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revolutionary epoch in both terminates in a military dictator Cromwell in the one case, Napoleon in the other, and the two have this in common, that they infinitely excel the men of their times in reach of mind, in resolution, and firmness-in every quality which enters into the composition of a ruler. Napoleon is Cromwell on a wider stage of action, and without religion. But the military despotisms of Cromwell and Napoleon were alike succeeded by a restoration - that worst of revolutions; and then after an interval, in both cases, of inglorious peace under inglorious sovereigns, we have revolutions resulting from similar causes in each, and issuing in the succession of men combining in their characters both a civil and military dictatorship. These dictators, William of Orange and Louis Napoleon, alike in their characters, both men of silence and phlegm, of inflexible determination and courage, find themselves champions of European right, marching at the head of an European combination, against the overgrown power and exorbitant ambition of one state, whose palpable object is to inaugurate a system of universal conquest.

Now, looking to the closeness of this parallel, it seems to us no unwarrantable induction to suppose that the coincidence will be continued in the future. We have the same causes in operation, the same position of parties, the same personal character; may we not expect like effects? For instance, that the war will be carried on dubiously, like that between William and Louis XIV., till a Marlborough appear; and that the times following will resemble the epoch from the reign of Queen Anne to the beginning of the French Revolution— only, in harmony with the difference in intensity observed in the prior stages, the progress of mankind will be in a vastly accelerated ratio.

But the vista of the future is not without its clouds. In the English crisis the motive power was religion, an element altogether excluded in the Republic or the Empire of France; and although the different phases in the development of events were on a greater scale in the later than in the earlier period, the same fundamental difference was continued. Napoleon was an irreligious Cromwell, and the reign of terror was an infidel copy of the Puritan rule the change was not

for good, but for evil. If, then, the parallel is not yet exhausted, and history has to complete its circle, it is not with unalloyed satisfaction that we guess at the character of the times reserved for our children.

But we have already gone too far in this speculation; let us return to the writings of Louis Napoleon, and note aphoristically some of his thoughts in the "Fragmens Historiques," which serve to illustrate the character of the author.

"L'armée (says he) est une epeé qui a la gloire pour poignee. Suggestive this of the policy of Napoleon in the present war, and of the unlikelihood that he will agree to a dishonourable peace; for as he again says “La lacheté ne profite jamais." There is profound reflection in the following remarks:-"Il y a des gouvernements frappés de mort dès leur naissance et dont les mesures les plus nationales n' inspirent que la defiance et le mecontentement! Quelque puissance materielle que possede in chef il ne peut disposer à son gré des destincés d'un grand peuple, il n' a de veritable force qu'en se faisant l'instrument des veúes de la majorité.” We would, however, suggest, as a correction to this last remark, that really great men, like Cromwell, William of Orange, and Napoleon I., to some degree make their majority by bringing over the nation to their opinions. Still the maxim is literally true in this sense that the success of the statesman cr legislator must run in the channel of public opinion.

Louis Napoleon, à propos of Revolutions in general, remarks, that when executed by a chief, they turn entirely to the benefit of the masses; for in order to succeed, the chief must follow the national tendency, and must continue faithful to the interest he has made to triumph; whilst, on the contrary, revolutions made by the masses often only profit the chief, for the people believe that their work is at an end on the very morning of their victory, and it is their nature to sink back into a state of quiescence after the conflict is over.

In concluding these "Fragmens," our author thus sums up the lessons to be derived from the historical epoch he has been studying, and we may take his summary as a statement of his own political creed :—

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Passing over a letter to Lamartine demurring to that author's criticism on Napoleon I., we come to an article entitled, "Reveries Politiques." This is an attempt at a more poetical style than generally characterises our author's writings, and so far it is a failure; a dry, bald style is the natural channel of his passionless nature, and so, it is only when he comes off his stilts that we find any observation worth quoting in the "Reveries."

The following, which we somewhat abridge, struck us as worthy of remark in the original:

"The despots who govern by the sabre, and who have no law but their own caprice, do not necessarily degrade; they oppress, but they do not demoralise. But weak governments, who, under the mask of liberty, march towards despotism—who can only corrupt what they would crush if they could who are unjust towards the weak, and humble towards the strong-these governments lead to the very dissolution of society, for they lull asleep by promises, whilst the governments of the sabre awakened by martyrdoms.

"To secure national independence, it is necessary that government be strong, and to be strong it must have the confidence of the people; it is only under this condition that a numerous and well disciplined army can be maintained without exciting the reproach of tyranny."

We cannot, however, approve of the wisdom of the following remark :-"Il faut que la masse qu'on ne peut jamais corrompre, et qui ne flatte ni dissimule soit la source constante d'où emanent tous les pouvoirs." That the masses cannot be corrupted is an assertion contradicted by all our electoral experience; and though it may be true that they do not dissemble, because that implies reflection, they make ridiculous men popular idols, and the intercourse betwixt them and their demagogues is but the interchange of flattery.

We only give the titles of some articles which follow, as they lack both interest and originality. Du Système Electoral L'Exil, Le Parti Conservateur," and "De la Liberté Individuelle en Angleterre."

An article, "De l'Organisation Militaire en France," has nothing worthy of remark, except the observation that in a well organised state we ought not to know where commences the soldier or where finishes the citizen-a maxim which may be regarded as the opposite rule to the shibboleth of the peace party.

"Aur Manes de l'Empereur" we would pronounce nonsense, if we had not committed ourselves already to a high estimate of Louis Napoleon's intellectual powers. But if he were an ordinary author, and amenable to criticism, we would hint to him to repress any inclination in himself to poetical or rhetorical writing as sedulously as he represses republican inclinations in others.

There now follow a few sketchy articles, from which the only remark we can find worthy of extract is a saying of Napoleon I., which we do not recollect meeting with elsewhere:

"Dans tout ce qu'on entreprend il faut donner les deux tiers à la raison et l'autre tiers au hazard. Augmentez la première fraction, vous serez pusillauime; augmentez la seconde, vous serez temeriare."

But an article, entitled "Les Specualities," deserves more particular notice. Louis Napoleon remarks that it was the vice of the French constitution under Louis Philippe that the political opinion of a man was everything; his intrinsic value, his special acquirements went for nothing. The best organiser of an army, for instance, would owe his dismissal to the rejection of a sugar bill, and a statesman who had conceived a vast plan for the amelioration of agriculture or industry, would retire, because the chambers had rejected a project for recruiting the army. "Ce systeme est non seulement illogique et absurde, mais il mine profondement la prosperité de la Francé." We fear we must admit we suffer under the same system. It is a necessary consequence of government by party, which again is the invariable concomitant of constitutionalism and liberty; so that we must console our

selves by putting the good we derive from our system of government, against the evil inherent in its principle.

An article, "Vieille Histoire toujours Nouvelle," opens with a story:

One morning in summer, as the Emperor Napoleon, risen earlier than usual, was passing through the vast reception rooms in the Tuilleries, he was astonished to find an immense fire lighted in one of the fireplaces, and a child occupied in heaping on it large fagots of wood. The Emperor stopped and asked the child why he made so great a fire in the middle of summer in a hall occupied only on reception days? The child answered simply"Monsieur, I make ashes for my father." In fact, the ashes were a perquisite, and in order to make them the fagots were burned. We quote this story, not so much for its moral as for its pictorial effect. We can evoke to our mind's eye the sombre figure of the Emperor pacing the silent halls of the kings of France, in the earliest dawn of a summer morning, raised from uneasy slumbers by thought, anxiety, and perhaps remorse.

We

can fix the date as that of the zenith of his power, and may imagine that in this solitary ramble mighty combinations passed through his mind, mingled with sad poetical reflections on the vanity of power and of the future which awaited him. Occupied with such meditations and in such a scene, he meets the child engaged in his incomprehensible employment. Did Napoleon believe in ghosts? If so, he might think, this was a child of the old race, occupying the palace of his ancestors when the living owners were asleep some infant Bourbon, some child of Henry Quatre, trying to instil warmth into his frame, icy cold from lying the livelong day in the vaults; or for a moment the great usurper might fancy, that the dead dynasty held high revel all night in these halls, and that this stray ghost of the family had lingered after the rest.

But the supernatural is unnecessary to the picturesque enough that we have in juxtaposition the mightiest intellect which ever appeared on earth and a simple child: the terrible power of the Empire incarnate in its master, contrasted with the utter weakness of infancy.

A page or two of striking reflections upon "La Paix" now follows:

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"On nous repete" (says our author) que la paix est un bienfait et la guerre un fleau." We hope our author is sincere; but we have a lurking suspicion that such an idea is contrary to the instincts of a race which produced Napoleon I., than whom a truer warrior to the backbone never existed; and we have more than a suspicion, that Louis Napoleon acknowledges no other principles in politics save expediency, and that war may sometimes appear to him as useful as peace.

Passing over an unimportant page or two upon French aristocracy, we come to an article entitled "Des Gouvernements et de Leurs Sontiens," in which Louis Napoleon still further developes his theories on government. His appreciations of the time before the Revolution are always peculiarly just:

"L'ancien regime fut inebranlable tant que ses deux soutiens, le clergé et la noblesse, resumèrent en eux tous les éléments vitaux de la nation. Le clergé donnait au pouvoir toutes les consciences; car alors conscience était synonyme d'opinion, et la noblesse ordre civile et militaire, lui donnait tous les bras. Mais aujourdhui que la noblesse n'existe plus et que la foi politique est complétement indépendant de la foi reliegieuse, s'appuyer sur ces deux ordre serait bâtir sur le sable."

But what alternative remains?—

"Dire que le gouvernement doit obéir à l'esprit des masses et favoriser les intérêts, generaux, est une maxime vraie may trop vague. Quelle est l'opinion de la masse. Quels sont les interets generaux? Chacun suivant son opinion, répondra différemment à ces questions."

We are also completely at a loss, and really do not see our way out of the dilemma. Louis Napoleon's practical answer has been a military despotism -a remedy which, like death, cures all diseases, but which is fully as bad as the diseases themselves. His theoretical answer is sufficiently vague :— "Nous dirons donc qu' un gouvernement doit aujourdhui, puiser sa force morale dans un principe, et sa force physique dans une organisation." We are inclined to admit this generally; and, indeed, the only difficulty is to find out the principle. Louis Napoleon suggests one :-"Supposons par exemple, qu' un gouvernement ac

cepte franchement le principe de la souveraineté du peuple, c'est-à-dire de l'élection, il aura pour lui tons les esprits." This is rather a startling proposition. One would think that, let à government accept universal suffrage as frankly as it may, this would not please many of the middle classes, and very few of the higher. Louis Napoleon, indeed, argues" Quel est l'individu, la caste, le parti qui oserait attaquer le droit, produit legal, de la volonté de tout peuple ;" so that, after all, the accord des esprits he requires is to be the offspring of fear; and, for our part, we are not disposed to dispute but that this "lien" might exist in a very high degree. But he might have said as well Qui oserait attaquer le droit, produit legal de la volonté de l'Empereur et de son armée.” The alternative seems to be, between a bonnet-rouge reign of terror, or a reign à la bayonette.

The next article of any consequence has for its title "L'Extinction de Pauperisme." The scheme is simple enough. There are, it seems, nine million hectares of uncultivated land in France, yielding, on an average, eight francs per hectare. Louis Napoleon proposes to seize these lands, and colonise them with paupers, paying the proprietors their eight francs of yearly rent. This scheme he developes in great detail, and, we may grant, makes out his case namely, that the pauper colonisation will extirpate pauperism, as all the paupers will become proprietors; but he does not inform us what is to become of the paupers of the next generation; or, if there be still land enough for them, what of the generation after? for, assuredly, the existing generation will breed a population which, if there be not some such violent measure as this to prevent it, will throw off a goodly swarm of paupers: therefore, at the best, our author's scheme merely staves off the evil, allowing a state of things meantime to grow up, which will make the mischief eventually ten times greater.

Such schemes in England would excite indignation, if they were not regarded as absolutely chimerical; but France is such a peculiar country, that it is not at all improbable but that the Emperor will, some fine morning, issue a decree carrying this

scheme into practical effect. He has always shown an inclination s'appuyer as he would call it, on the class of ouvriers, and such a scheme as this would make them his, body and soul; and as the French are little solicitous about the interests of their grandsons, the temporary prosperity which would result from such a bold measure, carried out as it would be by the most perfect organisation, would secure him the popularity of all the rest of the nation, with the exception of the proprietors of the waste lands, who might think they had as good a title as the pauper owners, to make the most of their property.

The subject which follows, entitled "L'Analyse de la Question des Sacres," is of so special a character, that it can interest very few of our readers. We have glanced over it, as in duty bound, and although we had little prior knowledge on the subject, there are intrinsic proofs that Louis Napoleon has mastered it in all its details-a result which implies no little inquiry and patience.

Our author was no free-trader when he wrote this article, since he is clear for protecting the beetroot growers. His principal reason is the expediency of letting well alone. He states fairly enough the stock arguments for free trade; but he remarks, that it is a dangerous thing to change established interests on theoretical anticipations of compensation, for human affairs are singular things, and occasionally refuse to follow the correctest theory.

We now pass over two articles— the one entitled "Projet de loi sur le Recrutement de l'Armée," and the other, "Considerations Politiques et Militaires sur la Suisse "- and come to an article, entitled "Quelques mots sur Joseph Bonaparte," which we only allude to, as it contains a short narrative of Joseph's life, after the fall of his brother. The ex-King of Holland and of Spain, after that event, resided mostly in Philadelphia, in America, where he seems to have been held in the highest estimation, and had the questionable honour of being offered the throne of Mexico, which he refused. Subsequently he was visited by that traitor, or French patriot →→ the epithets are equivalent Fayette, who certified him of the approaching

fall of the legitimate dynasty, and offered to bring about the restoration of the Bonapartes, if he would place at his disposal two millious of francs. But Joseph had resided too long in the land of the almighty dollar, to part with his money; and, accordingly, the Revolution of 1830 took place, to the advantage of a more daring speculator.

Joseph thereupon writes a long letter to the Chamber of Deputies, in which, undoubtedly, he has the best of the logic. He argues that the legitimate dynasty being repudiated, there only remained the right of the people to elect their ruler; and he offered to back the Duc de Reichstadt against Louis Philippe in an appeal to popular election. In this letter he bitterly says of Louis Philippe, that in vain he abjured his house; for he had entered France with the rest of the family sword in hand, and it made no difference that his father had voted for the death of the King, his cousin, in order to put himself in his place.

Our readers will perhaps excuse us declining to enter into the discussion of the practicability of the canal of Nicaragua, which is the subject of the next and concluding article. We would rather employ the little space which remains in a few general observations on the works which we have passed under review.

In the first place, we are sorry to be compelled to admit that there is no tinge of Christianity to be found throughout the wide range of topics; nor is the moral colouring more distinguishable. The whole might be written by a man who believed in no religion whatever, who denied God and providence, and who recognised no moral sanction but expediency. It may be answered, that his topics do not necessarily involve the discussion of religious or moral questions; but if it be considered that these are mainly inquiries into the foundation and nature of government, questions most intimately bearing on the destiny of man, it is difficult to account for the absence of any recognition of Providence, or of the general principles of right and wrong, except on the theory that the author exaggerates the principle of expediency into a preponderating rule of action.

It is a consequence of the same uti

litarian spirit that the schemes for the reformation of society he propounds are all of a material kind. He has no idea of ennobling human nature; his millennium is to be brought about by new territorial adjustments of the world, and a regimenting of its inhabitants; so that at the best the Napoleonic idea, when carried out in its full development, is merely a new arrangement of existing interests, kept in order by an organisation the highest type of which is a perfect police.

Such are the faults and short-comings of the works before us- let us now consider their excellencies. Clearness and precision are the characteristics of his style, indicating a mind to which anything approaching to obscurity is disagreeable, and which can only be satisfied with the clearest notions on all subjects. This tendency, allied to strong sagacity, has led him to maxims and conclusions of a definite and practical nature. Louis Napoleon is the most practical of living men. Even when he theorises, he does not speculate, but keeps close to facts. He takes men and things precisely as they are; and regarding both as equally fixed quantities, his plans only go to alter relations. He seems never to suppose the possibility of new conditions. From the same mental constitution might perhaps be traced another peculiarity, largely observable both in his writings and his life. He arrives at his conclusions not by logical steps of reasoning, but as it were intuitively. They seem to him to fit the existing system of things-how or why is to him of little importance. They seem to him axioms, and he states them as such, while other men would arrive at them by inferences, or support them by proof and illustration.

His political creed, all things considered, is not, we think, a dangerous

one.

His opinions are new, but they are not revolutionary. A profound conviction of the necessity of adapting himself to the course of events, prevents him adopting any absolute notions. His mind instinctively coalesces with the tendencies in existence. He is anxious to keep in front of the movement, but he never attempts to go in a contrary direction. If, then, we may not expect in Louis Napoleon a regenerator, neither need we apprehend a disturber of the existing order of things. His political conduct since

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