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not be less than one hundred feet in width at water level, and " part thereof shall be a highway and the remainder thereof shall be a highway, or park or parkway, as the commission shall determine.
. . The part of the dam used as a highway shall be maintained and operated in the same manner as the Cambridge bridge, and under the laws now or hereafter in force relating to said bridge." In other words, the part of the dam used as a highway is to be maintained and operated by a board of two commissioners, one appointed by the mayor of the city of Boston and one by the mayor of the city of Cambridge, exactly as the present Craigie bridge is maintained and operated under St. 1898, c. 467, § 14. By the act of 1903 the Legislature temporarily took the control of Craigie bridge out of the hands of the board of bridge commissioners and gave it into the hands of your commission, for the purpose of removing it and of building a new bridge in its place. By section 9 the expense of that work will be borne by the two cities, and the control over the new bridge, when you have finished it, will be vested in the board of bridge commissioners. A similar plan was adopted for rebuilding the West Boston bridge by St. 1898, c. 467. The rights of the two cities are the same as though the Legislature had authorized the board of commissioners having control of the bridge to rebuild it at the expense of the cities, in which case no taking would be necessary. The present structure was built in that way, and the constitutionality of legislation of that character has been for a long time recognized. Carter v. Cambridge & Brookline Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236.
I am of opinion, therefore, that your commission should not make a taking of the present Craigie bridge, but should proceed to remove it and rebuild the highway across the river in accordance with the provisions of your enabling act.
The powers vested under the provisions of R. L., c. 90, as amended by St. 1902, c. 116, in the officers of the Cattle Bureau with relation to contagious diseases of cattle are not to be extended by implication to contagious diseases other than those enumerated in R L., c. 90, § 4.
AUSTIN PETERS, Esq., Chief of the Cattle Bureau.
OCT. 10, 1904.
DEAR SIR: Your letter of July 19 calls for my opinion upon the question whether a disease of the eye, known as enzoötic ophthal
mia, which has attacked certain cattle in the town of Westborough, is a contagious disease within the meaning of the definition of that term contained in R. L., c. 90, § 4. The disease in question is stated to be apparently contagious but not dangerous to the animals attacked by it, or to the health of persons who may be brought into contact with it. Upon these facts you inquire specifically whether there is any legal authority in the chapter above referred to, as amended by St. 1902, c. 116, § 3, for isolating and forbidding the sale of animals from herds where such disease exists, until the danger of contagion is over.
Assuming that the disease in question is in no respect dangerous to mankind, I am of opinion that you have no jurisdiction in the premises. The evident purpose of the statute was to protect and preserve the health of persons purchasing the several products derived from domestic cattle; and it was not intended to relieve the owner of cattle from the responsibility of their care and maintenance or to preserve the health of the cattle themselves. The diseases specifically enumerated in section 28 of chapter 90 of the Revised Laws appear to be contagious diseases which affect the products derived from cattle, either milk or meat, and through them the health and safety of the persons by whom they are consumed. The powers vested in the officers of the Cattle Bureau, in the case of the contagious diseases enumerated in the statute, are very broad, and for that reason are not, in my opinion, to be extended by implication to diseases other than those specifically mentioned in section 28.
Very truly yours,
HERBERT PARKER, Attorney-General.
Person infected with Contagious Disease— Transportation beyond the Borders of the Commonwealth for Care and Treatment. There is no existing provision of law by virtue of which a person found within this Commonwealth suffering with a contagious or infectious disease may, without his consent, be transported beyond the borders of the Commonwealth, to be there confined and treated for such disease.
OCT. 14, 1904.
LEONARD HUNTRESS, M.D., Trustee, State Hospital and State Farm. DEAR SIR: You seek my opinion in behalf of your Board by an inquiry as follows: Whether under any existing law of the Commonwealth there is authority by virtue of which a person found within this Commonwealth suffering with a contagious or infectious disease known as leprosy may be transported, without his consent,
beyond the borders of this Commonwealth, to be there confined and treated for such disease.
There is no provision of statute which in terms authorizes such transportation, confinement and treatment. R. L., c. 85, §§ 23 and 24, provide for the transportation of paupers to any other State, or to any place beyond the sea" where they belong." This, however, is a different matter from the deportation for the purpose of confinement and treatment, under the control of officers of this Commonwealth.
R. L., c. 75, § 46, as amended by Acts of 1902, c. 206, § 2, provides for the removal of persons infected with contagious disease in the following language:
A magistrate authorized to issue warrants in criminal cases may issue a warrant directed to the sheriff of the county or his deputy, or to any constable or police officer, requiring them under the direction of the board to remove any person who is infected with contagious disease, or to impress and take up convenient houses, lodging, nurses, attendants and other necessaries. The removal authorized by this section may be made to any hospital in an adjoining city or town established for the reception of persons having smallpox or other disease dangerous to the public health, provided the assent of the board of health of the city or town to which such removal is to be made shall first have been obtained.
Control over inmates of the State Hospital is conferred upon the trustees of such hospital by R. L., c. 85, § 18.
The trustees of the state hospital shall have and exercise the same powers relative to pauper inmates and their property as towns and overseers of the poor have relative to paupers supported or relieved by them.
The power of overseers of the poor relative to the relief and support of paupers is fixed in part by R. L., c. 81, § 2.
The overseers of the poor shall have the care and oversight of all such poor and indigent persons so long as they remain at the charge of their respective cities or towns, and shall see that they are suitably relieved, supported and employed, either in the workhouse or almshouse, or in such other manner as the city or town directs, or otherwise at the discretion of said overseers. They may remove to the almshouse such children as are suffering destitution from extreme neglect of dissolute or intemperate parents or guardians, except as hereinafter provided.
This statute does not give overseers of the poor power to remove from the Commonwealth paupers having settlements in the Commonwealth without their consent (Westfield v. Southwick, 17 Pick. 68; Deerfield v. Greenfield, 1 Gray, 514; see also Smith v. Peabody,
106 Mass. 262), and the same limitation must attach to the powers of the trustees of the State Hospital.
There is, moreover, one general principle of interpretation which disposes of the whole question. In the absence of express words, or distinct implications, the presumption is that statutes have no extraterritorial effect. And this is true even in those cases where it would be in the power of the Legislature to give to statutes such an effect.
As to whether it would be in the power of the Legislature to provide for the removal from the Commonwealth, and the confinement and treatment without the Commonwealth, of a person afflicted with leprosy, who is unwilling to be removed, I express no opinion. It appears, however, that neither by express words nor by distinct implication do the statutes above quoted authorize such removal, confinement and treatment, and that consequently, according to the principles stated, the field for the exercise of the powers conferred is limited by the territorial boundaries of the Commonwealth.
Very truly yours,
HERBERT PARKER, Attorney-General.
Fire Insurance Massachusetts Standard Policy.
R. L., c. 118, § 60, does not forbid the making of a special contract inconsistent with the terms of the standard form of fire insurance policy therein contained, and in clause 7 expressly provides for such modification of the standard form as the parties themselves may choose to make; it follows, therefore, that a separate slip or "rider," complying with the provisions of statute applicable thereto, may provide for cancellation upon less than the ten days' notice required by the standard form.
A fire insurance company is not required to make temporary insurance by means of " binding slips," by which an agent is authorized to cover property with insurance from the moment of application until the applicant either receives his policy or is notified of the rejection of his risk, and such insurance may be terminated in any manner agreed upon by the parties.
The Insurance Commissioner is not required to pass upon or consider questions relating to the form or contents of the " binding slips" above mentioned.
Hon. FREDERICK L. CUTTING, Insurance Commissioner.
Ост. 31, 1904.
DEAR SIR: In your letter of September 14 you ask various questions as to the right of a fire insurance company doing business in Massachusetts to provide for the cancellation of its con
tracts of insurance upon Massachusetts property, in a manner other than that prescribed by the standard form of policy contained in section 60 of chapter 118 of the Revised Laws.
No fire insurance company shall issue fire insurance policies on property in this commonwealth, other than those of the standard form herein set forth, except as follows:
Seventh, A company may write upon the margin or across the face of a policy, or write, or print in type not smaller than long primer, upon separate slips or riders to be attached thereto, provisions adding to or modifying those contained in the standard form; and all such slips, riders and provisions must be signed by the officers or agent of the company so using them.
The language of the standard form in respect to cancellation is as follows:
This policy may be cancelled at any time at the request of the insured, who shall thereupon be entitled to a return of the portion of the above premium remaining, after deducting the customary monthly short rates for the time this policy shall have been in force. The company also reserves the right, after giving written notice to the insured, and to any mortgagee to whom this policy is made payable, and tendering to the insured a ratable proportion of the premium, to cancel this policy as to all risks subsequent to the expiration of ten days from such notice, and no mortgagee shall then have the right to recover as to such risks.
You ask: "Would it be lawful for a company to avail itself of the privilege granted by the Seventh' clause of section 60, chapter 118 of the Revised Laws, by using separate slips or riders' amending the time allowed for the cancellation of a policy to a shorter period than the stated' ten days'?"
The Legislature has not attempted to make the provisions of the standard form compulsory upon insurer or insured, nor to make such form the sole permissible form of contract. Section 60, above quoted, does not forbid the making of a special contract embodying terms inconsistent with the terms contained in the standard form; indeed, it provides for such modifications of the standard form as the parties may choose to make (clause Seventh, quoted above). The apparent purpose of the Legislature was to establish an approved form of contract upon which the insured might confidently rely without the necessity of considering special stipulations which might be obscure or of doubtful import as to the obligations or limitations of the contract. I answer the above question, therefore, in the affirmative. A rider complying with the