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iums in case of the failure of the mortgagor so to do, was delivered to the mortgagee, and transmitted by him to the mortgagor. Alterwards the agents effect. ing the insurance told the mortgagee that they had pot received the premium, and would cancel the policy If not paid for; and the mortgagee told them that the mortgagor would pay, and not to cancel the policy, as the mortgagee would pay it if the mortgagor did pot; and the policy was pot canceled, in re.

on such promise. Held to constitute a valid contract not to cancel the policy, whicb would reader the mortgagee liable for the premium. - COLBY Y. THOMPSON, Colo., 64 Pac. Rep. 1063.

57. JUDGMENT-Default - Res Judicata.-Where an action is brought to recover the accrued interest upon a promissory uote which stipulates for the payment of interest in annual installments, a judgment by de. fault in favor of the plaintiff in such action is not res judicata in a subsequent action brought by the same plaintiff against the defendant to recover the princi. paldue opon said note, and in such subsequent action the defendant is not estopped from setting up a want of consideration for the note sued on.-CROWDER V. RED MOUNTAIN Min. Co., Ala., 29 South. Rep. 847.

58. JODGMENT-Res Adjudicata-Estoppel.-Pending an appeal from a judgment allotting to a debtor & homestead in property upon which an execution has been levied, s, who bad purchased the property from the debtor, deposited a part of the purchase price with W, under an agreement that if the judgment should be a flirmed the money should be paid to t vendor, but if there should be a reversal the money should be returned to him. Before the appeal was disposed of, the execution creditor brought suit and attached the money in the hands of W; and the court adjudged that the money be paid to plaintiff, but that his execution lien on the property be discharged. Thereafter the judgment allotting homestead was reversed. Held, that the judgment under wbich plaintiff received the money, being valid, is a bar to the en. forcement of the execution lien, though the judgment may have been erroneous. - SCOTT V. LOUISVILLE BANKING CO., Ky., 62 8. W. Rep. 713.

59. JUDGMENT - Res Judicata - Second Appeal. Where a case has been reversed on appeal, and tried a second time in accord with the supreme court's de. cision, the supreme court will dismiss the second ap. peal as res judicata; the only error alleged being error in the former decision of the supreme court.-KRAMER V. SOUTHERN RY. CO., N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 872.

60. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - Mortgages -- Written Contract - Parol Evidence - Pleadingg-DismissalAmendment-Answer-Sufficiency.- Where a grantee of real estate agrees in writing with his vendor and the indorser of a mortgage note to assume such indebtedness, and the mortgagee brings suit to be gub. rogated to the rights of the holder and indorser under such agreement, the grantee, who contends that the written contract does not contain the entire agree. ment, cannot show a prior oral agreement that the grantee should only assume the mortgage on receipt of a certain sum from bis vendor, since tbe oral agreement was made before the written instrument, and with only one of the parties to the written contract.WOODCOCK V. BOSTIC, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 881.

61. MÅSTER AND SERVANT – Employment – Right to Discharge.-The making of an improv'dent contract by an electrical engineer with big assistants, which is corrected, at his employer's request, og soon as made, does not, as matter of law, justily his discharge, but is to be considered on the question of his alleged mis. conduct in acting against the emplnyer's pecuniary interest and in failing to render faitbul service.-NEW YORK INSULATED WIRE CO. V. BROADNAX, 0. S. C.C. of App., Second Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 634.

62. MASTER AND SERVANT – Fellow Servanto-Non. liability Rule-Origin.-The doctrine that a master is pot liable for injuries to a servant, caused by the neg. ligence of a fellow.ger ant, was not a part of the com

mon law existing at the date of our separation from England, and hence the courts of one state cannot presume that such rule exists in another state, so as to throw on a plaintiff who bas been injured in such other state by the negligence of a fellow-gervant, the burden of proving tbat the rule has been abrogated by statute.-WILLIAMS V. SOUTHERN RY, Co., N. Car.. 38 S. E. Rep. 893.

63. MASTER AND SERVANT - Injuries to Brakeman Appliances.-A brakeman was set to work in switcbing with a road engine regularly used for that purpose, but unprovided with any special hand hold in front, necessary in his work. No particular projection was used, and the use of any particular one was not forbidden. The brakeman, however, used the figure plate, which was adapted thereto, and most conven. ient for a man of his bize. It bad been loose for 24 hours, but was apparently all right when he took bold of it. It gave way, however, and he was thrown under the cowcatcher and injured. Held, that the company owed bim the duty of inspecting the plate commensurate with the purpose for which it must be as. sumed that it knew it was used, and hence, on proot of the foregoing facts, it was error to nonsuit him in an action for damages, enough being shown to require some proof of inspection to overcome the presumption of negligence.- DONN V. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. Co., U.S.C.C. of App., Second Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 666.

64. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injuries to Servant-Non. suit.- Plaintiff, a weaver, was injured while assisting in the repair of a loom which he operated, by a sliver of steel flying from a hammer and striking him in the eye. There was no evidence that the hammer was apparently defective, or was being negligently used. Held, that the plaintiff was properly popsuited, since the injury wes caused by a latent defect in the ham. mer, for which the defendant was not liable.-MARTIN v. HIGHLAND PARK MFG. Co., N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 876.

65. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Detective sidewalks -Negligence.-Plaintiff was injured by stepping into a hole in a sidewalk, caused by a plank being broken several days before. There were several churches and a school bouse on the street, and it was much traveled by those attending the churches and school as well as by those living along the street. The planks of the walk were raised 10 or 12 inches from the ground, and a driveway crossed the walk, where the plank was broken by & loaded wagon. Held, that the question of the pegligence of the city in not discover. ing the defect and repairing the walk was for the jury. -LAURIE V. CITY OF BALLARD, Wash., 64 Pac. Rep. 906.

66. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Liability for Injury to Property in Making Improvements.-Under Const. $ 242, providing that municipal and other corporations invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use shall make just compensation for property taken, injured, or destroyed, a city is liable for injury to private property in the construction of a sewer.-THOMAN V. CITY OF COVINGTON, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 721.

67. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-ReinstatementWaiver of Forfeiture.-The laws of a mutual benefit ingurance order authorized the reinstatement of & member only on satisfactory evidence of his good health. A member, who had forfeited his member ship by pon payment of his dues, while seriously sick and on his deathbed remitted to the proper officers of the order the amount necessary for his reinstatement. In the letter accompanying the remittance nothing was said as to his bealth, and the officers had no knowledge as to his pbysical condition. Held, that the receipt of the money was not a walver of the forfelture, and did not reinstate the member, since, even if the officers could waive a torleiture in contra. vention of the laws of the order, a walver was not shown by their receipt of the money wbile ignorant as to his sickness.-SUPREME LODGE K. P. v. QUINN, Miss., 29 South. Rep. 826.

68. NEGLIGENCE-Dangerous Property - Place At. made, the North Carolina court had jurisdiction of tractive to Children.-Where a complaint alleged that the action, and the fellow-gervant act of 1897 of that defendant had a piece of cement tubing, weighing state applied to it, making the railroad company from 500 to 700 pounds, 2 feet in length and 4 1.2 feet in | liable.-WILLIAMS V. SOUTHERN RY. CO., N. Car., 38 s. diameter, which was so topheavy that it frequently E. Rep. 893. tipped over from its side to its end, on land adjacent

75. RAILROADS-Persons on Track-Negligence.-In. to the street, and not separated therefrom by any

testate was found early in the morning beneath a tres. fence or other guard, so that, to defendant's knowl.

tle on defendant's road severely injured, and died soon edge, children were enticed to play with it, because it

thereafter. There was grease on his clothes, appar. rolled easily, and that, while plaintiff's intestate and

ently from an engine. There was evidence that a train other children were so playing, the pipe tipped over of defendant passed the trestle during the night. and fatally injured plaintiff's intestate, it stated a

Held that, if intestate was on the trestle and was struck cause of action.-KOPPLEKOM V. COLORADO CEMENT

by the train, it was negligence in defendant not to PIPE CO., Colo., 64 Pac. Rep. 1047.

have seen bim at the time; and if defendant's train 69. PAYMENT-Money.-Where plaintiffs sent an ac.

knocked the intestate off the trestle, and the em. count against defendant to an attorney for collection,

ployees knew it had done so, and went on without and in the settlement of another controversy money

stopping to look after and care for him on a cold win. belonging to the defendant came into the possession

ter night, it was negligence sufficient to make defend. of the attorney, and was deposited in the bank in his

ant liable. - WHITESIDES V. SOUTHERN RY. Co., N. name, and it was agreed between the attorney and de

Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 878. fendant that the attorney should send his own check 76. RECEIVERS - Parties - Partnership Liability. to plaintiffs in payment of the account, it was error to Where a contract liability was incurred by a copartcharge that tbe agreement did not constitute pay. nership long before the appointment of a receiver of ment, since the money was appropriated to the debt, the partnership assets, the copartners were necessary and accepted by plaintiff's authorized agent.-MILL parties to a suit on such contract, and a complaint HISER V. MARR, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 887.

against thelreceiver alone was.demurrable.-FLYNN V 70. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-Certificate-Record.

FURTH, Wash., 64 Pac. Rep. 903. ing.-Laws 1885, p. 296, $ 1 (Mills' Apn. St. $ 3550), pro.

77. SHIPPING-Injury to Vessel-Fault or Master.-Revides that the certificate of the state board of med. covery cannot be had for injury to a boat by its ical examiners to the effect that the person holding it grounding on an obstruction at a dock, on the going was a graduate in medicine from a legally chartered down of the tide, where the master, though notified medical school, in good standing. shall be conclusive | that there was an obstruction, and directed to breast as to the rights of such person to practice medicine in the boat off from the dock, for which purpose a breastthis state; and section 3554 declares that every person ing plapk had been fastened to the dock, failed to do holding such a certificate shall have it recorded in the 90.- LEO V. MOOOLLUM, U. S. D. O., E. D. (N. Y.), 107 office of the county clerk of the county in which he | Fed. Rep. 742. resides. Held, that where a physician possessed a 78. SHIPPING – Sale of Yacht - Appurtenances certificate of the state board, entitling him to prac.

Agency - Scope of Agent's Authority. - A naptha tice medicine, the fact that the certificate was not re launch used by the owner as a tender, in connection corded in the county in which he rendered services with a 30-foot yacht owned by him, but which could constituted no defense to an action for compensation, not be carried on the yacht, did not accompany since the issuance of tbe certificate was conclusive of

its trips, and was not a part of the usual equipme his rigbt to practice, and the statute did not make the

such yachts, did not by such use, merely as a matter recording of it a condition precedent to the right to

of convenience, become an appurtenance of the yacht, recover for services.-RILEY V. COLLINS, Colo., 64 Pac.

which pasged by a sale of the latter. Agents who are Rep. 1052.

authorized by the owner to sell a yacht are not there. 71. PLEADING AND PRACTICE-Personal Injuries.-In. by given any authority, either actual or apparent, to jury to eyesight may be proved under a complaint al. sell a paptha launch, sometimes used as a tender to leging that plaintiff was burled forward with such the yacht, but which was not legally an appurtenance force as to bruise her knee, wrench her arm, and thereto, but a separate vessel, and, in the absence of "otherwise seriously and grievously injure her." actual authority, they cannot bind the owner by a gale BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO. V. MACLAURY, U.S. C.C. of the launcb.-FORREST V. VANDERBILT, U.S.C.C. of App., Second Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 644.

of App., Third Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 734. 72. PLEADING AND PRACTICE – Trial-Misconduct of

79. SLANDER AND LIBEL-False Notice to Creditors' Counsel in Argument.-It was improper to permit

Protective Association.-If a notice given by defendcounsel for plaintiff, in an action against a railroad

ant brewing company to a brewers' protective asso. company to recover damages for personal injuries, to

ciation of which it was a member, to the effect that say, in argument to the jury: "The railroad can ap.

plaintiff, one of its customers, was indebted to it, was peal this case, but the plaintiff is a poor man, and has

false, and was given for the purpose of extorting from no money to appeal with, and will bave to accept

plaintiff a debt which he had settled, or for the pur. what you do;" but this error alone would not be guff.

pose of disabling plaintiff from dealing with other cient to autborize a reversal.-LOUISVILLE, ETC. RY.

members of the association, and keeping him in its Co. V. MOBGAN, Ky., 62 8. W. Rep. 736.

power, after the debt had been raid, there was legal

malice authorizing the recovery of damages.-JOHN 73. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Suretieg in Sheriff's BRENNER BREWING CO.V. MCGILL, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. Bond-Homestead.-A gurety in a sheriff's bond is not 722. entitled to the exemption of a homestead as against a 80. SURETIES-Replevin Bond-Indemnity.-Sureties judgment on the bond in favor of the commonwealth.

on an undertaking in replevin have no remedy at law and is therefore not entitled to the exemption as

or in equity upon a contract to indemnify them against the claim of a co-gurety for contribution on against loss on account of their suretyship until such account of the payment of such judgment.-HUTSON'S

logg has occurred; nor has the defendant in th ADME. V. COMBS, Ky., 62 8. W. Rep. 709.

plevin suit who recovered a judgment against the 74. RAILROADS – Injuries to Servant.-Where a gery. laintiff therein, though the sureties and judgment ant of a railroad company operating lines in North debtor be insolvent, and the judgment be otherwise Carolina was injured in Tennessee by the negligence

uncollectible. – BENDERSON ACHERT LITHOGRAPHIC of a fellow.servant, an action for such injuries was an Co. v. JOHN SHILLITO CO., Ohio, 60 N. E. Rep. 295. action in contract, and not in tort, and hence, in the 81. SURETIES AND SURETYSHIP-Official Bonds-Liaabsence of any showing as to where the contract was | bilities.-Under Gen. Stat. 1883, $ 647 (MIIS' App. Stat. $ 910), providing that an assessor shall give bond for tion, requiring a fixed monthly payment of dues, and the performance of his duties, the sureties on an a monthly payment of interest, and a certain preassessor's official bond are not liable to bis successor mium, aggregating an amount greater than the legal for fees received by their principal holding over after rate of interest, is usurious, the premium being the expiration of his term, though big bond, in addi. merely additional interest.-SOUTHERN HOME BUILDtion to requiring the faithful performance of his ING & LOAN ASSN. V. TONY, Miss., 29 South. Rep. 827. duties, requires him to deliver to his successor all the 80. VENDOR AND PORCHASER-Payment-Receipts.belongings of his office, such latter requirement being Where defendant sold land to plaintiff by agreement surplusage. – PEOPLE V. JACKSON, Colo., 64 Pac. in form of a lease, deed to be given on payment of 72 Rep. 1051. has."

montbly installments of $45.07 each, and a note of 82. TAXATION-Assessinent - Loans. - Under Const. $1,350, payable 9 years from date, receipts given by deart. 13, § 1, providing that "moneys, credits, dues," fendant to plaintiff 9 years thereafter, at a time subse. etc., shall be taxed, loans are taxable, though secured quent to any payments on the 72 installments and by property exempt from taxation.-SECURITY SAV. | when all payments were on the note, and reciting, BANK V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Cal., 64 I received $55 rent in advance" for said premises, Pac. Rep. 898.

will, in the absence of explanation or proof of mis83. TAXATION-Personalty-Seat in New York Stock

take, be conclusive of payment of all the previous in

stallments. – JOHNSTONE V. MULCAHY, Cal., 64 Pac. Exchange.-A seat in the York Stock Exchange is not

Rep. 1077. personal property, within Laws 1896, ch. 908, $ 2, subd. 4, defining personal property for purposes of taxation,

90. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Nuisances - Dam and is not taxable to a non-resident under section 7.

--Abatement.-Where a lower riparian owner erects a providing that personal property of a non-resident

dam which tbrows the water back on an upper owper, shall be "taxed to the extent" as if owned by a resi.

it is a nuisance, which the latter may abate to the ex. dent. The value of a seat in the New York Stock Fx.

tept necessary to stop the refluence, if he can do so change is capital invested in business in the state, but

without a breach of the peace.-LILES V. CAWTHORN, is not taxable, as the taxing statute does not cover it.

Miss., 29 South. Rep. 834. -PEOPLE V. FEITNER, N. Y., 60 N. E. Rep. 265.

91. WILLS-Charitable Use-Erection of a Church.

Testator directed that a large part of his property 84. TELEGRAPH-Delay in Delivery of Money-Dama.

should be converted into money, to be designated as geg-Mental Distress.-In an action against a tele.

the "general fund," and directed that such fund graph company to recover damages for the failure to

ghould be applied to the building of a stone church promptly deliver money transmitted through such

and school house of convenient size, two stories higb, company to the plaintiff, the fact that plaintiff was

and about 60 feet long by 40 feet wide, etc.; the buildevicted from her house because of her failure to re.

ing to cost about $2,000, and to be paid out of the "gen. ceive such money, and the injury to her reputation

eral fund." After his death the amount available in generally because of such eviction, are consequences too remote to be considered as elements of damages.

such fund was $4,000, but it was found that the test&

tor's entire estate was not sufficient to erect & stone Mental distress, unaccompanied by physical injury, is

building of the dimensions mentioned. Held, that the not a proper element of damages recoverable from a

provision for the size of the building was directory telegraph company for a failure to promptly deliver

merely, and that, in the absence of proof that a buildmoney sent through its agency to plaintiff.-STANSELL

ing could not be constructed of stone of sufficient size V. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co., U. 8. C. C., S. D. (Cal.),

and suitable for the purposes contemplated, by the 107 Fed. Rep. 669.

use of tbe entire amount of the "general fund," it 85. TRESPASS – Cutting Trees on Another's Land - would not be held that such provision of the will was Penalty-Instructions.-One who cute trees on the inoperative, or insufficient for its purpose.-PAINE Y. land of another, but who at the time of such cutting PORNEY, N. Car., 38 8. E. Rep. 885. is under the honest belief that the land 18 his own, or 92. WILL-Construction.-A will in which the testa. that it is the land of a third person who has consented

tor devises all of his real and personal property to his to such cutting on his land, ls pot llable for the pen.

wife, to have and control it as he would do it living, alty prescribed by statute (Code, $ 4137). - GLENN V.

and" to sell and convey any property she may choose ADAMS, Ala., 29 South. Rep. 836.

for her support or comfort, as she may see proper, 86. TRIAL - Continuance - Absent Witnesses. during her natural life; and at her death, what may --An application for a continuance in a crim. be left of my said estate, the same to be divided ac. inal cage on account of absent witnesses is addressed

cording to law 'in such cases made and provided," to the discretion of the trial court, and its refusal is

gives to his wife an estate for life in all of his propnot revisable on appeal, unless it is plainly shown

erty, with the absolute right of disposition of the that there was an abuse of such discretion by the trial same without restraint or control by the courts; and court. Thus, where an application for a continuance

her right of disposition is not limited to the necessiis made by the defendant in a criminal case on ac.

ties for her support and comfort.-CAIN V. CAIN, Ala.. count of the absence of some of his witnesses, and the 29 South. Rep. 846. state limits the showing made by the defendant as to

93. WILLS-Devise to Class- Beneficiaries - Particuwhat the absent witnesses would testify if present,

lar Estate.- Where testator devised a tract of land to and there are disclosed po facts wbich show that the

bis son's children, to be divided among them afte absence of the witnesses is prejudicial to the defend. death of such son, only those cbildren who were born ant, the refusal of the application for a continuance at the time of testator's death were entitled to a sbare is not erroneous.- HUSKEY V. STATE, Ala., 29 South. of the land, since there was no provision for an inter: Rep. 838.

mediate estate, but the title passed to the devisees im 87. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEE8-Conveyances by Trustee. mediately on the death of the testator.-WISE V. LEON-Where two grantors, each owning an individual

HARDT, N. Car., 38 8. E. Rep. 892. moiety in realty, convey it to one of them in trust for 94. WRIT OF REVIEW-Trustee-Deposit in Court. the other and certain third parties, imposing Do ac

Under the provisions of section 4339, Rev. St., when it tive duties on such trustee, such conveyance, under is admitted by the pleading of a party or shown upon the statute of uses, passes both the legal and equitable bis examination that he has in his possession or un estate of the grantors to such third persons, leaving der his control money that he is holding as trustee for the trustee without any title which he can convey as

others, who apply to the court for an order requiring against the latter.-JORDAN V. PHILLIPS & CREW Co., the holder thereof to turn the same into court, the Ala., 29 South. Rep. 831.

court has jurisdiction to grant such application, and 88. USORY-Building and Loan Associations – Mort. to make an order requiring the money to be deposited gages.-A contract with a building and loan associa. I in court.-REID V. STEELE, Idaho, 64 Pac. Rep. 892.

Central Law

Journal.

Perhaps the “fretfulness and impatience” of judges, and especially judges of nisi

prius courts is the lack of preparation on the ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 2, 1901.

part attorneys. Oral argument in the gen-
eral run of it to-day is, in most cases, ex-

ceedingly tedious and commonplace and is The peculiar value of oral argument is undoubtedly a great weariness of the flesh fery often greatly underestimated not only to even the most patient judge. How difby lawyers but also by judges on the |ferent it was with men like Choate and bench. How often one observes an attorney Webster by whose burning eloquence not arelessly “making a few remarks" to the | only juries but the courts themselves were fourt and wasting a most precious oppor captivated and constrained to view the law lunity to incline the mind of the judge in his and the facts in the light in which these svor which not even the most laborious and great advocates saa ihem. The idea which painstaking brief could even be expected to prevails to a very large extent that judges fo. The later generation of lawyers seem cannot be moved by the eloquence which to rely more upon the logic of cold type than would appeal to a jury, is fallacious and of burning words addressed to the ear of the ought to be exploded. Judges are human, fourt. This tendency of the bar is regretted even with all the classical coldness sometimes by Mr. Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court, assumed by them, and the earnest advocate In a statement made to a correspondent of the with his intellectual batteries well primed New York Evening Post, as follows:

and his whole nature on fire with zeal for the | "It is a matter of serious regret and con cause he represents is most likely to overcern to this court tbat the practice of oral come the heart and mind of either judge or argument appears to be falling into disuse. jury. A revival of forensic argument and a The idea seems to bave become general more careful preparation therefor on the among members of the bar that we prefer part of advocates would greatly lighten the srguments presented in the form of written burden of the court in understanding the briefs. Such is not the case. There are real point in issue and in arriving at a decismany times when nothing can take the place sion in harmony with the justice and law of bf the personal presentation. Briefs are the case. well enough in their way, but it very often happens that the real point upon which a 1 If one question in this country ought to ease turns may be overlooked in a brief, be definitely settled it is that the manufacwhile an oral argument may serve to bring it ture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not a home to the court. A special emphasis, a natural right protected by the constitution, striking simile may throw new light on an but is a recognized evil to be suffered or intricate problem, and perhaps reverse a licensed to exist by the people for a considjudgment in the mind of the court."

eration. It is held as a favor, which, like all In commenting on this, the American favors, “must be received upon such terms Law Review, says:

and conditions, and subject to such burdens “The Supreme Court of the United States and inconveniences, as the donor thinks have always set bigb value upon oral argu proper to impose and the donee elects ment, and difficult cases are often ordered to accept." In the recent and important down for reargument by that court. Two case of State v. Bixman, 62 S. W. Rep. 828, bours on a side are allowed for argument, the Supreme Court of Missouri was called and in cases of great importance, the time is upon to wrestle with this question in the extended. During the argument the judges form of a state inspection tax. Act of May frequently ask questions, tending to clear | 4, 1899, declared that beer and malt liquors doubts in their minds. It is a pleasure to | can be manufactured or sold in the state listen to a good argument in the supreme only on condition that they sball be made court. The fretfulness and impatience of from certain specified cereals and that they argument which are discovered in some other | shall be inspected and a certain amount paid appellate courts does not exist there at all.” | to the state on each gallon inspected, This

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the court held to be a proper exercise of the services which the lawyer of the corporation power of the state, since the manufacture and sale of such beverage is detrimental to

ADVERSE POSSESSION OF GRANTEE UNDER public morals, and the legislature has arbi. FORECLOSURE SALE.-The running of the statute tary power to prohibit such manufacture and of limitations in perfecting a title by adverse possale absolutely if it so desired. In answer to

session bas always managed to come up in some

changed form as a mooted question of law. In the objection that the fee charged for in

the recent case of Stout v. Rigney, 107 Fed. Rep. spection purposes was largely in excess of 515, it was held that one wbo enters upon land the costs of such inspection, the court held under a trustee's deed which purports to convey that the doctrine that an inspection law can an absolute title, and which was executed upon not be legitimately employed to yield a reve

a sale by the trustee in a mortgage, the purpose nue beyond the cost of inspection bas no

of wbich was to bar the mortgagor's equity of

redemption, must be regarded as bolding adapplication to a law regulating the manu

versely to the mortgagors from tbe time bis deed facture and sale of beer and malt liquors.

is recorded, and possession is taken thereunder, To tbe objection ibat ibe act intei fered with although the sale made by the trustee was irthe rights of interstate commerce, the court regular or premature; and no actual notice to the beld that under Act of Congress, August 8,

mortgagor of the adverse nature of his claim is

necessary to invoke the runding of the statute of 1890, declaring that all intoxicating liquors

limitations for its protection. Tbe court said: transported into a state, on arrival therein We do not believe it to have been essential to are subject to its laws enacted in the exer render their possession adverse tbat they (the cise of police powers, tbat part of the act purchasers at the foreclosure sale) should bave probibiting the sale of beer or malt liquors

notified the complainant that they were holding till the same are inspected, and the fee

the land adversely, and would dispute ber right

to redeem, inasmuch as the entry was made in. therefore paid to the state, is not in viola.

der a deed which purported to convey an absotion of the rights of congress over interstate lute title, and wbich also professed to foreclose commerce.

her rigot to redeem. In the case of Rogers v.

Brown, 01 Mo. 187, 195, it was ruled, among NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS other things, that the grantee under a fraudulent

conveyance would be regarded as bolding adATTORNEY'S FEES AS PREFERRED CLAIMS.-On versely to creditors wbo had oballenged the first thought mo:t attorneys would be very much validity of the conveyance from the time bis deed inclined to take exception to the bolding of Cald was recorded, and we perceive no sufficient reawell, J., in the recent case of Latta v. Lonsdale,

son why one who enters upon land under a 107 Fed. Rep. 585, tbat a lawyer employed by a

trustee's deed which purports to convey an absorailroad company on a yearly salary is not a lute title, and to bave been made with a view of laborer or employee of the corporation entitling

barring the mortgagor's equity of redemption, bim to a preference over other creditors. The should not be regarded as holding adversely to court sums up the question in the following

the mortgagor from the time that his deed is words:

recorded and possession is taken, althougb the "A lawyer employed by a railroad company on sale made by the trustee was irregular or premaa yearly salary, payable montbly, is not a laborer

ture. The precise question last suggested arose or employee, witbin the meaning of tbe sections

in tbe case of Miger v. Beekman, 50 Y. Y. 337, quoted. Cent. Dict. tit. “Wage'; Lewis v. Fisber,

344, in wbich case it was decided tbat the statute 80 Md. 139, 30 Atl. Rep. 608; Casualty Ins. Co.'s

of limitations began to run against the purcbaser Case, 82 M2, 538, 566, 34 Atl. Rep. 778; Bristor v.

of the equity of redemption, wbo bad not been Smith, 158 N. Y. 157, 53 N. E. Rep. 42; In re

made a party to an action of foreclosure which Stryker, 158 N. Y. 526, 530, 53 N. E. Rep. 525;

was brougbt against the mortgagor, from the Bristor v. Kretz, 49 N. Y. Supp. 404; Vane v.

time the mortgagee entered into possession as a Newcombe, 132 U. S. 220, 237, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.

purcbaser under the defective decree of foreclos60,33 L. Ed. 310; Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 138 U.

ure. Our conclusion is, therefore, that the comS. 501, 505, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405, 34 L. Ed. 1023;

plainant's right to redeem was effectually barred 3 Tbomp. Corp. $ 3145. It is very generally be

by the statute of limitations long before tbe preslieved that corporation lawyers bave the oppor

ent bill was filed." tunity, and are quite able and capable of taking care of themselves when their clients fail, and MASTER AND SERVANT — SCOPE OF SERVANT'S statutes of the character quoted are not enacted EMPLOYMENT.--One of the most difficult quesin their interest, but for the protection of wage tions with which courts and juries have to wrestle earners proper, who are laymen, and who have arises out of the relation of master and servant in neither the position nor the opportunity nor tbe determining whether a certain act committed by capacity to obtain payment or security for their 'a servant for which tbe master is sought to be

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