of the faith of treaties by him were to go unnoticed and unpunished, and that this country had no right to stop him in his career. Great Britain, in the mean time, -took the most effectual steps for carrying the treaty of Amiens into execution. But it might be urged that Great Britain had not evacuated Malta. Upon this subject his royal highness observed, that although by the treaty of Amiens it was stipulated that Malta should be evacuated by his majesty's forces, yet the terms and conditions upon which that evacuation was to take place were also distinctly stated in that treaty. These terms were not complied with. The other powers of Europe had not consented to undertake the guarantee of the independence of that island; and consequently Great Britain was guilty of no infraction of the treaty by not evacuating Malta: on the contrary, she was acting both according to its letter and spirit. As a still further proof of her good faith, she had repeatedly and earnestly required the guarantee of those powers, whose guarantee alone could have secured the independence of Malta. Upon the subject of Malta, in the negotiation, various propositions were made. some, that it should be retained in perpetuity, and some that it should be retained for a term of years: but what was the proposal of the government of France at last upon this point? Why, that we might retain Malta for a certain number of years, -provided the French were allowed to occupy Otranto and Tarentum, two important positions belonging to our ally the king of Naples. Whether this country could, consistently with its honour and good faith, have agreed to such a pro position, he would not insult their lordships with discussing. His royal highness then made a few general observations respecting the importance of Malta, which he considered in some degree as the salvation of Europe. He afterwards adverted to St. Domingo. A noble earl (Stanhope) had con tended that France was considerably weakened by the loss of that island. But it was to Great Britain alone that it was to be attri buted that France was prevented from having possession of St. Do mingo and Louisiana. It was his majesty's message to his parliament that prevented France from having Louisiana. It was Great Britain that said to France-"You shall not seize the colonies of Holland and Spain; you shall not. have their West-India islands; you shall have nothing but what Great Britain pleases in the east or in the west, unless you conduct yourself in a very different manner." It was, however, far from his wish, if it were in our power, that we should destroy France. He did not wish that this country, whatever her power or successes, should be insolent or oppressive; but he wished to show France that we could resist her aggressions, that we could chastise her insolence.He concluded by giving his assent to the motion. Lord Mulgrave followed.-The noble lord who had spoken last but one had delivered a speech which he should find the greatest difficulty in answering, because a greater display of French feeling and French partiality he never remembered to have heard. It was, with the most profound astonishment that he had heard the noble lord talk of giving up the islands of Jersey and Guernsey-those islands Islands which had been so long united to and were so sincerely at tached to Great Britain, the advantage of which we had so often experienced in war, the benefit of which we had so constantly experienced in time of peace: those islands which made a vigorous defence on former occasions against the common enemy, and whose exemplary rejection of every prin ciple of Jacobinism ought to endear them for ever to every Englishman. Having read the nego tiation with close attention, as he was sure each of them had, he would ask whether, the state of affairs, the circumstances, being maturely weighed, it ought not to be a matter of exultation that the treaty of Amiens no longer existed? He was one of those who had wished for peace, and deprecated war as the greatest of cala mities; but he had considered the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens as incapable of execution in its real sense and spirit; but as it had been signed, and as the honour of his majesty and the country was committed, it ought to be adhered to. Yes, my lords, said he, treaties should be sacred. But if one of the contracting parties departed from it, then the other was no longer bound. Now, how had the French government acted in conformity to the spirit and meaning of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens? Why, on the 11th of September, 1802, Piedmont was annexed to France. Was this a bagatelle ? Pied mont was a country of greater importance than was generally supposed. Its resources were great for its extent, and its productions abundant. We knew that its princes, supported by the ardour of the people, served as a coun terpoise against Austria in former wars; and should we admit as a mere bagatelle, that the resources of a country capable of being dangerous, in the hands of France against Germany, and consequently against Europe, at present should be so employed-should we consider this as a bagatelle?" Ces sont les bagatelles." Was not this a reason why this country should demand explanation, and additional security, in consequence of the an nexation of this valuable terri tory? The Helvetic republic was to have been independent; it was to have the power of legislating for itself: but see it reduced to the vassalage of France, trodden upon by her armies, and obliged to accept a constitution! What was the state of Holland? Com pelled to feed and pay the armies of its great ally and protector, it groaned under the weight of its slavery. What were we to understand by slavery? If a country could not act in conformity to its own wishes, if it could not legislate for itself, if it were obliged to give up, when called upon, every thing it possessed, under the pretence of friendship, to an ambitious and powerful neighbour what was this but slavery? And such was the condition of Holland, or, as it was nick-named, the Batavian republic. He did therefore call upon their lordships to say whether the aggregate at least of the ambitious and domineering acts of the French government, in Europe, and its views respecting Asia and India, should not be well weighed; and before he would commence on this occasion, he should weigh the conclusion very deliberately. But the conclusion was most clear and decisive; and his majesty's mini L 2 sters sters had declared that, notwithstanding the many incitements to irritation and hostility they had received, still they preferred the blessings of peace, consistently with the dignity of the crown, and the honour and welfare of the country, to every other consideration; and did ingenuously profess an intention to execute the treaty of Amiens. But in the purview of this treaty, the independence of Malta was to be guaranteed; a grand master was to be appointed-by whom? By the langues, and confirmed by the pope. View this subject in its proper point of view. The grand master was to be confirmed in his situation by the pope. The gua rantee of the pope, my lords, said he, in past ages, might have been sufficient security, when he could say to one power-You shall submit to my mandate, or I will excommunicate you, and absolve all your subjects from their allegiance but what was the power of the pope at present? Was he not the vassal of the French republic was he not the instrument of its ambition? was he not all things to all men when the consul commanded? But there was something extraordinary in the history of the langues of Malta. He should instance one, in order to show the insecurity of any treaty that might be subject to its ratification, as far as the articles respecting it may be extended. "A grand master had offended the fangues in consequence, as they thought they had a right to do, they suspended him. He appeal ed to the pope, who remonstrated, but in vain; the grand master appointed by the langues continued in his office until death." This was an historical and unequivocal proof of the hostilities of the knights of Malta. It was evident, under the circumstances of the present case, that the pope could not be a sufficient guarantee for the indepen dence of Malta. Without power, without territory, without even spiritual influence, what security could be afforded by him to the British empire? In regard to the report of colonel Sebastiani, his lordship remarked, conformably to the treaty of Amiens the independence of the Ionian islands was secured and the integrity of the Turkish empire confirmed. How did these things accord with the mission of Sebastiani? Under these circumstances, said he, allow me to ask, whether we are declaring war against France, or France against us? Were there not grounds at least of apprehension? And why should Great Britain for an instant hesitate to bring the point to an issue? But consider the subject a little further. In turning over the pages of the negotiation, he found a note from M. Ötto, requesting to send away from this country the princes, the bishops, and other emigrants, who had sacrificed their comforts, their property, their connexions, and, in fine, all that was dear to them, to their honour and principles. The government of this country was called upon to banish them, to reface them the rights of hospitality, and eject them from us as outcasts of society, doomed to encounter the horrors of degradation, poverty, and perhaps persecution. But, my lords, said he, what language is this? Was it not speaking to the government of this country as to the king of Naples? Was it not commanding us in a manner to succumb to the yoke, and bear the iron rod? Then we may expect to be under the pro-consulate of Arthur O'Connor," shorn, and to the quick" indeed. He concluded by saying, he hoped to be excused, on an occasion of this kind, for indulging a little in English feeling and English sentiments, arising from a wish to preserve our constitution, our liberty, and rights. Lord Melville wished it to be understood that he considered the retention of Malta for ever to be a most essential object, and one which, in the relative circumstances of France and this country, we were fully entitled to prosecute by war. In voting for the address, we therefore voted our concurrence in the war, of which that was the principal object. The attainment of it would be of the utmost benefit to all the states of the Levant; and under our protection alone, Malta could be rendered independent and happy. The duke of Richmond observed, with regard to the subject of peace or war, there could not be much difference of opinion; although it must be wished that the door of negotiation might be left open, and the dreadful evils of war averted, if possible. If Malta could have been obtained for us for a valuable consideration, he should have preferred that mode of securing it, far beyond a recur. rence to hostilities. When he referred to a valuable consideration, however, he begged to be understood as not willing to surrender what the noble earl (lord Stanhope) below him had proposed, the islands of Jersey and Guernsey in exchange for Malta. To deliver those islands into the hands of the French republic would be an act of the greatest ingratitude and injustice, as well as an act of the greatest impolicy. If he were to judge from the papers on the table, the duke said, he did not see that war was of necessity to be resorted to. Magnified as the va rious grievances stated in the king's declaration were, and seriously as they were insisted upon, they all vanished when the ultimatum of ministers was read. Not one of them was therein noticed; but the whole objects contended for in the negotiation were abandoned, and the controversy was brought to the single point, whether Great Britain should obtain the cession of the island of Lampedosa; an island he had never before heard of; nor did he at that moment know whether it was approximate to the coast of Spain, of Barbary, or of Egypt. Equally ignorant was he of what description the island was-whether a barren rock, or a fertile spot; whether it possessed rivers or springs, good naval or military psitions, or whether there was any ground fitted for fortifications. It really ap peared to him, from the papers, that the island of Lampedosa was the sole ground of the war; and surely it was too ridiculous an object for a grave and serious as sembly to act upon, when the consequent waste of blood and trea sure was taken into consideration. Notwithstanding the great importance attached to Malta, the king's servants had agreed to give it up, after a few years' possession, for the paltry island of Lampedosa. For his part, he did not think we ought to go to war on that account; and he could not but express a hope that some measures of arrangement would be taken with the government of France; L 3 although The marquis of Lansdown said, the different points in dispute required a most minute consideration, to enable the house to come to a final decision. He should not, for his part, take them upon rumour, but reason upon facts. All that had been said of Holland, of its distresses and suffer. ings, and of its intimate connexion with Great Britain, as to common interest, had been very much exaggerated and twisted, to serve particular ends, as the views of men and the state of public affairs varied. There was nothing, at all events, of such necessity as to press this country into hostilities on account of Holland. With respect to Switzerland, notwithstanding its boasted independence, it was undeniable that it belonged in fact to other powers, and not to us, to interfere for its deliverance. Au stria had clearly a more intimate connexion with Switzerland than we could possibly have, and a more powerful cause to interpose than we; yet she was deaf to those complaints in which also her own interests were allowed by every one to be most materially implicated. In addition to these subjects of complaint against France, it was stated, that she had acted in the most wanton and arbitrary manner with regard to the seizure of Parma and Placentia. He did not, he could not find an apology for an act so very tyrannical; but he would ask, was there no other power in terested in the repression of that despotism but Great Britain ? were we, upon all occasions, tà volunteer our resources and exertions, when those more immedi ately interested did not think proper to interfere? Why did not Russia think proper to interfere, who openly avowed the deep concern she felt in the preservation of these countries? His lordship did not think the mission of colonel Sebastiani could justify us in appealing to arms; since the governments of all countries, and particularly that of France, were in the habit of sending persons abroad in order to collect infor mation, sometimes of a commer cial and sometimes of a military nature; which information thus collected was carefully arranged and preserved. But it was maintained, as another cause of war, that the first consul had views upon Egypt. His lordship had no doubt that he had, and he be lieved any one in his situation would be actuated by just the same views. He was far from supporting the whole of that person's character. No honest man he believed could approve of his conduct: yet, it was not because the first consul had developed views of ambition, that we ought to conclude that he intended to go to war with us. After a few words concerning Malta, which he considered of less importance than had been at tributed to it, the noble marquis concluded by expressing his most fervent hopes that some means might be devised for keeping the door open to negotiation, and for avoiding the dangers and calami. ties of war. Let us profit, said he, by the example of the Ame rican war, and take care that our discretion |