this Meeting will give their best assistance | knowledge he has of the country, that it to the same end."-Agreed to. The thanks of the Meeting were then voted to the Chairman, after which the assembly immediately broke up. OFFICIAL PAPERS. BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. (Continued from page 446.) army, or such as belonged to individuals who had no right to have them, or to such who had a greater number than they are allowed. I did not hesitate making use of this means, the imminent interest of the army and the success of the operations being at stake. I therefore ordered the seizure of such horses as were under this predicament, and I likewise seized a great number which were with a convoy coming from Andalusia, all upon estimation of their value, and making payment for them. This measure, executed with security, gave us, in the space of eight days, 1,000 more horsemen, and my cavalry united amount ed to more than 3,000 combatants. Meanwhile I no less hoped to receive succours from the army of the North, which continued its promises, the performance of which appeared to have commenced, but of which we have not hitherto seen any effect. The 8th division of the army of Portugal occupied the Asturias; these troops were completely isolated from the army; by the evacuation of the provinces of Leon and Benavente they were without succours, and without any communication with the Army of the North; because on the one side the Trindadores, who should have come from Bayonne, could not be sent to Gijon; and, on the other side, the General in Chief of the Army of the North, although he had formally promised so doing, had caused himself to be dispensed with, throwing a bridge over the Deba, and there to establish posts. This division had been able to bring only very little ammunition, for want of means of carriage, and this was in part consumed; nor did they know how to replace it: its position might every moment become more critical, and the enemy seriously occupied himself with it, inasmuch as if it were still thus isolated, it would remain entirely ignorant of the important events which were taking place in the plains of Castille. General Bonnet, calculating on this state of matters, and considering, according to the is much easier to enter, than depart out of it, according as the enemy might oppose the entrance or departure, he decided on evacuating this province, and on taking a position at Reynosa; there having learnt that the Army of Portugal was in presence of the English army, and that they were on the point of engaging, he did not hesitate on putting himself in motion and rejoining it.--Strongly impressed with this important succour and the augmentation which my cavalry was about to receive, not having learnt any thing positive further concerning the Army of the North, and being besides informed of the march of the army of Gallicia, which in the course of a few days would necessarily force me to send a detachment to repulse them, I thought it my duty to act without delay. I had to fear that my situation, which was become much ameliorated, might change by losing time, whilst that of the enemy would, by the nature of things, become better every moment; I therefore resolved on repassing the Douro, but this operation is difficult and delicate, it cannot be undertaken without much art and circumspection in presence of an army in condition for battle. I employed the days of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th July in making a number of marches and countermarches, which deceived the enemy. feigned an intention to turn by Toro and turned by Tordesillas, making an extremely rapid march. This movement succeeded so well that the whole army could pass the river, move to a distance from it, and form itself without meeting a single enemy.- -On the 17th the army took a position at Navarre del Rey. The enemy, who was in full march for Toro, could only bring two divisions with celerity to Tordesillas de la Orden; the others were recalled from different parts, to recruit themselves. On the 18th, in the morning, we found these two divisions at Tordesillas de la Orden. As they did not expect to find the whole army joined, they thought they might, without peril, gain some time. Nevertheless, when they saw our masses coming forward, they endeavoured to effect their retreat to a plain which commanded a village to which we were marching. We had already reached them. If I had had a cavalry superior or equal to that of the enemy, these two divisions would have been destroyed. We did not, however, pursue them the less, and with all possible vigour, and during I three hours' march, they were overpowered | higher Guarena, to return by a rapid movement upon the position they should have abandoned. The enemy followed my movement. On the 20th, before day, the army was in motion to ascend the Guarena. The advanced guard rapidly passed that river at that part where it is but a river, and occupied the commencement of an immense piece of ground, which continues without any undulation to nearly Salamanca. The enemy endeavoured to occupy the same ground, but could not succeed: then he attempted to follow a parallel rising ground, connected with the position they had just quitted, and which every where offered them a position, provided I should have marched towards them. The two armies thus marched pa by the fire of our artillery, which I caused to take them in the rear and flank, and which they could with difficulty answer, and protected by their numerous cavalry, they divided themselves to reascend the Guarena, in order to pass it with greater facility.- -Arrived upon the heights of the valley of Guarena, we saw that a portion of the English army was formed upon the left bank of that river. In that place the heights of that valley are very rugged, and the valley a middling breadth. Whether it was necessary for the troops to approach the water on account of the excessive heat, or whether it was from some other cause of which I am ignorant, the English General had placed the greater part of them in the bottom of the valleyrallel with all possible celerity, always within half cannon shot of the heights of which we were masters; I therefore, upon arriving, immediately ordered a battery of 40 pieces of artillery to be placed, which in a moment forced the enemy to retire, after having left a great number of killed and wounded upon the place. The army marched in two columns, and I had given the command of the right column, distant from that of the left three-quarters of a league, to General Claussel. Arrived upon this ground, General Claussel, having few people before him, he thought he was able to seize upon the two rising grounds upon the left bank of the Guarena, and preserve them; but this attack was made with few troops; his troops had not halted, and scarcely formed; the enemy perceived it, marched upon the troops, which he had thus thrown in advance, and forced them to retreat.In this battle, which was of short duration, we experienced some loss. The division of dragoons which supported the infantry, vigorously charged all the English cavalry; but General Carree, a little too far advanced from the 13th regiment, fell into the enemy's power. The army remained in its position all the night of the 19th; it even remained in it all the day of the 20th. The extreme heat, and the fatigue experienced on the 18th, rendered this necessary to assemble the stragglers. -At four in the evening the army resumed their arms, and defiled by the left to proceed up the Guarena, and take a position in front of Almo. My intention was, at the same time, to threaten the enemy, and continue to proceed up the Guarena, in order to pass it with facility, or if the enemy marched in force upon the keeping their masses connected, in order to be every moment prepared for battle. The enemy thinking to be beforehand with us at the village of Cantalpeno, directed a column upon that village, in the hope of being before us upon the rising ground which commands it, and towards which we marched; but their expectations were deceived. The light cavalry, which I sent thither, and the Sth division, which was at the head of the column, marched so rapidly that the enemy were obliged to abandon it. Besides the road from the other plain approaching too close to ours, and that which we had having the advantage of commanding it, with some pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, greatly annoyed the enemy, for a great part of the army was obliged to defile under this cannon, and the remainder was obliged to repass the mountain to avoid it. At last I put the dragoons in the enemy's track. The enormous number of stragglers which were left behind would have given us an opportunity of making 3,000 prisoners, had there been a greater proportion between our cavalry and theirs, but the latter disposed so as to arrest our pursuit, to press the march of the infantry by blows from the flat sides of their sabres, and to convey those who could no longer march, prevented us. Nevertheless, there fell into our hand between 3 and 400 men and some baggage. In the evening the army encamped upon the heights of Aldea Rubia, having its posts upon the Tormes. The enemy re-occupied the position of San Christoval.- -On the 21st, having been informed that the enemy did not occupy Alba de Tormes, I threw a garrison into it. The same day I passed the river in two columns, taking my direction by the skirts of the woods, and establishing my camp between Alba de Tormes and Salamanca. My object in taking this direction was to continue the movement by my left, in order to drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of Salamanca and fight them with greater advantages. I depended upon taking a good defensive position, in which the enemy could undertake nothing against me, and, in short, come near enough to them to take advantage of the first faults they might make and vigorously attack them.On the 22d, in the morning, I went upon the heights of Calbaraca de Azzeva to reconnoitre the enemy. I found a division which had just arrived there, others were in march for the same place. Some firing took place, for the purpose of occupying the posts of observation, of which we respectively remained masters. Every thing announced that it was the enemy's intention to occupy the position of Tesares, which was a league in the rear of that in which he then was, distant a league and a half from Salamanca. They, however, assembled considerable forces upon this point, and as their movement upon Tesares might be difficult, if all the French army was in sight, I thought it right to have it ready to act as circumstances required.-There were between us and the English some isolated points, called the Aropiles. I ordered General Bonnet to occupy that which belonged to the position we ought to take; his troops did so with promptitude and dexterity. The enemy ordered theirs to be occupied, but it was commanded by ours at 250 toises distance. I had destined this point, in the event of there being a general movement by the left, and a battle taking place, to be the part and point of support of the right to all the army.-The first division had orders to occupy and defend the plain of Calbaraca, which is protected by a large and deep ravine. The third division was in the second line, destined to support it, and the 2d, 4th, 5th, and 6th were at the head of the wood en masse, behind the position of Aropiles, and could march equally on all sides, whilst the 7th division occupied the left head of the wood, which formed point extremely uneven, and of very difficult access, and which I had lined with 20 pieces of artillery. The light cavalry was charged to clear the left, and place itself in advance of the 7th division. The dragoons remained in the second line to the right of the army. Such were the dispositions made towards the middle of the day. a -The enemy had his troops parallel to me, extending his right by leaning towards the mountain of Tesares, which always appeared to be his point of retreat. There was in front of the plain occupied by the artillery another vast plain, easy of defence, and which had a more immediate effect on the enemy's movements. The possession of this place gave me the means, in case I should have manoeuvred towards the evening, of carrying myself on the enemy's communications on Tamames. This post, which was otherwise well occupied, was impregnable, and in itself completed the position which I had taken. It was, besides, indispensably necessary to occupy it, seeing that the enemy had reinforced his centre, from whence he might push forward en masse on this plain, and commence his attack by taking this important point.In consequence, I gave orders to the 5th division to take position on the right extremity of this plain, the fire from which exactly crossed that from Aropiles, to the 7th division, to place itself in a second line to support this, to the 2d to hold itself in reserve to the latter, and to the 6th to occupy the plain at the head of the wood, where a large number of pieces of artillery were yet remaining.I gave like orders to General Bonnet to cause the 122d to occupy a point situated between the great plain and the point of Aropiles, which defended the entrance of the village of Aropiles; and, finally, I gave orders to General Boyer, Commandant of the Dragoons, to leave a regiment to clear the right of the General, and to push the three other regiments to the front of the wood, on the flank of the second division, in such manner as to be able, in case the enemy should attack the plain, to attack them by the right of this plain, in the mean while that the light cavalry should charge his left. The most part of these movements were performed with irregularity. The fifth division, after having taken the post assigned to them, extended itself on its left without any cause or reason. The seventh division, which had orders to support it, marched to its position, and, in short, the second division was still in the rear. I felt all the consequences which might result from all these irregu→ larities, and I resolved on remedying them myself on the spot, which was a very easy matter, the enemy as yet not having made any movement at all. At the same time I received the report of the enemy having caused fresh troops to pass from his left to his right; I ordered the 3d and 4th divi sions to march by the skirts of the wood, in order that I might dispose them as I found needful. It was half past four o'clock, and I went to the place which was to be the object of a serious dispute, but at this moment a shell struck me, and broke my right arm, and made two large wounds in my right side. I thus became incapable of taking any kind of part in the command. -The previous time which I should have employed in rectifying the placing of the troops on the left, was fruitlessly passed, the absence of the Commander gives birth to anarchy, and from thence proceeds disorder; meanwhile the time was running away without the enemy undertaking any thing. At length, at five o'clock, the enemy, judging that the situation was favourable, attacked this ill-formed left wing with impetuosity. The divisions engaged repulsed the enemy, and were themselves repulsed in their turn, but they acted without concert and without method. The division which I had called to sustain the first, found themselves in the situation of taking part in the combat without having foreseen it. Every General makes extraordinary efforts to supply by his own particular dispositions, those which are in the whole requisite, but if he can attain it in part, yet he cannot effect it completely. The artillery covered itself with glory, performed prodigies of valour, and in the midst of our losses, caused the enemy to suffer enormously. He directed his attacks against Aropiles, which was defended by the brave 120th regiment, and was there repulsed, leaving more than eight hundred dead on the spot. At length the army retires, evacuates the plains, and retires to the skirts of the wood. There the enemy makes fresh efforts. The division of Foy, which, by the nature of the business, was charged with the covering of the retrograde movement, was attacked with vigour, and constantly repulsed the enemy. This division merits the greatest eulogy, as does likewise its General. From this moment the retreat was effected towards Alba de Tormes, without being disturbed by the enemy. Our loss amounts to about 6,000 men hors de combat.- -We have lost nine pieces of cannon, which being dismounted, could not be carried off. All the rest of the bag-particularly distinguished themselves.gage, all the park of artillery, all the materials belonging to the army have been brought away. -It is difficult, M. le Duc, to express to you the different sentiments which agitated me at the fatal moment when the wound which I received caused my removal from the army. I would with delight have exchanged this wound for the certainty of receiving a mortal stroke at the close of the day, to have preserved the faculty of command, so well did I know the importance of the events which had just taken place, and how necessary the presence of the Commander-in-Chief was at the moment when the shock of the two armies appeared to be preparing, to give the whole direction to the troops and to appoint their movements. Thus one unfortunate moment has destroyed the result of six weeks of wise combinations, of methodical movements, the issue of which had hitherto appeared certain, and of which every thing seemed to presage to us that we should reap the fruit. On the 23d the army made its retreat from Alba de Tormes on Penaranda, taking its direction towards the Douro. The whole of the enemy's cavalry harassed our rear, composed of the cavalry of the first division. This cavalry fell back, and left the division too much exposed, but it formed itself in squares to resist the enemy. One of them was broken; the others resisted, and especially that of the 69th, which killed 200 of the enemy's horse, by the push of the bayonet. After this time they made no attempt on us. -General Clausell has the command of the army, and takes such measures as circumstances require. I am going to have myself transported to Burgos, where I hope by repose and care taken, to recover of the severe wounds I have received, and which afflict me more from the dire influence which they have had on the success of the army, than from the sufferings which they have caused me to endure.I cannot do sufficient justice to the bravery with which the Generals and Colonels have fought; to the good disposition which animated them in that difficult circumstance. I ought particularly to mention General Bonnet, whose reputation has been so long established. should likewise name General Taufin, who commanded the sixth division; General Clausell, though wounded, did not quit the field of battle, but to the end gave an example of great personal bravery. The General of Artillery, Terlet, and Colonel Digeon, commanding the reserve of artillery, I In this day, unfortunate as it has been, there are a multitude of traits worthy of being noticed, and which honour the French name. I will collect them, and solicit from his Majesty rewards for the brave men who have deserved them.I ought not to de fer mentioning the gallant conduct of the brave Sub-Lieutenant Guillemat, of the 118th regiment, who sprung into the enemy's ranks to obtain a flag, which he seized, after having cut off the arm of the person who carried it; he has brought this flag into our ranks, notwithstanding the several bayonet wounds he has received.- -We have to regret the loss of the General of Division Fuey, dead of his wounds; of General Thomieres, killed upon the field of battle; and of General Desgravurs. Generals Bonnet and Clausell, and the General of Brigade Menne, are wounded.- -I beg your Excellency to receive the assurance of my high consideration. (Signed with the left hand) THE MARSHAL DUKE OF RAGUSA. the enemy. After the first movements of the English army, his Catholic Majesty, under whose orders were placed all the French armies in Spain, was determined to unite all the disposable troops he had belonging to the army of the centre, to march at the same time with the Marshal Duke of Ragusa against -On the 20th July his Majesty had in effect assembled a considerable corps, at the head of which he had advanced between the 21st and 24th of July to Arevalo.The retreat of the Army of Portugal having taken place before his Majesty could join it, he was obliged to confine himself to checking Lord Wellington's army, which he has successfully done by this diversion. The greater part of the enemy's forces having marched upon the army of the centre, his Catholic Majesty at first thought of covering Madrid, and sending from it the persons most attached to his service, and the most important objects. A considerable convoy, escorted by Darmagnac and Palombini's divisions, have been fortunately conducted towards Valencia. -On the 18th August the King had his head-quarters at Villa Robledo. The intention of his Majesty was to unite the troops of the Army of the Centre, according to circumstances, either with the Army of the South or the Army of Arragon, to fight the English with advantage. SEVILLE TAKEN.--DOWNING-STREET, Sept. 23.-A Dispatch, of which the following is a Copy, has been this day received at Earl Bathurst's Office, addressed to his Lordship by Major-General Cooke, dated Cadiz, Aug. 30, 1812. CADIZ, Aug. 30, 1812. My Lord,-Since my letter of yester day's date, reporting the entry into Seville SEVILLE, Aug. 28, 1812: Sir, I have the honour to report the movements of the detachment under my orders since the date of my last. The result of which, the capture of the city of Seville by assault, defended by eight French battalions and two regiments of dragoons intrenched, will, I trust, be considered as honourable to the allied arms and serviceinstant, General Cruz Mourgeon, commandable to the cause of Spain.On the 24th ing the Spanish troops, and myself, judged it advisable to make a forward movement on Seville; for this purpose it was advisable to force the enemy's corps of observation of three hundred and fifty cavalry and two hundred infantry, at St. Lucar la Mayor. I marched from Manzanilla with eight hundred troops, composed of the 1st regiment of guards, the 87th, and the Portuguese regiment, Brigadier-General Downie, acThe Spanish column attacked on the right, companied with six hundred Spanish troops. The French were driven through the streets and the British and Portuguese on the left. with precipitation, leaving some killed, wounded, and prisoners. We took post at San Lucar without the loss of a man.—On the 26th inst. Gen. Gruz and myself having judged that it would be attended with the opinion and in saving the city from being most beneficial effects, both on the public plundered, if the French could be precipitated in their retreat from Seville; the allied troops, in consequence, marched for and arrived at the heights of Castillejos de la Cuesta, immediately above Seville, on the morning of the 27th, at six o'clock. this purpose, advance. The Frencit advance was driven -The Spanish troops formed our in; the cavalry retired, leaving the infantry in the plain, which last were charged by the Spanish cavalry, who made many prisoners.The Spanish troops attacked a redoubt on our left, and lost a good many by which movement this redoubt was turnmen. The columns advanced into the plain, ed, and its communication cut off; the Spanish troops under General Cruz took the, right, and made a detour to arrive and attack on that flank of Triana (the suburbs of Seville). I ordered the redoubt to be. |