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consistency of this conduct, the French minister, Talleyrand, had the insolence to demand from his Britannic majesty the ratification of the treaty between Mortier and the regency of Hanover... It is needless to add, that the application was rejected with contempt. In the course of the summer, a statement appeared under the signature of the French respecting an overture not less immodest, which was made in the month of February, by an agent of Bonaparte, to levis XVIII., at Warsaw, for the resignation of that monarch's right to the throne of France. The proposal was, that, for this resignation, the fallen monarch should receive indemnities from Bonaparte, and even a splendid establishment. The answer of the king was full of dignity and modcration. It was as follows: “I am far from being inclined to confound M. Bonaparte with those who have preceded him. I think highly of his valour, and of his military talents. Neither do I feel ungrateful for many acts of his administration; for whatever is done for the benefit of my people, shall always be dear to my heart. He is deceived, however, if he imagines that he can induce me to forego my claims; for otherwise he himself would confirm and establish them, could they be called in question, by the very step he has now taken. “I cannot pretend to know what may be the intentions of the Almighty respecting my race, and myself; but I am well-aware of the obligations imposed upon me by the rank to which he was pleased I should be born. As a Christian I shall continuc to fulfil these obligations to my last breath. As a descendant of St. Louis I shall

endeavour to imitate his example by respecting myself—even in captivity and chains. As successor of Francis I., I shall at least aspire to say with him—We have lost every thing but our honour.” On the 2d of March the king wrote to monsieur, acquainting him with what had passed, and instructed him to make known the same to the princes of the blood who were in Ergland, taking charge himself to inform such of them respecting it who do not re

side in that country. On the 22d

of April, monsieur called a meeting of the princes, who signed an adhesion to the answer of the king of the 28th of February. It afterwards appeared, that, on the 19th of March, the same envoy, pursuant to the orders which he had received, waited again upon the king: there was no longer any question about the substance of his majesty's answer, but some alterations were intimated respecting the terms in which the form of the answer should be couched : apprehensions seemed to be felt lest it should so far irritate the usurper as to prompt him to exert his influence in order to aggravate the misfortunes of the king. His majesty, however, observed, that “he should make no alteration in his answer, which was as moderate as could be expected, and that Bonaparte could not be justified in com

plaining of it, since if indeed it had

treated him as a rebel and an usurper, it would have told him no more than the truth.” Upon this, certain dangers were hinted to him—“What dangers ?” observed the king. “ Ill-minded persons may require that I withdraw from the asylum that is granted to me. I will pity the sovereign who may deem himself compelled

to

to take such a part; and I will withdraw.” No 1 that is not it ; but may it not be apprehended that M. Bonaparte will make it a point with certain powers to deprive the compte de Lille of the assistance they now afford him.— “I do not dread poverty. Were it necessary, I would eat black bread with my family and my faithful servants:—but do not be alarmed ; I shall never be reduced to that extremity. I have another resource to rely upon, which I do not think proper to resort to as long as I have powerful friends; and that is to make known my situation in France, and to stretch out my hand, not—no never to a overnment of usurpation, but to my faithful subjects; and, rely upon it, I shall soon be richer than I am now.” The emissary employed on this singular mission was said to be the commandant De Meyer, an officer in the Prussian service, and enaged in this service by the king of russia, at the instance of Bonaparte. The overture, however, left no doubt on the minds of persons of discernment that Bonaparte had a still further object in view; an object wholly unconnected with the peace or welfare of the French nation, or with any principle even remotely connected with republicanism. That object has since been manifested ; the tyrant has completely unmasked, and if any thing was yet wanting to undeceive the friends of liberty, they cannot now complain that they are left any longer in a state of uncertainty. From the nature of the contest, it was natural that the war at home should be for the present year a war of defence and of preparation. England, however, gain

ed something more than honour, while she kept her boastful enemy at bay; while she baffled his threats, and disconcerted his projects. Abroad as much was performed as could possibly be expected. z On the 22d of June the island of St. Lucia was taken by general Grinfield and commodore Hood. The French commander, general Nogues, refused to capitulate, and the expectation of approaching rains rendered it necessary to get possession of the Morme Fortunée with as little delay as possible. It was therefore determined to attack it by storm; the defence was gallant; yet, by the determined bravery of the British soldiers and seamen, the works were carried in about half an hour, not without some loss, chiefly among the officers. This conquest was of considerable importance, as a naval station. The island, as a colony, is valuable, but the climate is remarkably unhealthy. The British commanders lost no time in pursuing their victorious career, and on the 25th they sailed for Tobago, which they reached on the 30th. It was defended by general Berthier, an officer of note in the French service; but being apprised of the numbers of the British, and of the gallantry they had displayed at St. Lucia, he did not think it prudent to risk an engagement. A capitulation was agre d to on the same day upon the most liberal terms, the garrison marching out with the honours of war, and to be sent back to their native country. Under the same successful and meritorious commanders the Dutch colonies of Demarara and Essequibo were reduced on the 19th of September; and on the 24th the settlement settlement of Berbice followed their fate, and surrendered to his Britannic majesty's arms. The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon were taken on the 30th of June by captain Malbon, of his majesty's ship Aurora. The British, it appears, came upon the enemy by surprise, and did not allow the soldiers and inhabitants time to prepare for the defence of the islands. These losses were trifling to the French, compared with cala

mities which accumulated upon

the remnant of their forces in St. 1)omingo. The war with Great Britain had precluded the possibility of their receiving any fresh reinforcements. The spirit and courage of the blacks was therefore increased in proportion to the difficulties which the French had to encounter. Cape François was surrounded by a negro army on the land side, and strictly blockaded by a British naval force in the latter end of July and the beginning of August. The French general, Rochambeau, continued to maintain his station with an obstimacy worthy of a better cause and a better fate; the miseries undergone by the French are almost beyond belief; and it is a singular circumstance that they were actually obliged for weeks to subsist on the very blood-hounds which they had introduced for the purpose of hunting down the negroes. On the 25th of July two French line-of-battle ships, in attempting to escape, were attacked by the Vanguard and the Elephant, and the Duquesne, of 74 guns, the commodore's ship, struck to the Vanguard, and was carried into Port Royal, in Jamaica. Destitute of resources, and suffering

the sharpest miseries, the French troops and white inhabitants chose rather to throw themselves on the mercy of a generous enemy, than to incur a risk of falling into the hands of the justly-irritated, but cruel and implacable people, whom they had in vain endeavoured to extirpate. Negotiations were successively entered into with the British commanders for the surrender of the different posts still occupied by the whites. Fort Dauphin surrendered to the Thesetts, and St. Marie to the Vanguard, or, more properly speaking, the wretched garrisons and inhabitants of those places were humanely received on board the British ships, to be conveyed to a place of safety. The inflexibility of general Rochambeau himself was obliged at length, to give way, and he was compelled to surrender, with the whole army of the Cape, two frigates, and some other vessels which lay in the harbour. The prisoners of war amounted in number to about 8000. In the mean time a most desperate attempt on the island of Antigua, destined for the destruction of the port and dock-yard in the English harbour, was happily defeated. On the 5th of September the Emerald frigate fell in with 13 armed schooners fitted out by the governor of Guadaloupe for the above purpose; she captured three, and chaced the rest under the batteries of Guadaloupe. In Europe, for the reasons we have already stated, and because the experience of the precedin war had sufficiently shown the fu. tility of attacks on the enemy’s coast, fortified as it was, and protected by myriads of mercenary troops, but few offensive opera

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tions could be with prudence undertaken. On the 14th of September, however, the port and town of Granville were successfully attacked by sir James Saumarez. The pier was demolished, and many vessels intended for the invasion of England were destroyed. On the same day the town and fort of Dieppe were bombarded by captain Owen, in the Immortalité frigate, with the Theseus and Sulphur bombs under his command. The Dutch ports, from Zandvoort, in the vicinity of Haarlaem, to Scheveningen, were also severely bombarded on the 28th of September, and many vessels were destroyed. These attacks, though not productive of any serious consequence, were not improperly made at this period of the war. While England was threatened with invasion by a pigmy flotilla, it was politic to o up the dread which her navy ha inspired, and to show that we were active and vigilant at every point. Such is the detail of the few naval and military exploits which the nature of the war and the circumstances of Great Britain warranted her government, in undertaking. When we consider these circumstances, we shall be surprised that so much was effected, rather than that not more was attempted. When we consider that the enemy, with only a narrow channel between the two countries, was actually possessed of a military force of nearly half a million of men, chiefly veteran soldiers, and in the highest state of discipline, which he daily threatened to disembogue upon our shores; when we remember that he had all the small-craft cf France, Holland, and the Netherlands at his absolute disposal, in which he might have embarked

them; when we recollect that he had but this one object in view, and nothing to divert his attention from it, we confess we cannot but admire the wisdom and vigour of those counsels, by which his plans for our destruction were rendered abortive. The administration, which in the midst of these perils was still enabled to act even in the offensive in different quarters of the globe, was, by a most singular and audacious perversion of language, termed weak and inefficient: be it so.--To that weak and inefficient administration we are convinced we are indebted for our present security; and when the transactions of almost any year in the British annals come to be compared with those we have been narrating, we honestly believe, that, all circumstances candidly considered, the year 1803 will not sink in the comparison. We cannot close these remarks without a just compliment to the unparalleled cou. rage and perseverance of our blockading squadrons, and parti. cularly to that gallant veteran admiral Cornwallis, who, in the most tempestuous season in the memory of man, kept the sea in defiance of a more formidable enemy than the navies of France and Holland; and destroyed effectually the naval force of our enemies, by keeping them in a state of ruinous inaction, breaking their spirits, and defeating all their

hopes. The close of our annual narrative is generally followed by some remarks on the political state of Europe. A period more fertile in important speculation than the present could not have presented itself. It is not merely to France and Great Britain, or to their fugre destinies, that we have to extend onr views; it is to Europe, perhaps to the world. The mad career of the French revolution is finished; and the result must have disappointed every friend of freedom in every quarter of the globe. We saw many things to disgust us almost from the first in that calamitous transaction; but that it should terminate in a despotism more oppressive than even the darkest ages exhibit, we could not have supposed. He who has perused our volumes with even tolerable attention, will see that we have never been too deeply enamoured of republicanism. In the fairest and most promising periods of the French republic, we cautiously discouraged the comparison between our own state and that of France before the revolution*; and we lifted up our voice against those pernicious theories and opinions, which would have promoted a similar experiment in this country. Yet, while unstained by blood, undisgraced by the atrocious murders which afterwards succeeded, we confess we were not adverse to seeing the trial made in a country like France, where, public liberty seemed to have nothing to risk, and where the situation of the people we scarcely suspected could have been changed for the worse. We are not deterred by a false shame from confessing that we have been completely deceived and disappointed. The French character has appeared altogether inconsistent with the enjoyment of liberty ; and perhaps the situation of a people is only to be anciorated by slow and almost imperceptible grada*

*

tions; the step from entire subor. dination to the enjoyment of civil freedom in all its branches is perhaps too violent for the human intellect; and the effort to transform slaves into freemen is as arduous, as we trust the converse will always be found, to change freemen into slaves. The ardour for political innovation on a large scale, that which regards the form of government and of the civil constitutions of nations, will doubtless receive a check from the event of the French revolution; but it may be questioned whether the established governments of Europe will yet be rendered more secure. A successful usurpation is perhaps a more dangerous precedent than even a successful revolution. In the latter, the passions of the many must be interested and engaged; in the former, those only of a few. By the example of Bonaparte, every fortunate commander may hope to climb, by the aid of the military, to the summit of human autho

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* See the preface to our volume for 1791.

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