themselves, and that as soon as the military chieftain threw off the mask, and showed that he was swayed by the love of power and self-aggrandizement, he lost Mr. Jefferson's confidence and good will.'

299

CHAPTER XII.

The President's Message to Congress. The foreign relations of the United States. Correspondence between the American Minister at Paris and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Madison's Correspondence with Mr. Pinkney. Proceedings of Congress. The embargo. Inquiry as to the two millions appropriated for the purchase of Florida. Effects of the Embargo. Measures of defence. Embargo taken off. Communication from Mr. J. Q. Adams. State of public affairs. Review of Mr. Jefferson's administration.

1808-1809.

HAVING seen the measures of self-defence adopted by the United States against the worst mischiefs to which the undiscriminating fury of the European belligerents exposed them, let us now see how these rights were asserted by their government, in its diplomatic intercourse with those belligerents.

Mr. Erskine having, on the 12th of March, 1807, sent a formal notice of the Berlin decree, and added, that his government, not exercising that retaliation which was justifiable, had merely issued an order of January, 1807, for preventing commerce between different ports of his enemies, Mr. Madison, in reply, remonstrated against this order, and the right of retaliation asserted in it; and Mr. Erskine having on the 23rd of February, 1808, explained the character of the order in council of November, 1807, Mr. Madison, on the 25th of March, replied to him at length. He denies the fact assumed by the orders, that the United States had acquiesced in the French decrees, and he denies

the principle that one belligerent may retaliate to any extent and under any modifications which may suit its pleasure! So far as the Berlin decree was a local regulation, it furt nished to Great Britain no ground of complaint: so far as it was to be executed on the high seas, it could affect only neutrals. That at the time of the orders of November, the French decree was not known to have been executed in any instance the case of the Horizon being the first: That the United States had every reason to believe that the decree was not to be enforced as to them; and as soon as it was, they took measures to defend their rights: That, admitting the right of retaliation in Great Britain, it could not justify her to the extent to which she carried it: That retaliation is an equivalent for injury received, and there was no comparison between that which she experienced and that which she inflicted: That the British order of January, 1807, itself declared that the fleets of France, instead of being able to enforce the blockade of the British isles, were themselves blockaded, and was thus self-condemned as a measure of retaliation.

1

1.25

He says that as the United States do not acquiesce in the invasions of their rights, they ought not to be involved in the controversy on which ever side the invasions began. He however reminds Mr. Erskine that before the French decree there were blockades declared by the British govern ment that were not authorized by the law of nations. He speaks in an indignant tone of the exceptions made in the orders of November, which, under the name of indulgences to neutrals, were in fact badges of humiliation, inconsistent with national independence. The first of these allowed commercial intercourse with the colonies of an enemy, contrary to the rule of 1756. He denies that this is an established principle of the law of nations; that it is claimed to be such only by Great Britain; never by her before 1756,

and at first then, not because such trade was in itself illegal, but because it furnished presumptive evidence that the property belonged to an enemy; and that the British courts themselves had sometimes conformed to it and sometimes rejected it. The other exceptions allowed to the United States a trade to the whole continent of Europe, on first going to a British port, accepting a British license, and paying a tribute, as if they were reduced to their former colonial dependence; and he asks, if the policy be to subject an enemy to privations, why are channels opened for a British trade which are shut to a neutral trade? and if the real object be to admit a neutral trade, why are neutral vessels required to come to a British port, when it is known that they are then not admitted into the ports of the enemy? He animadverts on the duty on cotton, and on the condemnation of American vessels for having "certificates of origin," though these are in conformity with domestic regulations generally practised.

On the 29th of March he sent a further remonstrance against the order in council of January, 1807, in which he enforces his former objections to the right of retaliation claimed by Great Britain.

On the 12th of November, 1807, General Armstrong learnt the decision of the council of prizes in France in the case of the Horizon. This American vessel was wrecked on the coast of France, was seized by the officers of the government, and though the value of the vessel was restored, that part of her cargo which consisted of English merchandise was condemned under the Berlin decree. The American minister made a remonstrance to the government, and showed that the decision was inconsistent with the declarations made to him in October preceding. One of the grounds taken by the council of prizes was that the interpretation of the decree that had been first given to General Arm strong was the opinion of an individual, and could not weigh