1

contended that peace in all its articles was practicable. The definitive treaty was now said to be an experiment; if so, it must mean an experiment leading to peace, and to ascertain whether the great sacrifices we then made were likely to produce the objects for which they were ostensibly made. As soon as peace, in so material an article as Malta, became impracticable, it was the duty of ministers to say so. When the house went up to his majesty with the address on the definitive treaty, ministers were in duty bound to disclose the impracticability of executing the treaty, arising from the known abolition of the Spanish priories at the instance of France. Not doing so, was putting a delusion on parlia ment, and suffering them to think and act on a supposition of facts

not true.

This happened the 14th and 15th of May. The session lasted six weeks after; yet no communication took place, and parliament were suffered to proceed in confidence in making reductions, and ministers themselves went on executing the treaties. The session ended on the 9th of June. In the speech made on that occasion by the speaker of the house of commons, it was obvious he had heard nothing of the impracticability of executing the treaty, as he spoke of peace, and thanked his majesty for giving the people repose and safety. His majesty's speech on the conclusion of the session had similar expressions. Who would think that, at that very moment, his majesty's ministers were in possession of facts that rendered peace impossible? One noble lord had said, that such

communication was unconstitu tional; whereas, his lordship maintained that it was a public principle, and that in no circumstances of the country, any way similar, had the fullest information been withheld. For the last 30 years, connexions with the continent had been more rare than formerly. He had always con demned this policy, though others might differ. But in this time, and during the reigns of George First and Second, communications from the king to parliament were matter of ordinary intercourse. In the reigns of William and Anne, still more so. The latter had sometimes asked the opinion of parliament as to pending treaties.

From these instances, his lordship said, that frequent and parti cular communications to parliament were sanctioned both by principle and practice. Now, so little had his majesty's present ministers treated parliament with that constitutional respect, that, so late as the opening of the present session, not one word was said that any thing had occurred, or existed, that threatened the breach of the treaty, though by the papers it was evident every point of dispute, except one, had then arisen.

As to the political relations of France, his lordship was at a loss to conceive what instances of great violence and aggression France could be guilty of to the powers of the continent, without affecting our domestic interests and security. The particulars of those aggressions were the isle of Elba, Parma, Placentia, Piedmont, Italy, Germany, Egypt, Malta, and Switzerland. He should not ask why France was suffered to annex Piedmont,

without

without any interference on the part of his majesty's ministers. He should say nothing of their conduct with respect to Italy and Germany, although he believed that there were many better opportunities for sounding the emperor of Germany and the other powers of Europe, than the af fairs of Switzerland afforded. As to the arrangements in Germany, he thought that, besides the disgrace which the country sustained, by suffering the German dominions of his majesty to be the object of violence and seizure, the arrangements were, in one respect, directly contrary to the treaty of Amiens, which stipulated a complete indemnity for the prince of Orange in Germany. The inadequate provision which was assigned him was a direct violation and breach of that treaty; and yet it did not appear that there was any interference with respect to this breach of the treaty. As to Switzerland, there was an interference; but what sort of interference was it? We sent our envoy to Vienna, to inquire whether the emperor could spare an army to march from Vienna to Switzerland, to protect that country from the French; but so it happened, that before our envoy got to Vienna the French were completely in possession of Switzerland. However right the interference of his majesty's ministers was in its principle, he could not discover much wisdom in it, when it was urged in a manner that it was almost impossible it could succeed. They had remonstrated with France, but in so mild a tone, that it rather appeared as if they were entreat. ing the compassion of the French for the poor innocent Swiss. He thought that perhaps Piedmont

would have been a subject of interference for which we should be more likely to obtain the co-operation of other powers. It was another consideration, whether it would not have been much better to have interfered in June than in October. In June, our sailors were not discharged, and we had 120,000 soldiers, which had since been disbanded. Perhaps this was the time we could have interfered with the best prospect of allies, and with a strong fleet and army of our own. But in the armament for Switzerland in October, his majesty's ministers, without any communication to parliament, put the country into a state of war. They sent out orders to retain the Cape, which, by treaty, was to have been ceded to the Dutch garrison, who were ready to take possession of it. In this instance, ministers ventured a direct violation of the treaty, without communicating this step to parliament; and afterwards counter-orders put the country again in a state of peace. As to the question of Malta, if the French official correspondence was to be believed, ministers had been guilty of a disingenuous suppression of a material note, which accompanied their projet. They knew, at the time they signed the treaty of Amiens, that Russia would not guarantee that article of the treaty, it being contrary to the wishes of Russia, and to a previous stipulation between England and Russia. Knowing then that Russia would not guarantee it, in the terms of the article, they affected to solicit the guarantee of Russia. He thought the charge of suppressing a material note to deceive parliament (although made by M. Talleyrand), was so serious as to

require

require from the noble secretary a specific answer. The designs of the French government upon Egypt were known long before Sebastiani's report; they were the common conversation of Paris long previous thereto. It might be proper for this country to interfere on the subject: it might be proper to arm; but ministers might have either negotiated or armed, without sending down to parliament that message which caused the ruin of so many private families. The object of the message was said to be, to call out the supplementary militia; but was there no way of arming but that? Might not the regiments of the line have been recruiting, and our naval strength considerably improved, without having recourse to a measure which appeared like a declaration of war in the first instance? He concluded by opposing the adjournment, and expressing a wish that the resolutions should meet that discussion which was due to their importance.

The lord chancellor opposed the adjournment in a very decided manner. His lordship replied to all the arguments urged by lord Grenville, on the events which had happened since the definitive treaty, and refuted the charge of ministers having been guilty of a breach of duty, in the particular instance of their long silence on the subject of the late discussions. He contended that they had followed the practice of former times, and mentioned the circumstances which preceded the commencement of the late war, the discussions relative to which had commenced in May, and there was no communication to parliament till November. In the affair of the Russian armament, the interval

was still longer. His majesty's ministers, conscious of having done the best they could for their coun try, had no apprehensions from appealing to its justice; and ab surd indeed would it be in them to consent to a motion of adjourn ment the present question, which would only serve to paralyse their exertions in the arduous cause to which they were then pledged, and thus furnish a new pretence for reviving, at the end of a month or six weeks, a motion for their censure and removal.

Many other noble lords spoke in the course of the debate against the motion.

On the question being called for, their lordships divided, when the numbers appeared

For the adjournment
Against it

Majority

18 106

· 88

The house again divided on the previous question, when the numbers were

For the previous question 96
Against it

Adjourned.

Majority

14

82

On the 6th of June, earl Fitzwilliam rose, according to the order of the day, to propose his additional resolutions relative to the conduct of ministers. He adverted to the arguments that had been used on the side of administration, on occasion of the former debate, and combated them. So far from giving satisfaction to his mind, they had only more firmly im pressed it with the conviction that the conduct of ministry had been such as justly merited the censure which it was the object of his resolutions

solutions to fix upon it. As his lordship traversed the same ground precisely which had been gone over before in the course of the former debate, it would be needless to give his sentiments in detail on the pre, sent occasion.

His lordship concluded his ob, servations on the question, and the arguments which had been adduced against his propositions, by declaring that the effect of the whole upon his mind had been such as induced him to persevere in his former intentions of submitting the additional resolutions to the consideration of the house. These resolutions were in substance as follow:

"That no firm and adequate representations had been made by his majesty's ministers relative to the system of aggression in which France had constantly persevered since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens. That his majesty's ministers had, by these means, neglected the opportunity of bringing France to such an explanation as would either have prevented the renewal of the war, or obliged her to disclose her real intentions, before the forces of this country had been, to any considerable degree, disbanded: and that their conduct had proved of the utmost injury and detriment to the nation.These were, that the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens was constructed in such a way as rendered it incapable of being executed. That, in these circumstances, ministers had neglected to enter, till too late, into a discussion with France, relative to the best mode of applying a remedy to this defect; and the consequence had been, that the question how it was to be adjusted had, by these

means, produced another rupture between the two countries."

Resolved, "That it was the duty of his majesty's ministers to have made early and spirited remonstrances against all those acts which constituted a series of aggressions, insults, &c. on the part of France, and by such representations to have endeavoured to ascertain whether their course and progress could have been arrested, without the necessity of recurring to force of arms. That before the determination of the French government was ascertained, they should not have proceeded to a reduction of our forces; and that the neglect of such duties on the part of his majesty's ministers was injurious to the public interests."

The duke of Clarence said, in whatever shape this motion had been introduced, he could not help considering it as a motion expressly made for the removal of his majesty's ministers. It was his opinion that ministers did rigght in making peace, notwithstanding their expectations had been frustrated. He must say, in justice to the ministers who concluded the treaty, that if in 1801 any one could have thought that there was any principle of honour or justice on the part of the government of France, the preliminaries were such as ought to have been entered into, considering the length of the war, and the severity of its pressure; and that ministers ought not to be censured for having agreed to the preliminaries. How far indeed they ought to have agreed to the definitive treaty was matter of serious consideration. That was a question that would involve the gross misconduct of the former administra

tion, which brought the country into the state that the present ministers found it. These ministers were accused for reducing our force. He did not admit that they did reduce it lower than was necessary for the safety and interest of the country. Supposing, however, the charge to be founded in fact, it showed that ministers were actuated by a pacific spirit, and repelled the charge that the enemy had brought against them, of wishing to renew the war. The army estimates, however, were voted to an amount that had been held sufficient for the establishment in any war in which the country had ever before been engaged. So far then for the charge of too great a reduction in the army. With regard to the navy, there was one circumstance, it would be observed, peculiar to our navy. We were a great commercial nation, and the manning of the navy must greatly interfere with our trade. A sailor's life was a profession, and therefore it was not so easy to procure sailors as marines and soldiers, who could learn their business in a short time. So early as the first week in August the marines were reduced; but still there was a large establishment of them. The army was also considerably reduced; yet still, on the 8th of March, it was in as good a state as in the time of any preceding war. Now let us see what was the conduct of ministers at this time. Upon the 17th of October they sent out orders to retain the Cape. This was done in consequence of the conduct of France towards Switzerland; and though he confessed in the November following another order was sent out for its evacua

tion, yet what did this conduct show? Was it not saying to France, we are not afraid of you? you must conduct yourselves as you ought, or dread our resistance. For, my lords, said he, we must despise the boast, that England, single-handed, is unable to contend with France. England, in fact, never beat France to so much advantage, as when she fought her single-handed. The man who said otherwise must know himself in his heart to be a liar, or he must be grossly deficient in historical informa tion. Now, coupling his majesty's speech with the date of the order, he thought it a fair policy to say to France, as they implied, we are ready to meet you; but, at the same time, you see in us our ardent and sincere disposition for peace. On these grounds, therefore, he did feel himself disposed to negative the proposition of the noble earl. He did not think that the present ministers, who came into power under such difficulties, deserved censure. As far as he had yet an opportunity of judging of their conduct, it had not deserved censure. He thought the noble earl was perfectly consistent in making the motion, but it had the objection of being very like the proposition which was made a few nights since, and was supported by those very men who brought us into our present situa tion by their gross and shameful misconduct. God forbid they should ever come again into his majesty's councils! Under these circumstances, he should wish to negative the motion of the noble earl.

Lord Minto began by declaring that he did not consider the

peace