A.D. 1866.]

Valeggio and Somma Campagna. Running parallel with the base of the triangle, at the distance of three or four miles from it, is the high road leading from Goito through Villafranca (which is just opposite the hill of Custozza) to Verona.

Heavy rain fell on the night of the 23rd, which must have caused great discomfort to the raw Italian troops bivouacking east of the Mincio. The next morning they

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division of Prince Humbert, on the right, was well to the north-east of Villafranca, marching along the plainswhen they unexpectedly encountered the vanguards of the Austrian corps, moving in the opposite direction.

The Austrian field army in Venetia, under the command of Archduke Albrecht, consisted of the 5th Corps, under Prince Lichtenstein; the 7th Corps, under Marshal Maroicic Madonna del Monte; the 9th Corps, under

were moved forward, if Captain Hozier's information be trustworthy, without having got their breakfast, without rations, and the infantry burdened with their heavy knapsacks, under the broiling midsummer sun of Italy. General La Marmora was so confident of the truth of his hypothesis respecting the Archduke's intentions, that he sent out no scouts or covering-parties, but moved forward as if no enemy were near. The division of Cerale, (1st Corps) forming the left wing, was near Alzarea that is, near the northern face of the group of hills-the

"Seven Weeks' War," Vol. II., p. 291.

Marshal Hartung; a division of reserve infantry, and another division of reserve cavalry-forming a total of about 63,000 men, with 168 guns. Colonel Rüstow estimates the force of Italian troops actually brought into action on the 24th at about 90,000 men, with 192 guns; so that the disparity of numbers was nearly as three to two. The division of Prince Humbert on the extreme right, supported by that of Bixio, were engaged all day with the Austrian reserve cavalry near Villafranca, neither side gaining any decided advantage. The Italian infantry had frequently to form squares to repel the cavalry, and Prince Humbert had more than once to take

refuge within a square during one of these charges. The heat of the day was very oppressive, and caused frequent pauses in the fighting all along the line. To the west of the Tione, Cerale's division of the 1st Corps fell in with the advance of the reserve division of Austrian infantry near Alzarea, about seven o'clock in the morning. Falling back upon Oliosi, Cerale held that village strongly, and for a long time the Austrians made no progress. But the Archduke detached Piret's brigade of the 5th Corps from the other side of the Tione to the assistance of the reserve infantry; and, after a stubborn resistance, in the course of which Cerale was wounded, and Villarey, one of his generals of brigade, killed, the Italians were driven out of Oliosi. They retired on the strong position of Monte Vento, and made a stand there for some time; but Durando, commanding the 1st Corps, was disabled by a wound, and about two o'clock the Austrians stormed Monte Vento. The division then fell back in good order upon Valeggio. The Austrians did not venture to pursue them much beyond Monte Vento, for their right flank was at this time menaced by Pianelli. That General, commanding the 1st Division of the 1st Corps, had been left, as has before been stated, on the right bank of the Mincio; but, observing how the battle was going, he crossed the river at Monzambano, sent part of his division against an Austrian force which had made a sally from Peschiera, and drove it back to the fortress, and with the remainder operated against the right flank of the troops which had beaten Cerale. Meantime Sirtori, commanding another division of the 1st Corps, had advanced slowly on Cerale's right to Santa Lucia on the Tione, and there taken up a position. He did nothing to help Cerale while the heavy fighting was going on at Oliosi and Monte Vento; and after the Italians had fallen back from the latter place, and the 5th Austrian Corps began to press him in front, Sirtori, on the ground that he was no longer supported on the left, led back his division to Valeggio. Thus, by three o'clock, the whole left of the Italian army was driven from the field.

On the other side of the Tione the battle raged more fiercely. General Cugia, commanding a division of the 3rd Corps, had advanced beyond Custozza, when he encountered the vanguard of the Austrian 9th Corps, under Marshal Hartung, about the same time that Prince Humbert, on his right, was attacked by the reserve cavalry. Cugia struggled gallantly to hold his ground, and for a long time the battle remained stationary around the villages of Monte Torre and Madonna della Croce. To the left of Cugia, La Marmora himself led the Division Brignone into the battle. The two brigades composing this division were named-the one the Sardinian, the other the Lombard Grenadiers; they were among the crack troops of the Italian army. They advanced to Monte Godio; but here they were attacked by the Brigade Sendier of the Austrian 7th Corps, which held this part of the enemy's line, between his 5th and his 9th Corps; and after both brigade-commanders, General Gozzani and Prince Amadeo, had been wounded, the Division Brignone abandoned Monte Godio, and fell back on Custozza. General Govone now brought up his division, and occupied

But he was

Bagolino, a little in rear of Monte Godio. here attacked, not only by the remainder of the 7th Austrian Corps, but also by a brigade of the 5th, which the retreat of Sirtori had left at liberty, and pushed back, after some hard fighting, from Bagolino. Cugia, his left being now exposed, fell back from Monte Torre, and about five o'clock the retreat of the Italian army became general. It was conducted, however, in perfectly good order, and the Austrians were too much exhausted to pursue with vigour. It was not till seven o'clock that the Austrians occupied the heights of Custozza, and pushed the Italian army completely off the hills. The retreat across the plains was covered by Bixio's division and the reserve cavalry.

During the latter half of the battle no Commander-inChief, if the current accounts may be trusted, directed the movements of the Italians. The generals of division retreated on their own responsibility, without having received orders. In the second part of General La Marmora's work, from which we have often quoted, an explanation and vindication of the author's military conduct, during and before the battle of Custozza, will doubtless be contained; till this appears, it seems only fair that we should suspend our judgment. According to the narrative of Colonel Rüstow (in which he is followed by Captain Hozier), La Marmora, after having led forward the Division Brignone, posted himself far in the rear, on the hill of La Gherla, whence he could see nothing. It is added that, about one o'clock, at the height of the conflict, he rode off to Goito (though he might just as well have sent an aide-de-camp with an order), to bring up the Divisions Angioletti and Longoni of the 2nd Corps; that, on arriving at Goito, he found nothing but a feeble vanguard, the main body of both divisions having, in defiance of orders, remained quietly at their quarters on the other side of the Mincio; finally, that he then gave up all for lost, and sent one officer to Valeggio with orders to secure the crossing of the river, and another to Custozza to collect exact information about the battle. Such a story sounds incredi ble, taken as a whole; yet there is no doubt that La Marmora did ride to Goito during the battle, and his full explanation, when it appears, will be read with interest. The divisions of Generals Govone and Cugia retreated to Valeggio, that of Brignone to Molino di Volta, those of Bixio and Prince Humbert to Goito. The whole Italian army recrossed the Mincio in the course of the next day (June 25), and fell back from the frontier behind the line of the Oglio. The bridge at Valeggio was broken down to impede pursuit. The Archduke sent a few detachments of cavalry across the Mincio, which scoured the country unopposed as far as the Chiese; but it was soon evident that he had no intention of assuming the offensive, or of advancing in force into Lombardy.

The loss of the Austrians in the battle of Custozza amounted to 960 men killed, and 3,690 wounded, of whom 283 were officers. The missing were between 900 and 1,000-these were chiefly prisoners taken by the Division Pianelli. The heavy loss in officers is to be ascribed to the accurate firing of the Italian Bersaglieri. The Italian loss amounted, in killed and wounded, only to 720 of the

A.D. 1866.]

former, and 3,112 of the latter; but the list of missing amounted to 4,315, among whom were many wounded men, who were left on the field when the army retreated. Colonel Rüstow considers that there was a general want of toughness about the Italian troops, although in the course of the battle they exhibited much dash and bravery; also that they had not the advantage of that thoroughly efficient officering which was so noticeable in the Prussian army; and that there was a want of inter-connection and prompt co-operation between the different parts of the line.

Cialdini, who was on the point of crossing the Lower Po, stopped his advance as soon as he heard of the disaster of Custozza, and fixed his head-quarters temporarily at Modena.

commence,

Garibaldi, with his volunteers-about 6,000 strongaccomplished nothing on the side of the Tyrol which could recall the memory of his former exploits. The nature of the materials which he had to discipline and make available was shown at the outset in a very characteristic way. The volunteers would not wait for the day on which the Italian commander had announced that hostilities would but made a hostile incursion across the frontier on the previous day, June 22nd. Garibaldi's headquarters were at Rocca d'Anfo, on the Lake of Idro. A sharp skirmish was fought on the 25th at the frontier bridge at Caffaro, a short distance from the northern end of the Lake of Idro, in which the Italians were beaten. They were again worsted at Monte Suello, near Bagolino, on Italian ground, on the 3rd July, the day of Königgrätz; in this affair Garibaldi was slightly wounded. Various slight skirmishes occurred on the frontier passes of the Tonal and the Stelvio, by which you cross from the head waters of the Oglio and the Adda into the Tyrol. On the whole, Garibaldi made no progress; and the Austrians, content with baffling his attempts, had no thought of taking the offensive. He had, it would seem, made a great miscalculation when he reckoned upon inoculating with revolutionary ideas the simple, loyal, religious nature of the Tyrolese peasant. Colonel Rüstow says that Garibaldi's main interest must have been to accustom his volunteers to stand fire, and to improve their organisation, especially by the elimination of worthless elements.

The disaster of Custozza, the full extent of which was for some time disguised by the Italian newspapers, and only gradually became known to the public, caused the withdrawal from La Marmora of the confidence both of the Government and the people. He was vehemently assailed on all sides, and had no choice but to send in his resignation. The chief command of the army was then given to General Cialdini. After Königgrätz, the Emperor of Austria ceded Venetia to the Emperor Napoleon, who accepted the transfer; and considering itself now free on the side of Italy, since it had nothing more to lose except the Trentino and Dalmatia, which, as events proved, the Tyrolese and the fleet were well able to guard, the Austrian Government recalled the 5th and the 9th Corps from Venetia to the defence of Vienna, now threatened by the advance of the Prussians. The Italians were

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now sure of Venetia; yet to obtain it in such a manner was galling to their pride, nor could they honourably desist from hostilities so long as the Prussian armies kept the field. Cialdini was accordingly ordered to cross the Po, and renew the invasion of Venetia. The passage was successfully effected near Massa on the 9th July, and Cialdini pressing forward occupied Rovigo and Monselice, and reached Padua on the 14th. His march was unopposed, for the Austrian force now remaining in Venetia, exclusive of the garrisons of the fortresses, was too weak to fight a battle, and it was no part of the policy of its commander to let the Italians win a cheap and easy victory. Meantime siege was laid to Borgoforte, a strong redoubt near the junction of the Mincio and the Po, by General Nunzianti. The batteries opened fire on the 17th, and the place was evacuated by the Austrians on the night of the 18th. As Cialdini advanced, the small Austrian field force, commanded by General Maroicie, continually retired, falling back successively behind the Piave, the Tagliamento, and the Isonzo. Udine was occupied by the Italians on the 24th July. A truce was concluded the next day, which was extended from week to week till the 12th August, when an armistice was agreed to, the line of the Indrio being fixed as the line of demarcation between the troops on either side.

The Italians had nourished the ardent hope that while Cialdini cut off Venice from succour on the land side, their iron-clad fleet might force its way into the lagoons, and compel Austria to relax her hold on the peerless Queen of the Adriatic. This hope was destined to be disappointed. By sea as well as by land defeat and disgrace were to await the Italian arms. Italy was to owe everything to the sword of Prussia and the patronage of France; nothing to her own exertions. A powerful fleet, including the ram Affondatore, eleven iron-clads, six or seven heavy wooden frigates, and several corvettes, had been fitted out at an expense which the disordered finances of the new kingdom could ill afford, and was believed to be capable of defeating with ease the fleet of Austria. Admiral Persano, who was in command, had distinguished himself on several previous occasions, and inspired his countrymen with entire confidence in his courage and skill. Sailing from Tarento, he concentrated the fleet at Ancona on the 25th June, and remained there for a long time inactive. A clamour was raised against him on this account, and he was at last positively ordered by the Minister of Marine to take his fleet to sea. A descent on Lissa was the enterprise fixed upon, for two principal reasons. The island of Lissa has excellent and roomy harbours, in which a fleet of iron-clads could lie far more commodiously than in the crowded port of Ancona; moreover, its reduction would be an important step towards the conquest of Dalmatia, which, as an ancient appendage to Venice, the Italians were bent upon appropriating as one of the trophies of the war. On the 16th July, Admiral Persano put to sea from Ancona, and steamed across the Adriatic to Lissa. The next three days were employed in useless and somewhat feeble endeavours to land a force on the island and silence the

batteries. The last attempt was made at daybreak on the 20th, and it was on the point of being abandoned when one of his corvettes brought to Persano the intelligence that the Austrian fleet was bearing down upon him. The Admiral then formed his ships in order of battle to the north of the island.

Admiral Tegethoff, the same brave sailor who distinguished himself in the naval action against the Danes off Heligoland, in 1864, had been for some time stationed at Fasana, in Istria, where he was in a position to protect Venice or Trieste if attacked, and close to the important arsenal of Pola. When he first heard that the Italian fleet was off Lissa, he believed the movement to be only a feint to draw him away from the coast of Istria; but when later advices convinced him that the attack on the island was serious, he resolved to sail to its assistance. The fleet with which he sailed from Fasana was in a high state of efficiency, and consisted of three divisions-ironclads, wooden frigates, and wooden corvettes-seven of each; to these were added four swift dispatch-boats, or tenders, so that the aggregate included twenty-five vessels, with upwards of 500 guns. The Italian fleet was of much superior force; it consisted at the time of the engagement of thirty-three vessels, one of them being the formidable ram, Affondatore, from which great things were expected. Tegethoff, on nearing Lissa, disposed his fleet in three lines, each formed in the shape of a wedge, the apex of which was towards the enemy; the seven iron-clads formed the first wedge, the wooden frigates the second, and the corvettes the third. Like Nelson bearing down on the enemy at Trafalgar, the brave Tegethoff, in his flag-ship, the Archduke Ferdinand Max, assumed the post of danger and of glory at the apex of the leading division. The Italian fleet, when drawn up for battle, was arranged in four groups. Three of these, all heading eastward, contained three, four, and three ironclads respectively. The leading group was commanded by Ribotty, the second by Persano himself, who had hoisted his flag on board the Re d'Italia, the third by Vacca. The wooden ships formed a fourth group in rear of the iron-clads. But before the battle began, Persano, without, it appears, communicating his intention to Vacca and Ribotty, quitted the Re d'Italia and went on board the Affondatore, which he ordered to be stationed on the side of the fleet remote from the advancing Austrians. A more unembarrassed direction of the movements of all his ships appears to have been Persano's object in this extraordinary step; but, besides that the position chosen seems to have been ill adapted for the purpose, the actual effect of the change was to leave the fleet without any direction whatever; for the Re d'Italia, to which every vessel in the fleet was looking for signals, made none, and those which proceeded from the Affondatore were not regarded. Tegethoff directed his iron-clads to steer, putting on all speed, so as to cut between the second and third groups of the Italian iron-clads. His own ship, the Ferdinand Max, admirably handled by his flag-captain, Max Baron von Sternek, "ran aboard, within the space of half an hour, three Sardinian iron-clads, of which two sustained heavy damages, the flag of one being captured,

and the third, the Re d'Italia, one of the largest vessels in the Italian fleet, was run down and sunk within two minutes, with her whole crew of more than 600 men. All attempts to save the swimming men belonging to the Re d'Italia were obliged to be given up, as an attack made upon us from all quarters compelled us to confine our attention to our own safety."* The battle soon became general, and each iron-clad was fully engaged, in addition to working its heavy guns, in eluding the onsets of hostile ships, and watching for a favourable opportunity of ramming an enemy. The Palestro, which had come up to the assistance of the Re d'Italia, was herself attacked by three or four Austrian iron-clads at once; and having her rudder dis abled, and being set on fire, she drifted out of the action to the southward, and presently blew up. Her whole ship's company, except sixteen men, were drowned; nor was a much larger proportion rescued of the crew of the Re d'Italia. Some of the Italian iron-clads, passing through the first Austrian line, engaged the wooden frigates, the chief of which was the Kaiser, commanded by Commodore Petz. The Austrian Admiral says of this portion of the contest: "The melée became general, and it is difficult to give particulars of it, as the vessels were cruising about under full steam, and it was often hard to distinguish friend from enemy, although the gala set of flags were hoisted on both sides."

The line-of-battle ship Kaiser-the flag-ship of the second division-was engaged with four iron-clads simultaneously. Commodore Petz, using his ship as a ram, ran aboard of one of his assailants while firing concentrated broadsides into the others, and this under the most trying circumstances; for at the same moment in which he struck the enemy, his foremast fell, crushed the funnel of the engine, and caused a good deal of confusion, without, however, seriously injuring any of the crew then on deck. The Kaiser lost 22 of her crew killed and 82 wounded. Her consorts in the wooden division suffered but little, some appearing to have escaped without a shot. As soon as he saw the critical position of his wooden vessels, Tegethoff, who had by this time disposed of the second and third divisions of the Italian iron-clads, steamed to their assistance, and the Kaiser was rescued from her numerous assailants and got safely into Lissa. All this time the group of wooden ships on the Italian side were looking on from a respectful distance; nor does the Affondatore appear to have taken any part in the action. After having lasted about four hours the battle gradually slackened; at two o'clock the firing was over; and Vacca, who supposed that the Admiral had gone down in the Re d'Italia, signalled to the remaining ironclads to assemble, and, forming column, to edge off to the westward. Persano, however, now came up in the Affondatore, and, assuming the command, placed himself at the head of the column, and led the fleet out of action. He returned to Ancona, where, soon after, the Affondatore sank at her anchors. On the 21st July, the Austrian Admiral returned, without having lost a single vessel, to the channel of Fasana. The consequences of

Admiral Tegethoff's Report.

A.D. 1866.]

this signal defeat by sea were very humiliating to the Italians. All hope of attacking Venice on the sea side must now be given up, and with it the ambitious dream of possessing Dalmatia and Illyria. A still louder outcry arose against Persano, through the length and breadth of the Peninsula, than had been directed against La Marmora. He was tried by the Italian Senate; his defence of his conduct was declared to be unsatisfactory, and he was deprived of all command in the Italian navy. Meantime the victorious career of Prussia was carrying her arms without a check to the banks of the Danube and under the walls of Vienna. Marshal Benedek, after having put the Elbe between the Prussians and his exhausted troops, had to decide instantly what was to be done. An armistice was thought of; and Von Gablenz was sent on a mission to the Prussian head-quarters to see if one could be obtained; but on this, and on a subsequent visit made with the same object, he failed. Benedek found that his army was so disorganised and disheartened by the great defeat of the 3rd, that it was idle to think of defending the line of the Elbe. He resolved, therefore, to retire within the lines of the fortress of Olmütz, and there re-form his broken and wasted ranks and recruit his dilapidated resources. The 10th Corps, upon which the heaviest loss had fallen in the battle, was sent by rail at once to Vienna. The rest of his army, on reaching the friendly shelter of the ramparts of Olmütz, was allowed a little respite. But the Marshal gave himself no rest, but laboured unceasingly to repair the effects of Königgrätz. Though past sixty years of age, he displayed a capacity for work, both in the saddle and at the desk, which would have put to shame many a younger man. He was sincerely respected by all his officers, and adored by his men; and in the camp no feelings were entertained towards him but those of compassion and sympathy. But the press and populace of Vienna clamoured vehemently for his dismissal from the post of Commander-in-Chief; and this was presently done, though not in such a manner as to disgrace him. The Archduke Albrecht, the victor of Custozza, was appointed to the command of the Austrian Army of the North, with General von John for his Chief of the Staff. Benedek was left in command at Olmütz, with orders to send all the corps lately under his command, as soon as they were ready for the field again, by rail to Vienna, there to be united under the Archduke for the defence of the capital.

The Prussians, after having seen the whole Austrian army retreating discomfited from the blood-stained hills along the Bistritz, bivouacked that night (July 3) on the field of battle. On the next day they marched no farther than to the bank of the Elbe, and on the 5th they crossed the river, the Crown Prince with the Second Army at Pardubitz, Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth at Przelautsch, thus preserving the relative positions in which the armies fought at Königgrätz-the Crown Prince holding the left wing, Prince Frederick Charles being in the centre, and Herwarth, with the Army of the Elbe, on the extreme right. The 6th July was a day of rest; next day the armies moved forward, Herwarth

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marching on Iglau, the First Army on Brünn, and the Crown Prince leading his army by roads midway between Brünn and Olmütz. Beyond a cavalry skirmish or two, no collision of any moment occurred till the First Army had reached and occupied Brünn, the capital of Moravia. This was on the 12th July. It was expected that the Austrians would make a stand here, but they did not do so. Meantime Prague, the ancient capital of Bohemia, which had stood many a siege in the olden time, and even in the last century, but the walls of which, in the absence of exterior forts, could make no resistance to rifled cannon, was occupied by a Prussian force on the 8th July. At Brünn the King of Prussia came to the front, and took up his quarters at the Rathhaus. On the 13th and 14th no forward movement was made, for M. Benedetti, the French Minister at Berlin, was at Brünn; and the presence of his unpretending black coat among the laced uniforms of the royal suite signified that France was using all her influence to bring about peace. Benedetti was closeted with Count Bismarck for some hours on the morning of the 14th July, in an upper room of the Rathhaus of Brünn; and it was generally supposed that they were discussing the conditions of an armistice. They did not at that time come to an agreement; Benedetti departed for Vienna, and the Prussians moved forward from Brünn on the 15th July. On the same day a part of the Crown Prince's army, under General Malotki, which had been sent to cut the railway from Olmütz to Vienna at Prerau, encountered an Austrian force, with a heavy artillery train accompanying it, on the road between Olmütz and Tobitsehau. After a desultory action, in the course of which the eighteen guns composing the Austrian artillery train, being left for a time without an escort, were captured by the Prussian cavalry, the Austrians retreated eastward, and Prerau was occupied by the Crown Prince. Benedek, however, altering his line of march slightly, succeeded in bringing the remainder of his columns over the Carpathians into Hungary, and uniting them to the main army under the Archduke Albrecht, by way of Presburg. He had before sent about 40,000 men by rail direct to Vienna, but the line was cut at Lundenburg by the cavalry advance of the First Army, on the 15th July, and after that he could only expedite them by road in the ordinary way. Gathering together all the troops that could be had, the Archduke posted them along a line of some thirty miles in length, from Krems to Presburg, with the Danube in his rear and his centre resting on the fortifications of Florisdorf, close to Vienna.

Another battle lost-and with inferior numbers, inferior arms, and inferior strategy, the Austrians could not reasonably count on victory-must have laid Austria utterly prostrate at the feet of Prussia, and would probably have resulted, considering the difficult and exasperating constitutional questions at that time still unsettled between the Emperor's government and the subject kingdoms, in her dismemberment and political degradation. From this fate Austria was saved, not by the moderation of Prussia, but by the firm and friendly mediation of France. The Prussians, both officers and soldiers, were eager, according to the testimony of Captain Hozier, to march on to the