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possibility of obtaining any satisfactory information, and that he considered the occupation of Perekop as an introductory step to operations neither advisable nor practicable. This much is certain, tbat on the very day of departure for the Crimea, he knew as little of the peninsula as at the time when he despatched the above-mentioned report to London."
At a council of war convened at Varna in the beginning of August, the details of the undertaking were discussed, and
Ferhat Pasha spoke decidedly as to the state of affairs there, and guaranteed the conquest of Grusia and Mingrelia in the course of two months; also the rising of the mountaineers, and the expulsion of the Russians from all the territory lying between the Euxine and the Caspian Sea, south of the Caucasus. He concluded by suggesting that the campaign in the Crimea should, after due preparations, and with larger forces, be undertaken next spring, commencing at Kertch and Kaffa, and supported by the army of Asia. St. Arnaud at first seemed to concur in these suggestions; but referring to the proclamation already issued, he declared that it was now too late to make any alterations. Thus the second council of war turned out to be a mere farce.
All the English officers present were apparently caught with the plan of taking Sebastopol, and became the most zealous supporters of St. Arnaud's opinion."
“ It was now incumbent on Lord Raglan, who held discretionary power from his Government, to state his conviction as to the difficulties which, in his opinion, still stood in the way of the undertaking; in which he would have been supported by Prince Napoleon, as well as by the Duke of Cambridge, and also by the admirals of both France and England. But a few imperious remarks from St. Arnaud, calculated to work a cbange of opinion in the Council, were sufficient to dissipate Lord Raglau's scruples, who, berides, being pressed by the young ofiicers of his staff, gave his full consent to the French plan of operations."
Why the latter part of Ferhat Pasha's advice should not have been adopted, seems now the more incomprehensible, in that the revelations of the Moniteur shov it to have been in accordance with the advice of the Emperor, which pointed to Kaffa as the most eligible spot for landing :
Here were the timides avis subsequently referred to in so pointed a manner by the Imperial designer of the enterprise. They were again, it would seem, urged upon better information and more specific reasons than could have iufluenced the English general:
“ First, its bay is vast and safe; it would hold all the vessels of the squadron, and the vessels with provisions for the troops. Secondly, once established on that point, it might be made a real basis før operations. In tbus occupying the eastern point of the Crimen, all the reinforcements coming by the sea of Azoff and the Caucasus could be cut off. A gradual advance could be made towards the centre of the country, taking advantage of all its resources. Simpleropol, the strategic centre of the peninsula, would be occupied. An advance would then be made on Sebastopol, and, probally, a great battle fought on that road. If lost, a retreat in yood order on Kaffa, and nothing is compromised; if gained, to besiege Sebastopol, to invest it completely, and its surrender would follow, as a matter of course, in a short interval."
“At the end of August, some time after the issue of the French marshal's proclamation (warning the enemy, in choice fustian, to provide for his defence), a second council of war was held at Varna. As the expedition had been fixed, as well as the dispositions sketclied out, and the troops acquainted with their task, it is difficult to come to a conclusion as to the real purport of a second deliberation on the matter. Amongst the members of this council of war was Ferhat Pasha, who formerly, under his real name of Baron Stein, served as an Austrian en. gincer officer; and later, in the Hungarian army, attained the rank of general, and wlio, from liis acquaintance with the Crimea, was invited to take part in the deliberations. Ferhat l'asha pointed out all the dangers of the expedition, and suggested that, as the season was so far advanced, the Allies had better give up the proposed scheme, at any rate for the year, and employ about twothirds of their troops in an attack upon Trans-Caucasia, leaving the rest as a reserve in Rounelia on the Danube. Having so lately returned from the seat of war in Asia,
That this advice was sound, bas been proved by the result of the operations in the sea of Azoff during the present summer. Unfortunately it was neglected, and the expedition was entered upon as a mere foray, unregulated by strategic plan of any kind, and without adequate preparation. The enterprise could not be called a coup de main, for the whole world was advertised of what was to be done a month before its execution was attempted. On the other hand, a first
disembarkation upon an enemy's coast
reconnaisanice would have assisted them in a in the middle of September, without better arrangement of the plan of battle. wagons, stores, or provisions, was not, Here, on the contrary, protracted reconnoiin a military sense, the opening of a
terings led to perpetual indecision and preregular campaign. No information
paration, and finally, to a formal siege,
which had never entered the calculation of was obtained as to the strength and
the Allies in the original plan of the expedie position of the Russian forces; and the
tion. One daring and rapid blow, even at simple precaution of cutting off the
a heavy sacritice, might still in the present enemy's supplies of men, material, and
state of affairs have led to a favourable issue, provisions, by taking possession of the and if the Allies had not had determination sea of Azoff, was disregarded, without enough at once to have recourse to such an even the unsoldierlike excuse of igno- extreme expedient, they ought immediately rance or inadvertence. In this way, to have returned to their vessels. Pelissier, upon the 14th and 15th of September, the present French Commander-in-chief, the allied army, consisting of 27,000
would, in all probability, have teen the very English, 25,000 French, and 8,000
man for such a contingency. Both Canrobert
and Lord Raglan were wanting in energy; they Turks, was thrown upon shore at Old
thought such an act of daring did not tally Fort-our troops without tents or bag
with their conscience and the responsibility gage — and as many as escaped the
devolving upon them. How incomparably horrors of a night of incessant rain, in
more victims has the winter campaign cost which some 1,500 English were put the Allies, than a bold assault under the hors de combat, wandered on along the protection of some easily-constructed battecoast towards Sebastopol.
ries at the end of September !" It is not our intention to offer any comment upon the much criticised In justice to Lord Raglan's memory, tactics of the battle of the Alma. It it is right to mention that the cautious was won by the strength and spirit of policy was supported by the opinions the troops under very unfavourable and promises of the professional encircumstances of position and prepara- gineers, whose self-sufficient pedantry tion, and a chance was thus given to was nevertheless the laughing-stock of the generals to redeem their character the army. It was a common joke that for strategic ability, of which, how- those gentlemen would not suffer the ever, they did not avail themselves.
troops to go into the place until such After two days of deliberation, the preparation could be made by the gararmy advanced on the 23rd of Septem- rison as would afford them a decent ber, the third day after the battle, and opportunity of exhibiting the value of there is every reason to believe that their art; and we have good authority they might then have attempted an for stating, that Sir John Burgoyne assault upon Sebastopol with a good pledged himself, without affectation of promise of success. They were aware mystery, to take the town, without that Prince Menschikoff, with the re- giving the soldiers any work to do, in mains of the army they had defeated eight days. Everyone knows how at the Alma, bad moved inland, and those promises have turned out, and circumstances warranted them in sur- at what a lamentable cost that display mising, what is now known, that the of engineering skill was made. When garrison of the place was so much the idea of a coup de main was aban. weakened as to render it improbable doned, and the Allies had, by their cethey could resist a bold attack by lebrated flank march, secured a basis troops inspirited by victory, and im- leaning upon the sea at Balaklava and pressed with the necessity of providing Kamiesch, the position of the army for winter quarters. That advantage soon became very critical.
It was should have been taken of the surprise shortly discovered, by the experience into wbich the enemy was thrown was of the 17th of October, that no deci. the general opinion of the army, and sive issue was to be expected from a it was shared in and expressed by the bombardment. The flank march of late gallant and lamented Sir George Prince Menschikoff had proved to be a Cathcart :
most successful manæuvre; he had re
ceived large reinforcements from the " But instead of this (says Klapka) they army of the Danube, whose work was took to protracted recomjoitering, in this
done by the Austrian occupation of case overdoing what had been utterly disre- the Principalities, and he was towards garded on the Alma, where a more acéurate the end of October in a condition to
threaten the besiegers from the rear. other half of it, including its citadel, The results were, the aflair of Bala- should remain uninvested and free for klava, on the 25th of that month, and unrestricted egress and ingress to the the battle of Inkermann on the 5th of garrison, and a large relieving army November, upon both of which occa- advantageously posted without. In sions the Allies were saved from the that Sisyphean labour the whole spring consequences of unskilful generalship was wasted, and it was only in the by the heroism of their troops. It was beginning of May it seems to have nevertheless but an escape, for by the occurred to some one that it would be movement upon Balaklava the Russians a good thing to make an attempt to had obtained command of the main interrupt the continual conveyance of line of communication between the stores and reinforcements into the English camp and the sea, and had town. The idea was probably sug. securely established their own position gested by a fortunate reminiscence of on the left bank of the Tchernaya, the Emperor's instructions, or of Ferwithin an hour's march of the English hat Pacha's counsel, and accordingly a head-quarters. From thenceforward fleet of screw-steamers, having on board there was no longer any thought of a a force of 12,000 bayonets, with artilplan of campaign among the allied lery, and a small body of cavalry, commanders-a dogged deterinination quitted the ports of Balaklava and to stay and fight was their only re- Kamieschi, and steamed in the direc. maining idea ; and we venture again to tion of the Sea of Azoff. On the morndiffer from General Klapka in thinking ing of the 5th May, a portion of the it was the best determination at which fleet was already within sight of their they could have arrived. After the destination, when an express-steamer, 5th of November but two other courses bearing despatches to Admiral Bruat, were open to them-one, which was hove in sight, and having run along. proposed at a council of war held the side the admiral's ship, it was disco. next day, being to take advantage of vered that her errand was to counterthe disheartening effect of the battle mand the expedition. We have not upon the enemy, and to attempt im. as yet any information as to the cause mediately a general storm ; the other of this remarkable act of folly, but it to retire at once to their ships. Nei- was immediately followed by the rether of these measures would, we be- tirement of General Canrobert from lieve, have been successful. Lord the position of Commander-in-Chief, Raglan was right in opposing the his unfitness for wbich he had demonadoption of the first as hopeless in the strated from the outset. On the 24th weakened condition of his army ; and of May the enterprise was resumed, the second could scarcely have been and was then carried out with com. completely accomplished at that season plete success. Kertch and Yenikale of the year, and with the available were taken, and the latter was occumeans of transport. Neither were the pied; a large quantity of stores and Russians so much weakened as to give provisions, and a fleet of transports, reasonable ground to expect that the engaged in their conveyance to the attempt would not invite another, and Crimea from the various ports of the possibly, an overwhelming attack. The Sea of Azoff, were destroyed; and certainty of disgrace would, therefore, Anapa, the last fortress held by the not have been balanced by a fair Russians in the Black Sea, was abanchance of safety in retreat.
doned by its garrison. It was a truly During the whole of the winter fortunate inspiration that led to this there was a suspension of operations at operation, but it must not be forgot. the seat of war, and the attention of ten that it was the solitary feat of strathe Governments was occupied by ex. tegy performed during a campaign of crtions for the reinforcement of the eleven months. A post of observation army and the improvement of its ad- had indeed been maintained at Eupa. ministration. No larger plan seems toria from the period of the landing of to have been thought of, either by the Allies, and some 30,000 Turks, minister or general, and towards the under the command of Omar Pasha end of March the engineers again set had been moved thither from the Da. themselves to a formal prosecution of nube during the winter; but they had their design of taking one side of Se- performed no service whatsoever, bebastopol by sap and nine, while the yond entrenching themselves, and oc
cupying a small corps of Russian ca- ration of the Bath. A similar disin. valry in watching their movements. clination to hear troublesome news No reconnaisance or diversion was at. from Sir De Laèy Evans left the tempted, and although the despatches heights of Inkermann unprotected ten of Lord Raglan constantly reported days later, and gave occasion for the the passage of long trains of wagons largest portion of the loss sustained in carrying stores into the town, in the the bloody surprise of the 5th of No. open day, and within sight of his lines, vember. But we need not multiply this is perhaps the only siege upon re- instances to prove what every reflectcord in which no attempt of any kind ing officer in the expedition will be was made to cut off or impede a single prepared to admit. Nor do we advert convoy. The nature of the country, to the subject with any desire to hurt doubtless, renders such operations dif. individual feelings, or to open up old ficult and hazardous; but the fact sores, but in all sincerity, with a view that no officer was thereby provoked to the future conduct of the war. We to try that mode of relieving the dul. are perfectly convinced that it would ness of a camp life, is, we think, sin. not be difficult to bring the army of the gular in the history of war. Nor does Crimea into a condition equal to that of it seem to us less surprising, that the the Duke of Wellington's, with which race of active officers, who in the old he could “ go anywhere, and do anyPeninsular war made it a matter of thing;” but for the attainment of that sport to purvey information for the consummation something more will be generals, seems to have had no succes. required in the general than amiable sors in the Crimea. The small stock manners, or the most antique personal of information as to the condition of heroism. He must bave formed a the enemy, which Lord Raglan had plan of the war, and a conception in when he sailed from Varna, was sup- his own mind of its scope and objects; plied to him by the minister at home; and he must also be able to impress and it does not appear that he ever in- upon the mind of every officer and creased it by a single item. Surtout, man in the army that such is the fact point de zele, was Talleyrand's warning that he has a definite end in view as to a young diplomatist, and the maxim the general object of bis operations ; seems to have been appreciated by that it is worthy of pursuit amid all old and young soldiers during this te- difficulties and misadventures; and dious campaign.
They went to the that bis inventive genius fits him to wars to fire guns and dig trenches, cope with or elude these. Such a and they performed those duties ho- commander, we venture to say, would nestly and bravely; but a thought that never want agents, able and willing, anything more was comprehended in to provide him with information, to the military art does not seem to have assist him in devising expedients in crossed the minds of the generals or emergencies, or to do his bidding their staff, and of course there was unhesitatingly and faithfully. His but small encouragement given to the troops would scarcely suffer such hard. development among the subordinate ships as those which pressed down officers of such sporting propensities our army last winter; nor would their as those to which we have alludeil. operations have been a mere duel of Nay, the disposition to communicate artillery, undistinguished by a single intelligence seems to have been posi. skilful mancuvre. tively discouraged at head-quarters, if The events of the three months that we may judge from the manner in followed the expedition to the sea of which Lord Lucan's message, carried Azoff, were not of a nature in any way by his son and aide.de-camp, on the calculated to alter our estimate of the 24th of October, was dealt with by general management of the campaign. the Quartermaster-general. The ne- The siege works were continued with glect of that communication was un- the unflinching perseverance displayed questionably the remote cause of the throughout; the calamitous failure of fatal occurrences of the succeeding the 18th of June showed a defect in day, yet the mention of it by Lord the power of combination and design, Lucan, in his own defence, attracted even within the narrow scope of that no public or official attention, and the operation ; the battle of the Tchernaya officer referred to was but a few days was a sarprise similar to that of Inkersince specially invested with the deco. mann, though bappily less complete.
These last two affairs further displayed lity prevented the striking of a blow upon a want of readiness to seize unexpected the retreating Russians which might advantages, the full possession of which, have terminated the war ; wbile, by it must be acknowledged, is the con- penning up the Allies in the deadly summation of a perfect military cha- camp of Devno, it actually forced them racter. In the assault of the 18th of to undertake the expedition to the June, General Eyre converted a de- Crimea. There, as we have seen, monstration into a real attack, and event led to event, unguided by design, drove the enemy from an important until the act was closed by a most imposition, which he occupied, four com- portant success, finally purchased by a panies of the Royal Irish Regiment sacrifice of ten thousand men, the riskbeing actually in possession of the ingof which, in the corresponding month suburb for seventeen hours. This of last year, would, in all human proachievement, however, not being com- bability, have led to a like result, and prised in the scheme of the assault, the spared the prodigious losses of the inGeneral was not supported, and was tervening twelvemonth. The formaforced to withdraw. Considering the tion of a comprehensive plan, political heavy losses inflicted upon the Rus- and strategical, is now scarcely avoid. sians by our gallant Allies at the able, and we shall presently revert to Tchernaya, it seems difficult to com- its consideration. In the meantime, a prebend why the enemy should have slight glance at the conduct of affairs been allowed to draw off his 'broken in the other seats of this multiform war, columns without even an attempt being will be sufficient to show that they made to convert his repulse into a de. afford no more satisfactory indications feat. It would appear as if but one of a ruling design than the operations idea could find room in the minds of we have been reviewing. the commanders, and was not to be In the East, the whole interest bas set aside for a moment to make way long since centered in the struggle at for a new scheme, however promising Sebastopol, but slightly diversified by
. At all events, the merit of tenacity of the ancillary operations in the sea of purpose must be accorded to the be- Azoff. Omar Pasha's army, reduced siegers, and, under all the circumstances, to inactivity by the Austrian occupaa great merit it must be considered. tion of the Principalities, has been disIt was rewarded on the 8th and 9th of persed, and its fragments, located at last month, by the attainment of the Eupatoria, Yenikale, and before Sebas. object held in view, through every dif- topol, have contributed little or no acficulty and discouragement, for an entire tive assistance to the common cause. year. By the capture of the city, arsenal In Asia, the war opened with so much and suburb of Sebastopol, the first act promise by the surprise of the Russian of the Crimean expedition was brought fort of St. Nicholas, in October, 1853, to a close, and that manifestly without soon sank into insignificance, and was any scheme for the development of the almost entirely suspended during the plot having been formed in the minds year that elapsed between July, 1854, of the managers. From the beginning, and the same month of the present each scene led to that which followed
year. Neglected by the Western Alby a concatenation of events for the lies, and mismanaged by the Govern. most part of a character very different ment, the Turkish army dwindled away from that intended to be impressed under the incompetent and corrupt adupon them. A tedious prologue of ministration of its officers, without any diplomacy, meant to introduce peace, important blow being struck upon ei. was followed by a military promenade ther side. Recently, however, the to the East. The entrenchment at resumption of active hostilities in the Gallipoli, designed for a demonstration neighbourhood of Kars and Erzeroum, of the weakness of the Ottoman na- has
attracted attention to that quarter, tion and an ostentatious show of pro- and it is to be boped that the vulnerabi. tecting it, led to the advance to Varna, lity of the enemy on his Trans-Caucasian to witness a triumph of Turkish patriot- frontier will receive due consideration ism and military spirit. The under- in the formation of a general plan for plot of the Convention of the 14th of the future conduct of this great strugJune, supposed to be craftily adapted gle. The abandonment of Anapa and to the establishment of Austria in the Sujuk Kaleh finished the demolition position of a peacemaker, in all probabi. of the Russian power on the Caucasian