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iums in case of the failure of the mortgagor so to do, was delivered to the mortgagee, and transmitted by him to the mortgagor. Afterwards the agents effecting the insurance told the mortgagee that they had not received the premium, and would cancel the policy if not paid for; and the mortgagee told them that the mortgagor would pay, and not to cancel the policy, as the mortgagee would pay it if the mortga gor did not; and the policy was not canceled, in re. liance on such promise. Held to constitute a valid contract not to cancel the policy, which would render the mortgagee liable for the premium. - COLBY V. THOMPSON, Colo., 64 Pac. Rep. 1053.

57. JUDGMENT-Default Res Judicata.-Where an action is brought to recover the accrued interest upon a promissory note which stipulates for the payment of interest in annual installments, a judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff in such action is not res judicata in a subsequent action brought by the same plaintiff against the defendant to recover the princi. pal due upon said note, and in such subsequent action the defendant is not estopped from setting up a want of consideration for the note sued on.-CROWDER V. RED MOUNTAIN MIN. CO., Ala., 29 South. Rep. 847.

58. JUDGMENT-Res Adjudicata-Estoppel.-Pending an appeal from a judgment allotting to a debtor a homestead in property upon which an execution has been levied, S, who had purchased the property from the debtor, deposited a part of the purchase price with W, under an agreement that if the judgment should be affirmed the money should be paid to the vendor, but if there should be a reversal the money should be returned to him. Before the appeal was disposed of, the execution creditor brought suit and attached the money in the hands of W; and the court adjudged that the money be paid to plaintiff, but that his execution lien on the property be discharged. Thereafter the judgment allotting homestead was reversed. Held, that the judgment under which plaintiff received the money, being valid, is a bar to the enforcement of the execution lien, though the judgment may have been erroneous. - SCOTT V. LOUISVILLE BANKING CO., Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 713.

Mortgages Written

59. JUDGMENT Res Judicata Second Appeal. Where a case has been reversed on appeal, and tried a second time in accord with the supreme court's decision, the supreme court will dismiss the second ap. peal as res judicata; the only error alleged being error in the former decision of the supreme court.-KRAMER V. SOUTHERN RY. CO., N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 872. 60. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS Contract - Parol Evidence Pleadings-DismissalAmendment-Answer-Sufficiency.-Where a grantee of real estate agrees in writing with his vendor and the indorser of a mortgage note to assume such indebtedness, and the mortgagee brings suit to be subrogated to the rights of the holder and indorser under such agreement, the grantee, who contends that the written contract does not contain the entire agree ment, cannot show a prior oral agreement that the grantee should only assume the mortgage on receipt of a certain sum from his vendor, since the oral agreement was made before the written instrument, and with only one of the parties to the written contract.WOODCOCK V. BOSTIC, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 881.

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mon law existing at the date of our separation from England, and hence the courts of one state cannot presume that such rule exists in another state, so as to throw on a plaintiff who has been injured in such other state by the negligence of a fellow-servant, the burden of proving that the rule has been abrogated by statute.-WILLIAMS V. SOUTHERN RY. Co., N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 893.

63. MASTER AND SERVANT Injuries to Brakeman Appliances.-A brakeman was set to work in switching with a road engine regularly used for that purpose, but unprovided with any special hand hold in front, necessary in his work. No particular projection was used, and the use of any particular one was not forbidden. The brakeman, however, used the figure plate, which was adapted thereto, and most conven. ient for a man of his size. It had been loose for 24 hours, but was apparently all right when he took hold of it. It gave way, however, and he was thrown under the cowcatcher and injured. Held, that the com. pany owed him the duty of inspecting the plate commensurate with the purpose for which it must be assumed that it knew it was used, and hence, on proof of the foregoing facts, it was error to nonsuit him in an action for damages, enough being shown to require some proof of inspection to overcome the presump tion of negligence.-DUNN V. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 167 Fed. Rep. 666.

64. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injuries to Servant-Nonsuit.-Plaintiff, a weaver, was injured while assisting in the repair of a loom which he operated, by a sliver of steel flying from a hammer and striking him in the eye. There was no evidence that the hammer was ap parently defective, or was being negligently used. Held, that the plaintiff was properly nonsuited, since the injury was caused by a latent defect in the ham. mer, for which the defendant was not liable.-MARTIN V. HIGHLAND PARK MFG. Co., N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 876.

65. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- Defective Sidewalks -Negligence.-Plaintiff was injured by stepping into a hole in a sidewalk, caused by a plank being broken several days before. There were several churches and a school house on the street, and it was much traveled by those attending the churches and school as well as by those living along the street. The planks of the walk were raised 10 or 12 inches from the ground, and a driveway crossed the walk, where the plank was broken by a loaded wagon. Held, that the question of the negligence of the city in not discover. ing the defect and repairing the walk was for the jury. -LAURIE V. CITY OF BALLARD, Wash., 64 Pac. Rep. 906. 66. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Liability for Injury to Property in Making Improvements.-Under Const. § 242, providing that municipal and other corporations invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use shall make just compensation for prop erty taken, injured, or destroyed, a city is liable for injury to private property in the construction of a sewer.-THOMAN V. CITY OF COVINGTON, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 721.

67. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-ReinstatementWaiver of Forfeiture.-The laws of a mutual benefit insurance order authorized the reinstatement of a member only on satisfactory evidence of his good health. A member, who had forfeited his membership by non payment of his dues, while seriously sick

68. NEGLIGENCE-Dangerous Property Place Attractive to Children.-Where a complaint alleged that defendant had a piece of cement tubing, weighing from 500 to 700 pounds, 2 feet in length and 4 1-2 feet in diameter, which was so topheavy that it frequently tipped over from its side to its end, on land adjacent to the street, and not separated therefrom by any fence or other guard, so that, to defendant's knowledge, children were enticed to play with it, because it rolled easily, and that, while plaintiff's intestate and other children were so playing, the pipe tipped over and fatally injured plaintiff's intestate, it stated a cause of action.-KOPPLEKOM V. Colorado CEMENT PIPE CO., Colo., 64 Pac. Rep. 1047.

69. PAYMENT-Money.-Where plaintiffs sent an account against defendant to an attorney for collection, and in the settlement of another controversy money belonging to the defendant came into the possession of the attorney, and was deposited in the bank in his name, and it was agreed between the attorney and defendant that the attorney should send his own check to plaintiffs in payment of the account, it was error to charge that the agreement did not constitute pay. ment, since the money was appropriated to the debt, and accepted by plaintiff's authorized agent.-MILLHISER V. MARR, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 887.

70. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-Certificate-Record. ing.-Laws 1885, p. 296, § 1 (Mills' Ann. St. § 3550), provides that the certificate of the state board of med. ical examiners to the effect that the person holding it was a graduate in medicine from a legally chartered medical school, in good standing. shall be conclusive as to the rights of such person to practice medicine in this state; and section 3554 declares that every person holding such a certificate shall have it recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county in which he resides. Held, that where a physician possessed a certificate of the state board, entitling him to prac. tice medicine, the fact that the certificate was not recorded in the county in which he rendered services constituted no defense to an action for compensation, since the issuance of the certificate was conclusive of his right to practice, and the statute did not make the recording of it a condition precedent to the right to recover for services.-RILEY V. COLLINS, Colo., 64 Pac. Rep. 1052.

71. PLEADING AND PRACTICE-Personal Injuries.-Injury to eyesight may be proved under a complaint alleging that plaintiff was hurled forward with such force as to bruise her knee, wrench her arm, and "otherwise seriously and grievously injure her."— BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. Co. v. MACLAURY, U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 644.

72. PLEADING AND PRACTICE Trial-Misconduct of Counsel in Argument.-It was improper to permit counsel for plaintiff, in an action against a railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries, to say, in argument to the jury: "The railroad can ap peal this case, but the plaintiff is a poor man, and has no money to appeal with, and will have to accept what you do;" but this error alone would not be suffi cient to authorize a reversal.-LOUISVILLE, ETC. RY. Co. V. MORGAN, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 736.

73. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Sureties in Sheriff's Bond-Homestead.-A surety in a sheriff's bond is not entitled to the exemption of a homestead as against a judgment on the bond in favor of the commonwealth, and is therefore not entitled to the exemption as against the claim of a co-surety for contribution on account of the payment of such judgment.-HUTSON'S ADME. V. COMBS, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 709.

74. RAILROADS - Injuries to Servant.-Where a serv. ant of a railroad company operating lines in North Carolina was injured in Tennessee by the negligence of a fellow-servant, an action for such injuries was an action in contract, and not in tort, and hence, in the absence of any showing as to where the contract was

made, the North Carolina court had jurisdiction of the action, and the fellow-servant act of 1897 of that state applied to it, making the railroad company liable.-WILLIAMS V. SOUTHERN RY. CO., N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 893.

75. RAILROADS-Persons on Track-Negligence.-Intestate was found early in the morning beneath a trestle on defendant's road severely injured, and died soon thereafter. There was grease on his clothes, appar. ently from an engine. There was evidence that a train of defendant passed the trestle during the night. Held that, if intestate was on the trestle and was struck by the train, it was negligence in defendant not to have seen him at the time; and if defendant's train knocked the intestate off the trestle, and the em. ployees knew it had done so, and went on without stopping to look after and care for him on a cold winter night, it was negligence sufficient to make defendant liable. WHITESIDES v. SOUTHERN RY. Co., N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 878.

76. RECEIVERS Parties - Partnership Liability. Where a contract liability was incurred by a copartnership long before the appointment of a receiver of the partnership assets, the copartners were necessary parties to a suit on such contract, and a complaint against the receiver alone was.demurrable.-FLYNN V FURTH, Wash., 64 Pac. Rep. 903.

77. SHIPPING-Injury to Vessel-Fault of Master.-Recovery cannot be had for injury to a boat by its grounding on an obstruction at a dock, on the going down of the tide, where the master, though notified that there was an obstruction, and directed to breast the boat off from the dock, for which purpose a breasting plank had been fastened to the dock, failed to do 90.-LEO V. MCCOLLUM, U. S. D. C., E. D. (N. Y.), 107 Fed. Rep. 742.

78. SHIPPING Sale of Yacht Appurtenances Agency Scope of Agent's Authority. A naptha launch used by the owner as a tender, in connection with a 30-foot yacht owned by him, but which could not be carried on the yacht, did not accompany it on its trips, and was not a part of the usual equipment of such yachts, did not by such use, merely as a matter of convenience, become an appurtenance of the yacht, which passed by a sale of the latter. Agents who are authorized by the owner to sell a yacht are not there. by given any authority, either actual or apparent, to sell a naptha launch, sometimes used as a tender to the yacht, but which was not legally an appurtenance thereto, but a separate vessel, and, in the absence of actual authority, they cannot bind the owner by a sale of the launch.-FORREST V. VANDERBILT, U. S. C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 734.

79. SLANDER AND LIBEL-False Notice to Creditors' Protective Association.-If a notice given by defendant brewing company to a brewers' protective asso. ciation of which it was a member, to the effect that plaintiff, one of its customers, was indebted to it, was false, and was given for the purpose of extorting from plaintiff a debt which he had settled, or for the purpose of disabling plaintiff from dealing with other members of the association, and keeping him in its power, after the debt had been raid, there was legal malice authorizing the recovery of damages.-JOHN BRENNER BREWING CO. v. MCGILL, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 722.

80. SURETIES-Replevin Bond-Indemnity.- Sureties on an undertaking in replevin have no remedy at law or in equity upon a contract to indemnify them against loss on account of their suretyship until such loss has occurred; nor has the defendant in the replevin suit who recovered a judgment against the plaintiff therein, though the sureties and judgment debtor be insolvent, and the judgment be otherwise uncollectible. HENDERSON ACHERT LITHOGRAPHIC Co. v. JOHN SHILLITO Co., Ohio, 60 N. E. Rep. 295. 81. SURETIES AND SURETYSHIP-Official Bonds-Liabilities.-Under Gen. Stat. 1883, § 647 (Mills' Ann. Stat.

§ 910), providing that an assessor shall give bond for the performance of his duties, the sureties on an assessor's official bond are not liable to his successor for fees received by their principal holding over after the expiration of his term, though his bond, in addition to requiring the faithful performance of his duties, requires him to deliver to his successor all the belongings of his office, such latter requirement being surplusage. - PEOPLE V. JACKSON, Colo., 64 Pac. Rep. 1051.

82. TAXATION-Assessinent

Loans. Under Const. art. 13, § 1, providing that "moneys, credits, dues," etc., shall be taxed, loans are taxable, though secured by property exempt from taxation.-SECURITY SAV. BANK V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 898.

83. TAXATION-Personalty-Seat in New York Stock Exchange.-A seat in the York Stock Exchange is not personal property, within Laws 1896, ch. 908, § 2, subd. 4, defining personal property for purposes of taxation, and is not taxable to a non-resident under section 7, providing that personal property of a non-resident shall be taxed to the extent" as if owned by a resi dent. The value of a seat in the New York Stock Fx. change is capital invested in business in the state, but is not taxable, as the taxing statute does not cover it. -PEOPLE V. FEITNER, N. Y., 60 N. E. Rep. 265.

84. TELEGRAPH-Delay in Delivery of Money- Dama. ges-Mental Distress.-In an action against a telegraph company to recover damages for the failure to promptly deliver money transmitted through such company to the plaintiff, the fact that plaintiff was evicted from her house because of her failure to receive such money, and the injury to her reputation generally because of such eviction, are consequences too remote to be considered as elements of damages. Mental distress, unaccompanied by physical injury, is not a proper element of damages recoverable from a telegraph company for a failure to promptly deliver money sent through its agency to plaintiff.-STANSELL V. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Cal.), 107 Fed. Rep. 669.

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86. TRIAL - Continuance - Absent Witnesses. -An application for a continuance in a crim. inal case on account of absent witnesses is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and its refusal is not revisable on appeal, unless it is plainly shown that there was an abuse of such discretion by the trial court. Thus, where an application for a continuance is made by the defendant in a criminal case on ac. count of the absence of some of his witnesses, and the state limits the showing made by the defendant as to what the absent witnesses would testify if present, and there are disclosed no facts which show that the absence of the witnesses is prejudicial to the defendant, the refusal of the application for a (continuance is not erroneous.-HUSKEY V. STATE, Ala., 29 South. Rep. 838.

87. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES-Conveyances by Trustee. -Where two grantors, each owning an individual molety in realty, convey it to one of them in trust for the other and certain third parties, imposing no active duties on such trustee, such conveyance, under the statute of uses, passes both the legal and equitable estate of the grantors to such third persons, leaving the trustee without any title which he can convey as against the latter.-JORDAN V. PHILLIPS & CREW Co., Ala., 29 South. Rep. 831.

88. USURY-Building and Loan Associations Mortgages.-A contract with a building and loan associa

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tion, requiring a fixed monthly payment of dues, and a monthly payment of interest, and a certain premium, aggregating an amount greater than the legal rate of interest, is usurious, the premium being merely additional interest.-SOUTHERN HOME BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. V. TONY, Miss., 29 South. Rep. 827.

89. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Payment-Receipts.Where defendant sold land to plaintiff by agreement in form of a lease, deed to be given on payment of 72 monthly installments of $45.07 each, and a note of $1,350, payable 9 years from date, receipts given by defendant to plaintiff 9 years thereafter, at a time subsequent to any payments on the 72 installments and when all payments were on the note, and reciting, "I received $55 rent in advance" for said premises, will, in the absence of explanation or proof of mistake, be conclusive of payment of all the previous installments. JOHNSTONE V. MULCAHY, Cal., 64 Pac.

Rep. 1077.

90. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Nuisances - Dam -Abatement.-Where a lower riparian owner erects a dam which throws the water back on an upper owner, it is a nuisance, which the latter may abate to the extent necessary to stop the refluence, if he can do so without a breach of the peace.-LILES v. CAWTHORN, Miss., 29 South. Rep. 834.

91. WILLS-Charitable Use-Erection of a Church. — Testator directed that a large part of his property should be converted into money, to be designated as the "general fund," and directed that such fund should be applied to the building of a stone church and school house of convenient size, two stories high, and about 60 feet long by 40 feet wide, etc.; the building to cost about $2,000, and to be paid out of the "general fund." After his death the amount available in such fund was $4,000, but it was found that the testator's entire estate was not sufficient to erect a stone building of the dimensions mentioned. Held, that the provision for the size of the building was directory merely, and that, in the absence of proof that a building could not be constructed of stone of sufficient size and suitable for the purposes contemplated, by the use of the entire amount of the "general fund," it would not be held that such provision of the will was inoperative, or insufficient for its purpose.-PAINE V. FORNEY, N. Car., 38 8. E. Rep. 885.

92. WILL-Construction.-A will in which the testator devises all of his real and personal property to his wife, to have and control it as he would do if living, and "to sell and convey any property she may choose for her support or comfort, as she may see proper, during her natural life; and at her death, what may be left of my said estate, the same to be divided according to law in such cases made and provided,”— gives to his wife an estate for life in all of his property, with the absolute right of disposition of the same without restraint or control by the courts; and her right of disposition is not limited to the necessities for her support and comfort.-CAIN v. CAIN, Ala., 29 South. Rep. 846.

93. WILLS-Devise to Class- Beneficiaries Particular Estate. Where testator devised a tract of land to his son's children, to be divided among them after the death of such son, only those children who were born at the time of testator's death were entitled to a share of the land, since there was no provision for an intermediate estate, but the title passed to the devisees immediately on the death of the testator.-WISE V. LEONHARDT, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 892.

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94. WRIT OF REVIEW-Trustee-Deposit in Court. Under the provisions of section 4339, Rev. St., when it is admitted by the pleading of a party or shown upon his examination that he has in his possession or under his control money that he is holding as trustee for others, who apply to the court for an order requiring the holder thereof to turn the same into court, the court has jurisdiction to grant such application, and to make an order requiring the money to be deposited in court.-REID V. STEELE, Idaho, 64 Pac. Rep. 892.

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Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 2, 1901.

The peculiar value of oral argument is very often greatly underestimated not only by lawyers but also by judges on the bench. How often one observes an attorney carelessly "making a few remarks" to the ourt and wasting a most precious opportunity to incline the mind of the judge in his favor which not even the most laborious and painstaking brief could even be expected to do. The later generation of lawyers seem to rely more upon the logic of cold type than of burning words addressed to the ear of the court. This tendency of the bar is regretted by Mr. Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court, In a statement made to a correspondent of the New York Evening Post, as follows:

"It is a matter of serious regret and concern to this court that the practice of oral argument appears to be falling into disuse. The idea seems to have become general among members of the bar that we prefer arguments presented in the form of written briefs. Such is not the case. There are many times when nothing can take the place of the personal presentation. Briefs are well enough in their way, but it very often happens that the real point upon which a case turns may be overlooked in a brief, while an oral argument may serve to bring it home to the court. A special emphasis, a striking simile may throw new light on an intricate problem, and perhaps reverse a judgment in the mind of the court."

In commenting on this, the American Law Review, says:

"The Supreme Court of the United States have always set high value upon oral argument, and difficult cases are often ordered down for reargument by that court. Two hours on a side are allowed for argument, and in cases of great importance, the time is extended. During the argument the judges frequently ask questions, tending to clear doubts in their minds. It is a pleasure to listen to a good argument in the supreme court. The fretfulness and impatience of argument which are discovered in some other appellate courts does not exist there at all."

Perhaps the "fretfulness and impatience" of judges, and especially judges of nisi prius courts is the lack of preparation on the part attorneys. Oral argument in the general run of it to-day is, in most cases, exceedingly tedious and commonplace and is undoubtedly a great weariness of the flesh to even the most patient judge. How different it was with men like Choate and Webster by whose burning eloquence not only juries but the courts themselves were captivated and constrained to view the law and the facts in the light in which these great advocates saw them. The idea which prevails to a very large extent that judges cannot be moved by the eloquence which would appeal to a jury, is fallacious and ought to be exploded. Judges are human, even with all the classical coldness sometimes assumed by them, and the earnest advocate with his intellectual batteries well primed and his whole nature on fire with zeal for the cause he represents is most likely to overcome the heart and mind of either judge or

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If one question in this country ought to be definitely settled it is that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not a natural right protected by the constitution, but is a recognized evil to be suffered or licensed to exist by the people for a consideration. It is held as a favor, which, like all favors, "must be received upon such terms and conditions, and subject to such burdens and inconveniences, as the donor thinks proper to impose and the donee elects to accept." In the recent and important case of State v. Bixman, 62 S. W. Rep. 828, the Supreme Court of Missouri was called upon to wrestle with this question in the form of a state inspection tax. Act of May 4, 1899, declared that beer and malt liquors can be manufactured or sold in the state only on condition that they shall be made from certain specified cereals and that they shall be inspected and a certain amount paid to the state on each gallon inspected, This

the court held to be a proper exercise of the power of the state, since the manufacture and sale of such beverage is detrimental to public morals, and the legislature has arbi· tary power to prohibit such manufacture and sale absolutely if it so desired. In answer to the objection that the fee charged for inspection purposes was largely in excess of the costs of such inspection, the court held that the doctrine that an inspection law cannot be legitimately employed to yield a revenue beyond the cost of inspection has no application to a law regulating the manufacture and sale of beer and malt liquors. To the objection that the act interfered with the rights of interstate commerce, the court held that under Act of Congress, August 8, 1890, declaring that all intoxicating liquors transported into a state, on arrival therein are subject to its laws enacted in the exercise of police powers, that part of the act prohibiting the sale of beer or malt liquors till the same are inspected, and the fee therefore paid to the state, is not in violation of the rights of congress over interstate

commerce.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS

ATTORNEY'S FEES AS PREFERRED CLAIMS.-On first thought most attorneys would be very much inclined to take exception to the bolding of Caldwell, J., in the recent case of Latta v. Lonsdale, 107 Fed. Rep. 585, that a lawyer employed by a railroad company on a yearly salary is not a laborer or employee of the corporation entitling him to a preference over other creditors. The court sums up the question in the following words:

"A lawyer employed by a railroad company on a yearly salary, payable monthly, is not a laborer or employee, within the meaning of the sections quoted. Cent. Dict. tit. 'Wage'; Lewis v. Fisher, SO Md. 139, 30 Atl. Rep. 608; Casualty Ins. Co.'s Case, 82 Md. 538, 566, 34 Atl. Rep. 778; Bristor v. Smith, 158 N. Y. 157, 53 N. E. Rep. 42; In re Stryker, 158 N. Y. 526, 530, 53 N. E. Rep. 525; Bristor v. Kretz, 49 N. Y. Supp. 404; Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S. 220, 237, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.

services which the lawyer of the corporation has."

ADVERSE POSSESSION OF GRANTEE UNDER FORECLOSURE SALE. The running of the statute of limitations in perfecting a title by adverse possession has always managed to come up in some changed form as a mooted question of law. In the recent case of Stout v. Rigney, 107 Fed. Rep. 545, it was held that one who enters upon land under a trustee's deed which purports to convey an absolute title, and which was executed upon a sale by the trustee in a mortgage, the purpose of which was to bar the mortgagor's equity of redemption. must be regarded as holding adversely to the mortgagors from the time his deed is recorded, and possession is taken thereunder, although the sale made by the trustee was irregular or premature; and no actual notice to the mortgagor of the adverse nature of his claim is necessary to invoke the running of the statute of limitations for its protection. The court said:

We do not believe it to have been essential to render their possession adverse that they (the purchasers at the foreclosure sale) should have notified the complainant that they were holding the land adversely, and would dispute her right to redeem, inasmuch as the entry was made under a deed which purported to convey an absolute title, and which also professed to foreclose her right to redeem. In the case of Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 187, 195, it was ruled, among other things, that the grantee under a fraudulent conveyance would be regarded as holding adversely to creditors who had challenged the validity of the conveyance from the time his deed was recorded, and we perceive no sufficient reason why one who enters upon land under a trustee's deed which purports to convey an absolute title, and to have been made with a view of barring the mortgagor's equity of redemption, should not be regarded as holding adversely to the mortgagor from the time that his deed is recorded and possession is taken, although the sale made by the trustee was irregular or premature. The precise question last suggested arose in the case of Miner v. Beekman, 50 N. Y. 337, 344, in which case it was decided that the statute of limitations began to run against the purchaser of the equity of redemption, who had not been made a party to an action of foreclosure which was brought against the mortgagor, from the time the mortgagee entered into possession as a purchaser under the defective decree of foreclos

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