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come. As with Austria, so with Prussia and Denmark, experience shows the proper course to be one of straightforward indifference. They will take their respective parts on either side as circumstances may determine, and not until neutrality shall cease to be profitable or possible. The adhesion of Sweden to the alliance, and the change in the character of the war that would effect, would, in all likelihood, soon bring about a condition of affairs which would render it easy to deal with the Prussian and the Dane. Until then they may be safely left to the perplexing operation of their own reflections upon the dangers of indecision, which would probably be sped, to their own and to the public advantage, by a practical hint now and then that a profession of neutrality confers no privilege of aiding or injuring belligerents.

We must now extend our vision across the Atlantic to examine for a moment that cloud in the West, which has recently risen into view. Brother Jonathan is not satisfied, it would seem, with the brisk trade he has driven, in munitions of war, with all the belligerents, under cover of the doctrine of "free ships, free goods;" but he must also aspire to the character of a mediator, and qualify for that office by assuming an air of swaggering, fussy importance. This aspiration has been quickened by the approach of the presidential election, which seems to require for its proper conduct a grand melodramatic spectacle of a terrific combat, in which the stars and stripes shall be waved triumphantly over some real or imaginary foe. An opportunity, too, has been unfortunately given for parading the union-jack on the boards, by the blunder of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and the unwarrantable proceedings taken under its provisions. A mighty noise has, therefore, been made, and too much notice has probably been taken of it by the prominent organs of British opinion. Mr. Caleb Cushing, the Attorney-General of the United States, has penned a vast amount of vulgar fustian, which has been answered, also in the Cambyses' vein, by the Times, in apparent forgetfulness of the fact, that Mr. Cushing fills no international political position, and that his raving no more expounds the views of the Government

and people of the United States, tham does that of Mr. Cobden or Mr. Duty set forth the opinions of the British people. We were wrong in the affair of the foreign enlistments, and having confessed to the fact, by the word of our foreign minister, there is an end of it. But late arrivals from America bring statements that "it is a fixed fact that a new ambassador is to be sent by Russia to Washington, and that be will bring, besides his regular credentials, a confidential communication from the Czar, of the most important character, relative to the terms on which alone Russia will consent to a peace. Russia mediated between Great Britain and the United States, and now the United States may mediate between Russia and the Allies. She does not ask American mediation, but she will accept it, and will at once indicate her terms, which, as I [s Washington correspondent of the New York Herald] stated in a former communication, will embrace such vast commercial advantages for all the world, that the industrial classes of France and England will clamour for their acceptance as soon as they are generally understood." We also hear of great doings, in the way of byeplay, between the Russian and American ministers, at the respectable court of Athens, and of a negociation that is on foot for the cession of the volcanic island of Milo to the United States. It is not impossible that the Americans may so far disregard the precepts of Washington, as to covet the possession of this standing-room for intermeddling in the broils of the old world. But as the island, although only thirteen miles long, possesses an excellent bay, and contains large supplies of iron, alum, sulphur, and salt, it is not likely that the Western Powers, who are now the acting trustees of the kingdom of Greece, will permit its alienation. It is too distant and in too dangerous a neighbourhood to suit the filibusters, and we must be permitted to doubt that the President and Congress have so far lost their senses as to make such an object an excuse for national war. Of the proposed Russian embassy and its objects it is unnecessary to speak, until we shall be further informed respecting them; but as braggart words may occasionally lead to blows, contrary to

the intent of those who use them, it may not be amiss to state how the case really stands as to a war between Great Britain and America. The idea is ab

horrent to every feeling of the British heart; and so united in this sentiment are all classes of the British people, that we verily believe nothing short of actual violation of our flag would force us to engage in the unnatural conflict. It is the heart, nevertheless, that is our main counsellor in this matter, and it is possible for the head to advise very differently. It is, in our opinion, scarcely doubtful that the one-sided neutrality of the United States is productive of more injury to the Allies than could attend their open hostility. A single sentence, in which The New York Journal of Commerce explains the demand for saltpetre that has recently sprung up in America, will show how the neutrality system now works. "The invoices," says the journalist, "of this contraband article now on the way from England to Boston, as already stated, have been shipped under bonds not to be reshipped to Europe; but they will supply the place of direct invoices originally destined for consumption here, and the latter will be sent to Germany for Russian use.' Were the Allies at war with America, and linked in an offensive and defensive alliance with Sweden, the Baltic might be hermetically closed. We should have no more Samuel H. Appletons slipping into Riga with a cargo of revolvers and other Yankee warnotions, in the early spring, before British caution would try the ice with our screw steamers; not a pound of any article contraband of war need be suffered to pass to the enemy's frontier from the seaboard. It is consideration for (if they like it better, fear of) the United States, and not any delicacy towards Prussia, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, or the other European maritime states, that has influenced the great powers to forbear so long from stopping the supplies of Russia, or to continue so patiently fighting with their own hands bound. On the other side, in the present relative position of the naval power of the world-the fleet of Russia being at the bottom of the harbour of Sebastopol, or cooped up

within the fortified ports of the Baltic, that of America existing chiefly in her forests the enormous commercial marine of the United States would fall an easy prey to the allied squadrons. The days of Paul Jones, or even of the frigates of the last war, have gone by; those of countless merchantmen, bearing the wealth of American citi zens, safely in peace, helplessly in war, over every sea, have come in their stead. These are simple, intelligible facts. We state them in no desire to cause irritation. Our words breathe no threatenings. We are convinced that no respectable American-we may even say no American in a prominent public position-contemplates war with France and England; but they may not know the whole truth as to British feelings and views, and a knowledge of it may suggest to them the reasoning suitable for them to use with desperadoes of the stamp of Mr. Caleb Cushing.

And while we are looking out be yond the Atlantic, we must not fail to turn a passing glance upon Canada. A few months since we called attention to the remarkable material progress of that colony, and to its cordial relations with home. We have heard since of the truly loyal spirit in which they hailed the great achievement of the war. If, then, it be true, as has been alleged, that the Canadians of fered their services, in complete colonial regiments, at the seat of war, may we not ask why was the offer disregarded? May we not hope that the failure of the stupid experiment of foreign enlistment will teach the Government to repair, as far as possible, the double error they committed in insult ing British citizens, by declining to receive them into the ranks of the army, and in drawing on quarrels with other states, by an unsuccessful endeavour to recruit their ranks with vagrant foreigners, who even in the class of officers find their place, as deserters and robbers, in the police-courts of London ?*

But it is time that we should turn our eyes homeward, and review the circumstances of the central position from which we have been examining this extended field of political action. And here, again, although we may

* See proceedings at Thames Police Court, in Dublin Evening Mail, Nov. 7, 1855.

have occasion to point out defects and laches, it is now our good fortune to see matters in a somewhat brighter light than has usually shone upon them of late. The nation remains unchanged in opinion in regard to the great question of the day. The popular instinct still perceives that the way to peace is to be found in a vigorous and effectual prosecution of the war. Among the people, notwithstanding the grievous burdens under which they labour, there is no change; but the Government no longer sets itself before the world as the unwilling agent of the popular will. It is said, and there is some reason to fear too truly, that neither Court nor Cabinet is yet altogether free from the leaven of German, if not of Russian, leanings; but there is homage to public opinion in the significant facts, that the statesman who, but a few years ago, was dismissed from the Queen's service for the crime of having rendered himself distasteful to foreign despots, is now at the head of the ministry; and that the minister who, on that occasion, became the ready agent in his colleagues' degradation from office, has been removed from public life. That Lord Palmerston is sincere in his declared intention, to go heartily and fully with the nation in its determination not to sheathe the sword until a safe, honourable, and lasting peace shall be insured, we can see no reason to doubt. But even should any mental reservation have lurked beneath the words in which he made that declaration before the assembled citizens of London, the cheers that then encouraged him, and still more plainly the hisses that saluted Lord John Russell, must have told him the time for hesitating and faltering was past. Onward he must go, boldly, or fall ignominiously from what he himself describes as one of the noblest positions to which a high-minded man can aspire. It is the duty of every honest citizen to support Lord Palmerston in making good the pledges he gave at Guildhall; and supported he assuredly will be if he prove true to himself. Having thus frankly stated our general view with respect to the minister, it will, we trust, be unnecessary to clear ourselves from any

suspicion of being influenced by hos tility to his Government, in the few comments we propose to make upon its proceedings in the way less of criticism than of friendly suggestion.

It is a prevalent, but we believe very ill-founded notion, that Englishmen of the high official class have the means of acquiring, and do actually possess, the fullest information attainable in relation to their proper business of Government, and as to the popular estimate entertained of themselves and their policy, which is the basis of their public position. Credit for such valuable knowledge is sometimes power. Thus, when an obvious blot in a minister's game is hit when it is seen by every one that he had no plan or a bad one, and that his action was feeble or too late-he is yet able to hold his ground under the shelter of the general belief, that he must have had a design hid under his apparent imbecility, only it was too deep to be understood by the uninitiated. "Be sure he is not the fool you take him for," is the common formula in which a minister is accorded another trial. Thus Lord Aberdeen was encouraged in a course which every man in the country saw, and, in common conversation, most men said, was leading inevitably to war, and yet, no doubt, he was in complete ignorance of the public judgment upon his policy, and very probably does not yet know it. In all likelihood he still imagines, with Mr. Gladstone,* that the nation was madly desirous of war, and that he only endeavoured to restrain a paroxym of rage, the very violence of which ensured its speedy subsidence. The simple truth is that the people were, to a man, sincerely anxious for peace; but seeing farther and clearer than the ministers, they perceived that it could not be obtained by humbly suing for it. Events have shown that the people were right, and that Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Gladstone, and their peace-at-any-price colleagues, were wrong; but the indulgence of trial after trial failed to bring those gentlemen to an acquaintance with the real sentiments of the nation, until the basis of public opinion, upon which alone a ministry can long stand, crumbled from under their feet. Has Lord Palmer

* See Mr. Gladstone's Lecture at Chester, in Spectator for Nov. 17, 1855.

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ston profited by this example? If he has, he will know, and he will show that he knows, that to secure his position he needs but to prove his fidelity to the national idea, that peace must be conquered by a repression of Russia within safe boundaries, and to throw himself in full confidence upon the sense of the country. He may thus attain to security from intrigues in the Court, divisions in the Cabinet, and factious coalitions in Parliament; and such is the common opinion of all observant men. But having already premised that we see no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Premier's confession of faith at Guildhall, we may be asked what further proofs can be required? Those whose sight and hearing are not dulled by the smoke and noise of London will be at no loss to recognise, in the answer to the question, the all but unanimous opinion of the public upon the principles that should at this crisis direct a British Government and their judgment upon the practices of the present administration."

At the very root of the matter lies the subject of public expenditure; and the cheerfulness with which the people have submitted to the heavy pressure of the last two years, while it entitles them to be respectfully listened to, ought not to be misunderstood. It is the will of the nation that the war should not be pinched; but while they set no bounds to useful outlay, they expect a war minister to waste not, while he wants not. The main object in the popular mind is the war; but the people do not accept the war as an excuse for recklessness and lavish profusion in the civil departments of the State. Wise men see, in the necessities and pressure of war, the soundest and most practical reasons for undertaking internal reforms, and the urgency of the tax-gatherer now popularises such wisdom. Retrenchments, that in the abundance of peace were languidly asked for, perhaps opposed on grounds of tenderness for vested interests, or a generous distaste for cheese-paring, are now thought of as though their sum would fit out a floating battery, or set another squadron in the field. Jobs, that a little while ago were but the subject of a passing sneer or jest, are now pointed to with bitterness as a wasting of the bread of the poor. We have no time now to write a re

port on Administrative Reform; but we will mention an instance or two in point, not of gigantic malversations, but of such blots as are continually hit in the daily converse of the people. Thus we have heard a number of intelligent men, casually assembled together, pro nounce a unanimous verdict of "guilty of intent to render war impossible," against the minister, upon evidence which satisfied them that a case occur red in which military stores were carried by waggon from the Tower to Euston-square, thence by railway to Liverpool, from Liverpool to Dublin by steamer, and then by railway, waggon, and boat to Cork, Queenstown, and so on board a store-ship. The statement is, we have reason to believe, perfectly correct, and it involves the charge of a public outlay of about £8 10s. per ton, for a transit which could have been effected by a steamer that plies regularly from the Tower wharf to Queenstown, at a cost of thirty shil lings. In larger and more numerous circles more generally known facts are cited in support of a similar conclusion. Men find, for example, seven commissioners on the Board of Inland Revenue, which has been repeatedly acknowledged to be over-manned, and they see a vacancy in it filled up at this time of public distress, and by an individual whose appointment cannot be considered in any other light than as a gross job. Only last month, a barrister was provided for by making him one of seven magistrates who are charged with police duties in Dublin; while in Liverpool, we believe, at least as much magisterial work is performed by a single stipendiary. As to the jobs of retirement and pensioning accomplished in the Irish Post-office, Poor Law and Board of Works Departments within the last year, they are known to every one, and their name is legion. A minister, bold enough to throw himself upon the people, would find in most of these cases-and in hundreds of others-the surest means of proving the sincerity of his own policy. If it was seen that he was disposed to husband the public resources, he need feel no fear of opposition to his war estimates. Viewed by this light, a season of war is of all others the most proper for civil retrenchments and reforms: it enables the minister to do, with the aid of the people, what in

peace he could not perform by reason of the cupidity of partisans.

But the nation also looks for guarantees for the honest and vigorous prosecution of the war in the military administration itself; and here again there is much to try their faith. We do not propose to advert to many points on which the public opinion has been very freely expressed, as, for example, the organisation of the several war departments, promotion, or the strategic conduct of the war, but shall content ourselves with mentioning one or two untoward arrangements which show so remarkable an ignorance of the public feeling as to look very like an intentional disregard of it. Even with the command of money, war cannot be carried on without men; and next to financial arrangements, a sound recruiting system is the main requirement. But this latter has no solid basis, except in the military spirit of the country, and to curb and stifle this seems almost to have been the object of some measures of the Govern, ment. Thus the recent regulation, by which militia officers are subjected to dismissal, as a penalty for encouraging their men to volunteer into the army, is, no doubt, a mere blunder, but why has it not been repealed? Lord Palmerston may possibly be ignorant that it has been committed, or he may not know that the reduction of officers in a ratio with the diminution of the strength of their corps must have the effect we have stated. Nevertheless, we have heard the circumstance adduced in proof of his philo-Russianism. To our mind, however, he seems chargeable with a still graver error of omission, in so far as he may have shared in the refusal of the Aberdeen ministry to respond to the general offer of the country to form volunteer corps, and we own we cannot comprehend why that error is persisted in. Such organisations would be much cheaper recruiting agencies than militia regiments, and they would be, at least, as efficient. A militia raised by voluntary enlistment, in fact scarcely differs from a regular army. The regiments become influenced by an esprit de corps that indisposes the men to exchange from them; the connexion between them and their counties is but slight, and the interest of the higher officers is, at all times, adverse to the volunteering of their

trained soldiers into the line. On the other hand, the mere authorisation of volunteer corps has always been, in these kingdoms, a sort of levee en masse, from which, in addition to some social benefits that we think we could show naturally attend such organisations, a large per centage of the best recruits might be expected to be continuously supplied. In a word, we can conceive no measure that would be more likely than this to convince the nation that the Government is thoroughly in earnest in its war policy, and to impress upon the mind of the Czar a convic tion that the nation is ready to support a fighting ministry at all bazards. Instead, however, of rousing the ardour of the masses, in these extraordinary times, by a somewhat extraordinary exhibition of military pomp and cir cumstance, the authorities take unusual pains to hide the glitter of arms. A red coat is seldom seen in our cities; the sound of the spirit-stirring drum is rarely heard in the streets of our market-towns; and men scarcely know of the existence of British soldiers but by dismal lists of killed and wounded, and vacant seats in almost every family circle.

Finally, it is not to be denied that a strong impression prevails in the country that there is too much of the peace-at-any-price element within the cabinet; and the recent endeavours to introduce more by the successive offers of the Colonial Office to Lord Stanley and Mr. Sidney Herbert, have unquestionably shaken, though perhaps slightly, the popular faith in the antiRussian disposition of Lord Palmerston. To us those events certainly seem to contain additional proof that the Premier's knowledge of the state of popular feeling is defective. The support of men pledged, like those we have named, to anti-popular views of the war and of foreign policy generally, would bring him not strength but weakness; their active opposition would rally the nation around him. The general acquescence in. - we may almost say approval of - his ultimate committal of the colonies to the care of Mr. Labouchere, ought to convince him that the people will not object to his clothing any lay-figure with the robes of office, provided only it be not suspected that the Russian uniform is worn underneath. But in truth it

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