mended to him by another reason, namely, that it is more conducive to submission to authority than a more general teaching. Metaphysical and moral speculation inevitably leads to discussion as to the limits of authority and the obligation to obedience, while the romance and poetry of all countries extol the liberator and patriot, and expatiate on the charms of freedom. On the other hand, the lesson taught by the exact sciences, is that of implicit obedience to uncontrollable law, of speculation confined within impassable channels, and regulated by preordained rules. Hence the moral effect of exclusive devotion to such studies, unconscious but inevitable, is to create a wish for the same order in human action which we see in nature, leading to an approval of, or if not, an acquiescence in, the subjection of mankind to laws equally as uncontrollable, by those they govern, as the laws of nature are by the elements. Allowing, however, for this most important and fundamental objection, the institutions for instruction under the Empire, so far as they went, were liberal and complete; and if ever we have a perfect National Education, we cannot do better than copy the machinery instituted for this purpose by Napoleon Bonaparte. must refer to the work before us, or to Alison, for a detailed account of the system. One great principle gave it vitality

We

namely, that the oflices of the State were the prizes open to the most distinguished sholars. This was a new idea for Europe, but the same system has existed in China from time immemorial, and perhaps we may gather this lesson from the effete state of the Celestial Empire, that the principle of free competition of talent, like every other exclusive principle in politics, has an inevitable tendency to lose all healthy influence, and that a compromise of principles a coexistence even of contradictory principles, with a considerable admixture of no principle at all— in short, the anomalous system called a Constitutional Government, is, after all, most consistent with the welfare of communities.

It would be instructive, but hardly interesting, to enter into the details of the French army under its great military organiser. We may, however, state that Napoleon I. regarded the conscription as the palladium of national independence, and that he, like

army.

our Wellington, had only faith in regular troops, holding that no undisciplined force could long resist a modern If this be true and the authorities whose names we have given are at least as much entitled to deference as Cobden and Bright, or any number of declaimers on the patriotism of our people-it is a serious question for us whether we are safe to be content with a standing army much short of three times the number of that which now stands on our muster-roll.

After discussing in detail the administrative organisation of the Empire, Louis Napoleon proceeds to criticise its political organisation. As introductory, he observes that the political ideas of France have always been as capricious as fashion. Under the Republic at first Brutus and Cato were her models. As her fervor cooled down the Anglomania which had flourished under the Regency revived; that gave way to an adoration of the American Republic; and lastly, Napoleon I. brought his system into fashion, which was nothing else than a reproduction of the institutions of Imperial Rome. Our author successfully demonstrates that none of these but the last could harmonise with the esprit Français ! The English constitution in particular is inapplicable, since, according to our author, and we must add, according to all foreign authors whose works we have read, its basis is the aristocracy - an element which he says does not exist in France. As to America, he denies its nationality, "L'homme n'a pas encore pris racine en Amerique."

But we must be equally as cursory in our observations as to the political organisation, as we have been in respect to the administrative system. The matter of present importance to us is not the material organisation of the empire, but its spirit, and the commentaries of our author upon it.

The following summary of the political organisation by our author may serve instead of detail:

"Les principes sur les quels reposaient les lois imperiales sont.

"L'Egalitê civile d'accord avec le principe democratique.

"La hierarchie d'accord avec les principes d'ordre et de stabilité.

"Napoleon est le chef supreme de l'etat. L'elu du peuple, le representant de la nation."

"The imperial power alone is trans

mitted by right of inheritance. There is no other hereditary employment in France. All the others are made by election or acquired by merit.”

Such also we may presume to be a summary of the principles of the government of Louis Napoleon; but it strikes us as somewhat inconsistent, that the Emperor should be "L'Elu du peuple," and yet that his title should be hereditary. But whatever might be his title notwithstanding the high-sounding institutions of Senates and Corps Legislative, of whose organisation Louis Napoleon here gives us an account the Imperial government was a pure autocracy, like that of the Czar, or like that of Louis Napoleon himself: the government of a great country carried on by the same principles as a man carries on a manufac tory or other private undertakingone master and a number of instruments. In the case of the first Emperor, this autocracy was rendered less obtrusive by his habit of frequently consulting his senate and counsel; though in reality bis individual will always prevailed, his intellectual superiority being fully as imposing as his material power; still his condescension flattered official men into the idea that they had some share in the splendid government which they served.

The code Napoleon was the fruit of one of these conferences between the Emperor and his legislative council; and as the subjects therein embraced less concerned his personal ambition than questions of general policy, more effect was given to the views of the parties whom he consulted than was generally the case. Still as the code is the noblest heritage which the empire has left, it is but just that the Emperor's share in it should be recognised. Now, besides suggesting the idea, and carrying it into effect, all authors concur in stating that Napoleon took an intelligent part in the discussion of every article, and astonished the practised jurists by the justice of his conclusions, and the facility with which he comprehended all the complexities involved in the various rights and interests of society which this code was to regulate.

Louis Napoleon next proceeds to treat of the foreign policy of his uncle; and his views of it are of the utmost importance; not so much as being a true account of his uncle's intentions,

as affording an indication of what he himself considers the proper fereign policy of France: which, with Louis Napoleon, is no matter of mere opinion, but a theory which we may rest assured he will try to put in practice. Luckily he adopts the leading maxim of his uncle- Je n'avais pas le folie de vouloir tordre les evènements à mon système, mais au contraire je plìais mon systeme, sur la contexture des evènements. So that we have in his very theory a counteraction to that native obstinacy which might otherwise convulse Europe. Holding such a definition of the policy of Napoleon I. no wonder our author can describe its relations with foreign powers in no more precise terms than that Napoleon allied himself with all those nations which followed him in what he conceived the

track of progress. Aware of this vagueness, he labours hard to prove that the wars of the Empire were essentially defensive, and that England was the only obstacle to the peace of the world. Her obstinacy, he says, ultimately forced Napoleon to adopt an aggressive policy in retaliation, and thereafter his views developed as his sphere of action enlarged, until he aimed at nothing short of the regeneration of Europe. Perhaps the conquest of Europe would be nearer the truth. As regenerator of Europe, his nephew continues, he now had two ends to pursue; as sovereign of France all his energies were for her, but

66

comme grand homme," his energies were for Europe. And thus in his conquests he consulted both the momentary interests of the war, and, at the same time, kept in view an ideal reconstruction of the European system. Such is Louis Napeleon's account of the matter; he, too, is sovereign of France, and also a great man, and has his own ideas of the regeneration of Europe.

Louis cleverly supports the theory of the provisional conquests of his uncle, and his intentions for the regeneration of Europe, by remarking that this was the reason he put his brothers on the thrones of the conquered states, as a species of viceroys, who could be removed whenever it was time to carry into effect the new balance of power. Russia and England, however, could not be got to understand his benevolent intentions; and therefore Napoleon's life was spent in an attempt to

compel them to acquiesce in the new order of things which he wished to introduce.

Assuming that Louis Napoleon adheres to the policy of his uncle, which, indeed, is no assumption, but a certainty, our present alliance with him to suppress one of these obstacles may be regarded by many as somewhat ominous. For our own part, as we think the danger to civilisation is at present from Russia, not from France, we entertain no such misgivings. On the contrary, we believe the present alliance to be the only combination capable of presenting an impassable barrier to the Slavonic invasion. Whatever opinion we may entertain of Louis Napoleon as a man of principle, we have implicit confidence in his intellect; and as an alliance with us is clearly his interest, both individually and as representing France, his sagacity and resolution are guarantees of his loyalty.

But if it were not for these "material guarantees," the work before us might excite our misgivings. All the French wars, says Emperor Louis, have come from England. "Elle n'a jamais voulu entendre aucune proposition de paix.” England and France, he continues, in the late war mutually misunderstood each other; England considered Napoleon merely as a despot who oppressed his kingdom by exhausting all its resources to satisfy his warlike ambition. She would not acknowledge him as the elect of the people, the representative of the material interests of France. Napoleon, on the other hand, and the French of his time in general, confounded the English nation with its aristocracy, which again was supposed to be the same as that aristocracy of France, of whose oppression so lively a recollection was entertained. The mutual mistake consisted in each

party supposing the ruling power of the other to be anti-national, whereas Napoleon represented the national spirit of France; and the English aristocracy, our author says, was, like Briareus, "Elle tient au peuple par cent mille racines," and obtained from the people as many sacrifices as Napoleon obtained from the French. If we are to believe Louis Napoleon, this misunderstanding exists no longer. In the memorable words used by him at Guildhall on the 19th April, "England and France are united in all the great

questions of politics and human progress which at present agitate the world, from the shores of the Atlantic to the Mediterranean-from the Black Sea to the Baltic. They have at heart one cause, and are determined on pushing it to one end. It is by no pitiful rivalries that the union of the two nations can be dissevered; and while they follow the dictates of common sense, they would be sure of the future."

Louis Napoleon next devotes a chapter to prove that his uncle did more good than harm to the countries he conquered; and that in many instances it would have been better to have left his territorial arrangements undisturbed. In Italy he formed a great kingdom, with an administration and army of native Italians. In that part of Germany which he conquered, there were two hundred and eighty-four independent states, each with different laws; and undoubtedly the amalgamation he enforced, and the introduction of the code were advantages nearly balancing the loss of their independence. He also abolished the feudal institutions; but we do not join his nephew in considering that this was an unmixed reform. Cumbrous and oppressive as the feudal institutions in Germany undoubtedly were, they constituted the only guarantees of liberty; and the result of their abolition bas been that the kingly power has been exalted, till, with hardly an exception, every state in Germany is under a despotism. Still it was something to establish the equality of all before the law; and it may be a question, whether the people, as distinguished from the old privileged classes, have not, on the whole, been gainers by the change. Everywhere Napoleon insisted on religious toleration and the suppression of monastic abuses. But whatever opinion may, on the whole, be formed as to the merit of the changes introduced by Napoleon in the conquered states, the manner of their introduction exhibited his sagacity. He was an economist in despotism; it was only when dispatch was necessary that he altogether laid aside the drapery of quasi legal and constitutional forms. In general the changes he introduced into the conquered states had some decent show of national concurrence. They were laid before delegates of the nation, and promulgated ostensibly on their authority, This was even the case

with Spain, the most barefaced of his usurpations.

Keeping in view our author's theory, that the end his uncle had in view was to establish an universal peace under a new balance of power, we are now favoured with a statement of the prin ciples on which this was to be brought about, and we are somewhat surprised to find that the Napoleonic idea was identical with the plan of the Peace Society. Europe is to be made a confederation somewhat like America; with uniform laws and machinery of administration, and with courts of judicature and appeal, to which the disputes between nations are to be referred. The supremacy or presidency of French in the confederation was, of course, necessary.

We believe that the notion that Napoleon I. had any such idea exists only in the imagination of Napoleon III.'; but the important point to us is, that these ideas are entertained by the latter, and that he considers it his mission to carry out the plans of his uncle. But, to continue our analysis. After Europe had been arranged on the Napoleonic plan, our author says his uncle would have proceeded to the task of the internal amelioration of France. "Il ent consolidé liberté." This is, of course, pure speculation. We have not even Napoleon the First's word for it, though that would not have made the matter more certain. But, again, the nephew thinks, or says, his uncle had such an idea. So here we have the prospect which France has of liberty. It is to be after the consolidation of Europe on Napoleonic principles.

Bonaparte fell, according to Louis Napoleon, because he attempted to do in his lifetime the work of ages, and time took his revenge. The nations he successively conquered were never properly consolidated, and deserted him on the first reverse. This is true; his scheme ultimately developed itself into the old project of universal conquest, which history proves can be effected, not by any one man, whether Alexander of Macedon or Napoleon of France, but only by the means adopted by the Romans-namely, that of successive conquests and colonisation, carried on by a national tradition. This career is now attempted by Russia on the old Roman principles, and already a result has been attained

VOL. XLVI.-NO. CCLXXI.

which proves the efficiency of the sys

tem.

We now come to the conclusion, which we will give nearly in the author's own words.

The period of the empire was a war to the death, England against France. The former has conquered; but, thanks to the creative genius of Napoleon, France, though vanquished, has lost less in material resources than England. Who, then, are the greater statesmen those who have governed countries which have gained in spite of defeat, or those who have governed countries which have lost in spite of their victory? Again, the period of the empire was a war to the death against the old European system. That system triumphed; but in spite of the fall of Napoleon, his ideas have everywhere germinated, and have been adopted by many of the allied conquerors, while the people of the other states waste themselves in efforts to regain what Napoleon had established. The Napoleonic ideas have thus the character of ideas which rule the movement of societies, since they advance by their own force, though deprived of their author. These ideas are not ideas of war, but a social, industrial, and humanising system; and if this system appears to some always surrounded with the smoke of battles, this was the fatality attending its inauguration, a period its author did not survive; but now the clouds are dissipated, and we see, through the glory of arms, a civil glory greater and more durable.

In reading the "Idée Napoleon" what has principally struck us is the evident originality of the author's views-not in the sense of being new, but in being evidently thought out by himself; — and, as we have also been impressed with the idea that he believes what he writes, we think the treatise explains much of his past political conduct, and suggests much which we may expect.

Considered as an essay on the character of Napoleon I., we look upon it as giving an exaggerated view of that which undoubtedly was his prominent peculiarity we mean, the preponderance of the intellectual over the impulsive nature. Napoleon I. was more than any other man, a mathematician by nature, a nearly passionless worker

F

out of a system. Sometimes, indeed, he seems to have acted on impulse, and even, though on rare occasions, passion and prejudice overruled his inajestic intellect. But these instances are exceptional to the general character of his career; and even in many of them his more intimate associates were of opinion, that what apparently was impulsive was merely exquisite acting, employed in order to secure the more energetic execution of his will. But his nephew goes farther; the scope of this treatise being, as we stated at the outset, to prove that Napoleon's career was the logical development of a preconceived plan; and so rigidly is this the case, that the man Napoleon is lost in the "Idee Napo. leonienne."

We think that by this exaggeration Louis Napoleon has taken the wrong way to enlist the sympathy of his readers in the character of his hero. No one now doubts or denies the pre-eminent abilities of that man of the people, who raised himself to the empire of France, kept Europe at bay, entered with victorious armies into every capital of the Continent, and left the impress of his mind on every department of human interest. But what was wanting to enlist the sympathy as well as the wonder of mankind was, a demonstration that Napoleon I. had a heart as well as a head; that there was in him somewhat of disinterestedness, benevolence, or chivalry; that he had faith, if not in God, at least in some being higher than himself. But there is no attempt at such a proof in the treatise we have been considering, and the want of it militates, not merely against the character of Napoleon I., but also against the artistic merits of the essay itself and the character of its author. The "Idée Napoleonienne," if as profound, is nearly as dull as a mathematical treatise; and we are inclined to suspect that the author, who seems to think a man of pure intellect the model hero, is himself but partially endowed with human affections.

The treatise next in order is entitled "Fragmens Histroiques;" the object of which is, to institute a comparison between our revolution of 1688 and the French revolution of 1830. The comparison is, of course, to the disadvantage of the latter, and we are

not disposed to cavil at the verdict ; on the contrary, we cordially agree with him in condemning that least chivalrous of all revolutions, which inaugurated the reign of Louis Philippe. In that phase of French history we fail to discover one generous sentiment, one noble principle. We also willingly acquiesce in his animadversions against the monarchy of the bourgeoisie; and think it one of the many happy accidents of Louis Napoleon's career, that such an inglorious epoch should have preceded his advent to power.

Our author's views of the English revolution are the same as those entertained by our constitutional Whigs. He professes intense admiration for William III., speaking of him in a way, as nearly approaching to heroworship as his cold and unimpassioned nature is capable of. We hope his admiration is sincere, because we know not a better kingly model than William of Orange. Unfortunately Louis Napoleon has another model in his uncle, whose unscrupulous ambition it is fully as likely he will follow as the conscientious moderation of the Protestant hero. Indeed, the two may he regarded as his good and evil genius, and according as the influence of the one or the other prevails, will his career in which great events are so clearly involved-be regarded by history as one of the brightest or one of the most disastrous of epochs.

But if we might expect that a similarity of position, approaching nearly to absolute identity, should have any influence on Louis Napoleon in selecting his model, the example of William of Orange, to use a legal phrase, runs on all-fours; and it would almost seem as if that period of history had been written precisely with a view to afford him a parallel case which he might study in all emergencies.

We are tempted to digress a little to point out the leading features of this remarkable coincidence. Take, in the first place, the English revolution of 1646 and the French revolution of of 1789 as the starting points in the parallel; and if we make allowance for the difference in the ruling princi ple which lay at the bottom of these two convulsions, we may fairly say that, in the order of the successive phases in each, the latter was merely an intensified copy of the former. The