Kev. Stat. 1894, § 7051) provides that, when the business of any person shall be suspended by the action of creditors, the debts owing to employees for labor to an amount not exceeding $50 each for work per formed within six months next preceding the seizure of the preperty of such person shall be treated as preferred debts, and shall be first paid in full. Held, that the statute is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligations of contracts because it operates only on contracts entered into after its enactment; nor is the statute unconstitutional as devesting vested rights, since the legislature has power to regulate the priority of statutory liens, among which are chattel mortgages.-SMALL V. HAMMES, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 342. 9. CONTRACTS - Assignment Breach. - Defendant sold his livery stable to plaintiff and F, as partners, and agreed not to re-engage in the livery business in that town while the parties of the second part were engaged in that business on the premises sold. assigned his interest in the contract to plaintiff, and thereafter defendant started a livery stable. Held, that the assignment destroyed the identity of the partnership, and the act of defendant was not in violation of his agreement.-BARRON V. COLLENBAUGH, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 53.

F

10. CONTRACT-Ignorance. The fact that sureties sign a bond without reading it, though they have op. portunity to do so, in reliance on false representations of the principal obligee that it is only a recom mendation of the latter, does not relieve them from liability thereon.-SPRING GARDEN INS. Co. v. LEM MON, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 35.

11. CONTRACT-Option.-An agreement of the owners of a certain lot that they will not sell it without first notifying an adjoining owner of the intention to sell, and giving him the privilege of buying the ground at a fair market price, becomes enforceable when the owners of the lot, without notifying the adjoining owner, cause a sale of it to be made by partition proceedings in this court. Such proceedings are a mani. festation of an intention to sell.-MYERS V. METZGER, N. J., 48 Atl. Rep. 1113.

12. CONTRACT OF SALE Agent-Oral Warranty.-A sales agent authorized to sell and warrant farm machinery under written conditions to be required of the purchaser may bind his principal by an oral warranty where he withholds from the purchaser all knowledge of the limitations upon his authority to impose such condition, as in this case--PARSONS BAND CUTTER & SELF FEEDER Co. v. HAUB, Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 14.

13. CONTRACT OF SALE-Breach of Warranty-Dama. ges. A contract in which it was provided that if a certain machine, for and on which notes were given and freight charges paid, did not and could not be made to fill the warranty therein contained, it was to be returned to the place where received, and another machine substituted therefor, or the "money and notes" returned, construed. Held, that the amount paid for freight charges could be recovered, in addition to the amount of the notes, in case of a breach of the warranty and a failure to substitute another machine.EVENSON V. KEYSTONE MFG. Co., Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 8. 14. CORPORATION-Contract-Signature of President. -Where a contract is consummated entirely through correspondence, it does not follow, as a matter of law, that the individual signature of the person who is

unless he shall file his dissent, and that the shares of any dissenting stockholder shall be acquired by the lessee, the lessee is not required to buy the stock of a member of such corporation who had voted for the lease and afterwards filed a written declaration of dissent.- BOSTON & M. R. R. V. GRAHAM, Mass., 60 N. E. Rep. 405.

16. CORPORATIONS Taxation Statutory Require ment.-Pub. Stat. ch. 13, §§ 38, 40, impose a tax on every corporation chartered by the commonwealth, or organized under the general laws for business or profit, having a capital stock divided into shares. The defendant gas company was organized in July, 1896, and in December, 1897, issued $1,000.000 worth of shares, which were paid for in cash. Held, that the fact that defendant's treasurer did not file a certificate with the secretary of State that the capital stock had been paid in, as required by Pub. Stat. ch. 106, § 46, until December 21, 1899, did not relieve the defendant from the payment of the tax assessed on May 1, 1898, since the corporation cannot escape taxation by fail. ing to comply with the statutory requirements.-AT TORNEY GENERAL V. MASSACHUSETTS PIPE LINE GAS Co., Mass., 60 N. E. Rep. 389.

17. DEEDS Constructive Notice.-Where the purchaser of land at a foreclosure sale notifies tenants thereon that he is the owner, and instructs them to pay the rent to him, and they consent thereto, they become his tenants; and their possession is construc. tive notice of the purchaser's interest therein to a person afterwards acquiring a deed to the land from the former owner.-HANNAN V. SEIDENTOPF, Iowa, 86 N. W Rep. 44.

18. DEEDS-Quitclaim.-Land worth $4,000 was sold at a foreclosure. The purchaser failed to record his deed, and the former owners transferred it by quit. claim deed to G, who conveyed it to M on the following day by warranty deed. The deed to G stated that it was given in consideration of $1 and other valuable consideration, and that the grantor made no represen tations as to the title, other than those contained in the deed. G paid for the land with 25,000 shares of mining stock, for which he had paid $75, and he sold the land to M for $440, and it was purchased by the latter without seeing it or obtaining an abstract of title. Held, in an action by the foreclosure purchaser to recover the land, that the evidence was not suffi cient to show that M was an innocent purchaser thereof.-HANNAN V. SEIDENTOPF, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep.

45.

19. EVIDENCE Expert Witness Qualification. Where, in a suit against a railroad for injuries to land caused by fire escaping from the right of way, a wit ness had resided for years in the neighborhood of the lands, and had been allowed, without objection, to testify as to the value of such lands before they were burned, an objection to the admission of his testimony as to their value after they were burned, on the ground that he had only been on a small portion of the lands since the fire, was to the weight, rather than the competence, of the evidence, and its admission was not error.-CHICAGO, I. & L. RY. Co. v. BROWN, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 346.

20. EVIDENCE-Hearing.-Where a brakeman in a suit against a railroad for personal injuries testified that his physician had advised another operation,

prove conversations with, or admissions of, any de. ceased or insane person, whether a party to the liti gation or not, relative to any matter at issue between the litigants, adhered to, and the rule applied.LOWE V. LOWE, Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 11.

23. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - Surviving Partner as Executor.-A testator, up to the time of his death, was engaged in business in partnership with one of the two executors named in the will. After the testator's decease such executor continued the business as the surviving partner. He then entered into an agreement with his co-executor, whereby he purchased the interest of the estate at a certain sum, but no money was paid to the co-executor, and no accounting was made to the probate court by either executor. Both executors were discharged without having rendered an accounting, leaving the estate unadministered. In an action against such surviving partner by a subsequently appointed administrator de bonis non, to compel an accounting, held, that such surviving partner was not a debtor of the estate at the death of the testator, and that his relation to the estate still remained that of executor, and the juris. diction of the probate court to compel an accounting was exclusive, and such jurisdiction was not lost by the fact that the executor was discharged, leaving the estate unadministered.-BETCHER V. BETCHER, Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 1.

25. FIRE INSURANCE Conditions Arbitration.-A condition in a fire policy requiring the submission to arbitration of any difference as to a loss on the request in writing of either party, and providing that no action shall be brought on the policy until after the award, is waived on a failure of either party to request an arbitration.-GARRETTSON V. MERCHANTS' & BANKERS' FIRE INS. CO., Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 32.

26. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Husband's Deed to Wife. A conveyance of land by a husband to his wife by a deed through a third party, to secure her for the principal of money of her separate estate taken and used by him, will be decreed to be a mortgage, and good as against creditors to the extent only of the amount of the principal so received by him, with interest thereon from the date of the delivery of such deed.-ADOUE V. SPENCER, N. J., 49 Atl. Rep. 10.

27. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Husband's Deed to Wife-Burden of Proof.-Where such a conveyance is attacked by creditors as voluntary or fraudulent, the burden is on the wife to establish that her husband took and used her separate estate; but when that fact is established, whether such taking was with or without her consent, the burden then shifts, and those claiming that such taking and use were by gift of the wife must establish such gift to the husband.-ADOUE V. SPENCER, N. J., 49 Atl. Rep. 10.

28. DAMAGES-Highways.-In an action for the con. struction of a switch track in the public highway in front of plaintiff's property, an instruction that plaintiff could not recover the amount her property depreciated in value by the means of access thereto being impaired, is not erroneous as not confining the damages to the time of bringing the action, since the action was not brought on the theory of an unlawful obstruction, but as a trespass on plaintiff s land.PITTSBURGH C. C. & ST. L. RY. Co. v. NOFTSKER, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 372.

29. HIGHWAYS-Damages.-Where a jury appointed to assess damages sustained by a landowner in the

laying out of a road returned an award in favor of such landowner, and, in a petition by her to recover a balance of the sum so awarded, she alleged that there was sufficient money in the county treasury liable for the payment of a warrant for such balance, but the court failed to find, in conformity with such allegation, that there was money applicable thereto, a judg ment requiring the payment of such balance will be reversed, since such claims can only be paid from the particular fund applicable to the construction of roads, and not from general county funds.- BOARD OF COMRS. OF MONROE COUNTY V. STATE, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 344.

30. HIGHWAYS-Discontinuance Owner's Right to Damages. Where land claimed to be damaged by the alteration of a railroad grade crossing was a highway when the proceedings for alteration were begun, the fact that in the course of the proceedings the highway was discontinued, and the land was taken by the railroad company for railroad purposes, did not preclude a finding that the land was thereby subjected to a more onerous use than it had previously suffered so as to preclude the owners from proof of damages by reason of the alteration.- BULLARD V. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. Co., Mass., 60 N. E. Rep. 381.

31. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Gift to Husband-Presump. tion. The presumption of law is against a gift by the wife of the principal of her separate property to the husband, and the burden of proving it is upon him who asserts it.-ADOUE V. SPENCER, N. J., 49 Atl. Rep.

10.

32. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Married Women's Act-Gift to Husband. - The statutes in the several States as to the property of married women, when as broad as the Texas statute or our own, have entirely overthrown the common-law rule of the merger of the wife's entity and estate, upon marriage, in the husband. It is unnecessary, under these statutes, that a wife shall take from her husband a promissory note, or other acknowledgment, upon handing him money of her separate estate, to be able to establish that such tak ing by him was a loan. In the transaction she will be considered as a feme sole, and as if a stranger to her husband.-ADOUE V. SPENCER, N. J., 49 Atl. Rep. 10.

33. HUSBAND AND WIFE Widow's Remarriage · Mortgage. Where a woman and her second husband executed a mortgage on land which descended from her first husband to her as his widow, there being children of such marriage living, thus violating Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 2641 (Rev. St. 1881, § 2484; Horner's Rev. St. 1897, § 2484), which forbids a widow remarrying to alienate real estate held by virtue of her previous marriage, etc., a decree of foreclosure thereon will be binding on the wife, and cannot be collaterally attacked.-MAYNARD V. WAIDLICH, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 349.

34. INJUNCTION-Separate Actions at Law-Relief in Equity.-Where a common right or a community of interest in the subject-matter of a controversy, or a common title, from which all of the defendants' separate claims, and all questions at issue between the parties plaintiff and defendants, have arisen, can be shown at the trial, an equitable action will lie to restrain and enjoin the several defendants from prosecuting separate actions at law against the plaintiff. Held, that under this rule a cause of action was stated in plaintiff's fourth amended complaint herein. Held, further, that, as the complaint stated a cause of action, it was not error for the court below to cause an order to be issued restraining and prohibiting each of the said defendants from proceeding further in his action at law pending the disposition of this action in equity.-CITY OF ALBERT LEA V. NIELSEN, Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 83.

35. INJURY TO RAILROAD EMPLOYEE- Evidence.-The complaint alleges that defendant operates a railroad in Montana, and negligently permitted its roadbed to become soft and springy, and allowed sand, gravel

and stone to be deposited and remain on and near its track, and that it also negligently operated an engine with a defective pilot. While respondent, in the performance of his duties as a brakeman, was riding in the cab of the engine, it sank upon the yielding roadbed, and the defective pilot struck into the gravel and stone, causing a stone to be thrown against the cab window of the engine, breaking the glass thereof, causing a piece of it to enter and injure respondent's eye. Held, that the acts stated were the proximate cause of the injury.- BAKER V. GREAT NORTHERN RY. Co., Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 83.

Where an

36. INSURANCE-Excessive Incumbrance. insured procured a loan on the insured property, with the proceeds of which he paid off incumbrances existing at the time the policy was issued, and later placed an additional mortgage on the property, ag. gregating $3,230, the property will not be deemed to have been incumbered for more than $3,000, within the terms of the policy, $400 of the mortgage having been paid before the loss occurred.-MCKIBBAN V. DES MOINES INS. Co., Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 39.

37. INTOXICATING Liquors-Liquor Tax CertificateAction on Bond.-Liquor Tax Law, § 23, provides that no person who has been convicted of a felony shall traffic in liquor or be granted a liquor certificate. An application for a liquor license falsely stated that the applicant had never been convicted of a felony. Held, that a surety on his bond, conditioned that the principal would not violate any provision of the liquor tax law, did not guaranty the truth of the statement, and, in the absence of knowledge of its falsity, was not liable for the acts of the principal in selling liquor under the certificate, which, at the election of the State, was void ab initio.- LYMAN V. SCHERMERHORN, N. Y., 60 N. E. Rep. 324.

38. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Lease Coal Lands. Plaintiffs' lease of coal lands to defendants gave them power to mine and remove all underlying coal. The refuse from the various shafts was to be dumped on the surface of plaintiffs' land. A right of way over the surface for railway track, etc., within specified limits was given to defendants at a certain rental, with privilege to continue such use at their option after the coal had been exhausted from plaintiffs' land. The surface was reserved by plaintiffs for agri. cultural or other purposes, subject to the rights granted by the lease. Held, that defendants had the right, under the lease, to use the land to remove coal from adjoining land, and hence plaintiffs could not recover additional compensation therefor.-MADISON V. GARFIELD COAL CO., Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 41.

39. LANDLORD AND TENANT Lien for Rent.-In an action for the conversion of grain on which plaintiff elaimed a landlord's lien, the fact that plaintiff had neglected to exhaust other property of the tenant on which he had a lien was no defense where, after giv. ing credit for the value of this property, there was still a balance due greater than the amount of plaintiff's recovery.-DERMIDY V. INTERSTATE GRAIN CO., Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 30.

40. LIFE INSURANCE-Surrender-Rights of Beneficiary. A beneficiary cannot enforce by action at law an original policy by treating payments made on a substituted policy issued without her knowledge, on surrender of the original, as payments made on the

42. LIMITATIONS-Wills Probate.-Under Code Civ. Proc. § 2628, relating to the running of four years' limitation after the death of an owner of realty, and declaring that, "if the will was concealed by one or more of the heirs of the testator, the limitation" would not begin to run until the delivery of the will to the devisee or to his representatives, or to the proper surrogate, the fact that after the death of an heir a will was found among comparatively worthless papers in his house does not show concealment, within the meaning of the statute, where, after the death of the testator, it was put in evidence in an ac tion to set aside a subsequent will, and all the heirs knew of its existence and contents.-FOX V. FEE, N. Y., 60 N. E. Rep. 281.

43. MASTER AND SERVANT-Contributory Negligence. -Plaintiff, a brakeman, attempted to uncouple two cars with a lever provided for the purpose; but the coupling was out of order, and he could not thus draw the pin. He attempted to draw it with his hand, and while walking between the moving cars his foot was caught between the rail and an unblocked guard rail, whereby he was injured. Held, that plaintiff's con. tributory negligence, or assumption of risk incident to the condition of the guard rail, was a question for the jury.-TROTT V. CHICAGO, ETC. RY. Co., Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 38.

44. MASTER AND SERVANT- Negligence.-Plaintiff

worked as a common laborer for defendant several years, and two weeks before the accident defendant's superintendent directed plaintiff to wash out a sewer hole in the slaughter house. The fireman adjusted the hose and nozzle, and, with the assistance of two men to handle the hose, plaintiff entered the hole and washed it out. The next week plaintiff applied to the superintendent for men to assist in handling the hose to wash out the hole, and was told that he did not need help, but must do it himself. The sewer was not cleaned at that time, as the pipe was burst, and the next time plaintiff went to clean it he attached the hose, took the nozzle, and went into the hole; and when the water was turned on the hose became unmanageable, and he was struck and injured by the nozzle. The water had a pressure of 80 pounds, with which pressure it required three men to handle the hose. Held, that the questions of defendant's negli. gence, and whether plaintiff assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence, were for the jury.DIEZI V. G. H. HAMMOND CO., Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 353.

45. MASTER AND SERVANT-Vice-Principal - Negli. gence. The plaintiff and S, the servants of the defendant, were assigned the duty of loading a pile. driver hammer upon a wagon. In doing so they used a tree standing by as a tackle post, which was up. rooted, fell, and injured the plaintiff, by reason of the force applied in an attempt to swing the hammer upon the wagon by the use of the tackle. S selected the tree and directed the work as foreman. Held, upon the special facts of this case, that the tree was not an appliance furnished by the defendant, but a mere temporary instrumental:ty provided by the servants themselves during the progress of the work, and that in selecting the tree S was not acting as a vice-principal.-BELL V. LANG, Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 95.

46. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Statement

- Amendment.-A

solved, attorney's fees incurred by the mortgagee in removing an injunction were reasonably necessary and hence rightfully allowed from the proceeds on foreclosure. A fee paid an auctioneer in selling property under foreclosure proceedings which is the ordinary and customary charge for such services without express agreement, and under the belief that auctioneers were entitled to such amount, is properly allowed, though there was reasonable probability that an auctioneer might have been found who would have conducted the sale for a much lower fee.- BANGS V. FALLON, Mass., 60 N. E. Rep. 403.

48. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION — Action on ContractMandamus.-Where plaintiff agreed to furnish a certain number of lights for the streets, and the town agreed to pay a certain rate per year, payments to be made every month, but not in advance, and after a certain month the town refused payment, not because it lacked funds, but asserting that the contract was void, plaintiff's action for the amount due was properly brought on the contract, instead of by application for mandamus.-TOWN OF GOSPORT V. P'RITCHARD, Ind., 59 N. E. Rep. 1058.

49. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Contract-Signature. -A contract for lighting streets, purporting to be the contract of the town, and signed by one as president of the board of trustees, and attested by the clerk, and entered on the proceedings of the board of trustees, is binding on the town, and is not merely the contract of the persons whose names are signed.-TOWN OF GosPORT V. PRITCHARD, Ind., 59 N. E. Rep. 1058.

50. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Heavy Teams-Unreasonable Ordinance.-An ordinance of the board of park commissioners of the city of Minneapolis provides that no vehicle which, together with its load weighs more than 2,000 pounds, and which is in use for carrying goods, merchandise, building material, manure, dirt, earth, or other article or commodity, and which has tires less than six inches in width, such shall pass or enter upon any park or parkway. Held, as applicable to a parkway, the ordinance is void, because unreasonable, and in its effect prohibitive of traffic thus classified.-STATE V. ROHART, Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 93.

51. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Injuries to Traveler on Highway.-Plaintiff's horse was frightened by a workman, employed in constructing a street in defendant city, dumping stone on the wooden platform of a stone crusher, and the escape of steam from the crusher, which caused a runaway, and the injuries for which plaintiff sued. The street on which the work was being done was laid out with two roadways, and the road on which plaintiff was driving was open to travel, though this fact was contradicted. Held sufficient to justify refusal to direct verdict for defendant, requested on the ground of plaintiff's assumption of the risk.-BUTMAN V. CITY OF NEWTON, Mass., 60 N. E. Rep. 401.

52. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Obstruction of Streets. Evidence that the road supervisor authorized defendant to erect scales in a street is not admis. sible in an action for injuries received because of such scales, since the road supervisor had no authority to grant such right, and evidence of an ordinance authorizing defendant to maintain stock yards within the limits of a municipal corporation, but not on its streets, is immaterial, in an action for a personal injury resulting from the maintenance of scales in the street.-RUPP v. HOWARD, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 38.

53. NEGLIGENCE-Dumping Stone.-Dumping stone on the wooden platform of a stone crusher, and the letting off of steam from the crusher, just as a horse being driven along a roadway, 25 feet away, was op posite and in plain sight, is sufficient to support a finding of negligence.-BUTMAN V. CITY OF NEWTON, Mass., 60 N. E. Rep. 491.

gutter of which a spout led to a groove in and crossing the sidewalk. The water flowing through the spout formed ice on the walk, rendering it dangerous to public travel, and causing injury to plaintiff. Held, that so maintaining the spout constituted a public nuisance, and defendant was not exonerated by the fact that the conditions existed when she purchased the property, and no previous complaint had been made, since, the nuisance being public, her predecessor could not have acquired a right to maintain it.LEAHAN V. COCHRAN, Mass., 60 N. E. Rep. 388.

55. PARK COMMISSIONERS-Powers-Conveyance of Land Exemption from Taxation - Contract.-Laws 1889 confers authority upon the board of park commissioners of the city of Minneapolis to contract for the conveyance of land to the city for park purposes in consideration of the exemption of other contiguous lands of the owner from assessments for park purposes, to the amount agreed upon. Such exemptions are not limited by the act to a single assesssment made with reference to the property so purchased, but include all assessments, present or future, and also installments not yet entered for collection, but which have been assessed prior to the execution of the contract.-STATE V. DISTRICT COURT OF FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST., Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 15.

56. PARTITION - Remainders.-Testatrix devised her house and lot to her daughter, subject to the condition that, if such daughter died before either of her grandchildren, all of the legacies given to the daughter under the will should revert to the grandchildren. Held that, in the absence of any intention to restrict the alienation, the bouse and lot descended to the grandchildren in pareels, for which partition might be maintained.-PULSE V. OSBORN, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep.

58. PENAL STATUTES Action to Enforce a PenaltyLimitation.-Gen. Laws 1896, ch. 234, § 4, allowing 20 years for bringing an action on a specialty, and not chapter 288, § 8, allowing one year for bringing suits founded on any penal statute, is the statute of limitations applicable to an action authorized by chapter 180, § 22, to enforce the individual liability of stockholders for the debts of the corporation in case of non-performance of statutory duties, since the action, though of a penal character, is not an action to enforce a penalty, within the meaning of the words "penal statute," as used in chapter 288.-KILTON V. PROVIDENCE TOOL CO., R. I., 48 Atl. Rep. 1039.

59. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS Failure to Answer Call-Liability.-A physician, licensed to practice medicine under Act 1897, p. 255, and Act 1899, p. 247, authorizing the licensing of physicians found to possess the necessary qualifications, etc., is not liable for arbitrarily refusing to respond to a call, though he is the only physician available.-HURLEY V. EDDINGFIELD, Ind., 59 N. E. Rep. 1058.

60. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS Negligence-Damages.-Plaintiff, a farm hand, was compelled to have his fingers amputated. Defendant, a physician, performed the operation. Afterwards he refused to further attend him, and amputation of the arm became necessary. Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence. Proof was given, over defendant's objection, of what plaintiff earned before and after the loss of his arm. Defendant contended that proof should be confined to the loss of his earning capacity after the removal of his fingers, which operation was conceded to be necessary. Held not to be reversible error, where the jury's verdict showed that due considera

tion was given to such difference in physical perfection.-RICH V. MOORE, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 52.

61. PLEADING AND PRACTICE Common Law.-In pleading the common law of another State it is sufficient to state as a fact what the law is, without setting out decisions of the courts. Decisions, opinions, and customs constitute the evidence of the law.-CRANDALL V. GREAT NORTHERN R. CO., Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 10. 62. PLEADING AND PRACTICE Equitable ActionTrial by Jury. - Where the heir of a grantor, who had deeded land to trustees for the erection and mainte nance of a library, sought to rescind the deeds on the ground that the grantor was not of sound mind at the time of the execution thereof, and, further, that the grantees exercised undue influence or fraud, and prayed in her complaint for an accounting, the action was an equitable one, and hence plaintiff was not en. titled to a trial by jury as a matter of right.-CARPEN. TER V. WILLARD LIBRARY TRUSTEES, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 365.

63. PLEDGE - Warehouse Receipts.- Where a warehouse receipt has been transferred as collateral, the pledgee has the right to take possession of the prop erty on the surrender and cancellation of the receipt, subject to the lien of the warehouseman for storage, but is not compelled to do so or pay the charges on the property. – DRIGGS V. DEAN, N. Y., 60 N. E. Rep. 336.

64. PUBLIC SCHOOL-Detention of Minor.- Where the return of the State superintendent to the writ in such a case shows that his detention of a female minor child is based upon a finding of the probate court that she possessed proper qualifications of age, health, and intelligence; that she was neglected; that her mother is hopelessly insane and detained in the State hospital; that her father is unable to and does not care to support her, in consequence of which she is on the street, and in peril of health and morality,-the order of the probate court committing such waife to the public school is valid, and justifies her detention by the superintendent of that institution, under sec. tion 3, ch. 210, Gen. Laws 1897.-STATE V. MERRILL, Minn., 86 N. W. Rep. 89.

65. REAL PROPERTY - Action to Quiet Title. - Where the title to real estate is in a husband and wife, and the latter dies, and the former sues to quiet title as against her heirs, though no administration has been granted on her state, and the time therefor has not expired, the heirs, who defend by filing a cross bill to partition the land, cannot join therein an application for the division of personal property owned by the wife, since such heirs are not entitled to share in the possession and control of the personal property until after an administration, or the expiration of the time therefor.-RITCHIE V. BARNES, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 48. 66. REAL PROPERTY-Taxes-Payment by Co-Tenant. -A tenant in common paid taxes on the property dur ing the tenancy of his mother, life tenant thereof, but It did not appear that he paid them on account of the failure of his mother to do so, or that he paid them after default. Held, that he would not be allowed for the taxes in partition proceedings, since it was the life tenant's primary duty to pay them.-BOOTH v. BOOTH, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 51.

67. RECEIVERS-Appointment Pendente Lite-Prerequisites.-Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 1236, provides that a receiver may be appointed in all actions where it is shown that the property in controversy is in danger of being lost, removed, or injured, or where, in the discretion of the court, it may be necessary to secure ample justice to the parties. Appellants contracted to sell appellees an electric lighting plant, appellees to deposit a certain amount in a certain bank within a stated period in payment thereof, which the latter did. Appellants refused to convey, but held posses. sion and operated the plant, refusing to pay over the income thereof, which was being wasted. It appeared that appellants refused to carry any insurance, that

the risk was hazardous, that they were making extensions of the plant, and that the property was liable to damage if permitted to remain in their possession. Held, that the court was justified in appointing a receiver to manage the property pending an action to enforce specific performance of such contract.- MEAD v. BURK, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 338.

68. RECEIVERS-Assets.Where one, in obedience to an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, bas turned over to a receiver appointed by it assets in his hands belonging to an insolvent, he cannot be com pelled, in a suit in another court, between different parties, to account therefor.-CARTER V. DIME SAV. BANK, Neb., 86 N. W. Rep. 29.

69. REPLEVIN-Body of Dead Dog.-A complaint in replevin to recover the body of a dead dog alleged the wrongful taking and detention, and that the body was of the value of two dollars, in that the hide was of the value of one dollar, and the carcass, exclusive of the hide, of the value of one dollar for fertilizing pur. poses. Held, that the complaint stated a cause of ac tion, under Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 1286, providing that, when any personal goods are wrongfully taken or unlawfully detained, the owner may bring an action for the possession thereof, since dogs are property, and the ownership is not lost by the death of the animal, especially if the body is of value.-VANTREESE V. MCGEE, Ind., 60 N. E. Rep. 318.

70. REPLEVIN-Pleading- General Denial.- A plea of general denial is sufficient to entitle the defendant to a return of the goods on a judgment in his favor.D'ARCY V. STEUER, Mass., 60 N. E. Rep. 405.

71. RES ADJUDICATA.-Where plaintiffs sued defendants to enjoin a specified use of leased lands as not within a lease, submitting the question for determina. tion whether such use was proper under the lease, and the case was dismissed on it merits, such adjudication will constitute a bar to a subsequent suit by plaintiffs against defendants presenting the same question with reference to defendants' rights under the lease.-MADISON V. GARFIELD COAL Co., Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 41.

72. SALES-Warranty-Time.-Where a contract of sale of machiney gave the purchaser a certain time in which to accept and approve a governor which was part thereof, and the evidence showed that before the expiration of the period he notified the seller that the governor was not satisfactory, leading to negotiations on the part of the seller to have the defect remedied, pending which there was nothing to show that either party considered the time for acceptance as running, no acceptance will be implied on the part of the purchaser at the end of the time limited in the contract.-JAMES LEFFEL & Co. v. PIATT, Mich., 86 N. W. Rep. 66.

Liabilities. 73. SURETIES Where a bond of an agent to his principal does not contain a general provision to answer for the default of the agent, and a provision creating a specific liability in case of such default is defective in leaving the amount blank, the sureties are not liable thereon.- SPRING GARDEN INS. Co. v. LEMMON, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 35.

74. TAXATION-Assignment for Benefit of CreditorsListing by Assignee.-Personal property in the pos session of an assignee for the benefit of creditors of a manufacturing corporation, which is not being reduced to money for distribution among the creditors of the corporation, but is being held and operated, under the orders of the insolvency court, and at the Joint request of the creditors of the assignee, in the conduct of a going business, such business being conducted as it had been theretofore by the corpora tion itself, is subject to taxation, and it is the duty of the assignee to list such property for taxation.FRENCH V. BOBE, Ohio, 60 N. E. Rep. 292.

75. TAXATION Illegal Tax Injunction. Supp. 1897, § 8421a, provides that all personal property shall be assessed to the owner in the township, town,