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proof of the paternal descent of natural children may be made ing the following ways: 1. By all kinds of private writings in which the father may have acknowledged the bastard as his child, or may have called it so. 2. When the mother of the child was living in a state of concubinage with the father and resided as such in his house at the time the child was conceived. 3. When the father, either in public or in private, has acknowledged it as his child, or has habitually called it so in conversation, or has caused it to be educated as such. Badillo v. Tio, 6 La. Ann. 129. Statements made by one charged with being the father of a child born out of wedlock, that he had a boy somewhere, that the mother of the boy had been ruined by him, that the mother was pregnant, and that he was going to send her money, do not constitute the general and notorious recognition of the child necessary, under the statute, to entitle it to inherit from the father. McCorkendale v. McCorken. dale (Iowa, 1900), 82 N. W. Rep. 754. In Maine no illegitimate child can inherit the estate of his father as heir, unless the written acknowledgment required by the statute has been properly executed. Hunt v. Hunt, 37 Me. 333. When an illegitimate child claims the right to inherit from his father under a statute giving such children that right when they have been recognized by the father as his children, and such recognition has been "general or notorious," though declarations of the putative father are competent to show such recognition, such evidence must be carefully scrutinized. Watson v. Richardson (Iowa,

1899), 80 N. W. Rep. 407. Evidence showing that a putative father recognized an illegitimate child as his own in the home of its foster parents during the first year of its life, and occasionally thereafter, is not sufficient to establish such "general and notorious" recognition by the father as will entitle the child to inherit from him. Watson v. Richardson, supra. Under a statute providing that every illegitimate child shall be considered as an heir to the person who shall, in writing signed in the presence of competent witnesses, have acknowledged himself to be the father of such child, the acknowledgment need not be made by the parent for the express purpose of admitting such child to heirship, but a collateral acknowledgment is sufficient. In re Rohrer (Wash. 1900), 60 Pac. Rep. 122. The right of an illegitimate child to inherit from its father is given by statute in North Dakota. But it is held that under this section he may inherit where the father has acknowledged him as his child by an instrument in writing, properly witnessed, and then only from his father directly and as an illegitimate child. It is also held, however, under the same section, that if the legal relation of parent and child has been established by an adoption under section 2806, providing for the adoption of illegitimate children, he is clothed with the full right of inheritance of a legitimate child. Eddie v. Eddie, 8 N. Dak. 37. See also as construing a similar statute, Lind v. Burke, 56 Neb. 785.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

"Just for exercise," as he told Judge Sidener, John Sippel kicked Oscar Borgel, a negro, whom he saw asleep in a doorway on Valentine street. The victim came into court with a cut beneath his eye and with

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1. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL-Foreclosure-Personal Representative.-Code Civ. Proc. § 385, provides that an action does not abate by the death of a party if the cause of action survives. Held, that the fact that defendant in an action to foreclose a mortgage died more than a year after the commencement of the action, and before the service of summons on her, did not prevent the court from acquiring jurisdiction of her personal representative, since the cause of action did not abate, and the court had implied power to order a new summons to bring in the new party.UNION SAV. BANK V. BARRETT, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 1071. 2. ACTION-Legal or Equitable-Jury Trial.-Where plaintiffs alleged ownership and possession of land, and that defendant claimed title thereto under forged deeds, and prayed cancellation of such deeds, and that defendant be restrained from claiming thereunder, such equitable action cannot be changed into a legal action by defendant filling a cross bill in the nature of ejectment, so as to entitle defendant to a jury trial.-ANGUS V. CRAVEN, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 1091. 3. ADMINISTRATOR DE BONIS NON Recovery of Assets Wasted by Administrator.-An administrator de bonis non cannot sue to recover notes belonging to the estate which the administrator turned over to his wife as her share of the estate, the right to recover assets wasted by the administrator being in the dis tributees.-KARN'S ADMR. v. SEATON, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep.

736.

4. ADMIRALTY - Maritime Liens - Supplies and Repairs Furnished to Owner-Implied Agreement for Lien. Under the rule that where repairs are ordered in a foreign port by the owner, there must be some affirmative evidence to show that the credit of the ship was pledged as security for payment, to entitle the repairer to a lien, it is not essential that such evidence should show an agreement for a lien in express words, but facts and circumstances which justify the inference that there was a common understanding that the ship would be bound to establish an implied ggreement for a lien. and are sufficient.—THE NEW.

which was executed upon a sale by the trustee in a mortgage, the purpose of which was to bar the mortgagor's equity of redemption, must be regarded as holding adversely to the mortgagor from the time his deed is recorded, and possession is taken thereunder, although the sale made by the trustee was irregular or premature; and no actual notice to the mortgagor of the adverse nature of his claim is necessary to invoke the running of the statute of limitations for its protection. STOUT V. RIGNEY, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 545.

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7. AGREEMENT Landlord and Tenant. - Where plaintiff's intestate took up defendant's rent note, and furnished him with supplies, under an agreement that defendant would recognize plaintiff s intestate as landlord, plaintiff was not entitled to a landlord's at. tachment for the suppl'es furnished, since such agree. ment could not create the relation of landlord and tenant.-COKER V. BRITT, Miss., 29 South. Rep. 833.

8. ARBITRATION-Award-Review.-Where an agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration provides that the award shall be faithfully kept as to all things by each of the parties, it will not be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct. - SKAGIT COUNTY V. TROW. BRIDGE, Wash., 64 Pac. Rep. 901.

9. ASSIGNMENTS Priority Representations of Agent.-A contractor made an assignment to a bank of the balance due him from a county. On false re. presentations of the bank's vice-president that the county owed enough to the contractor to pay defendant's claim and all others, nothing being said of the previous assignment, defendant obtained an assignment of the same fund to the extent of his debt. Part of this was for material not yet delivered; and on learning of the assignment to the bank defendant re fused delivery until secured or paid therefor. The bank paid the amount under agreement that neither party's rights would be prejudiced thereby. Previous to the bank's representations, defendant contemplated attachment of the contractor's property, but the evi dence showed no ground of attachment. This prop erty was subsequently mortgaged to the bank to secure another debt not herein involved. Held, that the bank was not estopped by its officer's false representations from claiming priority to the fund assigned, since defendant did not rely or act thereon.-WAXAHA. CHIE NAT. BANK V. BEILHARZ, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 743. 10. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS Validity. Where B conveyed his property to his brother on June 22d, and on June 24th it was reconveyed to B, who assigned it to his brother-in-law for the benefit of certain creditors, the assignment, in the absence of evidence that the debts secured were not due or were not bona fide, was not void as in fraud of creditors not Included in the assignment, since it is not frand for a creditor to prefer one debtor to an other.-CITY NAT. BANK OF NORFOLK V. BRIDGERS, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 888.

11. BANKRUPTCY-Discharge-Appeal Bond-Surety. -Where a surety on an appeal bond was discharged of all his debts and claims provable under the bank. ruptcy law subsequent to a judgment on such appeal bond, the discharge is a defense to the enforcement of such judgment, since the debt, or damages for breach of the appeal bond, was a provable one, under Bank. ruptcy Act 1898, § 63, subd. 4, subsec. "a," providing that debts of the bankrupt founded on an express contract may be proved.-COE V. WATERS, Colo., 64 Pac. Rep. 1062.

12. BANKRUPTCY-Vold Prior Incumbrances - Mortgages to Hinder Creditors.-A corporation executed mortgages covering all its property to favored creditors, who were not pressing it for payment nor asking to be secured, intending thereby to force indulgence from its other creditors and further advances from those secured. Held, that they were intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, within Bankruptcy Act 1898, § 67, declaring void incumbrances made with such intent within four months prior to filing a peti. tion in bankruptcy.-BAINBRIDGE STATE BANK V. TONGE, U. S, C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 669.

13. BILLS AND NOTES Non-negotiable Notes-Defenses. Where notes given with a mortgage were nonnegotiable, but were assigned, the assignee took them subject to all equities; and the mortgagees could set up the defense that by mistake the mortgage included more property than the parties intended, though the assignee had no notice of the mistake.-SAN JOSE RANCH Co. v. SAN JOSE LAND & WATER CO., Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 1097.

14. CARRIERS Loss of Goods Bill of Lading Reasonableness.-A clause in a bill of lading releasing the carrier from liability for loss or damage of the goods if notice is not presented in writing within 30 days after the delivery thereof, or after due time for such delivery, is unreasonable and void.-GYN HARPER MFG. Co. v. CAROLINA CENT. R. Co., N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 894.

15. CARRIERS Malicious Injury to Passenger. Plaintiff, a negro girl, entered the waiting room of defendant's depot with two other colored girls. E, a white man, also entered the same room. The agent refused to sell them tickets, and requested the girls to come into the office and talk it over. The girls refused, and E asked to go into the office, where there was a fire; but the agent drew a revolver and ordered E to leave, and followed him and the girls outside, where plaintiff ran into a pool of water, which caused her to be ill. Held, that a judgment for plaintiff would not be reversed for slight errors in the instructions.-YAZoo & M. V. R. Co. v. MARTIN, Miss., 29 South. Rep. 829.

16. CARRIERS OF LIVE STOCK Contract Limiting Amount of Liability to Agreed Valuation. A stipulation in a bill of lading for live stock that in case of loss or injury in shipment the carrier shall not be liable beyond a stated and agreed valuation per head, in consideration of which the shipper is given a lower freight rate, is valid and binding on the parties, although the loss or injury results from the negligence of the carrier. - METROPOLITAN TRUST Co., OF NEW YORK V. TOLEDO, ST. L. & K. C. R. Co., U. S. C. C., D. (Ind.), 107 Fed. Rep. 628.

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17. CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE · Agreement to Assist Litigant.-An agreement by one who was not a lawyer to assist infant heirs, to whom he was not related, in the contest of a will, by rendering personal services as their agent, in consideration of "a sum equal to" a certain part of what might be recovered, was vold where the litigation was the result of the agent's interference and intermeddling, and though the contract was made in the name of an attorney whose employment the agent procured under an agreement that the agent was to share the fee, which has since been collected by the attorney, the agent cannot require the attorney to divide with him upon the ground that the contract, though illegal, has been executed.-LYNN V. Moss, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 712.

18. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Disposal of Released Property-Effect of Renewal Mortgage.-If, before the execution of a second renewal chattel mortgage on the same property, included in the first between the same parties, the parties agreed by parol that the mort. gagor might dispose of a part of the mortgaged pron. erty free from the mortgage liens, and he did so, the rights thereby acquired by third parties to such re

leased property are unaffected by the renewal mortgage. -PECOS VALLEY BANK V. EVANS-SNIDER-BUEL Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 654.

19. CONTRACT-Instructions.-In an action upon an account, where the trial is had upon the plea of the general issue and of payment, and there is evidence tending to show that the defendant had never purchased the article alleged to have been sold to him by the plaintiff, and that if he did he had paid for it, a charge is properly refused which instructs the jury that "the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish his plea of payment to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, and, if the evidence is equally balanced, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict."-DAVIS WAGON Co. v. CANNON, Ala., 29 South. Rep. 841.

20. CONTRACT 8-Rescission - Diligence. Plaintiff and interveners alleged that they were stockholders in defendant corporation; that defendant Powned a majority of the stock; that, the corporation being indebted to P for land purchased of him, which, by agreement, was to be paid only out of the proceeds of sles of such land, the directors had adopted a resolu. tion authorizing a loan and mortgage of all its prop. erty, and, in consideration of P's guarantying the pay. ment of the loan, that he should be paid at once; that the loan was made, and P was paid his claim out of the proceeds. Held, under Civ. Code, § 1691, provid. ing that rescission, when not effected by consent, can be accomplished only by the complainant rescinding promptly on discovering the facts which entitle him to rescind, that rescission should be denied, the action not having been commenced until two years after the acts complained of, and no excuse being offered for the delay. WILLS V. PORTER, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 896.

21. CONVERSION-Claim Against County-Tax Sale.The defendant county instituted a suit against M and others to recover taxes on certain goods which in fact belonged to plaintiff, and the goods were sold by a receiver, whose actions were directed by the county treasurer and other county officers. A judgment in favor of the county was reversed on appeal and the sult dismissed. Held, that it was proper, in an action by plaintiff against the county for conversion, to charge that the receiver's acts were unauthorized, and that the county was responsible therefor.-ROSE V. PIERCE COUNTY, Wash., 64 Pac. Rep. 913.

22. CONVERSION - Damages.-An instruction, in an action for damages for conversion of a stock of merchandise, that "the burden is on the plaintiff to show that at the times alleged he was the owner of, and entitled to possession of, the goods, etc., and that at said time defendant sheriff wrongfully and unlawfully levied on and sold said goods, to plaintiff's damage; the burden is also on the plaintiff to show that the goods were of any greater value than $1,000, as admitted by the answer, and that he has expended any sum necessarily in endeavoring to recover said property or the value thereof,"-correctly stated the law on the issues of the ownership of the property and its value.-KIPP V. SILVERMAN, Mont., 64 Pac. Rep. 884. 23. CONVERSION- Officer How far Protected by Writ. In the absence of a statute, an officer, under a process against one of several co-tenants, may seize and take into his exclusive possession the common property, and a co-tenant, though a stranger to the writ, is without remedy for such invasion of his possession; and upon a sale of the interest of the joint owner, who is a party to the action, the possession of the common property may be delivered to the pur. chaser, who becomes a tenant in common thereof; but, if the officer assumes to levy on or sell the whole property, his act, as against the co-tenant not named in the writ, is wrongful, and he may be sued for trespass or conversion as the co-tenant may elect.-SPALDING V. ALLRED, Utah, 64 Pac. Rep. 1100.

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24. CORPORATIONS-Stockholders Subject to Assessments-Transfer of Shares in Good Faith.-An owner

of shares in a national bank, who sold the same in good faith, without knowledge or reason to believe the bank was insolvent, and who did everything that was reasonably possible to have the proper formal transfer made on the books of the bank, cannot be treated as a shareholder, and held liable to an assessment made by the comptroller upon the subsequent closing of the bank as insolvent, upon evidence show. ing that the bank was in fact insolvent at the time the sale was made, and that the purchaser was also insolvent. The statute imposes no restriction upon the right to transfer shares because of the insolvency of the bank or the transferee, nor do considerations of public policy justify him where the seller has exercised due diligence, and has acted in the transaction with fairness and good faith.-EARLE V. CARSON, U. S. C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 639.

25. CORPORATIONS-Stock Subscriptions Not Paid Up-Liability of Stockholders.-Where a corporation agrees with its stockholders that only a certain amount of the stock subscribed by each stockholder shall be paid in, but credit is extended to the corporation on faith that its corporate stock is payable in full, and without notice of a different agreement be tween the corporation and its stockholders, the unpaid subscriptions are assets for the payment of such creditors on the insolvency of the corporation.-BENT V. UNDERDOWN, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 307.

26. COURTS-Land Department of the United States -Judicial Power and its Effect.-The land department of the United States is a quasi-judicial tribunal, invested with authority to hear and determine claims to the public lands subject to its disposition, and its decisions of the issues presented at such hearings, and its patents issued thereon, are impervious to collateral attack.-JAMES V. GERMANIA IRON CO., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 596.

27. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Bigamy.-On a trial under an indictment for bigamy, evidence that at the time of the second marriage the defendant had made inquiries to ascertain whether or not his former wife was dead, and that he had received a letter stating that she was dead, is irrelevant, illegal, and properly excluded.-RAND V. STATE, Ala., 29 South. Rep. 844.

28. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Homicide.-On a trial under an indictment for murder, where it is shown that the homicide took place at the house occupied by the defendant, and there was evidence tending to show that deceased was trying to gain admittance into the defendant's house at the time of the killing, the fact that the door of the defendant's residence was broken and battered up several months after the homicide is not a circumstance which could in any way aid in determining the character of the homicide, and is plainly irrelevant to the issue being tried; and the error in the admission of such evidence, in the absence of its being shown to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant was not prejudiced thereby, will work a reversal of the judgment of conviction.-ABERNATHY V. STATE, Ala., 29 South. Rep. 844.

29. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Homicide-Circumstantial Evidence.-Allowing the state to introduce only circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt, and not requiring it to call eyewitnesses of the homicide because they were unfriendly to the state, was not erroneous as depriving the defendant of a presumption of innocence by forcing him to put such witnesses on the stand.-MCCANDLESS V. STATE, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 745.

30. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Identifying Accused.- On prosecution for theft an officer may testify to his tak ing prosecutor to the jail, and, after putting a certain hat on accused's head, that prosecutor identified her as the thief, over objection that it was forcing accused to testify against herself while she was confined in jail. WHITE V. STATE, Tex., 62 S: W. Rep. 749.

31. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Res Gesta.-Where, in a prosecution for homicide, there was evidence that de

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fendant killed deceased by throwing a stone, which struck deceased on the temple, evidence of a witness who was present, that he heard the lick, and asked R, who was standing two steps from defendant, what it was, and R stated that defendant hit deceased with a rock, was admissible as res gestæ, though it did not appear that the defendant heard R's statement; he being present within hearing distance from R at the time.-STATE V. MCCOURRY, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 883. 32. CRIMINAL LAW-Forgery Indictment.-The indictment charged forgery in uttering a false and fictitious note, dated April 28, 1897, purporting to have been made by R. J. McIntyre to Eddie Bunney for $260, gold coin, payable one year after date. The note of fered in evidence corresponded with such description, except that it contained a provision for interest, and for payment of attorney's fees if collected by suit. Held, that there was no material variance, since the description in the indictment was correct, as far as it went, and sufficient to identify the instrument, and the fact that there were conditions in the instrument not inconsistent with, but in addition to, those men. tioned in the description, was immaterial, since an indictment is sufficient, without containing a copy of the instrument alleged to be forged.—PEOPLE V. TERRILL, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 894.

33. CRIMINAL LAW-Former Jeopardy.-On a trial for forgery, the court excluded the instrument claimed to be forged, on the ground of variance with the indictment, and directed a verdict for defendant; and a ver. dict was returned of “not guilty, on the ground of a material variance between the note set forth in the indictment and the note offered." Held, that defendant could not be again tried for the offense, since by the verdict he was acquitted, and it was immaterial what reason the jury gave for the acquittal, or that there was in fact no material variance. -PEOPLE V. TERRILL, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 894.

34. CRIMINAL LAW-Fraudulent Use of Mails-Indictment.-An indictment for a fraudulent use of the mails, in violation of Rev. St. § 5480, as amended by Act March 2, 1889 (1 Supp. Rev. St. p. 694), not charg ing a scheme to defraud the public generally, or a class not capable of being resolved into individuals, but clearly importing an intention to defraud definite individuals, is bad, if it does not describe them by name, or give a good and true reason for the omission. -LARKIN V. UNITED STATES, U. S. C. C. of App., Sev. enth Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 697.

35. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Insanity as Defense. -Where deceased had seduced a sister of defendant, and then married her, the testimony of the county clerk that defendant said when deceased procured the license to marry that he "didn't believe in settling it that way" was testimony in chief, though it contradicted the defendant, who denied that he had made the statement, and should not have been admitted for the commonwealth after defendant had closed his testimony.-ABBOTT V. COMMONWEALTH, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 715.

36. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide - Second Degree.Where, in a prosecution for homicide, the court was requested to charge that, if the prisoner killed deceased with a deadly weapon, malice would be pre

strained by force or fear, and that in making their verdict they should take into consideration all the facts and circumstances.-NEACE V. COMMONWEALTH, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 733.

38 CRIMINAL LAW-Right to Continuance-Absence of Witnesses-Diligence.-Defendant was indicted for horse theft, and sought a second continuance on account of the absence of three witnesses, by whom alone he could prove that he traded for the horse, and the absence of an attorney whom he had employed to defend him, and to whom he claimed to have given a bill of sale which he received at the time he made the trade. On a former application defendant stated that there were several witnesses by whom he could prove the same facts, and it appeared that the attorney employed had been elevated to the bench, and could no longer act for defendant, but that there had been two terms of court since such attorney's appointment, and no process had been issued to require his attendance as a witness, or effort made to secure the bill of sale. Held, that no diligence was shown to obtain either the witnesses or the bill of sale, and hence defendant was not entitled to a continuance. -PEREZ V. STATE, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 748.

29. CRIMINAL LAW-State's Evidence-Nolle Prosequi. -Where a prisoner awaiting trial under indictment agreed with the sheriff and county attorney that he would testify against others, and that in considerstion thereof he should not be prosecuted, he is not en titled to a discharge from jail until he has given such testimony, even though he is unable to furnish bail.EX PARTE GIBSON, Tex., 62 S. W. Rep. 755.

40. CRIMINAL TRIAL-Homicide-Change of Venue.Pen. Code, § 1033, directs a grant of a change of venue in a criminal case on a showing that a fair trial cannot be had or a jury cannot be obtained. Defendant, who was a man of bad repute, made an assault on a person who had filed an information against him, and fired several shots into his house. The sheriff went to the house of defendant, and was shot by him. A mob was formed, composed of persons of standing in the community, and mob violence was only prevented by prompt removal of defendant to another county. The defendant was denounced in the pulpit and by the press, and public opinion was unanimous that the death penalty should be inflicted. Sixty-eight jury. men were examined on their voir dire, and all but eight had formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt, and three of these were excused. Held, that it was error to refuse a change of venue. -PEOPLE V. SUESSER, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 1095.

41. DECEDENTS-Estates-Fraudulent Conveyance.Owing to the provisions of sections 3922, 3923, Rev. St. 1898, creditors of an insolvent estate may not bring an action in their own names to set aside a conveyance made by the decedent in his lifetime, without first having made the demand on the administrator to bring such suit, required by said sections, and having been met with a refusal by him.-FEHRINGER V. COMMERCIAL NAT. BANK OF OGDEN, Utah, 64 Pac. Rep. 1108.

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thereto in himself until payment of the purchase money. A part thereof was paid, when the son reconveyed it, some of the personal property sold therewith having been changed in the meantime. The father undertook to sell the land under the power contained in the original contract of conveyance, and repurchased from the vendee at such sale. After the original conveyance, a judgment was obtained by plaintiff against the son. Held, that plaintiff had no lien superior to those claiming under the father, since he bad never parted with the title to the land.-TAYLOR V. CAPEHART, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 890.

45. DIVORCE-Agreement Relieving Husband of Obligation to Pay Alimony.-Where a husband and wife had separated and were dealing at arm's length, an agreement between them for a dismissal of a divorce sult brought by the wife, and for a division of their personal property, with a stipulation that neither should have any interest in the real estate belonging to the other, was valid; and it being further stipulated that "if either of said parties shall hereafter institute divorce proceedings against the other, or further prosecute the divorce suit above named, it shall not vary the property rights of either of said parties," the agreement relieved the husband of the obligation to pay alimony upon a divorce being subsequently obtained by the wife.-PARSONS V. PARSONS, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 719.

46. EASEMENTS-Partition-Rights to Existing Passways. Each of the several parcels of land allotted in a partition proceeding is subject to the benefits and burdens of existing passways as between it and the other parcels, though there be no reference to passways in the deeds of partition; and a subsequent pur. chaser of a part of one of the lots takes it subject to an existing passway between it and that part of the lot retained by the vendor.-MUIR V. Cox, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 723.

47. ELECTIONS-Statement of Expenses - Forfeiture of Office.-Purity of Elections Act (St. 1893, p. 15) sectlon 4, declares that one elected to an office shall for feit it if he neglects to file a statement of election expenses, as prescribed by section 3, which provides that he shall give an itemized statement, showing in detail all moneys expended by him in aid of his election, giving the names of persons to whom such moneys were paid, and the specific nature of each item; and section 13 provides that on the trial under the act of the right to an office, if it appear that the offenses complained of were trivial, unimportant, and limited in character, the candidate shall not be deprived of his office by reason thereof. Held, that an election was not rendered void by the candidate putting down as a single item, "sundries and incidentals, $22.65;" the statute providing that the candidate may expend $100 for necessary incidentals, and dispensing with vouchers for expenditures in amounts less than $5.-LAND V. CLARK, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 1071.

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In such case a court of equity has no jurisdiction to administer the fund in the hands of the trustee for the benefit of creditors, the trustee being merely an agent for the corporation, which owns the property or fund; nor has the creditor, who has no lien on such property or fund, any right of action against the trustee.— AMES & HARRIS V. SABIN, U. S. C. C., D. (Oreg.), 107 Fed. Rep. 582.

50. EVIDENCE-Expert Opinion-Machinery. - Where the facts touching the question whether a machine was impracticable and unsafe cannot be fully com. municated to the jury, expert opinion is competent.HUTCHINSON COOPERAGE CO v. SNIDER, U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 107 Fed. Rep. 363.

51. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - Conveyance of Property Rights of Creditors.-Under Code, § 1442, providing that any conveyance of real estate by an heir at law, made within two years after the death of the intestate, shall be void as to estate creditors, but that conveyance made thereafter shall be valid as to bona fide purchasers without notice, land so inherited is liable for the debts of the ancestor, though conveyed after the expiration of two years, for full value, to a grantee who has knowledge of such debts.HOOKER V. YELLOWLEY, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 889.

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52. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS Liability of Heir Who Has Sold Estate Descended.-Under Ky. St. § 2087, providing that, "when the heir or devisee shall alien before suit brought the estate descended or devised, he shall be liable for the value thereof, with legal interest from the time of alienation to the creditors of the decedent or testator," the administrator is not a necessary party to an action to enforce the liability of the heir; and, where the administrator was joined with the heir, the court; erred in refusing to permit plaintiff to dismiss as to the administrator, and in then sustaining a demurrer to the jurisdiction, and dismissing the action as to both defendants, because the administrator resided in another county.LANCASTER V. WOLFF, Ky., 62 S. W. Rep. 717.

53. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - Liability of Sureties. Where the surety on an administrator's bond, to whom real estate inherited by the latter from his intestate has been mortgaged as security, defeats a suit on the bond for a debt of the intestate by pleading limitations, he cannot resist a suit by the creditor to enforce payment from mortgaged real estate on the ground that he is solvent, and that the administrator's bond, as representing the personalty, must be exhausted before the realty.-HOOKER V. YELLOWLEY, N. Car., 38 S. E. Rep. 889.

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54. ILLEGITIMATE CHILD Adoption. Under Civ. Code, § 230, providing that the father of an illegiti mate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own and receiving it into his family, adopts it and makes it, for all purposes, legitimate from the time of its birth, the acknowledging of an illegitimate child by a father without receiving it into his family is not sufti. cient for its adoption, and such child can confer no right to administer her father's estate.-GARNER V. JUDD, Cal., 64 Pac. Rep. 1076.

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