treatment of Switzerland was no cause of war.. He would therefore say, preserve peace, if possible: peace if possible, because the effects of war, always calamitous, might be calamitous indeed; buckling, as we should be forced to do, all our sinews and strength to that power, in a contest with her upon such grounds. He repeated therefore, peace if possible; but, he added, resistance,, prompt, resolute, determined resistance, to the first aggression, be the consequences what they may. Influenced by these sentiments, he should vote cordially and cheerfully for that large peace establishment; and it was because he should vote for it, that he thought himself bound to state his reasons.

thing to do with France; nothing but with her power-as if that were little. He asked, too, where was the great difference of France under the Bourbons, and under her present ruler? Why, an honourable general inferred, from the conduct of France, that with her growing power, she had a growing disposition to mischief. But was that power, demanded the honourable gentleman, greater now than it was last June? Perhaps it was not. But her mischievous disposition was greater; and if he were asked to bring a proof of the truth of his assertion, he must bring the case of Switzerland. If he saw a purposed contempt of the independence of a nation; if he saw a perfidious disregard of the faith of treaties; if he saw a power withdraw her assistance, only to return and entrap a country of freemen with greater certainty; why then, he said, there had been a change, and a great change too, and that such a power we had a right to watch. But, said the honourable gentleman, we have no right to make use of invectives against the first consul of France. He would abstain if he could; he said, if he could, because he felt that even a simple narrative might be construed into invective. With regard to the general question, of a disposition to peace or war, he, for one, declared that he was as strongly and as sincerely for the preservation of peace as any man, and that he did not consider war as any remedy for the evils complained of. If a war spirit were springing up in this country, if a chivalrous disposition were observable, if a sentiment of indignation were rising upon the subject of the treatment of Switzerland, he, for one, should contend that the

But,

Mr. Sheridan next proceeded to reply to some objections to the motion, made by the honourable gentleman who spoke second. This honourable gentleman complained that his majesty's ministers did not state our danger precisely. said Mr. Sheridan, does he pretend that he does not see and feel it? Can any one look at the map of Europe, and be blind to it? Can any one have a heart to resist apprehended injury, and say that we ought not to be prepared? The next excellent reasoning of the same honourable gentleman against the proposed vote was, that the first year of war, there would be an immense army drawn up on the opposite coast, and therefore now it was not necessary to be prepared. When the army was upon our shores, when the trumpet of the enemy sounded at our gates, then it was time to be prepared. The next argument of the honourable gentleman was, that it was unreasonable to think that the French

wished to meddle with us. Why, he (Mr. Sheridan) protested, he could not explain. If, as had been said, they had felt our arms, they, who had been every where else successful, could not but view the only power whose arms they had felt, with feelings of warm resentment, and with sentiments of mortified pride. But look at the map of Europe; there, where a great man (who, however, was always wrong on that subject) said, he looked for France, and found nothing but a chasm. Look at that map now, and see nothing but France. It was in our power to measure her territory, to reckon her population; but it was scarcely within the grasp of any man's mind, to measure the ambition of Bonaparte. If then it were true, as he had stated, that his ambition was of that immeasurable nature, there were abundant and obvious reasons why it must be progressive: -reasons much stronger than any that could have existed under the power of the Bourbons.

They were ambitious; but it was not so necessary for them to feed their sub jects with the spoils and plunder of war. They had the attachment of a long-established family applied to them; they had the effect and advantage of hereditary succession. But he saw in the very situation and composition of the power of Bonaparte, a physical necessity for him to go on in this barter with his subjects; and to promise to make them the masters of the world, if they would consent to be his slaves. If that were the case, must not his most anxious looks be directed to Great Britain? Every thing else was petty and contemptible, compared with it. Russia, if not in his power, was at least in his influence. Prussia was at his

beck-Italy was his vassal-Holland was in his grasp-Spain at his nod-Turkey in his toils-Portugal at his foot. When he saw this, could he hesitate in stating his feelings, still less could he hesitate in giving a vote that should put us upon our guard against the machinations and workings of such an ambition? But it had been said, that it was possible he might mean nothing more than rivalry of commerce. Happy should he be, if such an idea entered into his mind at all, much more if it formed part of his plans. But he confessed he could not see that it did. He marked him taking positions calculated to destroy our commerce, but he did not find him doing any thing for the mutual benefit of the trade of the two countries. He saw him anxious to take possession of Louisiana, and to use the ports of Saint Domingo to cut off our West-India and Jamaica trade. He could conceive a possible case, in which such positions might be taken as to force us to surrender our commerce without a stroke. An ignorant observer might see two armies, and say there was no war, because there was no battle; yet one of them might make such move ments as to compel the other to surrender, without striking a blow. Of the commercial talents of Bonaparte, he could be supposed to know but little; but bred in camps, it could not be imagined that his commercial knowledge could be very great; and indeed, if he was rightly informed, he was proceeding on the old plan of heavy duties and prohibitions. But he would go a shorter way to work with us. The old country Lad credit, and capital, and commercial enterprise and he might think, if he could subjugate us, that he could carry them

off to France, like so many busts and pictures. But he would find himself mistaken; that credit would wither under the gripe of power; that capital would sink into the earth, if trodden upon by the foot of a despot; that commercial enterprise would, he believed, lose all its vigour in the presence of an arbitrary government. No-instead of putting his nation apprentice to commerce, he had other ideas in his head. His (Mr. Sheridan's) humble apprehension was, that though in the tablet and volume of his mind there might be some marginal note about cashiering the king of Etruria, yet that the whole text was occupied with the destruction of this country. This was the first vision that broke upon him through the gleam of the morning; this was his last prayer at night, to whatever deity he addressed it, whether to Jupiter, or to Mahomet; to the god of battles, or to the goddess of reason. An important ·lesson was to be learnt from the arrogance of Buonaparte. He Buonaparte) said he was an instrument in the hands of providence an envoy of God: he said he was an instrument in the hands of providence, to restore Switzerland to happiness, and to elevate Italy to splendour and importance: and he (Mr. Sheridan) thought he was an instrument in the hands of providence, to make the English love their constitution the better; to cling to it with more fondness; to hang round it with truer tenderness. Every man felt, when he returned from France, that he was coming from a dungeon, to enjoy the light and life of British independence. Whatever abuses exist, we should still look with pride and pleasure upon the substantial blessings we still enjoy. He believed

1803.

too, that he (Buonaparte) was an instrument in the hands of provi dence, to make us more liberal in our political differences, and to render us determined, with one hand and heart, to oppose any aggres sions that might be made upon us. If that aggression were made, his honourable friend would, he was sure, agree with him, that we ought to meet it with a spirit worthy of these islands; that we ought to meet it with a conviction of the truth of this assertion, that the country which had achieved such greatness had no retreat in littleness; that if we could be content to abandon every thing, we should find no safety in poverty, no sectirity in abject submission. Finally, that we ought to meet it with a fixed determination to perish in the same grave with the honour and independence of the country.

Mr. Canning, in a speech of considerable length, indulged in a forcible philippic against ministers. He entered into a statement of particulars, in respect of which he pronounced them deserving of severe censure. In the conclusion of his speech, he repelled the insinuations, that his honourable friend (Mr. Pitt) prompted what he said, and that he (Mr. Pitt) guided, at a distance, in surety and irresponsibility, the measures of government.

He was followed by Mr. Fox, who remarked, relative to the establishment of the army-it might be considered, whether a small or a great army be best suited to the defence of the country. He found it said, that as formerly alliances superseded the necessity of large establishments, now, having no alliances, we should have a large army. Now, he believed the argument in former times to have been directly the reverse. It was

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on account of our continental alliances that a standing army was justified. But how did the argument apply? What were the most glorious wars in which this country had been engaged for the last century? They were those that are called the war of succession, and the seven years war. Now it was certain that, previous to these wars, our peace establishment was lower than the peace establishment previous to other wars in which we were less successful. But it might be said that the establishments of France were then proportionably low. If relative proportion were made the rule, it would not be easy to apply it satisfactorily. The truth was, that the power of France was different in its principle from the power of Great Britain; and hence arose a necessary variation in the principle of our offensive and defensive war. It was not a ratio of 30, 40, or 60,000 men, to any given number in France, that would enable us to judge when our establishment was adequate. He proceeded to mention the power of France. Upon this subject, he would maintain that the government of France was less in a situation, than formerly, to make any attempt upon this country. If it were by invasions that we were to be menaced; and if it were against invasion that high establishment was intended; if we considered the state of the French navy, compared with our own, we must see, that for this species of attack there could not, for several years at least, be any well-founded alarm. It was admitted too, that the case of Switzerland did not form an aggression against this country. Why then should it be an argument for adding 20 or 30,000 men to our establishment? Instead of augmenting

our army now, might not, upon the old foundation of our army, as many more troops be added in a short space, as any emergency might require? Was the danger of invasion to be feared? Our supe riority by sea was unquestionable, and must so continue for at least some time. The French then must evade our fleet. They might per haps succeed in landing an army, and the possession of Belgium cer. tainly gave new facilities. But then, if an army were landed, all succour would be cut off, and the whole must be either taken or de. stroyed. Did those who chose to exaggerate the courage, strength, force, genius, or desperation of the French really believe that there was any danger of seeing the tri, coloured flag flying on the tower of London? Was it possible that a people so numerous, however dastardly (and he thought the people of England as brave as any nation in the world), could be subdued by 40,000 men, the greatest number that could be conveyed over to this country in the relative state of the navies of France and England? But an invasion, though it would neither destroy our laws, our government, nor our constitu tion, might do serious mischief, he confessed. It would perhaps destroy or suspend that credit and that wealth, of which some gentlemen spoke so contemptuously in comparison of guns and bayonets. But if we were not vulnerable by invasion of the soil of Great Britain, there were vulnerable points in our situation.. Were we not vulnerable through our finances? Might not the French think that to harass this country by expensive establishments; to divert, in useless and cumbrous forces, the resources that might be employed in accele

rating the extinction of the national debt; was no very unsuccessful way of carrying on war with us? It was lately said, that the greatest part of the population of Ireland was disaffected; but without ascribing great effects to the union, nay, unless we supposed the government outrageously bad, the people of Ireland must, in a few years, be much less disaffected than they then were. Thus, a few years of peace and moderate establishment would enable us to throw off a considerable part of that debt, which in war was called the best ally of France; while peace would equally tend to fortify us in Ireland, a point where it was evident we now were vulnerable. He had already remarked, that the strength of France and England was different; their offensive and defensive systems were different; the credit of this country was a main spring of its greatness and of its wealth. In England, the destruction of credit, though it would not be attended with the loss of the independence of the country-for we might still possess men and armsyet would spread infinite misery over the land. Let us therefore ward off from our finances, and from our credit, every danger; because, though not fatal to our existence, their overthrow would be fatal to our well-being. High establishments would form no security against the danger which had been held out to us. Wise economy was the resource from which we should draw the means of defending ourselves against every danger. If we had 25,000 men less, we should in return, in a short time, have 25,000,000. more to apply to our defence, and to enable us to repel any aggression. Hitherto he had argued the question

upon the ground that war was an event which we might expect in no very distant period; but he did not think that we were to anticipate a speedy war. The question of the navy establishment had been mixed with the consideration of the army; and, he thought, strangely. It seemed to be taken as a matter of course, that you must have a large army because you have 50,000 seamen. Now, it appeared to him, that the conclusion should be directly the reverse. It operated two ways. You need employ fewer soldiers for your defence, said he, because you have augmented your navy; and the additional expense by sea, is an argument for additional economy in the establishment of land forces. He then alluded to the source of influence which the army afforded, for procuring a general support to the measures of administration. The naval es

tablishment was less liable to objection on this ground, while it afforded all the security we could have against danger. There was another view of the subject:-if we were to go to war in a month or two, it would be idle to reduce our establishment. He could judge of ministers only from their words and their actions. The chancellor of the exchequer, if he rightly understood him, said, a few nights ago, that he saw no danger to the peace of Europe at present; and the secretary at war, to-day, spoke out distinctly, candidly, and laudably. As to philippics, sure we must have philippics to keep up the national spirit. He was very willing that they should be taken into the account as provision for our security; but he hoped that 30,000 men would, in lieu of them, be deducted from our establish ments.