shore of the Euxine. There, in fact, Russia never could pretend to any other than a hostile possession, while the recent date of her acquisition of Georgia and the other Trans-Caucasian provinces the contest with Persia and Turkey for their possession continuing up to the year 1829-is such as to weaken much her moral and material hold of those guarantees of her ambition. The complete subjection of the Black Sea to the power of the Allies, leaves a Russian army operating south of the Caucasus dependent for its communications upon the military roads of the Caucasus and the uncertain navigation of the Caspian Sea, neither of which, we conceive, would suffice for its support against a serious attack of the Allies directed to a repression of Russia within her southern mountain boundary. To keep her there should be the object of subsequent arrangements.

Of the two campaigns in the Baltic, we have only to say, adverting to a former expression* of our opinion of the possibilities of the case, that as much seems to us to have been accomplished as could reasonably have been expected, and somewhat more than we should a priori have counselled. A blockade of the Russian coast of that sea offers the advantages of materially damaging the commerce of the enemy and diminishing his means of carrying on war, and, at the same time, of effecting a diversion of his military force; and these, we believe, were to a considerable extent obtained during the campaigns of the past and present summers.

In the destruction of Bomarsund, if our naval reputation was little advanced by the over prudence which brought so large a force to the accomplishment of so small a deed, still it is probable that the germ of much future mischief was thereby stopped in its growth. Of the bombardment of Sweaborg we confess we are not inclined to form so favourable an opinion. It was an inconsequential and useless operation, not calculated to enhance the general estimation of the daring qualities of our seamen; while its results in the exposure of the bad quality of the ordnance employed, and the deficiency of its supply, cannot but lower the character of our administration in the eyes of the world. Had it, indeed,

been possible to take or to destroy that ancient Swedish fortress, the moral effect of the blow might have been incalculably great. As it was, the enthusiasm of the Swedes was raised to a high pitch by the sound of our guns, only to be lowered again by a reaction of disappointment at its small signification, which will throw another obstacle in the way of their so far overcoming their fear of the giant of the North, as to permit of their adhesion to an active league against his aggressive tyranny. Finally, in the lamentable exposure made by Admiral Napier of his own want of self-respect, and of Sir James Graham's duplicity and selfseeking, there is but too much evidence that the Baltic campaigns were, like those in the East, affairs of haphazard. The expedition was instituted by the minister to stop the grumbling of the people it was undertaken by the commander with a consciousness that the means placed at his disposal were insufficient for any real work.

All

that Sir James saw in a fleet of 44 sail and 2,000 guns was, the material for a coup d'etat: he would have knocked ships, guns, and crews against the rocks of Sweaborg, without a thought for their safety, when the national exultation at the Tartar story of the fall of Sebastopol startled him from his dream of peace-patching. Sir Charles saw in the same mighty armament only a command; to obtain which he perilled his personal honour, by boasting of an intent to perform exploits which he was conscious he had not the means to accomplish. Neither one nor the other seem to have understood that the obligation in which they bound themselves to the country, in undertaking the management and direction of that costly fleet, was to use its power with the single view of forcing Russia into submission. No one had conceived a comprehensive plan for distressing the enemy, in the working of which each of the various operations should play its appointed part. The cause of this going to war without counting the cost, was manifestly the faith placed by the Aberdeen ministry in the success of their negotiations. They did not believe in the existence of war, even when Bomarsund had been bombarded : after Alma and Inkermann, they talked of sparing the military honour of Rus

sia; and of respecting her territory, when one of her most valued provinces had been formally taken possession of by the outpouring of torrents of the best blood of France and England. The time for these absurdities has passed away, and a period has arrived when the object of the war must be defined, and a plan for attaining it laid down.

The convention between England, France, and the Porte, signed on the 13th of March, 1854, bound the Western Powers to "assist the Sultan in repelling the attack which has been made by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias on the territory of the Sublime Porte-an attack by which the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the Sultan's throne are endangered." The assistance was to be in addition to that already given by the "ordering of strong detachments of their naval forces to repair to Constantinople, to afford to the territory and the flag of the Sublime Ottoman Porte such protection as the circumstances should admit of." It was to extend to "the protection of the Ottoman territory in Europe and Asia against the attack of Russia," and with that view their majesties engaged to "send land troops to any such point or points of the Ottoman territory as shall appear suitable." It is plain that the stipulations of this convention have been long since fulfilled, and their limits over. passed. When the Russians withdrew behind the Pruth, in July, 1854, they abandoned the attack they had made upon the territory of the Sublime Porte, and neither in Europe nor Asia did a single Russian soldier remain to insult the Ottoman flag. The ostensible object of the war was then at an end; and had the Czar been content to pocket a very slight affront, peace would have been concluded, and her Majesty the Queen and his Majesty the Emperor would have been bound by their treaty, subsequently ratified in the terms of the convention, to "immediately take measures to withdraw their military and naval forces," and to deliver up the fortresses and positions in the Ottoman territory occupied by them, "in the space of forty days." The articles of that treaty have become obsolete: a new and distinct war was, in fact, declared and commenced when the allied armies landed in the Crimea, and the object of hostilities then ceased to be limited

to the defence of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. What is it at the present moment? The simple answer is THE HUMILIATION AND CRIPPLING OF RUSSIA. This is the only intelligible interpretation of the much-abused phrase, a safe and honourable peace, and it is the meaning attached to it by the English and French nations. That gantic autocracy has grown too great for the freedom and civilisation of Europe, to which it is antagonistic; and the common sense of the western people has discovered and resolved to redress the evil. How is the great defensive work to be conducted? To reply satisfactorily to this question would be to frame a plan of the war: to sketch a slight outline of our view of what that ought to be, is, however, the utmost we can at present attempt.

When Peter the Great succeeded to the throne of Russia in 1689, she had no seaport but Archangel on the White Sea, while her western frontier did not extend beyond Smolensko. During the century and a-half that followed, her territorial dominion was extended, at the expense of neighbouring nations, to the Black Sea and the River Araxes on the south, to the Baltic on the north-west, and so far into central Europe, that her boundaries are now within one hundred and eighty miles of Berlin and Vienna. Cronstadt, St. Petersburgh, Helsingfors, Sweaborg, and Revel, stand upon Swedish soil. So late as 1809, the whole of Finland belonged to Sweden: it was not until 1812 that the frontier of Russia was advanced to the Pruth, and that she obtained possession of Bessarabia and the mouths of the Danube. Since 1800, she acquired Georgia, and with it a footing south of the Caucasus; and it was only in 1828-9 that she wrested from Persia and Turkey the provinces of Erivan and Nakshivan in Armenia, Anapa, Poti, and the ports on the eastern shores of the Euxine, from which her garrisons have recently fled. " Assuredly (said Bonaparte to Las Casas), in such a situation, I should arrive at Calais by fixed stages, and be the arbiter of Europe." As the encroachments of Russia have been chiefly made in the three directions we have indicated, so the plan of an active resistance to her aggression is naturally divided into operations upon her north-western, western, and southern frontiers.

We have already intimated our opinion that, under present circumstances, the operations of the Allies on the North-west line should be, in a great measure, limited to a blockade of the Russian coast, the impounding of her fleet, and the obstruction of her commerce. Whether it may become pos sible to give a more active character to hostilities in that quarter, depends upon the resolution that may be taken by the Northern nations, over which France and England can exercise no direct control. It is clearly the inte rest of Sweden to join in any attempt likely to be successful for the reduction of the power of Russia: national hatred, the remembrance of past injuries, and the desire to regain her plundered provinces, would add warmth to her co-operation in a movement suggested by the most prudent precaution against future danger. And Sweden has a regular army of enlisted soldiers and indelta (or military tenure force) amounting to 50,000 troops of all arms; with a local militia of about 100,000 men. Her fleet comprises in its list 250 gun-boats, admirably fitted for use in the shallow waters of the Baltic; and in 1840 the force available to man it was estimated at 24,000 as good seamen as any in the world. But Sweden has too much at stake to forego her neutrality until the sincerity and determination of the Allies shall be so fully proved as to leave no risk of her being deserted in the future struggle, and exposed single-handed to the vengeance of her powerful neighbour. With the aid of the Swedes, joined in a strict alliance of offence and defence, it would be no longer an impossibility for the Allies to land in the Baltic provinces, and to reduce Revel, Riga, Sweaborg, and even Cronstadt and St. Petersburgh. But should prudence interfere to forbid operations of such extent, the adhesion of Sweden to the Western Powers would provide a permanent frontier against Russia, from which her slightest movement on the Baltic might be watched, and effectual restraint promptly applied when required. To Sweden the immediate gain, by union in a policy thus limited, would be the pledge (of inestimable value to a free nation) of security against foreign interference; while in the future would loom the probability of Finland, Livonia, and Courland being encouraged, by the reverses of Russia and the prospect of support at

hand, to assert their ancient independence, and re-establish their former connexions. Then might follow a resuscitation of Poland, and its erection into a permanent barrier between Russia and Central Europe-if, indeed, the germs of national life still exist in that much-injured people. To call Poland into galvanic existence, does not seem to us to be within the province of the Western nations, nor to consist with their interests. It is in the power of the German people alone to work that miracle; and by no other policy can Central Europe be secured from the tide of Russian despotism, as it rolls westward. That the German courts are less disposed to take part in such a work, than to join with the Czar in a new Holy Alliance, cannot now be a matter of doubt to the firmest believers in the policy of the Aberdeen cabinet t; and there is, consequently, at present, but little room to hope that any active opposition will be offered to Russia in her Western attack upon civilisation. The situation is, nevertheless, complicated by the grave blunder which permitted the occupation of the Principalities by Austria; and should it be thought advisable to renew hostilities upon the Danube, she will be forced to declare upon which side she stands. For her the one course or the other is almost equally fraught with danger. If she were to break with the Allies, her dominion in Italy would not be worth a week's purchase. If she take a direct part in humiliating Russia, where will be her protection against a revolt in her Selavonic and Magyar provinces, for turning which to use Russian craft has already provided, by the invention and propagation of the idea of a Panslavic federation? Nor has the Convention of June 14th had a less perplexing operation upon the Allies. An attempt on their part to drive Austria from her neutral position, if made before they have demonstrated their power and will to cripple Russia, would almost certainly end in her assumption of a hostile attitude in the Principalities, which would seriously embarrass their general operations. Holding these considerations in view, it would seem that little advantage is likely to accrue from a renewal of the Danubian campaign; although much annoyance might be given to the enemy, and a most useful diversion effected, by naval operations along the coast,

from the mouth of the Danube to Odessa. That this object should not long since have engaged the attention of the admirals, as a means of diverting the tedium of their long inactivity, is indeed one of the strangest features of the war.

Let us now return to the operationson the southern frontier of Russia, where alone they have assumed an aggressive character. We confess we venture to differ in opinion from some highly competent military critics, in thinking the invasion of the Crimea defensible upon strategic and political grounds, although we admit the details of the undertaking justify no more favourable commentary than that conveyed in Sir George Brown'sexplanation-that they were based upon no plan, and carried out in ignorance of the locality of the enterprise.* At all events, circumstances have decided the general question, and the Crimean campaign must now be prosecuted to a successful termination, or defeat and disgrace be courted by the Western Powers. Recent events leave little room for doubt, that the Russians may be driven out of the Peninsula, if the superior force of the Allies be used with vigour and promptitude; and that we should be able to keep it, with our complete command of the sea, we cannot bring our selves to question. For the operations along the coast, which we have already suggested, and for observation of the Isthmus of Perekop, and of the shores of the Sea of Azoff, a large supply of gun-boats, of a light draught of water, would now be invaluable. If well worked, they would render the subjection of the Crimea a matter of certainty their co-operation would facilitate the undertaking, even in the short remnant of the present season, of an extension of the southern attack, which we cannot indicate in fewer or more intelligible terms than those of M. Klapka, with whose views we so far concur:—

"By their successes in the Sea of Azoff and the eastern coast of the Black Sea, where the Russians have evacuated Anapa and retreated to the Kuban, the Allies have it still in their power, spite of their former oversights, to give an extremely favourable turn

to affairs in those parts. Their first consideration should, therefore, be the establishment of several places d'armes, the organisation of a numerous corps of Circassians, and the union of the mountaineers against Russia. This accomplished, an advance against the Kuban should follow; and when the Russian forces were repulsed behind the Don, their military road across the Caucasus should be menaced. Simultaneously with operations on the Kuban, and along the coast of the Sea of Azoff, a corps, assisted by the Turkish forces at Sakum Kale and Redout Kale, should attempt the occupation of the Rion valley; and if successful, execute a march upon Teflis conjointly with the main army of the Turks, which would put an end to the Russian rule in the Caucasus."

Were this point once obtained, with the Crimea in the hands of the Allies, we conceive the objects of the war would be gained. Russia would be humiliated and crippled, and her contemplated promenades to Constantinople and to Hindostan (via the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf) would be effectually interrupted. If Georgia was restored to independence, civil and political; Circassia supported by assistance in arms and ammunition; free traffic established in the eastern ports of the Euxine and the Sea of Azoff; the Crimea put in safe keeping; and the mouth of the Danube opened, the interests of civilisation would be secured from Russian aggression in the East. A firm Swedish alliance would provide equal security in the NorthWest; and Germany would be placed in all the better condition to constitute herself, if she pleased, the champion of the liberty of Central Europe. With so much accomplished by themselves, the Allies would do well to allow Austria and Prussia to consider that matter at their leisure. A difficulty might indeed arise in getting the former power out of the Danubian Principalities, but we are not inclined to fear that it would prove very formidable. There would also be some trouble in arranging a government for Wallachia and Moldavia, and in settling for the keeping of the Crimea; points into a consideration of which it is not now in our power to enter. It is not impossible that they might prove to be the beginning of another end.

"NoT come, Craggs!" said Harcourt, as, late on the Saturday evening, the Corporal stepped on shore, after crossing the Lough.

"No, sir, no sign of him. I sent a boy away to the top of the Devil's Mother,' where you have a view of the road for eight miles, but there was nothing to be seen."

"You left orders at the post-office to have a boat in readiness if he arrived ?"

"Yes, Colonel," said he, with a military salute; and Harcourt now turned moodily towards the Castle.

Glencore had scarcely ever been a very cheery residence, but latterly it had become far gloomier than before. Since the night of Lord Glencore's sudden illness, there had grown up a degree of constraint between them, which, to a man of Harcourt's disposition, was positive torture. They seldom met, save at dinner, and then their reserve was painfully evident.

The boy, too, in unconscious imitatation of his father, grew more and more distant; and poor Harcourt saw himself in that position, of all others the most intolerable the unwilling guest of an unwilling host.

"I have said every one of these things over to myself, Harcourt; but they don't satisfy me. This is a habit with Upton. I've seen him do the same with his Colonel, when he was a subaltern; I've heard of his arriving late to a court dinner, and only smil ing at the dismay of the horrified courtiers."

"Egad," said Harcourt, bluntly, "I don't see the advantage of the practice. One is so certain of doing fifty things in this daily life to annoy one's friends, through mere inadvertence or forgetfulness, that I think it is but sorry fun to incur their ill-will by malice prepense."

"That is precisely why he does it." "Come, come, Glencore; old Rixson was right when he said-Heaven help the man whose merits are canvassed while they wait dinner for him.' I'll order up the soup, for if we wait any longer we'll discover Upton to be the most worthless vagabond that ever

walked."

"I know his qualities, good and bad," said Glencore, rising and pacing the room with slow, uncertain steps; "few men know him better. None need tell me of his abilities; none need instruct me as to his faults. What others do by accident, he does by design. He started in life by examining how much the world would bear from him; he has gone on, profiting by the experience, and improving on the practice."

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