tions in Europe; namely, one month after the ratification of the definitive treaty; at which period, both Porto Ferrajo and Minorca were evacuated by his majesty's forces; whereas, the troops of his majesty were in no case bound to evacuate the island of Malta antecedent to the period of three months after the ratification of the definitive treaty and even in that event, that it was to be considered as depending upon the other parts of the arrangement being in a course of execution. With respect to the assertion of the French government, that the Neapolitan troops were to form the garrison of Malta until the period when the arrangements relative to the order could be carried into effect, it was observed, it would appear by a reference to the article, that, by the preliminary paragraph, the island was to be restored to the order, upon the condition of the succeed ing stipulations; and that it was only from the period when the restitution to the order had actually taken place, that by the 12th paragraph the Neapolitan troops were to form a part of the gar

rison.

The note of the French ambassador to which the preceding observations form a reply, was dated 10th of March, 1803. Two days prior to this, however, his majesty had sent the message to both houses of parliament relative to the proposed armament, which has been noticed in a preceding chapter. This measure was stated, in the message, to be merely precautionary, as founded on the armaments then carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, which, though expressly intended for colonial service, might, in the event of a rup

ture, be turned against some part of the British dominions.

This intelligence being conveyed to the French government, M. Talleyrand repeatedly assured the English ambassador, that there was no foundation whatever for the alarm which was felt by his majesty's ministers, that the first consul was pacific; that he had no thoughts whatever of attacking his majesty's dominions, unless forced to do so by a commencement of hostilities on our part; that he should always consider the refusal to evacuate Malta as such a commencement of hostilities; and that as we had hitherto hesitated to do so, he was justified in adopting the measures which might eventually be necessary. He disclaimed every idea of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch ports having any other destination than to the colo nies; and concluded that, for his part, he could not comprehend the motives which had necessitated a resort to such a measure on the part of the British government. After conferring with the first consul upon the subject, he added, that, if England wished to discuss fairly, he wished the same; that if England prepared for war, he would do the same; and if England should finally determine on hostilities, he trusted to the support of the French nation in the cause of honour and of justice. It was in vain, says lord Whitworth, that I repeated, that England did not wish for war; that peace was as necessary for us as it could be for France; that all we desired, and all we were contending for, was security; that every thing proved to us that security was threatened by the first consul's views on Egypt; and that consequently our

refusal

refusal to evacuate Malta, was become as much a necessary measure of precaution as the defence of any part of his majesty's dominions.

On this occasion M. Talleyrand communicated to lord Whitworth a paper which he, that morning, had drawn up with the first consul, and which contained the following articles: 1. If his Britannic majesty, in his message, meant to speak of the expedition from Helvoetsluys, all the world knew that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination; but in consequence of his majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea were about to be countermanded. 2. If the French government did not receive satisfactory explanation respecting the armaments in England, and if they actually took place, it was natural that the first consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland was mentioned in the message. 3. These troops being once in the country, it was natural that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position. 4. It was natural that the first consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coast. 5. It was likewise in the nature of things, that the first consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country. 6. It was also the natural consequence of all this, that the first consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the

position of Tarentum. 7. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, would compel France to put her armies on the war esta. blishment, a step so important as could not fail to agitate all Europe.

66 we

On the Sunday following this transaction, at the court which was held at the Tuilleries, the first consul accosted lord Whitworth evidently under considerable agitation. "And so," said he, "you are determined to go to war?" "No," his lordship replied: are too sensible of the advantages of peace." "Nous avons," said he, "déja fait la guerre pendant quinze ans. Lord Whitworth answered, "c'en est déja trop." "Mais,' rejoined the first consul, "vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forcez." His lordship said, that was very far from his majesty's intentions. The first consul then proceeded to count Markoff and the chevalier Azara, who were standing together at a little distance, and said to them"les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers à tirer l'épée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne respectent pas les traités. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de crêpe noir." In a few minutes he resumed the conversation with lord Whitworth. He began-" Pourquoi des armemens? Contre qui des mesures de précaution? Je n'ai pas un seul vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France. Mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi ; si vous voulez vous battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peutetre tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimider."-" On ne voudroit,” said lord Whitworth, " ni l'un ni l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle."—" Il faut donc respecter les traités," replied he: "malheur à ceux qui ne re

spectent

spectent pas les traités! ils en seront reponsable à toute l'Europe." The British ambassador, in his report of this singular conversation to his government, observes, that the first consul was too much agitated to make it advisable for him to prolong it; he therefore made no answer; and the first consul retired to his apartment, repeating the last phrase. All this, added lord Whitworth, passed loud enough to be overheard by two hundred people; and he was persuaded that there was not a single person who did not feel the extreme impropriety of the consul's conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occasion.

The French government, however, were not yet fully prepared for war, and were therefore not desirous of immediately proceeding to extremities. Accordingly, in an official note to the British government, they denied, in the most positive manner, the hostile intentions of France; and affirmed that, at the time of his majesty's message, there were but two frigates in the roads of Holland, and but three corvettes in the roads at Dunkirk. They complained of the violation of a usage practised among nations, which is, to demand explanations previous to an appeal to arms. As to the discussions mentioned in his majesty's message, and the success of which were stated to be doubtful, they asked, with an air of astonishment, what were these discussions? what official notes, what protocol proved the opening, the progress, the vicissitudes of a debate? Could a state of difficulties, which led to an alternative of peace or war, spring up unawares without commencement, without

progression, and lead without distinction to an appeal to arms before all the means of conciliation had been exhausted? They denied also that the power of France had increased since the peace; and added that if his Britannic majesty were determined to make war, he might allege all the pretexts he pleased. Whatever had been the clamour, the activity, the provocations of war, which had taken place in England, since the message, the first consul had given no orders, he had made no dispositions, no preparations. He placed his glory in an affair of this nature, wholly in being taken in an unprovided state! He would continue in this system of honest frankness, until his Britannic majesty had reflected fully on the part he proposed to take.

In regard to the report of colonel Sebastiani, an explanation was neither a long nor a difficult matter. A colonel in the English army had published a work in England, filled with the most atrocious and disgusting calumnies against the French army and its general. The lies it contained had been contradicted by the reception which colonel Sebastiani experienced. The publicity of its report was at once a regulation and a reparation which the French army had a right to expect. On his arrival in Egypt, this officer, to his great astonishment, found the English army there, although they should have evacuated it, and the Turks prodigiously alarmed at the continuance of the English army, and at its relations with the natives in rebellion and open revolt against the Sublime Porte. He must have conceived that the treaties which

connected the French government with the Porte, and by which the former had guaranteed to it the integrity of its possessions, compelled them to unite themselves with that power. It was natural to think that England meant to declare war from the instant she refused to execute the articles of the treaty. For, after all, France was not reduced to such a state of debasement as to suffer treaties made with her to be executed, or not, at pleasure. Hence the researches made by that officer as to the forces which were in Egypt, and to the position occupied by the English army. But Egypt had since been restored to the dominion of its lawful sovereign; and the idea of a rupture between the two nations, on account of the engagement contracted with the Porte, no longer existed. There remained, therefore, but one object worthy of fixing the attention of the two nations the execution of the treaty of Amiens as far as concerned Malta. As to this point, the first consul saw no subject for discussion, the treaty having provided for every thing, and settled every thing; and declared that he would not take up the defiance of war given by England to France.

To this declamatory and hypocritical note, the answer of the English government was in the most dignified terms; and was simply, that his majesty had perceived, with great regret, that the French government continued to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which he had complained; and, that at the time when they evaded all discussion on the subject of his representations, they persisted in their requisition, that the island of Malta should be forthwith evacu

ated by his forces. That his majesty could never so far forget what was due to himself and to his people, as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding; that he had therefore judged it expedient to give instructions to his ambassador at Paris to ascertain distinctly from the French government, whether they were determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which his majesty had complained; or, whether they were disposed, without delay, to give such satisfaction and explanations upon the present state of affairs, as should lead to an arrangement which might be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two governments.

In the instructions, to the above effect, transmitted to the British ambassador as Paris, was inclosed the project of an arrangement, to be concluded by treaty or convention, between his Britannic majesty and the French government. This project proposed, "that Malta should remain in perpetuity in. the possession of his majesty; the knights of the order of St. John to be indemnified by his majesty for any losses of property which they might sustain in consequence of such an arrangement; that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops; that the island of Elba should be confirmed by his majesty to France, and the king of Etruria acknowledged; that the Italian and Ligurian republics should be acknowledged by his majes ty, provided an arrangement were made in Italy for the king of Sardinia, which should be satisfactery to him.

The French minister, Talleyrand, after an interview with the