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but was determined to be prepared for what was worst. It would submit to no base dishonourable compromise of its rights and of its dignities; but would not be misled, by any exaggerated statements of danger, to overlock all considerations of prudence. In that house, and in the country, there would be no disposition to prostrate the homour of the nation; but he was aware that there was in some individuals a disposition,-originating, no doubt, in the most laudable feelings, a disposition to rouse the passions, to alarm the fears, to pique the p. of the country, in order to force us back into war, without any adequate motive. Nevertheless, he was convinced that the great body of reflecting men in the commons would give a zealous and steady support to mimisters, while they showed themselves determined to watch over the true honour and interests of the state; but, at the same time, not to be led away, by feelings which they felt it their duty not unfrequently to moderate, into a fruitless and premature contest. Not only from feelings which pronounce war to be the greatest of evils, but from the conviction of his cool judgement, he was desirous to avoid it: but dreadful as it was, it was not so dreadful as dishonour; and if ever the alternative were presented, he should not hesitate in the choice. After the eloquent speech of his noble friend, he should not enter into many of the topics on which he should otherwise have dwelt; but content himself with expressing his concurrence in the reasons he gave for the conduct of the ministers in toncluding peace, and their motives in employing

every effort to preserve it.

Mr. T. Grenville concurred in

the address, on the principles laid down by Mr. Windham. He rejoiced to hear that the revenue was in so flourishing a state; but to show that the revenue was flourishing was no answer to his right honourablefriend, who had shown that the whole state was exposed to such imminent danger. Mr. Grenville adverted to the address moved by lord Hawkesbury, on the definitive treaty last May; in which the house relied upon his majesty to prevent any encroachment on the sources of our wealth, greatness, and naval power. He asked how this had been followed up 2 Much stress, he observed, had been laid by the noble secretary of state, in defending the F. treaty, on the tone and temper in which it was concluded. It appeared, however, that the noble lord himself had bem to distrust the temper of rance; by recommending, by the address on the definitive treaty, an increased vigilance in regard to the measures of France. But had there been any vigilance or increased vigour in opposing encroachments 2 Those, then, who approved the treaty, relying upon the tone and temper in which it had been concluded—or on the increased vigilance to be exercised, to supply what was doubtful in the temper of Bonaparte—might, consistently, blame the conduct of mimisters, by whom they had been deceived. He proceeded to ask, if any attempts had been made to renew foreign alliances? the want of which was, as alleged, the cause why the war could not be carried on, or the aggrandisement of France on the continent be opposed with success. In the debates on the preliminaries and treaty, the noble secretary of state stated that all hope of foreign alliances was at an end. Was Was such a declaration an encouragrencht to foign princes to form alliances with us? Was our treatment of allies such as to induce them to make common cause with us? said that night, that we were to resist the unjust demands of any foreign power; but as that was confined to ourselves, and to our naval power, there was no reason to imagine that any encroachments of France on the continent would meet with any resistance. He concluded with repeating, that as the tone and temperof the peace had not corresponded with what had been held out by ministers, and as their promises of watching the farther encroachments of France had not been realised, they did not merit the confidence of those who approved the peace, far less of those who considered our present situation as dangerous. Lord Castlereagh repeated the reasons which had induced him to approve the peace. He contended, that Mr. Grenville had mistaken the passage of the address he had quoted, which referred to the sources of our naval greatness. If the relative situation of France were so materially changed as to affect these, it would be necessary to oppose her encroachments; but it did not follow that we were to resist every measure of France on the continent, when we had no direct interest and no co-operation of other powers. He contended that, even if it were necessary to go to war to resist any new encroachment, it would be of the utmost advantage to be able to carry the country along with it, by showing that it was a point of necessity, not of choice; whereas before the peace, it would have been impossible to make them co-operate with *

The noble secretary of state

spirit in supporting it. He observed, that the remarks of Mr. Grenville, on the words of lord IHawkesbury, that we should resist all unitist demands of a foreign power, related to those which af. fected us. As to what regarded the continent, it would not depend upon us so much as others more immediately interested, what opposition might, consistently with prudence, be given to the encroachments of France 2 Lord Hawkesbury explained. He said, that he had observed the house would be prepared to defend our honour and essential interests, if attacked ; but, as to interference with the continent, it must depend on the consideration of many circumstances, upon the support we should receive, and the chance of success. He observed, that he had not spoken of the temper of the treaty ; but of the tone, the time, and the terms. By the tone was meant the tone of equality which should prevail between independent states, and absence of revolting and degrading conditions, bei. the terms. Mr. Whitbread concurred in the address, with the explanations given by Mr. Fox. He lamented that ministers, particularly lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh, had rather imprudently, he thought, talked too much, as if there were doubts of the permanence of peace; by that means damping enterprise, and keeping the country in suspense: He approved of the peace, and trusted it would be lasting. He saw no new grounds of war. France was in real possession of Piedmont and Switzerland when the treaty was concluded. He admitted that Mr. Grenville, having opposed the peace, was consistent in wishing to renew the war, which was was clearly the object at which he and his friends pointed. He also noticed the inconsistency of Mr. Windham in continuing a member of a cabinet, which, in a preceding negotiation, had offered to give up all our foreign conquests, while he had protested against any of them being given up. He showed that France had not been aggrandised more by peace than war. He referred to former ...”. after which, and particularly after the refusal of Bonaparte's overtures, Erance was so rapidly aggrandised. For all this the late ministry were answerable. On the subject of the peace establishment, he said he saw no reason why it should be larger now than was intended when the treaty was concluded. . . . The chancellor of the exchequer said, that the honourable gentleman had totally misunderstood both him and his noble friends. General arguments had been stated, but nothing had been said which

indicated that ministers looked to

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assure the house that they were not lightly taken up; that they were the result of very serious and long investigation of the history and po- ' litics of this country. The language in which the address was couched, precisely suited his ideas; which were, that the government ought to look with a jealous eye to the state of affairs Ón the continent, and to lose no opportunity of taking such measures as the conduct of foreign powers might render necessary for our security. If there were anything in the address which was calculated in some measure to excite suspicion in his mind, it was

the expression by which the house

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the country had shown, at various periods, too great an eagerness to engage in continental contests. Our national blood and treasures had been too often wasted in the pursuit of objects but very remotely connected with our national interests; and public burdens had been accumulated only to afford facilities to continental ambition, or to hold

out temptations to continental ra

pacity. It had been asserted that he had contended, that at no time, and under no circumstances, was it expedient or politic in this country to interfere in continental affairs, or to connect itself with continental alliances. He begged leave unequivocally to disclaim this as a fair statement of his sentiments. Extended as the relations of this country were, any man who should lay down such a proposition would affirm what was monstrous and absurd. What he contended was, that in the present circumstances of

this country and of Europe, it was not politic to form such connexions without due deliberation. If this truth were not clearly admitted, the experience of the last ten years, which had been so dearly purchased, was sadly thrown away. It was true that France, our constant rival and frequent enemy, was so formidable, both by land and sea, that it was a matter of prudence and policy that, such continental connexioms should exist at the breaking out of the war, as might furnish employment for those troops which would otherwise be engaged in annoying us, either in our foreign possessions, or in attempts to effect an invasion on our native coasts. This, he said, was a principle of continental connexion which every sound principle authorised. But the doctrine was pushed to a much greater, and in his opinion a much more than justifiable length, by the supporters of the standing policy of England respecting foreign relations. A speech of a noble friend of his (lord Hawkesbury) had, at an early period of the last war, contained such an extensive definition of the right of interference in the affairs of other states, and the policy of augmenting our foreign alliances, that not a single state on the continent could have been in the slightest degree convulsed or distracted, without affording to this country the fair right of interfering in its internal arrangements. The impolicy of any system of external relations, founded on these principles, was abundantly proved by the history of all ages. An expression of his on a late occasion (his address to his constituents), that the people of this country were too honest to have any thing to do with the continent, had been thought by a right ho

nourable gentleman (Mr. Canning) to be a fair subject for pleasantry and ridicule. He did not now mean to make any apology for the expression. On the contrary, he was ready to re-affirm that the people of England were too honest for continental connexions. Was it not, he asked, notorious that in all the coalitions which had ever been formed by this country with continental powers, those powers had adhered homestly to their engagements only so long as a show of fidelity was advantageous?—Of this continental perfidy, Mr. Wilberforce adduced several strong and incontrovertible instances.—He proceeded. When all these things were duly considered, he trusted that the house would hear nothing more of renewing the war from a speculation of success; since such a step could not be called a speculation, but had been reduced to a fatal and destructive experience. There were a variety of other considerations which powerfully demonstrated the impolicy of extending our connexions on the continent under the present circumstances. We could not, he contended, expect to form any arrangements, for the rmanence of which we could ave the smallest security. France, in his opinion, possessed such means of influence over the leading powers of the continent, that she could, without difficulty, counteract any alliances which we might form, or at least might render $on of very trifling utility for any great national purpose. In illustration of this idea, the honourable member called the attention of the house to the present state of the relations between Turkey and France. It was obvious to the most careless observer, that that country was completely at the mercy of the French government. It was not difficult to understand what was meant by the boasted rantee of the integrity of the Turkish dominions. It was neither more nor less than that the French government should decide the fate of that empire, whenever such a measure should appear necessary for the furtherance of its views. With such influence, it did not require much penetration to foresee that France could, at all times, hold out to the cupidity of Russia or Austria a division of the Turkish empire; and it was not difficult to see that would at all times be employed as a powerful engine of alienating those powers from the interests of this country.

With regard to Russia, the argu

ment applied with peculiar force. It was well known that Russia had long entertained a desi Turkish empire. On these principles he must argue that to form continental connexions, under the present circumstances, or to enter into engagements for the stability of which we had no security on the part of foreign powers, was unwise, impolitic, and inexpedient. On these principles he was anxious that the attention of government should be principally directed to our internal situation, and the improvement of the resources which the country contained within its own bosom. They were to keep an eye on the continent, but they ought to turn their special regards to domestic affairs. He then proceeded, at some length, to dissuade from a war in strong and decisive terms. He also ridiculed the remarks of Mr. Canning, respecting the situation of the country at the time his majesty’s present ministers assumed the management of affairs; and complimented them highly on their talents, their rectitude of intention,

on the

their perfect disinterestedness, and their zeal for the public service. He concluded by expressing his confidence in their future exertions for the general interests of the emF. and conjured them, as they oved their country, as they valued the confidence of the house, as they respected the attachment of the people, to persevere, unmoved by the clamour of party, in their desire to preserve the blessings of


General Gascoigne did not op

pose the address. Mr. Elliot, who succeeded him, drew a most alarming picture of the situation of this country in respect to France. His arguments, however, for the most part, have been already detailed in other speeches. He quoted the follow; passage from the official journal of the French government:— “What is the interest of France It is to have none but good neighbours and sure friends. In the south, the king of Spain, the ally of France from inclination, as well as from interest; and the Italian and Ligo republic, which enter into er federative system. Switzerland, the duke of Bavaria, the ood prince of Baden, the king of russia, Holland, to the north and the east.” It then went on to state, “that this situation of France is the result of ten years of triumph, of hazards, and labours, and immense sacrifices. The peace of Luneville, the preliminaries of London, and the peace of Amiens, far from having changed it, have consolidated it !” On this passage Mr. Elliot remarked, without any other commenton this production,it might suffice to observe, that ministers, by signing the treaty of Amiens, had signed and sealed the consolidation of the French *:: o e

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