etc. of City of Jersey City, 47 N. J. Law, 286; State v. Sheppard, 64 Minn. 287, 67 N. W. Rep. 62, 36 L. R. A. 305; and other cases cited by counsel. One of the primary essentials of a valid ordinance is that it must be general in its operation; that is, it must affect all persons alike, under like circumstances and conditions. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 322. It may, and often does, become a question whether certain persons or corporations, acting in peculiar capacities or special emergencies, come within the legitimate purview or spirit of the ordinance, and such was the question presented and determined by the above cases. The ordinance in each case was general in its scope, affecting all persons alike, but in the first the business of the railroad concentrated in a small compass, but had grown to such proportions that the ordinance became unreasonably embarrassing and burdensome, and it was held, therefore, that it should not be enforced against the company as to the particular locus in quo. So, in the latter case, the ordinance prohibited the driving of animals in the street at a rate of speed exceeding six miles an hour, and it was held that a fireman, acting in the discharge of his duties in hastening to the scene of a conflagration, did not come within the inhibition. The doctrine is operative in the establishment of an exception rather than that of a general rule, and can have no application in the case at bar.

Reliance is had upon the case of City of Portland v. Terwilliger, 16 Oreg. 465, 19 Pac. Rep. 90, as being an adjudication sustaining the power of the eity to exclude burials from within the city limits. The court there had under consideration the effect of an ordinance prohibiting the burial of the dead within the city, and conseqently upon an estate conceded, for the purpose of the case, to have been vested in the municipality upon a condition subsequent as to the continued use and occupation thereof by it for cemetery purposes. The power to adopt the ordinance in that case seems to have been taken for granted, or, at least, it was not a matter of controversy in the course of the hearing. In announcing the opinion, Mr. Justice Strahan incidentally says: "That power was delegated by the State to the city of Portland under the general description of police power," referring, we presume, to the power of prohibiting burials within the city limits. The learned justice then proceeded to an elaboration of the idea that every citizen holds his property subject to the proper exercise of the power, but the question whether the charter did or did not confer the power to adopt the ordinance was not mooted so far as we are informed by the record, much less can it be said to have been decided. The idea of declaring the act of burial a nuisance, and the power commensurate to that particular purpose, does not seem to have been suggested at any time during the proceeding. The case is therefore not controlling as a precedent. If, however, it ever had any vitality in the direction claimed for it. it must be considered as over

ruled in its general scope by the subsequent case of Grossman v. City of Oakland. There will be an affirmance of the judgment.

NOTE. Power of Municipality to Prohibit or Restrict the Establishment of Cemeteries or Right of Burial within Certain Limits.-What is termed in law the police power" of a State has never been satisfactorily defined, and the Supreme Court, the tribunal most competent of any other to define it, has absolutely confessed its inability to do so, and therefore refuses to try it. It would hardly be acting with becoming modesty on our part,in the face of this confession, to make any attempt at definition, but we will content ourself with the suggestion offered by Scott, J., in the case of Lake View v. Cemetery Co., 70 II. 191, where, after suggesting several other attempts at definition, the learned judge says: "It [the police power] may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."

The question whether a cemetery is a nuisance per se, while sufficiently settled by authority, has been opened for academic discussion. Tiedeman, for instance, in his late work on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property, says: "It is held by some that a cemetery is not a nuisance per se, and consequently the interment of the dead cannot be prohibited altogether. Of late, the advocates of cremation of dead bodies have been urging the unwholesomeness of burial as a reason why cremation should be adopted in its stead, as a means of disposing of corpses. If the burial of the dead does not cause or threaten injury to the public health, burial could not lawfully be prohibited; but if it is proven to be a fact that the interment of dead bodies does injure the public health, and is a fruitful source of the transmission of disease, as it is claimed to be by many scientists, it cannot be doubted that the State may prohibit burial and compel the remains of the dead to be cremated, or disposed of in some other harmless way." While not disposed to share completely with Mr. Tiedeman the sentiments thus expressed, any discussion of the question would be useless, as it has been determined, not by "some," but by all authorities which have come to our observation that a cemetery is not a nuisance per se. Lake View v. Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191; People v. Pratt, 129 N. Y. 68; Dunn v. Austin, 77 Tex. 139; Pfleger v. Groth, 103 Wis. 104; Kingsbury v. Flowers, 65 Ala. 479; Humphrey v. M. E. Church, 109 N. Car. 132; Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 359. Not being a nuisance, per se, the interment of bodies cannot be declared such except upon proof showing that in the particular case it has become such. For instance, in Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 309, it was held that a cemetery which does not affect the physical health of the occupants of a dwelling house near it, nor their olfactories by any effluvia from the graves, is not in law a nuisance. To become a nuisance the effect must be such as to interfere with ordinary physical existence, and the injury must be something more than fancy, delicacy or fastidiousness. If it is established, however, by sufficient proof that the place of burial has become so situated as to injure the health and comfort of the people living in its neighborhood, equity will interfere and grant relief by injunction abating the nuisance. Jung v. Neraz, 71 Tex. 306.

In regard to State and municipal regulations it is now definitely settled by a long line of decisions that the legislature has the right, under the police power, to

199;

regulate the burial of the dead and may restrict it within definite limits or even prohibit it altogether, as, for instance, in large cities. Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, 5 Con. (N. Y.) 423; Concordia Cemetery Assn. v. Railroad Co., 121 Ill. Woodlawn Cemetery v. Everett, 118 Mass. 354; Pfleger v. Groth, 103 Wis. 104; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 423; People v. Pratt, 129 N. Y. 68. In Town of Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Company, 70 Ill. 191, the court seems to take an opposite view. In this case the charter of a cemetery com pany authorized it to acquire and use land not exceeding five hundred acres for burial purposes. After it had acquired the land and spent money in preparing and adorning the same, a statute was passed forbidding the company to use any of its lands for burial purposes outside of its then inclosure, which was less than five hundred acres. Held, that as it did not appear that any nuisance existed or was liable to arise, the statute was not a valid exercise of the police power and was unconstitutional. The court said: "There is no pretense that the cemetery, as constructed, is a nuisance, nor is there any charge that the health or comfort of the people in the vicinity has been or will be affected in the near or even in the distant future. If it can be maintained at all, it must be by some absolute power by which the general assembly, it being the sole judge of the extent of its powers, may declare what shall and what shall not be, independently of all constitutional restrictions.

We are unwilling, however, to concede the existence of any indefinable power superior to the constitution that may be invoked whenever the legislature may deem the public exigency may require it, by which a party may be capriciously deprived of his property or its use without compensation." The difficulty in reconciling this decision with the weight of authority is wrapped up in a further question. Is the question whether there was a sufficient occasion for the exercise of the police power in any given case a judicial or political question? In Coates v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585, it was said: "It is of the nature of legislative bodies to judge of the exigency upon which their laws are founded." It may be safely affirmed that the proper rule is that that the discre tion of the legislature as to what constitutes a sufficient exigency for the exercise of the police power, if not merely colorable, will not be reviewed by the court. Of course the police regulation must be one in fact and the right to use private property cannot be arbitrarily abridged under the mere pretense of a police regulation. It is also to be observed that the legislature may delegate the exercise of this power to its municipalities who may restrict or prohibit the interment of dead bodies as they may believe necessary. People v. Pratt, 129 N. Y. 68; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411; Austin v. Cemetery Asso ciation, 87 Tex. 330; Page v. Symonds, 63 N. H. 17. Nor is the police power being a "law of overruling necessity" restricted by rights of con. For instance, where the right of

tract or long user.

if the legislature had given express power to the municipality of Portland to restrict or prohibit the interment of the dead within that city the ordinance under consideration could not be questioned as to its reasonableness. But the court insists that under a mere general provision to provide for the health and comfort of its citizens the municipality had no authority to unreasonably restrict or prohibit the right of burial. This is in line with the weight of authority. Two cases directly in point on this question seem to have been overlooked by the court in the principal case. For instance, in the case of Los Angeles v. Cemetery Association, 124 Cal. 344, it was held that a city cannot prohibit or suppress cemeteries under a charter power to institute police regulations. Again in the case of Austin v. Cemetery Association, 87 Tex. 330, it was held that a municipal ordinance lim. iting the places within a city in which it shall be lawful to inter deceased human beings is not void on its face. It is valid unless it unreasonably restricts the rights of its citizens to procure places for that purpose within such limits. These cases contain a most exhaustive discussion of this very interesting question. We shall examine them at length. In Los Angeles v. Cemetery Association, the ordinance in question made it "unlawful to locate or establish, extend or enlarge any cemetery or graveyard within the limits of the county of Los Angeles without the permission of the board of supervisors." After showing that a cemetery cannot in the least degree be con. sidered a nuisance per se, the court says: "We quite agree with the learned counsel for respondent that there are many considerations which may bring cemeteries within the power of reasonable regulation of both city and county municipalities.

Is

the ordinance before us a reasonable exereise of the power conferred by the constitution and the statute apon boards of supervisors, and as applicable to counties? The ordinance makes it unlawful to estab lish or enlarge any cemetery within the limits of the county without the permission of the supervisors. It declares that in no part of Los Angeles county, however remote from any city or town, even though the location be suitable for the purpose and entirely satisfactory to the neighboring inhabitants, no cemetery shall be established except by permission of the supervisors. There are reasons why the burial of the dead should be subject to reasonable regulations, but we can see no more reason why the right to establish cemeteries in a county should be subject to the will of the supervisors than that the right to engage in any other lawful enterprise should be so circumscribed. Under the guise of regulating a business the municipality cannot make prohibition possible by committing to the officers of the munici pality the arbitrary power to deny permission to engage in that business. We do not think it was ever intended by the legislature in the statutory enactment, to include, in the power to make and enforce regulations, a power purely personal and arbitrary." In the case of Austin v. Cemetery Association, the

shall be permitted, but that it may be controlled by reasonable restrictions as to the manner and circum stances of its performance." Here the court comes to the vital question: "If said ordinance was legally passed by virtue of authority of the charter, have the courts the authority to inquire into the reasonable. ness or unreasonableness of the ordinance?" In answer to this question the court said: "It is doubt. less within the power of the legislature to make arbitrary laws, provided they neither infringe the consti tution of the State or of the United States. We are not prepared to say that it could not delegate that power to a municipal corporation. But before it should be held that such grant was intended, it would seem that the language of the charter should be sufficiently explicit clearly to manifest that intention; and, in the absence of such language, we think it should also be held that it was not the intention to confer authority to make an arbitrary and unreasonable law. It occurs to us that it is upon this principle that the courts proceed when they hold that the ordinance of a municipal corporation must be rea sonable. We are therefore of opinion that it was not the intention of the legislature to confer power upon the city council of the city of Austin either to pro hibit the burial of the dead within the limits of the city, or to unreasonably restrict the rights of its citi. zens to provide places for that purpose within such limits." The court further held that whether the ordinance was reasonable or unreasonable depended on the facts in each case, and that the question was one of law for the court. Further, the court held that the presumption would be in favor of the reason ableness of the ordinance and that he who claims the contrary must assume the burden of proof. And, finally, the court decided that under the facts in this case the cemetery could proceed in equity by injunc tion against the city prohibiting them from enforcing the ordinance and was not required to test the law in a criminal proceeding for its violation.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

CHANGES IN WAR REVENUE TAXES.

On Monday, July 1, 1901, the act of March 2, 1901, went into effect amending the war revenue law of 1898, which will remove a number of stamp and other taxes and will modify other charges upon the busi ness of the country. The taxes repealed comprise those on bank checks, issues or obligation of guarantee companies, certificates of damage, certifi cates of deposit and certain other kinds of certificates, charter parties, commercial brokers, sight drafts, export bills of lading, express receipts, life, marine, inland, fire, casualty and fidelity and guaranty insur ance policies, leases, manifests for custom house entry, mortgages or conveyances in trust, orders for the payment of money on sight or on demand, powers of attorney to convey and to sell, promissory notes, protests, telegraph and telephone messages, postoffice money orders, warehouse receipts, perfumery and cosmetics, proprietary medicines and chewing gum. In relation to drafts and orders for the payments of money other than at sight or on demand, and foreign bills of exchange and foreign orders for the payment of money, it may be said that these still remain taxable. The tax of 1 cent also remains upon freight receipts or domestic bills of lading. The requirement that stamps shall be affixed to the following documents, used extensively by all who have business connected

with the mercantile marine, will cease on July 1, namely: Certificates of registry and of enrollment, certificates to the acknowledgments of bills of sale of vessels, charter parties of registered vessels, certificates of record of American built vessels owned by aliens, master carpenter certificates, certificates of issue of temporary documents, certificates of ownership, of the surrender of documents and of payment of tonage duty, United States bills of health, certificates to shipping articles required by section 4512 of the revised statutes, certificates of damage by port wardens or marine surveyors, certificates as to wages and effects, certificates of discharge and accounts of wages and effects.

Upon a number of articles and documents reductions and modifications have beer. made by the new law. For example, the tax on beer is reduced from $2 per barrel, and 7 1-2 per cent. discount, to $1.60 per barrel. The rate on cigars of all descriptions made of tobacco or any substitute therefor, and weighing more than three pounds per thousand, is fixed at $3 per thousand. On cigars, weighing not more than three pounds per thousand, the rate is fixed at 18 cents per pound. On cigarettes, weighing not more than three pounds, and of a wholesale value or price of more than $2 per thousand, 36 cents per pound is charged. On cigarettes, weighing not more than three pounds per thousand, and of a wholesale value or price of not more than $2 per thousand, the charge is fixed at 18 cents per pound. On cigarettes, weighing more than three pounds per thousand, the tax of $3.60 remains. On tobbacco and snuff, the rate of which was fixed by the war revenue law at 12 cents per pound, a discount of 20 per cent. is allowed by the amending law. The rate on foreign bills of exchange is changed from 4 to 2 cents for $100. Conveyances of property below $2,500 in value are now exempted from taxation, while each $500 above that amount is taxed at the rate of 25 cents. The law affecting legacies is modified so as to exclude from taxation legacies of a charitable, literary, religious or educational character after March 1, 1901. Orders for the payment of money by telegraph issued by express companies, drawn in but payable out of the United States, are to pay 2 cents for each $100. Passage tickets from the United States to foreign ports, formerly paying from $1 to $5, are now exempted from taxation when below $50 in value, but for each $50 they pay a rate of 50 cents. On sales of products at exchanges the rate of 1 cent for each $100 is retained, but sales of merchandise in the actual course of transportation are exempted from the tax.

A number of items in the law remain unchanged. These comprise the tax of $50 for each $25,000 of bankers' capital and surplus and $2 for each addi tional $1,000; the tax of 5 cents for each $100 worth of bonds, debentures, certificates of indebtedness, etc.; the tax of 50 cents on bonds of indemnity or for the execution of the duties of any office; the tax of $50 on brokers; the tax of 10 cents on brokers' contracts, and the tax of $2 for every $100 on certificates of profits, of $2 for each $100 of certificates of stock transfers, and of 5 cents for each $100 of the original issue of the certificates of stock. There also remain the taxes of $10 on custom house brokers; of from 6 to $24, according to sales, on dealers in leaf tobacco, and of $12 on dealers in tobacco whose sales exceed 50,000 pounds. In like manner the law maintains the tax of 2 cents for each $100 on time drafts or inland bills of exchange, of 25 cents to 1 on the entry of goods at the custom house for consumption and of 50 cents for entries for withdrawal. The taxes of from

$6 to $24 on manufacturers of cigars, of $12 per annum on manufacturers of mixed flour, of 4 cents per bar rel on mixed flour, of $20 on pawnbrokers, and of 1-4 per cent. of the gross receipts in excess of $250,000 on petroleum and sugar refineries are also retained, as are the taxes on bowling alleys, circus, theaters, museums, concert halls and other public amuse

ments.

Finally, the new law maintains the tax of 1 cent on sleeping and parlor car tickets, of 1 cent a pint on sparkling and other wines, and of 2 cents on quanti ties of more than a pint, and of 10 cents per pound on tea, while the special taxes of $50, in addition to other special taxes, on class 2 of brokers and of 2 cents for each $100 on bucket shop transactions, which went into effect on April 1 last, are continued under the new law. It is somewhat difficult to estimate what will be the effect upon the revenue of the changes in the law, but there is, of course, no doubt, whatever that the reduction of taxes effected by it will still leave a comfortable surplus at the end of the fiscal year, assuming that at the next session congress will make no material reduction in the revenue rates.Bradstreet's Journal.

BOOK REVIEWS.

COLLIER ON CIVIL SERVICE.

It is not often that we enjoy the novelty of reviewing a treatise on a subject of law wholly new or never before brought down into the systematic form of a text book. Such, however, is the work entitled "The Civil Service Law of the State of New York," by William Miller Collier, president of the New York Civil Service Commission. The compass of the book is not so narrow as its title would seem to indicate, as it embodies copious references to analogous statutes, and to decisions by the federal courts and courts of other States. Civil service legislation inaugurated by the federal government January 16, 1883, has to day found entrance into the statute law of eight States of the Union, and is rapidly gaining in popularity and influence. Appointment to positions in the civil service, either of the State government or of the mu. nicipality, according to merit and fitness of the ap plicant, rather than to political service or preference, is such a clear step in advance that one fails to understand the stubborn opposition that is sometimes made to such legislation. The civil service law, however, is no longer an experiment, and it has established itself as a part of our system of political juris prudence with which every practitioner of the law must acquaint himself. Mr. Collier's excellently arranged work on this subject will fill every require. ment of the lawyer, and to the vast army of public officers and public employees whose powers, rights, and duties are measured and determined by the civil service law, this treatise will be of invaluable service in construing, applying, and enforcing the provisions of that law. Published in law buckram, and for sale at the price of $4.50 by Matthew Bender, Albany, N. Y.

AMERICAN STATE REPORTS, VOL. 78.

The 78th volume of the American State Reports is a welcome addition to the long line of excellent vol.

pended to the case of Booth v. People, 186 Ill. 43, 78 Am. St. Rep. 229, entitled, "Acts Which the Legisla ture May and May Not Declare Criminal." The treatment of this subject embraces a full discussion of the extent of the right in the legislature under the police power to declare acts criminal which were heretofore innocent, and contain among others the following subtopics: Abandonment of Children, Erection of Building within "Fire Limits," Burial of the Dead, Compulsory Vaccination, Game Laws, Laws against Free Speech, Horse Racing, Lotteries, Miscegenation, Oleomargarine Laws, Licensing of Physicians, Prostitution, Sunday Laws and Ticket Brokerage Laws. Other notes especially valuable and interesting are the following: Fletcher v. American Trust & Banking Co., p. 164, on the "Common Law Powers of Executors;" State v. Michel. p. 364, on the "Computation of Time;" Jordan v. Greens boro Furnace Company, p. 644, on "When and How the Statute of Frauds Must be Pleaded." Published by Bancroft-Whitney Company, San Francisco, Cal.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

American Bankruptcy Reports, Annotated (cited Am. B. R.), Reporting the Bankruptcy Decisions in the United States of the Federal Courts, State Courts and Referees in Bankruptcy. Edited by James W. Eaton and Wm. Miller Collier. Vol. V. Albany, N. Y. Matthew Bender, 1901.

The Law of Bankruptcy, Including the National Bankruptcy Law of 1898, the Rules, Forms, and Orders of the United States Supreme Court, the State Exemption Laws, the Act of 1867, etc., etc. With Citations to all Relevant Decisions. Second Edition, by Edwin C. Brandenburg, LL. M. Author of the Digest of Bankruptcy Decisions; Professor of Procedure in Bankruptcy at Columbian University; in Charge of Bankruptcy Matters in the Department of Justice. Chicago, Callaghan & Company, 1901. Sheep, pp. 1,041. Price, $6 00. Review will follow.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

A well known San Francisco attorney, who prides himself upon the handling of Chinese witnesses, was defending a railway damage case. Instead of following the usual questions as to name, residence, if the nature of an oath were understood, etc, he began: "What your name?" "Kee Lung." "You live San Francisco?" "Yes." "You save God?" "Mr. Attorney, if you mean 'Do I understand the entity of our Creator?' I will simply say that Thursday evening next I shall address the State Ministerial Association on the subject of the Divinity of Christ,' and shall be pleased to have you attend." A roar of laughter swept over the courtroom, and it was some minutes before the examination proceeded.

Hennypeck-Skoots eloped with my wife last night. Gabbleton-Why, I thought he was your best

friend.

Hennypeck-He is!

When William E. Evarts was secretary of state the

"The old judge was one of the kindliest of men," said an attorney of New Orleans to a representative of the Times Democrat, speaking of a distinguished member of the local bar, who is now dead, "but his temper was as warm as his heart, and when momentarily exasperated he had a tongue like a razor. When I was studying law in his office we had a copy. ing clerk who was known about the place as 'the late Peter Jones'-a sobriquet he acquired by being always behind time. He was a slow, abstracted, dreamy kind of a fellow, with his mind generally a hundred miles from his business, and he was contin ually working the judge up to the point of explosion. One day a wire basket fell off the top of his desk and grazed his cheek, making a slight scratch several inches long. Being very busy at the moment, and wishing to protect the abrasion from the air until he could get some court plaster, he slapped on three postage stamps and went on with his work. A little later on he had some papers to take to the United States court, and, forgetting all about his peculiar decoration, he put on his hat and sallied out. He must have created a sensation on the street, but, as usual, his mind was elsewhere, and when he returned in half an hour or so, he was still in blissful ignorance of his Mardi Gras aspect. The three stamps hap pened to all be of different colors, and he looked like an Apache chief made up for a ghost dance. As he entered the office, the judge raised his head and fixed him with an astonished stare. Poor Jones quailed under his eye. Anything-er-wrong, sir?' he inquired, tremulously, when the silent scrutiny became unendurable. 'Yes, sir!' thundered the old gentleman; you are carrying too much postage for secondclass matter.""

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Of ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts of the United States, except those that are Published in Full or Commented upon in our Notes of Important Decisions and except those Opinions in which no Important Legal Principles are Dis cussed of Interest to the Profession at Large, INDIANA, 3, 6, 8, 19, 24, 28, 29, 33, 44, 48, 49, 56, 57, 59, 62, 67, 69, 75, 87.

IOWA, 4, 5, 9, 10, 17, 18, 20, 25, 36, 38, 39, 43, 52, 60, 65, 66, 71, 73, 83, 89.

MASSACHUSETTS, 2, 15, 16, 30, 40, 47, 51, 53, 54, 70, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 86.

1. ADULTERATAON-Milk-Evidence.-In the proceed. ing to recover a penalty for the violation of section 36 of the act to prevent the adulteration of milk (Gen. St. p. 1170), it is not necessary to show the particular manner in which the analysis was conducted. All that it was necessary to allege or to prove was that the milk contained more than 88 per centum of watery fluids, or less than 12 per centum of milk solids. Nor was it necessary to aver or to prove that the milk in question was, to the knowledge of the defendant, be

low the required standard. It is competent for the leg islature to declare that the doing of an act shall subject the doer thereof to a penalty, irrespective of his motive or knowledge, and in such a case the courts have no power to require proof of knowledge or motive to be shown.-VANDERGRIFT V. MIEHLA, N. J., 49 Atl. Rep. 16.

2. AGENCY-Authority-Burden of Proof.- Where the defendant, in an action to recover money, has paid the money to a person formerly authorized by plaintiff to collect the same, but whose authority is shown to have been revoked prior to the payment,the burden of showing that the money was paid in good faith, and in reliance on the continuance of the agency, is on the de fendant.-WHITAKER V. BALLARD, Mass., 60 N. E. Rep.

379.

3. BILLS AND NOTES-Consideration-Parol Evidence. - A note promising to pay a certain sum of money at a certain date, in consideration of the founding of a college at a place named, is based upon a sufficient consideration. In an action on a note "given in consideration of founding a college," evidence that at the time the note was signed plaintiff undertook to perform certain acts at the request of the maker of the note is admissible to establish that there was a good consideration for the rote in the acts which the payee of the note was to perform. - KEUKA COLLEGE V. RAY, N.Y., 60 N. E. Rep. 325.

4. BILLS AND NOTES-Husband and Wife-Ratifica tion. Where a husband signed his wife's name to a note without her authority, and no adoption of the signature by the wife, nor estoppel, was pleaded, nor proof thereof given, an instruction in a suit on the note against the wife was correct which stated, in substance: "If you find that defendant, with full knowledge of plaintiff's claim of her liability on the note, and the facts and circumstances respecting the indebtedness evidenced thereby, admitted the liability thereon, and promised to pay the same, this will be a ratification; otherwise, if she was not informed of the facts and circumstances respecting the indebtedness evidenced by the note.- MEYER V. WEGENER, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 49.

5. BILLS AND NOTES-Indorsement in Blank-Want of Consideration.- Where defendant was sued as indorser of a note, and it appeared that the note was made payable to him by mistake, and without his knowledge or consent, and that he indorsed it in blank at the request of the true owner, for the pur. pose of showing title in him, such indorsement was without consideration, and defendant was not liable thereon.-FARMERS' SAV. BANK V. HANSMANN, Iowa, 86 N. W. Rep. 31.

6. RILLS AND NOTES-Pleadings — Joint Answer.Where suit is brought on a note and to foreclose a mortgage securing it, an answer purporting on its face to answer the entire complaint, but only alleging facts showing a defense to the mortgage, and wholly silent as to the liability on the note, is subject to demurrer.-HOLLINGSWORTH V. MCCOLLY, Ind., 60 N. E.

Rep. 371.

7. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Right of Posssession-Execution. Where one of the members of a firm dealing in race horses was given a power of attorney to act for the firm, and, acting thereunder, mortgaged the horses to pay a judgment for which they were about to be sold, and agreed with the mortgagee that the horses should be entered in races, and the mortgagee should advance the entrance fees and have a lien on the horses therefor, such agree ment was not beyond the partner's authority, so as to make evidence thereof inadmissible in an action by the mortgagee, to recover possession of the horses from a sheriff who had seized them under an execu tion in favor of a creditor of the mortgagee. - MORRIS V. HUBBARD, S. Dak., 86 N. W. Rep. 25.

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Obligation of ContractsWages as Preferred Debts.-Acts 1885, p. 95 (Burns'