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y discretion and prudence be not sacrificed to false glory. The duke of Norfolk trusted that the house would not think with a noble lord who had preceded him in the debate, that we should go to war for Malta, because it was for our interest to retain possession of that island. In his grace's opinion, if the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens could have been put under the guarantee of the powers mentioned in it, particularly Russia, we should have had as much security for the peace as the circumstances of Europe would permit. The address did not entirely meet his ideas. He wished that it should state, that the house would see with satisfaction his majesty avail himself of any opening, either by negotiation or mediation, calculated to avoid the necessity of War. Lord Melville said, in explanation, that the noble duke had not given a correct representation of one part of the short speech which he had had the honour to address to their lordships. He had not stated that this country was to go to war because it was our interest to keep Malta. His proposition was merely this—that the article of the treaty of Amiens relative to Malta being incapable of execution, although not from any fault of ours, but from the force of circumstances, it consequently led to an arrangement completely new. He desired not to have it sent out to the country, that he should wish to violate the treaty because it was for our interest to do so, but that the treaty, as far as it respected Malta, had been so materially altered as to render the execution of it impossible.

Lord King said a few words ; at the conclusion of which he proposed an amendment, the object of which was to leave out the greatest part of the address, and to substitute some new paragraphs, the purport of which was, that the house would see with satisfaction that his majesty would listen to any further offer of amicable settlement, consistent with the homour and interests of the country. Lord Ellenborough, in answer to the question where were the causes that justified our going to war, observed, it was not a war merely for Lampedosa, as a noble duke (Richmond) had said, though, as the noble duke might have looked to that object as a fruitful subject of future fortification, he ought not to have held it so despicable. It was necessary to consider whether the war was iust: for, unless that was sound, all the rest was hollow. But he contended that for Malta alone, independent of other circumstances, we had a just ground of war. The 10th article of the treaty could not be carried into execution. The order was degraded by the confiscation of their revenues; the guarantees were withheld, so that it could not beexecuted. By every principle,both of the law of nations and of common law, it was necessary to execute the contract as nearly as possible in the spirit and sense, if not in the form intended. But it was necessary too that time and conference should be employed to that end. Upon taking up the treaty on the ground of its being impracticable, France could not, with justice, demand the evacuation of Malta, since nothing had continued in the same state as when the former arrangement was concluded. But L 4 siuog since it had been shown that Malta was of the utmost importance to the preservation of the interests of this country, could it be expected that Malta should be given up after Sebastiani's report furnished us with such decisive information of the intentions of the first consul ? Besides, the aggrandisement of France since the peace entitled us to new securities and compensation. By the law of nature and nations, even an aggrandisement by succession or otherwise might have been ground for jealousy and suspicion: but when that aggrandisement had been j by viplence and injustice, it could no longer be doubted that we were entitled to make new demands. He denied that the proposal of accepting Lampedosa in sovereignty, and Malta for ten years, was one that was to be rated by the mere value of those objects. The object gained would have been security that the danger which the ambition of France threatened would be guarded against for ten years; that Europe would have obtained a breathing-time; that means might, in that period, have been devised for fresh securities. His lordship concluded by saying, to the energies of the people parliament he trusted would supply wisdom, counsel, and unanimous resclution to withstand

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lord, which he hoped would not be pressed, as it would violate that unanimity which was of the last consequence to the fate of the country, he adverted to the manner in which a noble and learned judge had treated the complaints of the French government, with respect to the publications in this country, many of which, he was ready to admit, were certainly of fensive. Among these, however, he did not mean to dwell so much upon the sentiments of the English newspapers, as upon those which

appeared in French newspapers

published in London, particularly the Courier de Londres, a paper understood to be, in a great degree, under the peculiar patronage of his majesty's ministers. If so, the French government had very just reason to complain. It was reviled in the grossest terms of abuse, in this publication; and why, he would ask, should a par o which could not be employed or any purpose of amusing or informing the people of this country, be suffered to pursue that system of conduct which must operate to disturb the amity subsisting between the two governments, more particularly when government had power, under the alien act, to send the editor out of the country, if it chose to discountenance such proceedings — Their declining to do so, was not less a justification of the remonstrances of the French government upon this subject, than a ground of suspicion to this country as to the disposition of his majesty’s ministers.

These observations he thought a sufficient reply to the arguments advanced by the learned judge on

the ministerial bench. IHis His lordship could not accede to the proposition of a noble viscount, that Malta alone would have been a rational ground of war. The objects for which we have to contend, were of a wider and more important nature. Our jealousy and alarm were excited by that incorrigible spirit of encroachment and ambition, which not only the first consul, but in fact all the persons connected with the government of France, had for some time manifested; and even if Malta were actually in our hands in perpetuity, we should not sit down contented until some further security should be obtained : of this the nation ought to be aware. The fact was, that, from the present state of this country, there was no option; either the attempt to reduce that power must be made, or the nation must fall down to the most abject and degrading submission. The main object of the war, if it be either popular or politic, must be to restrain the arrogance—to reduce the preponderance of the French government; and until that object be attained, the war should not be abandoned—until France should not be capable of endangering our existence, whatever might be the disposition of her government to injure us. The material point was to diminish the continental power of France, where, he contended, she was vulnerable: for, whatever noble lords might say of her extent, he would beg the house to consider the nature of the strange sombination of particles which formed that extent, and it would cease to be thoughtan object of such terrific magnitude. It was, in fact, quite competent to Great Britain, with the resources, population, and spirit she possessed, to bring this overgrown authority within rea wanting, to prove the determined and unremitting hostility of France to this country. The circumstance alluded to is the following:—Mr. Pitt observed, that the French government had made a formal proposition to send persons, in the capacity of commercial agents, who had never been found necessary, even when a commer

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sonable bounds; but it must be done by vigorous efforts—by a short and decisive war. His lordship repeatedly urged the necessity of endeavouring to render the war of short duration; and this was not possible, unless the minds and re. sources of the people were vigorously and judiciously exerted. He concluded by observing that, if the country were to be engaged in war, it ought to receive a confident assurance that it did not go into it merely for colonial purposes, for petty contests, but for great national interests. Such ought to be the general feeling; and the house should bear in mind this important fict—that, if the present war were misconducted, one consolation only would remain, that we should never have another war to con

duct. * Earl Spencer considered this country, as having not only a just but an indispensable cause of war against France; he should, therefore, give his most hearty support to the address, rather than to the amendment, which, by prolonging a temporising system, would lead to no possible advantage, but rather exhaust the means of our security, and allow the French government time to gain new advan

tages. * he earl of Rosslyn stated, that the French complaimed of a sublication called “ L'Ambigue,” of which there were but three numbers published. The first number had nothing offensive in it; the second, very little; the third they complained of-and the paper was noticed, and instantly stopped by legal prosecution. But France was dissatisfied with this legal course, and observed, that the author was subject to the alien law, and therefore they expected that he should be

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for the purpose of putting the law

in motion; and that, when a law was made for one purpose, it was never in England applied to another The remainder of the noble earl's speech was decidedly in favour of war. Lord Grenville, after descanting for some time on the justice and necessity of the war, proceeded to observe, that it was stated in his maesty's declaration, that the French government had actually proposed to other governments the partition of the Turkish territories, and her share would, no doubt, comprehend Egypt. Without taking Sebastiani's report at all into account, the circumstances alluded to in the

'declaration were quite sufficient to

warrant the inference, that the first consul meditated a breach of the treaty of Amiens. Under all those circumstances, he was perfectly convinced that peace or war was not a matter of choice; and he would suggest to the noble lord who proposed the amendment, that as temporising had already produced no other effect than to torture the ople of this country by suspense, and embolden the pretensions of the first consul, it would hardly be advisable to make any other experiments in that way. In pursuance of that system, his majesty's ministers had given up the Cape of Good Hope, and Martinique; and if still more were to be given up, the country would soon be con

vinced, notwithstanding, that pro

tection was not to be obtained by such means, against any project that France might have in contem. plation against our Indian empire, or elsewhere. Being convinced that war alone was the remedy left for the country, he would strongly exhort to every possible exertion. Lord Clifton (earl Darnley) remarked that lord Hawkesbury, in his last dispatch to lord Whitworth, complained that “ until the very moment when his excellency was cbout to leave Paris, the French government avoided making any distinct proposition for the settlement of the differences between the two countries,” &c., Could any thing prove more strongly, than this avowal of the secretary of state himself, that nothing had been fo by procrastination and deay? and that the French government never believed, till the last moment, that ours was really in earnest 2. He concluded by voting for the address. After lord Cwydir had spoken a few words recommendatory of unanimity, the question was put, and there appeared,

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cial treaty subsisted, at a time when

not only there was no such treaty, but when, as appeared from the papers on the table, the commer. cial intercourse of his majesty’s subjects with France was suffering every degree of violence and oppression. This proposition had naturally and wisely been refused. The French government then proceeded .#. to send these agents in the train of their ambassador; and, not content with this breach of the law of nations, they afterwards addressed to them instructions, under the official character in which they had received admittance: and the object of these instructions was, to direct them to take measures, in time of peace, for ascertaining the soundings of ports, and for obtaining military information of districts—acts for which they would have been hanged as spies in time of war. Under such circumstances, he could not but lament to find, that his majesty's ministers had contented

themselves with merely applying to the French government to with. draw those persons, and had not at once advised his majesty, by his own authority, to order them to depart the kingdom within twentyfour hours, reserving it to him. self afterwards to require from

France the reparation due for so

i. an insult. This pretension, he said, in respect of the commercial agents, manifested an avowed determination to introduce, in defiance of our formal refusal, authorised emissaries into our arsenals and ports, in order to preparé, in time of peace, the most effectual means for our annoyance and dev struction in time of war. This was nothing less than to insist on our surrendering before-hand the right and the means of national defence; and if the former claim (of restraint upon the ...! had struck at the liberty, this struck as directly at the actual safety of the country. It was time, he believed and hoped, that the commercial agents had at length been withdrawn, upon the representation of his majesty’s ministers, though it did not appear that any disavowal had been obtained of the principle on which they had been sent. On the question being called for, there apeared

For the address 398—Against it

67.

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Defence of the Kingdom.—Militia embodied.—Message from the King:Debate on the Message in the IIouse of Lords.-Army of Reserre-Bill

for additional Military Force.

HE first object with ministers, in the existing circumstances

of the nation, was to prepare for the defence of the country; and i: st

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