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The contents of the duplicate mentioned extreme diffatisfaction at his having gone out

hit were these.

"Bartier, off Antigua, Aug. 4, 1781. "SIR,

"The command of his Majesty's fleet in "thete feas, having devolved upon me by "Admiral Sir George Rodney's departure for "England, with the King's leave, I have "the honour to acknowledge the letters, and "intelligence, you fent him on the 2d of "July by Lieutenant Delanoe, in the Ave brig, which joined me yefterday morning "off St. Chriftopher's: I immediately fent "her into Nevis Road, to complete her water "with all pollible difpatch, and then to join "me off St. John's Road, Antigua; where I "expect to pick up two thips of the line, "which I have ordered to meet me from St. "Lucia, for the purpose of going to America " with me, in order to counteract, in con"junction with the naval force under your "command, any defign of the Count de "Grafe; having two days ago received pietry authentic intelligence of the arrival "of a number of American pilots at the Cape, for the ufe of the French fquadron, which I thould have difpatched a veffel to have informed you of this day, and of my intentions of proceeding directly to America with ten fail of the line, had I not received your letters and intelligence by "Lieutenant Delanoe, who thall proceed on his return to you the moment he joins me, "and I expect to fee him every hour.

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"My intentions were to make the Capes of the Chesapeak, then thofe of the Dela"ware, and afterwards theer for New York, unless I fhould have received orders, and "intelligence, in confequence of Sir George Rodney's letter by the Swallow floop. I thall fill perfevere in that plan; therefore flatter myself you will detach frigates to "look out for me at the different Capes; and as Sir George Rodney was unable to leave "the fignals he appointed to be used for his Majesty's fhips of the two fquadrons knowing each other, through the negligence of his fecretary in not taking a copy of them, "or if he did, not knowing where to find "them, I herewith enclofe you the private "fignals he established, in cafe the Active hould get to New York before me. "I have the honour to br, Sir,

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Your moft obedient humble fervant, "SAM. HOOD. "Rear Admiral Graves, &c. &c."

The Active was taken upon her return and carried into Philadelphia, fo that the foregoing letter by Lieutenant Delanoe never reached the Admiral; and Captain Wells of the Swallow, the bearer of the duplicate, who had found means to make his way from Long and to New York (about the 18th of Augeft), did not come to Mr. Graves, owing (as the young gentleman fays) to ill health, until after the arrival of the Leeward Inland fquadron, when the Admiral expreffed to him

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of his way to chafe whiit carrying dispatches. But my realons for taking any notice of thete two letters are (in the firth place) the proof which they contain of S. George Rodney and Sir Samuel Hood having known fo little of the force and measures of the Count de Graffe, that they deemed the ten ships of the line then with Sir Samuel, and the two more which might join him from St. Lucia, quite futficient for the fervice of North America; and that the latter in particular judged in this maaner is ftill more manifeft from his letter of the fame day (the 25th of August) to the General, where, after mentioning (as he had done to the Admiral, his Commander in Chief)" the number and force of bis Majesty's "Squadron under his command," he very confidently adds and, I truf, you will think it "equal, fully to defeat any defigns of the enemy, "let De Graffe bring or fend what ships be may, in aid to those under De Barras*; both of these our naval Commanders in Weftern India holding an opinion exactly conformable to the intelligence of the Admiralty, enclofed in their dispatch of the 5th of April. beforementioned: although I cannot fuppofe (along with the fufpicious world) that this was owing to an implicit reliance upon that intelligence, without using the best means within their power for procuring better upon the fpot; or to any deficiency in their lookout, the capture and care of St. Euftatius, its plunder and pillage, having fo totally abforb. ed their minds as to leave no room for any other ideas, either of the public weal or aught elfe. In the next place, 1 infert these letters because they prove the arrival of Mr. Graves's advices by the Active long before our fleets departure from Antigua; and, laftly, because they alfo thew that Sir Samuel himfelf had doubted, fo early as the 4th of Auguft, whether the Attive, with his retorn to thofe advices, would get to New York before him.

No information or instructions from Eu¬ rope, concerning the French or the intentions of our own government, had come to the Rear Admiral. None of his cruizers, a!though many were out, had brought any in. telligence from the Capes of Virginia or the Chesapeak either of the enemy's, or of our fquadron, from the Leeward Ilands. It is indeed now known, that Sir Samuel arrived at Sandy Hook the fame day that Monfieur de Graffe got off Cape Henry. The former officer, with fourteen fail of the line, came under a fresh of wind, his frigates following, and was fo close upon the heels of his exprefs, that he repaired alfo to Denyzes, where in perfon he let the Admiral know that "br bad firft made the land fomewhere about the

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Hood's Pallage from IV. Indies to America E. of Denbigh refuted. 27%

« inlet of Currituck, from whence be bad writ"ben, but that afterwards be bad pushed on as s fast as he could, and had made no other "land until be jaw the Neverfunk, and that "be was come as joon as his letter, wherefore "it was of very little confequente what it con"tained." He said he did not believe the "French would come with more than four teen "fail of the line; it was políble bowever they "might bring eighteen, but he did not beteve "they would come with more than fourteen; "that he knew nothing of De Graffe with cer

* The letter tallies to precifely with the affertion of the Earl of Denbigh as to look like the foundation of it; and, if fo, must have been fhewn to bis lordship for the purpose, and probably by a perfon who knew that the naval Baronet had carried into execution none of the intentions which be bad so specifically bolden out bath to the Admiral and General. The noble Peer, however, without confidering that the actions of the leaf parading men feldom quite cone up to their words (and thofe of the magniloquent and vain-glo glorious never ventured upon fuch, or fill fighter, authority, publicly in Parliament to impute the greatest ofcitancy and neglect, at the most important period, to a military Commander abroad, who bad through the course of bis life been diflinguished by exemplary diligence, attention, and circumspection, and by doing this before a crowded audience upon a debate in the Houfe of Lords, in prefence of and uncontradicted by the Fift Lord of the idmiralty, his lordship gave rife to fuch calumny a- ainfi the Rear Ad

ial in every company, coffee-boufe, and newf paper, as to ublige me, reluctantly, under many dijadvantages and the most guarded filence of office, to collect all the circumftances within my knowledge which any way tended to wipe off fo foul an afperfion. At length I procured abfolute, proof of the falfity of every part of the allerton, by the following transcript from the log book of one of Sir Samuel's line of battle fhips.

"Saturday, 25th of August, 1781. Part of Carolina, diftant 4 Pragues.

"Sunday 261b. Bearings and diftances at "noon) Cape Henry S. W. W. 22 leagues."

(By which lall bearing it is plain they bad gone paft the Chesapeak to the N. E. of it, or towards New York, twenty-two leagues by noon.)

"Monday, 27th Auguft. Neverfunk N. 20 "leagues.

"Tuesday 28th. Diflant Sandy Hook W. N. W. 5 leagues."

Upon which day the whole fleet anchored off the bar there. The course between Cape Henry and the Never funk (which is a bigh land at the entrance of Hudson's river) is nearest S. W. and N. E.; and by the ship's reckoning at noon on the 26th of Auguft (Cape Henry S. W. 22 leagues) they were all that length beyond the paffage into the Chesapeak upon their way towards New York; and after that they far no land until they got fight of the Neverfunk.

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tainty fince be has pased down, as was be"lieved, to Cape Francois; and that he bimfelf had been feventeen days from Antigua, "having failed from St. John's road the 11th "of Auguft early in the morning." This account, fuch as it was, thus brought by Captain Ford, and Sir Samuel Hood, was the first which the Admiral had of the French Wett Indian fleet being tailed for and probably gotten to fome part of the coalt of North America. He directly afked Sir Samuel the condition of his thips, who anfwered" they had a months good jervice," and " repeated it; but made no regular report, nor delivered or tent any weekly account of the fate of each, until the Adminal was over the bar: and, at their first meeting, these two flag officers remained together but forne few hours to confult with the general, who did not think it neceffary to embarque any troops,' provifions, or ammonition for the relief of Lord Cornwallis.

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The following day (the 29th) a letter from Commodore Affleck came to Mr. Graves from New York, running thos. "Sir S. Hood " and I have expected you impatiently this "morning; as that cannot be, I must acquaint you that we have intelligence to be relied on from Philadelphia that ten fail of the line French were feen ten days ago off the Capes of "Virginia, and that they parted company with "the rest of the Heet from Cape Francois, who "were gone on for Europe, about ten days bẹ"fore they made this coal."

The Admiral, concluding that a fortnight must bring matters to a decifion, was determined to feek the enemy, and to fail with the first wind for the chance of falling in with one of their fquadrons before joined by the other. Five of his own thips of the line and one of fifty guns were (as i before obferved) quite ready; and there were but two fhips of two decks befides at New York, the Prader and Robuse, the former of which was partly difmantled, and off the careening place, and the latter had no mals; and neither could be equipped within ten days. It would have been a great fatisfaction to him to have been" able to take thefe men of war, not only for their rate, but because they were commanded by the Captains Burnett and Cotby, who had fo recently diffinguished their valour, under Mr. Arbuthnot, in the very fame feas. But not a moment was to be loft; the fate of America might depend upon a ftroke being Atruck in time. A line of battle was therefore delivered on the 30th, and the wind ferving the next day the Admiral proceeded over the bar with his five fhips of the line and a fifty, and without anchoring pufhed with the united fleet directly for the Chesapeak.

On the morning of the 5th of September, between nine and ten o'clock, as the mouth of the bay began to open, the frigate a head defcried the enemy within it at anchor. They were feen from our large thips between ten and eleven within Cape Henry in Lynnhaver. D 2

Bay

Bay, and were gueffed to amount unto fifteen fail of the line or thereabout. At noon, whilst we were running in, they were dicerned to be getting on their way.

About a quarter after one o'clock the fignal was made for our leading fhip (which was of Sir Samuel Hood's divifion) to lead more towards them, and our fleet continued to advance as fast as poffible in a line a head, until the thoal of the Middle Ground made it necessary to alter that course. The wind was upon the tarboard quarter; and the fleet was now formed into an east and weft line, and in that manner continued to prefs forward until our van was advanced beyond that of the French, who were at this time standing out of the bay, forming their line of battle upon the larboard tack. This manœuvre confined our ships to the fteering upon a courfe the clofeft that was practicable to the shoal of the Middle Ground, and confequently made it ap. proach the enemy in the most direct manner poffible, at the fame time that it fecured the weather-gage, and was likewife the propereft line for battle when the fleet thould approach near enough to be formed upon the fame tack with the enemy and enter into action with them; for, the wind being at N. N. E. it gave an eaft, or E. B. S. courfe for forming the line of battle when upon the fame tack with the enemy. The French vanguard, as they came without the shoal of the Middle Ground, hauled up eat, or E. B. S., which was the course that brought their van close up. to ours, and fo near as to pafs within point blank of our centre. About two o'clock their Aeet difclofed itfelf fully to our view, and thewed twenty-four heavy fhips of the line, which made it be believed univerfally that De Graffe had been joined by De Barras. About a quarter after two our fleet was wore, the pilots judging our van guard to be in very Thoal water, and (as I have fince been well affured) the Alfred (our leading ship) was actually in no more than four fathoms. By wearing, the vanguard fell to Rear Admiral Drake, and the Rear to Sir Samuel Hood, the divifion of which latter was at this moment full two miles nearer than the centre divifion to the enemy, who were to leeward, as the hoal was clofe to windward of us. The Admiral continued to prefs his hips as much as he could down towards the enemy, by frequent repetitions of the fignal for the van to lead more towards them. About three quarters after three o'clock he flung out the fignal for forming at a cable's length, one thip from the other, in order to compact his fleet. Soon after, the van of our line appearing to be well formed, and many of their rear clofe in with Cape Henry, fo that we could act against their vanguard with an advantage of three to two, it seemed to be the favourable moment for attack, and the fignal was accordingly made for each fhip to bear down and engage her opponent clofe; the Admiral indeed bore away more himself, for he had never

kept his hip higher to the wind than fo as to bring it upon the beam: which will account for our van and centre getting down and engaging extremely near, whilft the rear, by keeping their wind, kept out of gunshot, although their relative pofition to the enemy about an hour before (when the Admiral wore his fleet) was fo much the reverse. Some few minutes after this, the fignal for clofing with the French was repeated; and at eleven minutes after four the Admiral, whofe conftant attention was to preffing the enemy hard, hauled down the fignal for the line ahead that nothing might interfere with and prevent obedience to the fignal for clofe action, which had been flying for fome time; and about a quarter after four the van and centre entered into action. The thips however of the van appearing not to keep themfelves futficiently extended, the Admiral at twenty-two minutes past four hoisted anew the fignal for the line a-head in order to push forward the hips a-head of him, fome of them being upon the off beam, but within five minutes he took it in, and never made it again during the battle. The figual too for clofe action was immediately repeated, the Admiral faying to his fignal officer (Captain Morrice,) who had frequently drawn his attention to the rear, 66 if this will not induce "them to go into action, now that the fignal for "the line of battle is taken doron, I know not "what will, and I should be forry to fend a

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frigate to an officer who knows his duty fa """well." About a quarter after five the fignal for close action was again repeated*. Nevertheless,

* To prevent any misrepresentation of mine, through want of feamanship, I shall bere give a tranfcript of the proceedings aboard the London, as minuted down at the time by the Admiral's Secretary, who sent me a copy; although it will be intelligible, I am afraid, to none but failors.

"An account of the proceedings of the fleet, under the command of Rear Admiral Graves, in an action with the French fleet off Cape Henry, on the 5th of September, 1781.

"Half paft 9, A. M. the wind at N. N. E. the Solebay made the fignal for a fleet in S. W. At 10 Cape Henry bore W. fix leagues. Half past to made the fignal to prepare for action. Signal to call in all cruizers. At 11 difcocovered a fleet at anchor near Cape Henry, fuppofed to be the enemy. Made the fignal for a line of battle a-bead at two cables length. At noon the King's fhips getting into their fiations. Cape Henry W. § S. four or five leagues. Moderate and fair weather. Half past 12 difcovered the enemy's fhips getting under fail. Three quarters pat 12 made the fignal for the line a-head a cable's length. At t hauled down the fignal for the line a-head,

and

Account of the Action, as taken down by the Admiral's Secretary. 29

vertheless, the feven rear or fiernmost of our fhips, from fome caufe of which I am ignorant, did not come at all into the engagement; and by the return they appear to have had no meu killed or wounded, nor to have received any the leaf damage: the centre and rear of the enemy were therefore able to advance in fupport of their beaten van which had twice borne away: indeed both the van and centre of the French had contionally edged away from us whenever we could come fairly to engage and renew our fire, for they would not foffer us to remain any time clofed with them; and the Ville de Paris in particu. lar avoided as much as poffible the clofing with the London, and bore away twice for the purpose, which muft unquestionably have beco done by De Grafle to protract the time and

and made the fignal to form an E. and W. fine at a cable's leath. At 8 minutes paft made the fignal for the rear divifion (Admiral Drake) to make more fail The weather inclinable to be fqually, took a reef in the topfails. At 20 minutes past 1 made the fignal for the leading fhip to lead more to ftarboard. 25 minutes past I repeated the fignal for the rear of the fleet to make more fail. Half paft I the Centaur's fignal to keep her station. 35 minutes past I the fignal for the leading thip to lead more large or towards the enemy. 39 minutes past I made the Refolution, America, and Bedford's fignals to get into their flations. At 2 found the enemy's fleet to confift of 24 thips of the line and two frigates, their van bearing S. three miles, ftanding to the eastward, with their larboard tacks on board, in a line ahead. 4 minutes paft 2, finding our van approaching too near a thoal (called the Middle Ground) made the preparative fignal to

veer.

It minutes afterwards made the fignal and wore together; brought to in order to let the center of the enemy's thips come abreast of us. 21 minutes patt 2 made the Bedford's fignal to get into her ftation. Half past 2 made the fignal for the leading fhip to lead more to ftarboard (in order to approach the enemy). 40 minutes past 2 made the Salamander's fignal to prime. 52 minutes past 2 made the Royal Oak's fignal to keep the line. 55 minutes past 2 made the Terrible's signal to get into her ftation. 56 minutes part 2 made the Princefa's signal alfo, and at 3 the Aleide's fignal likewite. At 16 minutes patt 3 repeated the fignal for the van thips to keep more to ftarboard (or towards the enemy.) At 27 minates paft 3 made the fignal for the rear of the fleet to fill. Half paft 3 made the figual for the thips aftern to make more fail 34 minutes past 3 made the fignal for the thips in the van to keep more to ftarboard (or towards the enemy). 46 minutes past 3 made the fignal for a line ahead at a cable's length. The enemy's fhips advancing very flow, and evening approaching, the Admiral, judging

bring up his whole-fleet, for the wind did not fhift materially during the fight. The firing ceafed with the day.

Had our whole line (which is by the enemy allowed to have been a fine one and well formed) pushed into battle at once, according to the Admiral's intentions and the best adapt ed fignals, clearly and diftinctly made, for the purpose; and had each thip clofely engaged her opponent, fomething decifive must have happened; and, as the French van was broken, it must have been cut off, probably taken; and their other thips prevented from coming up to its affiftance, and many of them perhaps forced athore: so that their fleet (prodigiously fuperior as it was) might upon the whole have been fo far defeated, as to have been obliged at last to fly that coaft, and must

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this to be the moment of attack, made the fignal for the fhips to bear down and engage their opponents; filled the main topfail, and bore down to the enemy. 3 minutes afterwords repeated it. At 11 minutes paft 4 hauled down the fignal for the line a-head, that it might not interfere with the fignal to engage clofe. At a quatter paft 4 the van and center of our fleet commenced the action. 22 minutes past four hoisted the fignal again for the line ahead, the fhips not being uticiently extended. 27 minutes part 4 hauled down the fignal for the line ahead, and made the fignal for clofe action, 40 minutes past 4 the Royal Oak's fignal to keep her fa

tion.

11 minutes past 5 the Montagu's fignal to get into her fation. 20 minutes past 5 repeated the fignal for clofe action. Half paft 5 the rear divifion bore down (Sir Samuel Hood). 35 minutes pait 5 made the Solebay and Fortunet's fignals to come within bail. 15 minutes pat 6 the Admiral fent the Solebay to the ships in the rear, and the Fortunée to thofe in the van, with orders for the thips to keep in a parallel line with the enemy, and well abreast of them, during the night. 23 minutes pati 6 the fignal for the line a-head at a cable's length, and hauled down the fig nal for clofe action, Half patt 6 the fire ceafed on both sides. A quarter past 7 made the night figna! for a line a-head at two cables length afunder. At 9 the Montagu hailed, and said she could not keep the line, being fo much damaged. At 10 the Fortunée informed the Admiral that the Shrewsbury had the Captain and many men wounded, and first lieutenant killed, both her topfail yards fhot away, and was then employed in getting one up. The Intrepid was much difabled in every refpect. The Princesla's main topmait was fo much wounded as to expect it every moment to fall. At 7 Cape Henry N. W. 3 leagues.

"Found our main and foremast dangerouf, ly wounded, tanding and running rigging much cut, inner gammoning of the bowfprit flot through, fails much damaged, three guns

dismounted,

for certain have been difabled from ever regaining or entering the Chesapeak. Indeed unless one of thefe two events could have been compaffed, nothing could be effected of any utility; for, had our fleet engaged that of the French on different tacks, and endeavoured to pass them and get up the bay, no good purpofe could have been anfwered by it. Our nineteen thips of the line would not have been fufficient to block up the rivers James and York, lying fome leagues afunder, against 29 fail of fuperior force, which too by the arri val of the fquadron from Rhode Island would foon have been augmented to thirty-fix, whilst on the contrary, fo numerous au enemy might eafily and effectually have blocked up our fhips in either river, whence nothing but a hard N. W. wind could have brought away

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or extricated any of us; and then we must

have cut our cables, left our anchors, and fud.enly and ditgracefully fied amain. Our fleet had neither troops nor army fupplies of any kind on board; and that part of it which had come from the Weft Indies was already very thort of provifions of both kinds: thus conditioned we could fornith nothing to Lord Cornwallis, and fhould have added fo many more mouths to be fed from the fame flender ftock: the two fervices could only have mutually increased and become witneffes of each other's diftreffes. Therefore every thought or attempt of pushing paft the enemy and taking their anchoring ground, or of anchoring within them, would in fuch circumstances have been worle than trifling or rath, for it would have been

I have likewife feen the journals of two of the officers of the London, fent to the Admiralty, which confirm the truth of this minute.

BATTLE.

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The fignal was in truth made for the two frigates, for the purpose of fending orders to the rear to push into action, and for the van to continue to prefs the enemy bard: but this cannot be done on the fea with the promptitude that an aid de camp by land gallops from one part of the line of an army to another; and it was three quarters of an hour before the frigates came up to the London, about junfet, and too late to at nempt any thing new. And at this time the ma

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ritime fervice had no eftablished fignals for going into action but thofe that were general, that is, one for the whole fleet to engage, and another for it to engage clofe; there being none for directing a particular divifion to bear down and attack. However, the Admiral afterwards formed a special fignal for this purpose and delivered it out in orders, in addition to the flanding code of Fgnals.

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Fran. S. Drake, Tho. Graves, Efq;

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Rear Admiral of the Red, Commander in Chief.

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Bart. Rear Admi

ral of the Blue. Sir Samuel Hood,

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