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contracting parties to the treaty ; as well as to the emperor of Germany, the emperor of Russia, and the king of Prussia, as guaranteeing powers. With regard to the evacuation of Holland, he repeated that the French troops should evacuate it at the instant the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens should be executed. . This answer being deemed wholly unsatisfactory, lord Whitworth renewed his demand of passports; but in the interim re. ceived a note, intimating that the French minister demanded a conference on the 4th, in order to enable him to communicate something of the greatest importance. The object of this communication was to propose that Malta should be placed in the hands of one of the guaranteeing powers, Austria, Russia, or Prussia, till France and England should come to an agreement respecting it. .. This proposition was deemed altogether inadmissible by the En

glish government, which again in

sisted on the possession of Malta for 10 years, but admitting, to save the honour of the French government, that this stipulation should be included in a secret article. .." - This proposal was reduced to the form of a project, and submited to the #: government by ord Whitworth on the 9th of May, in the following terms:–

ProJEcT.

1st. The French government shall engage to make no opposition to the cession of the island of Lampedosa to his majesty by the king of the Two Sicilies.

2d. In consequence of the present state of the island of Lam

pedosa, his majesty, shall remain in possession of Noi. until such arrangements shall be made by him as may enable his majesty to occupy Lampedosa as a naval station; after which period, the island of Malta shall be given up to the inhabitants, and acknowledged as an independent state. 3d. The territories of the Bata: vian republic shall be evacuated by the French forces within one month after the conclusion of a convention founded on the principles of this project. 4th. The king of Etruria, and the Italian and Ligurian republics shall be acknowledged by his majesty. 5th. Switzerland shall be evacuated by the French forces. 6th. A suitable territorial provision shall be assigned to the king of Sardinia in Italy.

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CHAP. XIII.

Reflexions on the Spirit of the Negotiation between Great Britain and France.—Heroism of the British Nation on the Threat of Invasion.— Proceedings of the Government.—Immense Exertions in assembling a Naval and Military Force.—Perfidious Conduct of the French Government in arresting English Travellers.-Violation of the Rights of the Germanic Body by the March of a French Army into Hanover.—Conduct of the Hanoverians.—Convention.—Fresh Violation of the Law of Nations in disarming the Hanorerian Soldiers—Their spirited Conduct.—New Convention.—Blockade of the Elbe and Weser, and of the French Poros.Insolent Demand of the French Government.—Singular Negotiation of Bonaparte with the French Princes.—The War.—Foreign Transactions, —St. Lucia taken by Storm.—Tobago taken.—Demarara and Essequibo surrendered to the English.-Reduction of Berbice—Of St. Pierre and Miquelon.—Horrible State of the French in St. Domingo—Blockaded by an English Squadron.—Surrender of several Ports—Final Surrender of General Rochambeau and his Army to the English.-Attempt of the French on Antigua defeated.—Bombardment of the French Ports—Of

the Dutch Coast.—Concluding Reflexions.

HE transactions which have

just been narrated will sufficiently explain the grounds and reasons of his Britannic majesty’s message to his parliament on the 8th .# March. It is evident that the suspicions of the English government had been excited by many little concurring causes, rather than roused by any great act of aggression. The mysterious conduct of France was not calculated to remove these suspicions: the eagerness of the first consul, cm the contrary, to wrest Malta, which could be of no possible use to France, nor of any annoyance to her possessions, from the hands of Great Britain, was certainly a further cause of jealousy and uneasiness. The unguarded conversation of Bonaparte with lord Whitworth, on the 20th of February, contributed greatly to unfold the ambitious designs of the usurper; but we have been assured, on most respectable authority, that, to

others more in his confidence, he
had expressed himself in still more
unequivocal terms of hostility to-
wards Great Britain, as the only
obstacle to his vast schemes of na-
tional aggrandisement, and of esta-
blishing a paramount authority in
Europe. Under these circum-
stances, a state of active warfare
was thought preferable to a hollow
and insidious truce, which was
liable to be interrupted, at any
time, at the caprice of a man on
whose faith no dependance was to

be placed.
It is probable then, that when
the negotiation was entered into,
neither party expected it to termi-
mate in a permanent peace. The
British ministry insisted on the pos.
session of Malta, as a pledge, or
perhaps as a means of temporary
security; Bonaparte, on the other
hand, did not even condescend to
ive an assurance of sincere or
asting amity, unless an intimation
which he dropped to lord Whit-
worth,

worth, on the 20th of February, is to be regarded as such, where, speaking of the naval power of England, and the military force of France, he says, that “two such countries, by a proper understanding, might govern the world;"—in plain terms, if England would submit to be the instrument of his ambitious views, she should, for at least a time, be a sharer in the spoils:–a most alarming sentiment, by the way, for the rest of Europe, if England should ever have a minister weak and wicked enough to enter into such an infamous combination. But though Bonaparte did not appear to be actuated by any friendly sentiments towards England, and probably was, at the moment, planning schemes for her destruction, we must confess, that he appears to have been taken unprepared, and seemed not desirous of immediate hostilities. Every effort was exerted on his part, and the part of his minister, to gain time, and protract the negotiation. Even the delay of a few months, or even weeks, seemed to be of importance; but, had even the ultimatum of the British ministry been complied with, the truce, %. such it can only be called, must have been of very short duration. The alleged motive of his majesty's message, the armaments in the ports of France and Holland, seems to have been the least urgent of the causes of war. We are disposed entirely to believe that their destination was really for the colonies; yet had these armaments been permitted to sail, who will answer for the consequences? The negro force in St. Domingo would have been infallibly subdued; reinforcements of fresh troops would have been poured into that

and the other islands: Bonaparte would have been glad to find employment for the negro soldiers, whom he could not trust, and whom he must wish to see cut off. Who then can say that the first effort of renewed hostility would not have been the destruc

tion of our most valuable West

India colonies 2 If, therefore, peace was not likely to be maintained with the ambitious government of France, we must believe that a more favourable time could not have been chosen for the renewal of the war. In England the vigour of the government was nobly seconded by the heroism of the people. From the 8th of March to the time of the declaration, a warm impress had been carried on ; and, at the commencement of hostilities, we had a

naval force nearly double in num

ber and in metal to what we had possessed at the commencement of any former war. The militia were next embodied ; and this was followed by the act for raising the army of reserve, which, in the course of a few months, added 30,000 men to the regular force of the country. The reader will also recollect, that an act also passed, enabling his majesty to call out the whole mass of the people fit to bear arms, in different classes, and to put a certain proportion of them into immediate training. The measure was, however, rendered unnecessary by the spontaneous zeal of the people. In some cases the inclination of government was anticipated, and volunteer associations were formed even before they

knew their services would be accept

ed. Loyal meetings were called in London, and all the great towns, which terminated not in mere verbal declarations, but in substantial aid

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to government. , Large subscriptions were raised to bear the expenses of the volunteer associations; and it was difficult to say whether the people were more liberal in offering their persons or their property in defence of a country and a constitution so dear to their affections. Thus, by the vigour and promptitude of the government and people, the daring project of invading and subjugating Britain, a project suited to that spirit of enterprise and ambition which characterised the martial leader of the French nation, was defeated at the only period when it was likely to be successful. Could Bonaparte have assembled, in the ports of France and Holland, a naval armament of any description, fit for the transport cf 100,000 men across the channel, before our flects were manned, before our militia had been called out, and the people arranged in military array, the mischief he might have ef. fected is incalculable; perhaps licrty would have received her death-blow in this quarter of the globe. He expected to have caught the lion sleeping in his den —he found him couched for battle, and ready to spring upon his prey. Unwilling, in this state, to try the issue of the contest, the enemy could only threaten. Immense preparations were, however, made on the opposte side of the channel, and particularly at Bologne, the harbour of which, and the coast for a considerable distance, was strongly fortified. An army of nearly 300,000 men was marched. to the coast, and vessels of a particular description, calculated to cross the channel and approach near to the shore, were constructed

not only in the ports, but in all the

navigable rivers of France and the Netherlands. Among the chief causes of our safety at this dangerous crisis, let us not omit that which by many will doubtless be accounted the most effectual, the unanimity and harmony which pervaded the nation; and to the conciliatory and constitutional conduct of the ministers, this happy effect is principally to be attributed. An act of perfidy and violence, scarcely to have been expected in the darkest ages of society, disgraced the French government at the commencement of hostilities. A number of English gentlemen and others had visited France from curiosity, and other motives. The defenceless travellers were inhospitably seized, and committed to custody as prisoners of war—such an actis, we believe, entirely without a precedent in the annals of civilised Europe; it was an act as impolitic as base, since the French government could derive from it no possible advantage; on the contrary, it displayed nothing but impotent resentment and treacherous malignity. This act was immediately followed by another equally disgraceful infraction of the laws of nations, a violation of the neutrality of the German empire. About the latter end of May, a division of the French army, under general Mortier, passed the Waal on their march towards Hanover; and, before the end of the month, reached the frontier of that country. A faint show of opposition was made by general Hammerstein, who commanded the electoral forces; but he was too weak to make an effectual stand, and retreated hastily on the approach of the French. After a few ineffectual skirmishes, a deputation, civil and military, - was was dispatched by the regency to the French general on the 3d of June; and a convention, or rather capitulation, was signed, the basis of which was, that Hanover, with its forts, should be occupied by a French army; the Hanoverian soldiers to be permitted to retire beyond the Elbe, under a parole, not to serve against France, or her allies, during the war, unless exchanged; the stores and the private property of his Britannic majesty to be given up to the French; the English soldiers and officers to be arrested, and sent into France; the French commander to be at liberty to make any change in the regency; the French cavalry to be remounted at the charge of the electorate, which was also to furnish the pay, clothing, and maintenance of the French army: the whole of the revenues of the electorate to be also at the disposal of the French government; and the French gene<neral to be at liberty to levy contributions at pleasure to supply the wants of the army. The French general proceeded, on the following day, to issue his commands to the city of Bremen, to seize all the British vessels in the port, and confiscate all British property for the use of the French republic. These demands were, however, refused. Degrading as were the terms imposed upon the unfortunate Hanoverians, they were not sufficient to satisfy that spirit of oppression, which was now become habitual to the French. Contrary to both the ietter and the spirit of the treaty, general Mortier proceeded, in the eginning of July, to disarm the Hanoverian soldiers, who were encamped on the other side of the Elbe, agreeably to the treaty. At

first it was proposed that they were to be sent as prisoners of war to France; but they were commanded by a spirited and experienced officer, Walmoden, and gallantly refused to subscribe to any degrading conditions. A new convention was signed on the 5th day, by general Walmoden and general Mortier, on board a small vessel on the Elbe. The only additional concession made to the enemy by this new treaty, was the delivery of their horses, artillery, and arms to the French. The men were disbanded, and permitted to return to their respective homes on their parole, as already stated. In the mean time a spirited measure was adopted by the British ministry for the blockade of the Elbe, as long as the banks of that river should remain in possession of the French. The notice to foreign ministers, to this effect, bears date the 28th of June. A similar measure was shortly after adopted with respect to the Weser; the ports of Genoa and Spezia were blockaded the 13th of August; and, in the month of September, Havre, and the ports of the Seine, were also declared in a state of blockade. o Nothing could be more inconsistent, not only with the law of nations and the rights of the German empire, but even with the former conduct of the French republic itself, than the invasion of Hanover. A very few years before, his majesty, as elector of Hanover, made a separate peace with the French republic, while, as king of Great Britain, he continued at war with that country: thus the two capacities were acknowledged as distinct by the republicans themselves. Netwithstanding the inconsistency

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