possibility of obtaining any satisfactory information, and that he considered the occupation of Perekop as an introductory step to operations neither advisable nor practicable. This much is certain, that on the very day of departure for the Crimea, he knew as little of the peninsula as at the time when he despatched the above-mentioned report to London."

At a council of war convened at Varna in the beginning of August, the details of the undertaking were discussed, and

"It was now incumbent on Lord Raglan, who held discretionary power from his Government, to state his conviction as to the difficulties which, in his opinion, still stood in the way of the undertaking; in which he would have been supported by Prince Napoleon, as well as by the Duke of Cambridge, and also by the admirals of both France and England. But a few imperious remarks from St. Arnaud, calculated to work a change of opinion in the Council, were sufficient to dissipate Lord Raglan's scruples, who, besides, being pressed by the young officers of his staff, gave his full consent to the French plan of operations."

Here were the timides avis subsequently referred to in so pointed a manner by the Imperial designer of the enterprise. They were again, it would seem, urged upon better information and more specific reasons than could have influenced the English general:

"At the end of August, some time after the issue of the French marshal's proclamation [warning the enemy, in choice fustian, to provide for his defence], a second council of war was held at Varna. As the expedition had been fixed, as well as the dispositions sketched out, and the troops acquainted with their task, it is diflicult to come to a conclusion as to the real purport of a second deliberation on the matter. Amongst the members of this council of war was Ferhat Pasha, who formerly, under his real name of Baron Stein, served as an Austrian engineer officer; and later, in the Hungarian army, attained the rank of general, and who, from his acquaintance with the Crimea, was invited to take part in the deliberations. Ferhat Pasha pointed out all the dangers of the expedition, and suggested that, as the season was so far advanced, the Allies had better give up the proposed scheme, at any rate for the year, and employ about twothirds of their troops in an attack upon Trans-Caucasia, leaving the rest as a reserve in Roumelia on the Danube. Having so lately returned from the seat of war in Asia,

Ferhat Pasha spoke decidedly as to the state of affairs there, and guaranteed the conquest of Grusia and Mingrelia in the course of two months; also the rising of the mountaineers, and the expulsion of the Russians from all the territory lying between the Euxine and the Caspian Sea, south of the Caucasus. He concluded by suggesting that the campaign in the Crimea should, after due preparations, and with larger forces, be undertaken next spring, commencing at Kertch and Kaffa, and supported by the army of Asia. St. Arnaud at first seemed to concur in these suggestions; but referring to the proclamation already issued, he declared that it was now too late to make any alterations. Thus the second council of war turned out to be a mere farce. All the English officers present were apparently caught with the plan of taking Sebastopol, and became the most zealous supporters of St. Arnaud's opinion."

Why the latter part of Ferhat Pasha's advice should not have been adopted, seems now the more incomprehensible, in that the revelations of the Moniteur show it to have been in accordance with the advice of the Emperor, which pointed to Kaffa as the most eligible spot for landing :

"First, its bay is vast and safe; it would hold all the vessels of the squadron, and the vessels with provisions for the troops. Secondly, once established on that point, it might be made a real basis for operations. In thus occupying the eastern point of the Crimea, all the reinforcements coming by the sea of Azoff and the Caucasus could be cut off. A gradual advance could be made towards the centre of the country, taking advantage of all its resources. Simpheropol, the strategic centre of the peninsula, would be occupied. An advance would then be made on Sebastopol, and, probably, a great battle fought on that road. If lost, a retreat in good order on Kaffa, and nothing is compromised; if gained, to besiege Sebastopol, to invest it completely, and its surrender would follow, as a matter of course, in a short interval."

That this advice was sound, bas been proved by the result of the operations in the sea of Azoff during the present summer. Unfortunately it was neglected, and the expedition was entered upon as a mere foray, unregulated by strategic plan of any kind, and without adequate preparation. The enterprise could not be called a coup de main, for the whole world was advertised of what was to be done a month before its execution was attempted. On the other hand, a first

disembarkation upon an enemy's coast in the middle of September, without wagons, stores, or provisions, was not, in a military sense, the opening of a regular campaign. No information was obtained as to the strength and position of the Russian forces; and the simple precaution of cutting off the enemy's supplies of men, material, and provisions, by taking possession of the sea of Azoff, was disregarded, without even the unsoldierlike excuse of ignorance or inadvertence. In this way, upon the 14th and 15th of September, the allied army, consisting of 27,000 English, 25,000 French, and 8,000 Turks, was thrown upon shore at Old Fort our troops without tents or baggage and as many as escaped the horrors of a night of incessant rain, in which some 1,500 English were put hors de combat, wandered on along the coast towards Sebastopol.

It is not our intention to offer any comment upon the much criticised tactics of the battle of the Alma. It was won by the strength and spirit of the troops under very unfavourable circumstances of position and preparation, and a chance was thus given to the generals to redeem their character for strategic ability, of which, however, they did not avail themselves. After two days of deliberation, the army advanced on the 23rd of September, the third day after the battle, and there is every reason to believe that they might then have attempted an assault upon Sebastopol with a good promise of success. They were aware that Prince Menschikoff, with the remains of the army they had defeated at the Alma, had moved inland, and circumstances warranted them in surmising, what is now known, that the garrison of the place was so much weakened as to render it improbable they could resist a bold attack by troops inspirited by victory, and impressed with the necessity of providing for winter quarters. That advantage should have been taken of the surprise into which the enemy was thrown was the general opinion of the army, and it was shared in and expressed by the late gallant and lamented Sir George Cathcart:

"But instead of this (says Klapka) they took to protracted reconnoitering, in this case overdoing what had been utterly disregarded on the Alma, where a more accurate

reconnaisance would have assisted them in a better arrangement of the plan of battle. Here, on the contrary, protracted reconnoiterings led to perpetual indecision and preparation, and finally, to a formal siege, which had never entered the calculation of the Allies in the original plan of the expedition. One daring and rapid blow, even at a heavy sacrifice, might still in the present state of affairs have led to a favourable issue, and if the Allies had not had determination enough at once to have recourse to such an extreme expedient, they ought immediately to have returned to their vessels. Pelissier, the present French Commander-in-chief, would, in all probability, have been the very man for such a contingency. Both Canrobert and Lord Raglan were wanting in energy; they thought such an act of daring did not tally with their conscience and the responsibility devolving upon them. How incomparably more victims has the winter campaign cost the Allies, than a bold assault under the protection of some easily-constructed batteries at the end of September!"

In justice to Lord Raglan's memory, it is right to mention that the cautious policy was supported by the opinions and promises of the professional engineers, whose self-sufficient pedantry was nevertheless the laughing-stock of the army. It was a common joke that those gentlemen would not suffer the troops to go into the place until such preparation could be made by the gar rison as would afford them a decent opportunity of exhibiting the value of their art; and we have good authority for stating, that Sir John Burgoyne pledged himself, without affectation of inystery, to take the town, without giving the soldiers any work to do, in eight days. Every one knows how those promises have turned out, and at what a lamentable cost that display of engineering skill was made. When the idea of a coup de main was abandoned, and the Allies had, by their celebrated flank march, secured a basis leaning upon the sea at Balaklava and Kamiesch, the position of the army soon became very critical. It was shortly discovered, by the experience of the 17th of October, that no decisive issue was to be expected from a bombardment. The flank march of Prince Menschikoff had proved to be a most successful manoeuvre; he had received large reinforcements from the army of the Danube, whose work was done by the Austrian occupation of the Principalities, and he was towards the end of October in a condition to

threaten the besiegers from the rear. The results were, the aflair of Balaklava, on the 25th of that month, and the battle of Inkermann on the 5th of November, upon both of which occasions the Allies were saved from the consequences of unskilful generalship by the heroism of their troops. It was nevertheless but an escape, for by the movement upon Balaklava the Russians had obtained command of the main line of communication between the English camp and the sea, and had securely established their own position on the left bank of the Tehernaya, within an hour's march of the English head-quarters. From thenceforward there was no longer any thought of a plan of campaign among the allied commanders-a dogged determination to stay and fight was their only remaining idea; and we venture again to differ from General Klapka in thinking it was the best determination at which they could have arrived. After the 5th of November but two other courses were open to them-one, which was proposed at a council of war held the next day, being to take advantage of the disheartening effect of the battle upon the enemy, and to attempt immediately a general storm; the other to retire at once to their ships. Neither of these measures would, we believe, have been successful. Lord Raglan was right in opposing the adoption of the first as hopeless in the weakened condition of his army; and the second could scarcely have been completely accomplished at that season of the year, and with the available means of transport. Neither were the Russians so much weakened as to give reasonable ground to expect that the attempt would not invite another, and possibly, an overwhelming attack. The certainty of disgrace would, therefore, not have been balanced by a fair chance of safety in retreat.

During the whole of the winter there was a suspension of operations at the seat of war, and the attention of the Governments was occupied by exertions for the reinforcement of the army and the improvement of its administration. No larger plan seems to have been thought of, either by minister or general, and towards the end of March the engineers again set themselves to a formal prosecution of their design of taking one side of Sebastopol by sap and mine, while the

other half of it, including its citadel, should remain uninvested and free for unrestricted egress and ingress to the garrison, and a large relieving army advantageously posted without. In that Sisyphean labour the whole spring was wasted, and it was only in the beginning of May it seems to have occurred to some one that it would be a good thing to make an attempt to interrupt the continual conveyance of stores and reinforcements into the town. The idea was probably sug gested by a fortunate reminiscence of the Emperor's instructions, or of Ferhat Pacha's counsel, and accordingly a fleet of screw-steamers, having on board a force of 12,000 bayonets, with artillery, and a small body of cavalry, quitted the ports of Balaklava and Kamiesch, and steamed in the direc tion of the Sea of Azoff. On the morning of the 5th May, a portion of the fleet was already within sight of their destination, when an express-steamer, bearing despatches to Admiral Bruat, hove in sight, and having run alongside the admiral's ship, it was discovered that her errand was to countermand the expedition. We have not as yet any information as to the cause of this remarkable act of folly, but it was immediately followed by the retirement of General Canrobert from the position of Commander-in-Chief, his unfitness for which he had demonstrated from the outset. On the 24th of May the enterprise was resumed, and was then carried out with complete success. Kertch and Yenikale were taken, and the latter was occupied; a large quantity of stores and provisions, and a fleet of transports, engaged in their conveyance to the Crimea from the various ports of the Sea of Azoff, were destroyed; and Anapa, the last fortress held by the Russians in the Black Sea, was abandoned by its garrison. It was a truly fortunate inspiration that led to this operation, but it must not be forgotten that it was the solitary feat of strategy performed during a campaign of eleven months. A post of observation had indeed been maintained at Eupatoria from the period of the landing of the Allies, and some 30,000 Turks, under the command of Omar Pasha had been moved thither from the Danube during the winter; but they had performed no service whatsoever, be yond entrenching themselves, and oc.

cupying a small corps of Russian cavalry in watching their movements. No reconnaisance or diversion was attempted, and although the despatches of Lord Raglan constantly reported the passage of long trains of wagons carrying stores into the town, in the open day, and within sight of his lines, this is perhaps the only siege upon record in which no attempt of any kind was made to cut off or impede a single convoy. The nature of the country, doubtless, renders such operations dif ficult and hazardous; but the fact that no officer was thereby provoked to try that mode of relieving the dulness of a camp life, is, we think, singular in the history of war. Nor does it seem to us less surprising, that the race of active officers, who in the old Peninsular war made it a matter of sport to purvey information for the generals, seems to have had no succes sors in the Crimea. The small stock of information as to the condition of the enemy, which Lord Raglan had when he sailed from Varna, was supplied to him by the minister at home; and it does not appear that he ever increased it by a single item. Surtout, point de zele, was Talleyrand's warning to a young diplomatist, and the maxim seems to have been appreciated by old and young soldiers during this te dious campaign. They went to the wars to fire guns and dig trenches, and they performed those duties honestly and bravely; but a thought that anything more was comprehended in the military art does not seem to have crossed the minds of the generals or their staff, and of course there was but small encouragement given to the development among the subordinate officers of such sporting propensities as those to which we have alluded. Nay, the disposition to communicate intelligence seems to have been positively discouraged at head-quarters, if we may judge from the manner in which Lord Lucan's message, carried by his son and aide-de-camp, on the 24th of October, was dealt with by the Quartermaster-general. The neglect of that communication was unquestionably the remote cause of the fatal occurrences of the succeeding day, yet the mention of it by Lord Lucan, in his own defence, attracted no public or official attention, and the officer referred to was but a few days since specially invested with the deco

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ration of the Bath. A similar disinelination to hear troublesome news from Sir De Lacy Evans left the heights of Inkermann unprotected ten days later, and gave occasion for the largest portion of the loss sustained in the bloody surprise of the 5th of November. But we need not multiply instances to prove what every reflecting officer in the expedition will be prepared to admit. Nor do we advert to the subject with any desire to hurt individual feelings, or to open up old sores, but in all sincerity, with a view to the future conduct of the war. We are perfectly convinced that it would not be difficult to bring the army of the Crimea into a condition equal to that of the Duke of Wellington's, with which he could go anywhere, and do anything;" but for the attainment of that consummation something more will be required in the general than amiable manners, or the most antique personal heroism. He must have formed a plan of the war, and a conception in his own mind of its scope and objects; and he must also be able to impress upon the mind of every officer and man in the army that such is the factthat he has a definite end in view as the general object of his operations; that it is worthy of pursuit amid all difficulties and misadventures; and that his inventive genius fits him to cope with or elude these. Such a commander, we venture to say, would never want agents, able and willing, to provide him with information, to assist him in devising expedients in emergencies, or to do his bidding unhesitatingly and faithfully. troops would scarcely suffer such hardships as those which pressed down our army last winter; nor would their operations have been a mere duel of artillery, undistinguished by a single skilful manœuvre.

His

The events of the three months that followed the expedition to the sea of Azoff, were not of a nature in any way calculated to alter our estimate of the general management of the campaign. The siege works were continued with the unflinching perseverance displayed throughout; the calamitous failure of the 18th of June showed a defect in the power of combination and design, even within the narrow scope of that operation; the battle of the Tchernaya was a surprise similar to that of Inkermann, though happily less complete.

These last two affairs further displayed a want of readiness to seize unexpected advantages, the full possession of which, it must be acknowledged, is the consummation of a perfect military character. In the assault of the 18th of June, General Eyre converted a demonstration into a real attack, and drove the enemy from an important position, which he occupied, four companies of the Royal Irish Regiment being actually in possession of the suburb for seventeen hours. This achievement, however, not being comprised in the scheme of the assault, the General was not supported, and was forced to withdraw. Considering the heavy losses inflicted upon the Russians by our gallant Allies at the Tchernaya, it seems difficult to comprehend why the enemy should have been allowed to draw off his 'broken columns without even an attempt being made to convert his repulse into a defeat. It would appear as if but one idea could find room in the minds of the commanders, and was not to be set aside for a moment to make way for a new scheme, however promising. At all events, the merit of tenacity of purpose must be accorded to the besiegers, and, under all the circumstances, a great merit it must be considered. It was rewarded on the 8th and 9th of last month, by the attainment of the object held in view, through every dif ficulty and discouragement, for an entire year. By the capture of the city, arsenal and suburb of Sebastopol, the first act of the Crimean expedition was brought to a close, and that manifestly without any scheme for the development of the plot having been formed in the minds of the managers. From the beginning, each scene led to that which followed by a concatenation of events for the most part of a character very different from that intended to be impressed upon them. A tedious prologue of diplomacy, meant to introduce peace, was followed by a military promenade to the East. The entrenchment at Gallipoli, designed for a demonstration of the weakness of the Ottoman nation and an ostentatious show of protecting it, led to the advance to Varna, to witness a triumph of Turkish patriotism and military spirit. The underplot of the Convention of the 14th of June, supposed to be craftily adapted to the establishment of Austria in the position of a peacemaker, in all probabi

lity prevented the striking of a blow upon the retreating Russians which might have terminated the war; while, by penning up the Allies in the deadly camp of Devno, it actually forced them to undertake the expedition to the Crimea. There, as we have seen, event led to event, unguided by design, until the act was closed by a most important success, finally purchased by a sacrifice of ten thousand men, the risking of which,in the corresponding month of last year, would, in all human probability, have led to a like result, and spared the prodigious losses of the intervening twelvemonth. The formation of a comprehensive plan, political and strategical, is now scarcely avoidable, and we shall presently revert to its consideration. In the meantime, a slight glance at the conduct of affairs in the other seats of this multiform war, will be sufficient to show that they afford no more satisfactory indications of a ruling design than the operations we have been reviewing.

In the East, the whole interest has long since centered in the struggle at Sebastopol, but slightly diversified by the ancillary operations in the sea of Azoff. Omar Pasha's army, reduced to inactivity by the Austrian occupation of the Principalities, has been dispersed, and its fragments, located at Eupatoria, Yenikale, and before Sebastopol, have contributed little or no active assistance to the common cause. In Asia, the war opened with so much promise by the surprise of the Russian fort of St. Nicholas, in October, 1853, soon sank into insignificance, and was almost entirely suspended during the year that elapsed between July, 1854, and the same month of the present year. Neglected by the Western Allies, and mismanaged by the Government, the Turkish army dwindled away under the incompetent and corrupt administration of its officers, without any important blow being struck upon either side. Recently, however, the resumption of active hostilities in the neighbourhood of Kars and Erzeroum, has attracted attention to that quarter, and it is to be hoped that the vulnerability of the enemy on his Trans-Caucasian frontier will receive due consideration in the formation of a general plan for the future conduct of this great strug gle. The abandonment of Anapa and Sujuk Kaleh finished the demolition of the Russian power on the Caucasian